The opinion
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JONATHAN VALENTIN, :
:
Plaintiff, :
CIVIL ACTION
:
v. :
:
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,1 : No. 20-cv-05239-RAL
Commissioner of Social Security, :
Defendant :
RICHARD A. LLORET January 5, 2023
U.S. Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Commissioner of Social Security, through the decision of an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”), denied Jonathan Valentin’s (“Mr. Valentin”) application for Social
Security disability benefits. The ALJ determined that Mr. Valentin was not disabled
under the definition of the Social Security Act (“SSA”). R. 46.2 Plaintiff requests review
of the ALJ’s decision. Doc. No. 37 (“Pl. Br.”), at 12. Because I find that the ALJ did not
commit error, I affirm the ALJ’s decision.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2017, Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”). In his application, Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of
May 30, 2017, citing a diagnosis of Cervical Disc Disorder with Radiculopathy, Cervical
Myelopathy with Cervical Radiculopathy, Cervical Myofascial Pain Syndrome,
Foraminal Stenosis, neck and bilateral shoulder pain, shoulder muscle strain and
1 Kilolo Kijakazi became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on July 9, 2021. Pursuant to Rule
25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Kilolo Kijakazi should be substituted for Andrew Saul as
Defendant. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of §
205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
2 All references to the administrative record will be listed as “R. ___”. The administrative record is
Valentin’s application was denied at the initial level of review. R. 97. In January 2018,
Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. R. 101. The request was granted, and a
hearing was held in April 2019, at which Mr. Valentin was represented by counsel. R.
125. Mr. Valentin and a vocational expert testified at the hearing. R. 61-87. The ALJ
found Mr. Valentin was not disabled under the SSA. R. 46. Mr. Valentin filed an appeal
in this court. Doc. No. 2. In September 2021, the matter was reassigned to me. Doc. No.
19. Upon a showing of good cause, Mr. Valentin filed an amended brief. Doc. No. 37. The
Commissioner responded. Doc. No. 39.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Claimant’s Background
Mr. Valentin was 34 years old at the onset date of the alleged disability, making
him a “younger person” under the regulations. R. 88; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563. He has a
GED and can understand English. R. 94, 205. From March 2016 to the alleged onset
date, May 30, 2017, Mr. Valentin was unemployed. R. 207. Prior to this period of
unemployment, Mr. Valentin worked as an order picker with multiple companies from
March 2003 through March 2016. R. 208. As an order picker, Mr. Valentin processed
orders and used a forklift to load and unload materials. R. 208, 213-20.
B. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ found that Mr. Valentin was not disabled under the SSA from May 30,
2017 through September 8, 2017. R. 46. In reaching this decision, the ALJ made the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Social Security's five-step
sequential evaluation process.3
3 An ALJ evaluates each case using a sequential process until a finding of “disabled” or “not disabled” is
reached. The sequence requires an ALJ to assess whether the claimant: (1) is engaging in substantial
September 30, 2017, pursuant to the insured status requirements of the SSA.4 R. 48. At
step one, the ALJ confirmed that Mr. Valentin had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity during the alleged disability period. R. 48. At step two, the ALJ determined that
Mr. Valentin had two severe impairments: cervical myofascial pain syndrome and
cervical disc disorder with radiculopathy. Id. At step three, the ALJ compared Mr.
Valentin’s impairments to those contained in the Social Security Listing of Impairments
(“listing”).5 The ALJ found that Mr. Valentin’s impairments, individually and jointly, did
not meet any listing criteria or medically equate the severity of a listing, including that
of listing 1.04. R. 49. In 2017, Listing 1.04 related to spinal disorders “resulting in
compromise of a nerve root. . . or the spinal cord. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App.
1 (effective March 27, 2017 to Dec. 15, 2017).
Prior to reviewing step four, the ALJ determined that Mr. Valentin had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with a restriction “to no
more than routine and repetitive tasks” and that Mr. Valentin needed the flexibility to
“sit or stand as needed.” Id. at 49 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a)). The ALJ determined
that Mr. Valentin was unable to perform any past relevant work, due to his prior work
falling under “medium unskilled work (SVP 2) actually performed at heavy.” R. 53. The
of impairments; (3) has an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or equal the criteria
listed in the social security regulations and mandate a finding of disability; (4) has the residual functional
capacity to perform the requirements of his past relevant work, if any; and (5) is able to perform any other
work in the national economy, taking into consideration his residual functional capacity, age, education,
and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v).
4 When an applicant is seeking disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) the ALJ must determine the
applicant’s insured status. 20 C.F.R. § 404.101(a). If an applicant is “neither fully nor currently insured,
no benefits are payable based on [the applicant’s] earnings.” Id. The applicant is able to recover DIB only
through their last insured date. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a).
5 The regulations contain a series of “listings” that describe symptomology related to various impairments.
See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1. If a claimant's documented symptoms meet or equal one of the
impairments, “the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141
(1987). If not, the sequential evaluation continues to step four, where the ALJ determines whether the
impairments assessed at step two preclude the claimant from performing any relevant work the claimant
404.1563; has at least a high school education and can communicate in English, per §
404.1564; and that transferability of skill was not an issue since Mr. Valentin’s
previously held positions fell under unskilled work, per § 404.1568. R. 53. At step five,
the ALJ determined that there were jobs in “significant numbers in the national
economy” that Mr. Valentin could have performed, including the job of a dental implant
polisher, dowel inspector, or circuit board layout taper. R. 53-54. The ALJ ultimately
concluded that Mr. Valentin was not disabled during the insured period. R. 54.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
My review of the ALJ’s decision is deferential. I am bound by his findings of fact
to the extent those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Knepp
v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d
Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, my review of the ALJ’s findings of fact is limited to
determining if substantial evidence supports the decision. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d
358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). If the ALJ’s factual conclusion is
supported by substantial evidence, his disability determination must be upheld.
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 164 (1999).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial
evidence “is more than a mere scintilla but may be less than a preponderance.” Brown v.
Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988). I must rely on the record developed during
the administrative proceedings along with the pleadings in making my determination.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). I may not weigh the evidence or substitute my own conclusions
I must also defer to the ALJ’s evaluation of evidence, assessment of the witnesses, and
reconciliation of conflicting expert opinions. Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500,
506 (3d Cir. 2009).
The ALJ’s legal conclusions and application of legal principles are subject to
plenary review. See Krysztoforski v. Chater, 55 F.3d 857, 858 (3d Cir. 1995). I must
determine whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standards in reaching the decision.
See Coria v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 245, 247 (3d Cir. 1984). Accordingly, I can overturn an
ALJ’s decision based on an incorrect application of a legal standard even where I find
that the decision otherwise is supported by substantial evidence. Payton v. Barnhart,
416 F. Supp. 2d 385, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (citing Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445,
447 (3d Cir. 1983)).
DISCUSSION
Mr. Valentin appeals pro se. Doc. No. 37, at 12. He argues that the record does
not support the ALJ’s holding, because the ALJ “misinterpreted the medical evidence”.
Id. at 10-11. The Commissioner argues there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ’s decision. Doc. No. 39, at 1. I find that the ALJ’s decision accounts for
all the evidence of record, is soundly reasoned, and free from legal error. I will review
only the steps that required the ALJ to review medical evidence, since Mr. Valentin
specifies an alleged error in weighing the medical evidence.6
At step two, the ALJ determined that Mr. Valentin had two severe impairments:
Cervical Myofascial Pain Syndrome and Cervical Disk Disorder with Radiculopathy. R.
6 I will not review the ALJ’s calculation of Mr. Valentin’s insured period, because Mr. Valentin
acknowledges September 30th, 2017 as the end date to his insurable period. Doc. No. 37, at 8. I will also
not review step one, because the determination is based on employment history, not medical history. See
impairments which significantly limits [the applicant’s] physical or mental ability to do
basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Basic work activities include physical
functions (such as walking, sitting, or carrying); “[c]apacities for seeing, hearing, and
speaking;” following instructions; judgement; appropriate responses to workplace
interactions; and response to “changes in a routine work setting.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.922.
The ALJ found that “[t]he above medically determinable impairments
significantly limit the ability to perform basic work activities as required by SSR 85-28.”
R. 48. SSR 85-28 is a program policy statement to help “clarify the policy for
determining when a person's impairment(s) may be found ‘not severe’”. Titles II & Xvi:
Med. Impairments That Are Not Severe, SSR 85-28 (S.S.A. 1985).
The ALJ explained that Mr. Valentin’s chronic knee pain was not a severe
impairment, citing to an examination performed in August 2017. R. 48. The examining
physician noted that Mr. Valentin had a normal gait, with no swelling or tenderness. R.
335. The ALJ also cited to a January 2018 x-ray report, which indicated that the x-ray
showed no abnormalities to the knee. R. 363. The ALJ noted that Mr. Valentin also
“admitted he engaged in weight lifting five to six times per week.” R. 48 (citing R. 334).
This admission is dated March 21, 2017—three months prior to the alleged onset date in
May 2017. R. 334. In sum, the ALJ appropriately cited evidence that would allow a
reasonable person to make the determination that the knee pain did not affect Mr.
Valentin’s ability to perform basic work activities during the insured period and, thus,
was not a severe impairment.
The ALJ also reviewed medical records from 2018—the year after the insurable
period—to see if there was longevity to any of the 2017 impairments. R. 49. The ALJ
determined that the February 2018 medical records, which contained information on a
impairment [that] was not a medically determinable impairment during the relevant
adjudicatory period.” R. 370, 377. The ALJ reviewed the medical records summarizing
examinations performed during the disability period and did not find reference to the
medical issues addressed in the 2018 surgical procedure. R. 49. The ALJ’s findings were
a reasonable assessment of the record, because there is no evidence connecting the 2018
surgery to the 2017 medical ailments.
At step three, the ALJ determined that Mr. Valentin’s impairments did not meet
one of the listed impairments. Id. The ALJ’s analysis outlined the evidence needed to
establish an impairment under Listing 1.04. R. 49 (citing 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,
Appx. 1). The ALJ, correctly, determined that nothing in the record indicated “cord or
nerve root compression”, “sensory or reflex loss”, “abnormalities in strength or gait”, or
“focal neurological deficits.” R. 49. I find the step three determination was supported by
substantial evidence.
Prior to step four, the ALJ determined Mr. Valentin’s RFC. R. 45-55. He found
that Mr. Valentin’s RFC permitted sedentary work with a restriction “to no more than
routine and repetitive tasks” and that Mr. Valentin needed the flexibility to “sit or stand
as needed.” Id. at 49 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a)). The ALJ spent approximately
three and a half pages reviewing the evidence in the record; the ALJ analyzed Mr.
Valentin’s hearing testimony, Mr. Valentin’s function report, office treatment records, a
radiology report, physical therapy reports, medical reports postdated September 30,
2017, and a disability determination explanation created by Dr. Davit Hutz. R. 49-53.
The ALJ explained that he weighed the objective medical evidence on the record more
than Mr. Valentin’s subjective testimony, because “the records do not support the
severity of [Mr. Valentin’s] allegations.” R. 52. The ALJ also explained that he
with Dr. Hutz that Mr. Valentin “is exertionally limited due to his cervical spine
impairment with radiculopathy”. R. 53. In his Disability Determination Explanation, Dr.
Hutz recommended a medically determinable impairment due to a spine disorder
corresponding to Listing 1.04. R. 90-91. He opined that Mr. Valentin could occasionally
lift 20 pounds; frequently lift 10 pounds; sit, stand, or walk for about 6 hours; had an
unlimited ability to push or pull. R. 91-92. He also opined Mr. Valentin had postural
limitations, because he recommended that Mr. Valentin never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds; but could occasionally climb ramps or stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or
crawl. R. 92. Dr. Hutz also found environmental limitations, opining that Mr. Valentin
should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, wetness, vibration, and hazards
(such as machinery or heights). R. 93. Even though Dr. Hutz opinion included Mr.
Valentin had these limitations, Dr. Hutz ultimately opined that Mr. Valentin could
perform light, unskilled work even with any impairments caused by the medical
afflictions. R. 94. The ALJ concluded his analysis with a clear summary of all of the
longitudinal evidence used to show that his RFC assessment was appropriate. R. 52.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support this conclusion, and no evidence
that contradicts the ALJ or Dr. Hutz’ conclusions.
At step five, the ALJ determined that there were alternative jobs present in
significant numbers within the national economy that Mr. Valentin could have
performed. A page of the opinion is dedicated to reviewing alternative work available
and Mr. Valentin’s capacity to perform this work. R. 53-54. The review included analysis
of the vocational expert’s testimony, which the ALJ concluded was consistent with “the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles.” R. 54. The vocational expert testified that Mr.
Valentin had the capacity to perform as a dental implant polisher, a dowel inspector, or
ALJ and the vocational expert. See R. 94 (finding that Mr. Valentin was not disabled,
because there were at least three other occupations available—picker, bin packer, and
sorter—that Mr. Valentin could have performed at the reduced work-load level). There is
substantial evidence within the record to support the ALJ’s determination.
CONCLUSION
Because I find no error, the decision of the ALJ is affirmed, and the appeal
dismissed. I will enter an Order and Judgment accordingly.
BY THE COURT:
s/Richard A. Lloret
RICHARD A. LLORET
U.S. Magistrate Judge