JOHNSON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE: :

: CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-CV-4206

OBE E. JOHNSON :

MEMORANDUM

SÁNCHEZ, C.J. OCTOBER 28, 2022

Obe E. Johnson, a pro se litigant incarcerated in Puerto Rico, filed a motion seeking a

writ of mandamus. (ECF No. 2.) Johnson asks this Court to compel the transfer of currently

pending matters from the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico to the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Johnson has also filed an

application to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, Johnson’s Motion

seeking mandamus relief will be denied.

Johnson, who is currently incarcerated at the Correctional Institution Guayama 500, in

Guayama, Puerto Rico, alleges that he was wrongfully convicted and sentenced in the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. (Id. at 1, 4.) It appears that Johnson has filed several habeas

corpus matters in the District of Puerto Rico related to his conviction. (Id. at 1-2.) Johnson

claims that his “first and second habeas corpus action[s]” should be transferred to the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania because he “cannot obtain fair justice in Puerto Rico.” (Id. at 2.)

According to Johnson, on May 25, 2010, a “great conspiracy commenced” among the

Department of Justice and attorneys and judges of the Puerto Rico District Court such that he

cannot “obtain fair justice.” (Id.) He contends that his habeas corpus petitions have been

dismissed as part of the conspiracy. (Id.)

A review of public records reveals that Johnson has filed over fifty matters in the United

States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico and the United States Court of Appeals for

the First Circuit. It is not entirely clear which specific case or cases Johnson seeks to transfer to

this court. It appears that he has at least one habeas corpus matter filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254 that is currently pending in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.

See Johnson v. Ocasio-Montanez, Civ. A. No. 20-1222 (D.P.R.). Johnson also appears to have a

currently pending bankruptcy matter as well, see In re: The Financial Oversight and

Management Board for Puerto Rico, Civ. A. No. 17-BK-3283 (D.P.R. Bank.), which he claims

inhibits the resolution of his habeas cases. (Id. at 2-4.)

Johnson’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is incomplete pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(2) in that it does not contain a certified copy of his trust fund account statement for the

six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the Motion for a Writ of Mandamus. (See

ECF No. 3.) Until recently, this Court would have been precluded from addressing Johnson’s

pleading unless and until he either paid the fees or was granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. See Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cty. Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 458 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1996)

(explaining that an action commences when a plaintiff pays the fees or following a determination

that the litigant is entitled to in forma pauperis); see also Francis v. State of N.J. Office of Law

Guardian, 289 F. App’x 472, 474 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (explaining that district court erred

in addressing complaint before IFP was granted, because the “complaint was not yet subject to

dismissal”). However, in Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc), the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit announced a “flexible approach” that permits the

screening of cases filed by prisoners pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915A even if the prisoner has neither

paid the fees nor been granted in forma pauperis status.

Section 1915A requires that the Court “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any

event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In doing so, the Court must dismiss a pleading or any portion thereof that “is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Id. §

1915A(b)(1). Additionally, the Court must dismiss the matter if it determines subject matter

jurisdiction is lacking. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Group Against Smog and

Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an

objection to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise

jurisdictional issues sua sponte”). As Johnson is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his

allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021).

The Court understands Johnson to bring his Motion for a Writ of Mandamus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1361, which provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any

action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any

agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” Mandamus relief is generally considered

a “drastic” remedy, “to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.” Kerr v. United States Dist.

Ct. for N. Dist. of California, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). A party seeking a writ of mandamus

must show that he has “(i) no other adequate means of obtaining the desired relief and (ii) a

‘clear and indisputable’ right to issuance of the writ.” Mote v. United States Dist. Ct. for Middle

Dist. of Pennsylvania, 858 F. App’x 39, 40 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (citations omitted), cert.

denied, 142 S. Ct. 906 (2022).

For a district court to have subject matter jurisdiction to compel the action of an

individual pursuant to § 1361, the individual must be “an officer or employee of the United

States or any agency thereof.” See Semper v. Gomez, 747 F.3d 229, 250-51 (3d Cir. 2014). The

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has concluded, “in determining whether an

individual qualifies as an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof, . . . that

Congress, in enacting § 1361 was thinking solely in terms of the executive branch.” Mendez v.

Plaskett, 764 F. App’x 201, 202 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Consequently, courts have held that § 1361 does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on federal

district courts to compel the actions of judges and judicial employees. See Semper, 747 F.3d at

250-51 (citing Trackwell v. United States Government, 472 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2007)

(noting that “[f]or a district court to issue a writ of mandamus against an equal or higher court

would be remarkable” and holding that the Supreme Court is not an “‘agency’ within the

meaning of § 1361”); Viola v. United States, No. 17-0856, 2017 WL 4318029, at *3 (D. Conn.

Sept. 28, 2017) (holding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of

mandamus against federal district court judge); United States v. Cox, No. 11-99, 2017 WL

11428575, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2017) (holding, inter alia, that district court lacked jurisdiction to

grant writ of mandamus directed against Third Circuit Clerk), aff’d, 692 F. App’x 85 (3d Cir.

2017); Natkunanathan v. Barnes, No. 15-0895, 2015 WL 13908113, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16,

2015) (finding district court lacked jurisdiction over mandamus action seeking to compel United

States Supreme Court Clerks to file plaintiff’s submissions with the Supreme Court), aff’d sub

nom. Natkunanathan v. United States Supreme Ct., 689 F. App’x 567 (9th Cir. 2017).

Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Johnson’s Motion for a Writ of

Mandamus, which seeks to compel federal District Court Judges in Puerto Rico to transfer

pending cases to this district.

Johnson’s Motion for a Writ of Mandamus will be denied and the Clerk of Court will be

directed to close this case. An Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Juan R. Sánchez

JUAN R. SÁNCHEZ, C.J.