MCDANIEL v. BRYN MAWR BANK CORPORATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALICIA MCDANIEL, :

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. :

:

THE BRYN MAWR TRUST COMPANY, : No. 19-2419

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

Schiller, J. October 27, 2022

Plaintiff Alicia McDaniel began working at Defendant The Bryn Mawr Trust Company

(the “Bank”) in 2016 and remains an employee there. Throughout her time at the Bank, she raised

several incidents of discrimination and harassment to her manager and HR. She then sued the Bank

for employment discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under applicable federal

and state law. The Bank filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. For the reasons that

follow, the Bank’s motion is granted in full.

BACKGROUND

Alicia McDaniel is an African American woman originally hired by the Bank as a part-

time teller at its Ardmore location in December 2016. (See Def.’s Statement of Undisputed

Material Facts [Def.’s SUMF] ¶ 1; Pl.’s Statement of Disputed Facts [Pl.’s SDF] ¶ 1.) The Bank

promoted her twice, first to a full-time position of Universal Banker I and then promoted to

Universal Banker II, a position she still holds at the Bank. (See Def.’s SUMF ¶¶ 2, 5; Pl.’s SDF

¶¶ 2, 5.) McDaniel also received a pay raise for both promotions. (See McDaniel Dep. at 491:4-

23.)

Incidents at the Ardmore Branch

Shortly after McDaniel began working at the Bank, she overheard a white customer tell a

white employee “that there were a lot of [B]lack faces” in the branch. (McDaniel Dep. at 15:22-

16:12, 20:4-16.) McDaniel testified that this customer also declined her assistance when he visited

the branch and instead preferred to be assisted by white employees. (See id. at 16:15-17:8, 18:11-

15.) McDaniel reported this to her supervisor, Danielle Llewellyn-Perez, who discouraged

McDaniel from formally reporting this incident to HR. (See id. at 20:17-24, 22:12-19.) McDaniel

stated that Llewellyn-Perez told McDaniel she submitted a complaint to HR, but Llewellyn-Perez

did not actually do so.1 (See id. at 22:12-23:17, 488:8-14.)

0F

McDaniel also testified that during a call on or after January 29, 2018, Maria Delimitros,

who worked as a recruiter, asked her “how is Laura Biernacki,” an individual the Bank had recently

hired as a Market Area Manager. (Id. at 199:24-200:24; see also id. at 201:6-202:10.) McDaniel

stated she “explained to [Delimitros] the things that [she’d] witnessed and supposedly

experienced,” but the subject quickly changed. (Id. at 199:24-200:15.)2

1F

i. July 2018 Corrective Action Notice and subsequent actions

On July 12, 2018, Llewellyn-Perez and Biernacki met with McDaniel and provided her

with a “Corrective Action Notice.” (Def.’s Ex. 112 at 1; see also Def.’s SUMF ¶ 18.) The Notice

began by informing McDaniel that her recent “behavior in the workplace has been unacceptable.”

(Def.’s Ex. 112 at 1.) It explained that “[m]anagement has sensed tension and poor rapport between

[McDaniel and her] co-worker[s] in the past and [her] inability to put the organization’s needs first

in line with the duties and responsibilities of [her] role is unacceptable.” (Id.) Specifically, on June

1 The Bank points out that by not reporting this incident directly to HR, McDaniel failed to

comply with its Employee Handbook’s requirement to “immediately report” any discriminatory,

harassing, or retaliatory conduct “to Human Resources.” (McDaniel Dep. at 21:1-24:15; see also

Def.’s Ex. 18 at 10.) When McDaniel was asked to specify when she brought certain complaints

directly to HR, McDaniel explained that by “speaking to [her] manager,” who “said she would

escalate it to HR,” she “considered that following the chain of command to get to HR.” (McDaniel

Dep. at 203:17-23.)

2 See infra n.4.

8, 2018, McDaniel “refused to provide” certain information a Regional Manager requested. (Id.)

While tracking down that information from McDaniel’s colleagues, the Regional Manager learned

that McDaniel “left the branch without notifying [her] co-worker and remained out of the branch

for approximately 15 minutes.” (Id.) This “created a situation where proper service levels would

not be delivered to [the Bank’s] customers.” (Id.) On another occasion, McDaniel failed to

sufficiently answer questions from Stephen Novak (Director of Retail), who was investigating a

customer complaint.3 (Id.) The Notice urged McDaniel to correct her “unacceptable” behavior and

2F

reminded her to “respect everyone on [her] team and cooperate for the best interest of our branch

and company.” (Id. at 2.) McDaniel refused to sign the Notice despite a disclaimer that signing the

document did “not necessarily indicate that [she] agree[d]” with its contents. (Id.)

McDaniel was scheduled to have a meeting the next morning with Nicola Fryer and Gina

Marandola-Tincu (who both worked in HR) to discuss the Notice. (See Def.’s Ex. 115.) During

the meeting, McDaniel stated that she feared Biernacki, as did her colleagues.4 (See Def.’s Ex. 119

3F

3 That investigation focused on a March 2018 incident involving McDaniel and her co-

worker Magdaline Intzes. In a May 2018 email, McDaniel explained that she was assisting a

customer when Intzes “abruptly transferred” another customer to her. (Def.’s Ex. 97 at 2.) Intzes

was helping that customer file a Power of Attorney on behalf of his wife. (Id.) Intzes “was late for

an appointment at her daughter’s school and . . . she could no longer assist the customer,” so she

transferred the customer to McDaniel. (Id.) McDaniel wrote that this “was not a warm transfer.

[McDaniel] did not have background information regarding this sensitive matter” and the customer

became “agitated.” (Id.) However, McDaniel was ultimately able to assist the customer with help

from Llewellyn-Perez. (See id.) In an email response, Novak asked why McDaniel “thr[e]w

[Intzes] under the bus” and told McDaniel she should raise any issues she had with Intzes with

Llewellyn-Perez. (Id. at 1.) McDaniel forwarded this email chain to her personal email because

she felt she “was being harassed” and “intimidate[ed]” and “needed to have this as proof of our e-

mail exchange.” (McDaniel Dep. at 121:19-122:2, 123:11-14.)

4 The record is not clear why McDaniel so strongly feared Biernacki from virtually the outset

of Biernacki’s time at the Bank, but the record is replete with instances reflecting McDaniel’s

feelings towards Biernacki. McDaniel testified that Biernacki was “a bully” and “racially

discriminatory.” (McDaniel Dep. at 156:12-19.) She stated that she had observed Biernacki

exhibiting favoritism to white employees at another branch and that Biernacki was perceived as

coming “down particularly hard on African-Americans who did not meet” performance metrics,

at 2.) She also stated she believed Biernacki forced Llewellyn-Perez to issue the Notice because

Llewellyn-Perez seemed nervous during the meeting and regularly commended McDaniel’s

performance. (See id.) McDaniel also claimed that she had previously been forced to work after

clocking out and she had not received proper credit for a loan she opened for a customer. (See id.)

Additionally, she complained it was hard to work with Intzes. (See id.) Finally, McDaniel asked

to be transferred out of Biernacki’s geographic market or transferred to a “back office” job. (See

id.)

In response, Fryer explained Llewellyn-Perez chose to issue the Notice as a means of

addressing McDaniel’s recent behavior. (See id.) Fryer stated she would investigate possible job

openings, told McDaniel she could have the day off, and asked McDaniel to send her information

regarding when she was told to work after clocking out. (See id. at 3.) In an email sent shortly after

the meeting, McDaniel thanked Fryer and Marandola-Tincu for meeting with her and

acknowledged being given the rest of the day off.5 (See id.; see also Def.’s Ex. 118 at 4-5.)

4F

including sales goals. (McDaniel Dep. at 159:18-160:10, 188:2-9.) McDaniel believed Biernacki

“created an environment of fear when she walked into a branch” and that through her emails and

phone calls, “she sets [the] tone of a dictator.” (McDaniel Dep. at 189:5-13.) She also said

Llewellyn-Perez told her that Biernacki was “racially rude” and that Biernacki was “evil,” which

Llewellyn-Perez disputed. (McDaniel Dep. at 106:4-107:15; Def.’s Ex. 119 at 2, 8.) McDaniel

thought that Biernacki “was going to try her best to run [McDaniel] out of Bryn Mawr Trust.”

(McDaniel Dep. at 156:5-11.) When Biernacki asked McDaniel about her sales success, McDaniel

believed that it was actually an implicit accusation “that an African-American woman can’t meet

[a] goal, can’t be great at [her] job; [she] can’t be better at [her] job. And there must be something

wrong with – or there must be something that [the Bank doesn’t] know that you’re doing or to

insinuate that [McDaniel was] . . . misleading customers into products.” (McDaniel Dep. at 196:12-

23.)

5 Later that day, Fryer and Marandola-Tincu met with Llewellyn-Perez to discuss

McDaniel’s Notice and the allegations McDaniel made in their subsequent meeting. (See Def.’s

Ex. 119 at 7.) Llewellyn-Perez refuted McDaniel’s claim that Biernacki forced her to issue the

Notice. (See id. at 7-8) In fact, Llewellyn-Perez stated that she had previously raised some of the

issues in the Notice informally with McDaniel. (See id. at 7.) She also agreed with McDaniel that

McDaniel should have been awarded credit for a loan that she helped open. (See id.) Finally,

That evening, Marandola-Tincu and McDaniel spoke on the phone. (See McDaniel Dep. at

132:15-133:4; Def.’s Ex. 116.) According to Marandola-Tincu’s notes, she explained to McDaniel

she might be able to work as a temporary analyst with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) Team. (See

Def.’s Ex. 116.) The position was expected to last three to six months and “could lead to [full-

time]” employment. (Id.) McDaniel responded positively to this opportunity and Marandola-Tincu

stated she would follow-up with McDaniel. (Id.)

On Saturday, July 14, 2018, McDaniel wrote down twelve “Points of Discussion” in

response to her meetings with HR. (See Def.’s Ex. 117.) In the list, McDaniel disputed the Notice’s

contents of the Notice and asserted various forms of mistreatment, including “Hostile Environment

‘Environment of Fear,’” “Retaliation”, and “Witness of Harassment.” (Id.) McDaniel testified she

wrote these notes to “document [her] experiences.” (McDaniel Dep. at 182:6-14.)

On Monday, July 16, 2018, Fryer emailed McDaniel to inform her that she set up a meeting

for McDaniel with the BSA Team so McDaniel could “learn more about” a possible role with the

team and “share [her] education, background and experience.” (Def.’s Ex. 118 at 2.) McDaniel

met with the BSA Team the next day, expressed continued interest in the role, and asked Fryer a

Llewellyn-Perez vehemently denied McDaniel’s allegation that she or anyone else at the branch

was forced to work after clocking out. (See id. at 8.)

Llewellyn-Perez also explained that Intzes offended McDaniel soon after they first started

working together. (See id.) Intzes allegedly disparaged McDaniel for working full-time rather than

staying home to raise her children. (See id.) Llewellyn-Perez believed that McDaniel continued to

hold a grudge against Intzes as a result. (See id.) McDaniel testified that Intzes called her a “bad

mother” for working rather than staying home to raise her children. (McDaniel Dep. at 105:4-21.)

McDaniel stated Intzes, who was Greek, “made comments that her culture was superior and . . .

she just didn’t understand how . . . [B]lack women would allow our children to be home. She made

comments about [B]lack fathers. How we don’t as [B]lack women allow our [B]lack men to rule

the house and to be the leaders of their house.” (Id.) According to McDaniel, she and Llewellyn-

Perez discussed these comments and Llewellyn-Perez told McDaniel to ignore them. (Id. at 106:4-

107:15) Llewellyn-Perez also allegedly told McDaniel that HR was aware of Intzes’s remarks.

(Id.)

series of logistical questions about transitioning to the position following the meeting. (See id. at

1-2.) Fryer suggested they meet on July 18 to discuss McDaniel’s questions. (See id. at 1.) During

that meeting, Fryer and Marandola-Tincu explained that the BSA role was not currently intended

to be a full-time position. (See Def.’s Ex. 119 at 4.) They suggested exploring a position at the

Media branch instead. (See id.) McDaniel was open to that possibility and reiterated her desire to

remain a full-time employee. (Id. at 4, 6)

Fryer and Marandola-Tincu also informed McDaniel that they were unable to corroborate

McDaniel’s allegation that Biernacki forced Llewellyn-Perez to issue the Corrective Action

Notice. (Id.) McDaniel continued to push back against this. (Id. at 4.) Similarly, Fryer and

Marandola-Tincu explained that after speaking with McDaniel’s Ardmore colleagues, they were

not able to verify her allegation that employees were forced to work after clocking out. (Id. at 4-

5.) However, they asked McDaniel to provide details of the specific dates when she alleged this

occurred. (Id. at 5-6.)

McDaniel then informed Fryer and Marandola-Tincu that on June 6, 2018, she had emailed

Llewellyn-Perez regarding another dispute she had with Intzes. (See Def.’s Ex. 119 at 5.) McDaniel

explained that while the staff was closing the branch, Intzes “became confrontational.” (Def.’s Ex.

120.) McDaniel believed the “Branch environment ha[d] become toxic and uncomfortable” due to

Intzes’s “hostility towards” McDaniel and other team members. (Def.’s Ex. 120.) Fryer and

Marandola-Tincu said Llewellyn-Perez did not previously alert them to this incident. (See Def.’s

Ex. 119 at 5.) Upon investigation, however, the Bank reviewed video footage of this purported

incident and found there was “no altercation.” (Def.’s Ex. 120.)

After Fryer, Marandola-Tincu, and McDaniel concluded their July 18 meeting, Fryer

formally notified McDaniel that the Bank would not be able to transition her to a full-time position

with the BSA Team. (See Def.’s Ex. 121.) To accommodate her wishes to avoid working under

Biernacki’s purview, however, Fryer told McDaniel to report to the Bank’s Media branch for work

the next day. (See id.) She explained that McDaniel would continue serving in her same role and

at her same rate of pay. (See id.) Fryer concluded by stating that she did “not believe this [would]

be a permanent move and” reassured McDaniel that the Bank was “still working on finding you a

new home.” (Id.)

Transition to Media

On August 3, 2018, McDaniel filed a charge with the EEOC. (Def.’s SUMF ¶ 62; Pl.’s

SDF in Opp. ¶ 62.)

On August 6, while still working at the Media branch, McDaniel informed Fryer and other

members of HR that her timecard needed to be adjusted. She explained that “[d]ue to [her] change

of schedule, she was “one [hour] short of 40 hours for the week.” (Def.’s Ex. 144 at 6.) McDaniel

was “accustomed to working 40+ hours per week,” but once she began working in Media, she was

only working “38 or 39 hours per week. To reach 40 hours, [she] would have to work every

Saturday of the month, which is not fair to [her] and [was] never discussed with [her] ahead of

time.” (Id. at 3.)

Fryer explained that “the company does not provide adjustments for time not worked” and

quoted the Bank’s policy, which provides that “[t]he daily working schedule for [Bank] employees

varies according to the branch office or department in which they work.” (Id. at 4.) However, Fryer

stated the Bank was “willing in this one instance to pay you for the hour requested since [McDaniel

did] not appear to have been clear about the policy.” (Id.) In the future, however, the Bank would

not make any adjustments for hours not worked.6 (See id.)

5F

In response, McDaniel expressed various concerns she had. (See id. at 2-4.) First, she

explained that prior attempts to “follow[] the chain of command . . . to report [her] concerns of a

hostile and racially toxic work environment” were futile. (Id. at 2-3.) With respect to her temporary

transfer to Media, McDaniel stated that her supervisors “were completely unprepared for [her]

arrival and stay” at the branch and her Regional Manager “has not [been] able to see [her] timecard,

discuss sales/goals or provide coaching.” (Id. at 3.) McDaniel did not believe she had “been

properly supported. The entire staff in Media has asked [her] uncomfortable questions pertaining

to the reason for [her] switch and how long [she] will work in the [b]ranch.” (Id.) McDaniel also

asserted that Media’s new Branch Manager, Frantz Excellent, told her that she “was officially

being transitioned to the Media Branch” even though she “was not informed about the switch.”

(Id.) McDaniel was frustrated by this, since working in Media was intended to be “only a

temporary transition.” (Id.) She alleged she was “being penalized financially, mentally, ethically

and morally for following protocol.” (Id.)

On August 16, 2018, Fryer responded that the Bank “fully investigated [her] concerns and

[was] unable to agree with [her] recount of the matter.” (Id. at 1.) Fryer also disputed other aspects

6 McDaniel also sought to be reimbursed for extra mileage she drove by commuting to Media

rather than Ardmore. (See Def.’s Ex. 147 at 2.) The Bank did not believe McDaniel was entitled

to this reimbursement under its policy regarding reimbursing expenses. (See Def.’s Ex. 202 at 2-

3.) However, as it did with respect to McDaniel’s claim for being underpaid by an hour, the Bank

made an exception and awarded McDaniel mileage expenses retroactively (to the date she raised

this issue) because McDaniel appeared to be mistaken regarding the policy. (See Def.’s Ex. 202 at

2-3.) The Bank also explained that McDaniel would not be entitled to future mileage

reimbursements because those costs did not fall within the Bank’s limited circumstances for which

mileage can be reimbursed. (See Def.’s Ex. 202 at 2-3.) McDaniel alleged this was retaliatory

because she had previously been reimbursed when covering a different branch. (See id. at 1;

McDaniel Dep. at 232:19-233:6.)

of McDaniel’s claims, including with respect to the company’s policy for employees’ working

hours. (See id.) Finally, Fryer assured McDaniel that the Bank would “have information regarding

[her] future work location by the end of next week.” (Id.)

On August 27, 2018—just over a month after McDaniel began working in Media—

McDaniel met with Fryer and Lindsay Saling (VP for Retail Strategy) to discuss a permanent

position at another branch location. (See Def.’s Ex. 147.) Saling informed McDaniel there were

full-time openings for Universal Bankers at three branches: Phoenixville, Aston, and Northern

Liberties. (See id. at 1.) Saling also stated McDaniel “would be scheduled 40 hours” at any of these

locations. (Id.) When McDaniel asked about prospects for a promotion at each branch, Fryer and

Saling explained that each branch could “support a promotion internally,” but noted that

McDaniel’s prior Corrective Action Notice “would be considered and may lessen her ability to”

be promoted. (Id. at 1-2.)

McDaniel then asked questions regarding her sales goals. She asserted she was on track to

meet her goals and asked how a transfer would affect those benchmarks. (See id. at 2.) Fryer stated

McDaniel’s goals would be based on the new branch, as each location has different standards based

on its “size, volume, market share[, and] opportunity as well as the number of [full-time

employees] in that branch.” (Id.) McDaniel was concerned about moving to a new branch because

she believed she was “starting over” and she did not transition smoothly at Media. (Id.) Fryer and

Saling both assured her that other employees had successfully transferred branch locations in the

past and that a transfer can often be a conversation-starter with clients. (See id.) Following the

meeting, Saling sent McDaniel each potential new branch address and asked McDaniel to make a

decision by the end of the week. (See id. at 3.) McDaniel confirmed she would do so shortly

thereafter. (See Def.’s Ex. 148.)

On Friday, August 31, McDaniel emailed Fryer and stated that none of the three branches

offered to her were “feasible options.” (Def.’s Ex. 151 at 2.) McDaniel did “not want to start over

a third time” and instead wanted “to work at my Home Branch, Ardmore.” (Id.) McDaniel alleged

“HR has turned a deaf ear to my concerns and subjected me to more retaliation.” (Id.) She claimed

that this suggested move was in “retaliation to my filing with the EEOC.” (Id.) She again asserted

that Media’s new Branch Manager, Excellent, told her she was becoming a permanent employee

of the Media branch despite Fryer’s assurances to the contrary. (See id.)

Fryer responded that the Bank did “not agree with all of the facts as [McDaniel had]

depicted” them but wanted “to provide clarity regarding [McDaniel’s] branch assignment and [her]

discussion with Frantz Excellent.” (Id. at 1.) Fryer explained that Excellent was mistaken that

McDaniel was to become a permanent employee at Media. (See id.) Further, Fryer acknowledged

McDaniel’s request to return to Ardmore “and will work toward that goal.” (Id.) Because that

“may take some time,” Fryer asked McDaniel to “please continue to work in the Media branch.”

(Id.) Finally, Fryer reminded McDaniel that any concerns or complaints, including those related

to retaliation, should be directed to HR or the Bank’s General Counsel. (See id.)

i. McDaniel’s Complaint Regarding a Phone Call

In September 2018, McDaniel sent an email to Excellent with the subject line “Harassment

and Racial Discrimination Claims.” (Def.’s Ex. 155.) McDaniel wrote that she had “a major

concern” because Biernacki was “on the phone line with” two Media employees and was “grilling

them about what [McDaniel is] doing on the Teller Line.” (Id.) McDaniel said she was “extremely

uncomfortable with the harassment and racial discrimination” and claimed this was “all done in

retaliation to my filing with HR and the EEOC.” (Id.) Excellent reached out to Biernacki to

schedule a meeting to discuss these allegations. (See Def.’s Ex. 156 at 2.) McDaniel later

forwarded Excellent’s message to Frank Leto, the Bank’s CEO, to inform him of the harassment

and retaliation she claimed she suffered. (See Def.’s Ex. 157.) Shortly thereafter, Marandola-Tincu

and another HR representative arranged to visit the Media branch. Over the course of the next two

days, they interviewed McDaniel and six other employees across multiple branches to investigate

her allegations. (See Def.’s Exs. 158, 161.)

McDaniel’s interview lasted only four minutes because she refused to discuss the events

without her lawyer. (See Def.’s Ex. 161 at 3.) McDaniel testified that she had “already had several

meetings with HR and it was very redundant. They had already known [her] requests and [her]

complaints,” so she did not feel the need to talk to HR about this incident, even though she had

never discussed the phone call in question with HR. (McDaniel Dep. at 337:7-338:8.)

In investigative interviews with other Bank employees, the Bank learned that Biernacki

called the Media branch because its employees had not yet made certain customer outreach calls.

(See Def.’s Ex. 161 at 4, 11.) According to one employee, Biernacki asked whether McDaniel

“was making calls,” but Biernacki was not “grilling” her, as McDaniel claimed in her email to

Excellent. (Def.’s Ex. 161 at 4.) The two employees who actually spoke to Biernacki both

described the calls as “professional” in tone but noted that the calls were upsetting because they

were already overwhelmed and felt belittled. (See Def.’s Ex. 161 at 4-6, 18.)

After speaking with seven employees related to this incident, the Bank did not find support

for McDaniel’s allegations.7 (See Def.’s Ex. 161 at 28-29.) However, because multiple employees

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reported that Biernacki was a harsh manager, the investigation recommended that she “receive

7 An employee at the Media branch stated that he overheard Biernacki state that the tellers

at Media were “incompetent” roughly a week before this incident. (Def.’s Ex. 161 at 24.) He

interpreted that comment to be racial “because the two tellers behind the line are African-American

and he associated incompetent with lazy.” (Id.) No other employee interviewed claimed Biernacki

made any comments regarding race.

training and coaching on her communication” and management skills. (Id. at 29.) It also explicitly

noted that “it is not advisable to have [Biernacki] manage a branch where Alicia McDaniel works.”

(Id.). Accordingly, the report suggested the Bank consider “realigning Market Managers.” (Id. at

29.)

ii. Sales Goals and Performance Review Issues

During her first quarter at Media, McDaniel did not “make” scorecard8 and therefore did

7F

not receive a bonus. (See Def.’s SUMF ¶ 110; Pl.’s SDF ¶ 110.) At McDaniel’s request, Excellent

reached out to his superiors to see if her scorecard could be adjusted to reflect her recent branch

transition. (See Def.’s SUMF ¶ 111; Pl.’s SDF ¶ 111; see also Def.’s Ex. 168 at 1.) During the

subsequent review of McDaniel’s goals, Excellent “did not indicate that the sales goals were not

set properly or unreasonabl[y] as they are in alignment with the other two bankers in the office.

[Excellent] confirmed that the goal was attainable based on [McDaniel’s] past performance, the

activity at the Media branch and the performance of the other staff members.” (Def.’s Ex. 168 at

2.) Accordingly, the Bank declined to retroactively adjust McDaniel’s goals and she did not receive

a bonus.9 (See id. at 3.)

8F

In March 2019, McDaniel emailed HR to express her “dissatisf[action] with [her] annual

performance review.” (Def.’s Ex. 189 at 3.) McDaniel claimed that Biernacki “altered [her]

8 A scorecard is a set of quarterly sales goals an employee must meet to qualify to receive a

bonus. (See Def.’s SUMF ¶ 108.)

9 The Court also notes that McDaniel did not raise issues regarding her sales or performance

goals when she met with Fryer and Saling in August 2018. (See Def.’s Ex. 147.) In fact, McDaniel

asserted that she was on track to meet her sales goals at that time. (See id. at 2.) The Court also

notes that in September 2018, McDaniel helped Excellent draft an email to Biernacki and Saling

regarding McDaniel’s salary and sales goals. (See Def.’s Ex. 153.) In response, Fryer explained

that McDaniel’s salary did not need to be adjusted and her sales goals were “in line with overall

goals, objectives and opportunity” at Media. (Def.’s Ex. 154 at 2.)

scorecard results as a retaliation tactic to use against [her].” (Id.) McDaniel testified that she

believed Biernacki altered her scorecard because she was “given . . . higher goals with the intention

that [she] would not meet the goals.” (McDaniel Dep. at 316:14-17.) She asserted that Biernacki

“scrutinized and dissected” her original review until her manager “succumbed to the criticism and

submitted ‘bland and blanket’ comments” with inferior scores.10 (Def.’s Ex. 189 at 3.) According

9F

to McDaniel, this was a result of McDaniel’s “report of racial discrimination to senior

management, HR & [her] subsequent filing with the EEOC. [She has] been subjected to a hostile

work environment” and she believed her sales quotas were unjustifiably increased after

transitioning to Media. (Id.) Finally, McDaniel protested the Bank’s practice of imposing sales

quotas and “the relentless pressure to obtain new sales,” which she asserted “has had and will

continue to perpetuate fraudulent actions” and “booking fraudulent revenues.” (Id.)

An HR representative responded to McDaniel’s concerns and explained that “HR has

initiated an investigation” into whether Biernacki altered McDaniel’s scorecard. (Id. at 1.) With

respect to her allegations of fraud, the Bank reminded McDaniel that she has “an affirmative

obligation under [the Bank’s Ethics Code] to tell HR, Risk or Legal about it immediately so that it

can be investigated and appropriate action can be taken.” (Id. at 2.) The Bank assured McDaniel

that it “takes this allegation very seriously . . . and it is imperative that if you know of misconduct,

you provide details as soon as possible so that the issue can be dealt with.” (Id.) Finally, the Bank

acknowledged that its employees face sales pressure because the Bank is “a business and absent

10 According to Excellent, when he sent McDaniel’s annual review to Bienacki to be

finalized, she questioned whether it was accurate. (Excellent Dep. at 42:5-43:8, 233:23-234:2.)

Specifically, after Excellent gave McDaniel scores of five out of five, Biernacki told Excellent that

even the Bank’s CEO “does not have a five rating.” (Id. at 43:9-45:16.) Excellent stated he

“acquiesced” and reduced McDaniel’s scores to a four. (Id.)

sales, [the Bank] would not exist. But in no instance would [the Bank] ever expect or pressure

employees to engage in fraudulent activity.” (Id.)

On April 24, 2019, McDaniel emailed Sanchez, Leto, and two HR representatives to

complain of additional retaliation by Biernacki. (See Def.’s Ex. 199 at 4-5.) McDaniel alleged

Biernacki accused her of “gaming” by impermissibly splitting credit for a loan, “falsifying a credit

card sale,” and more broadly claimed the Bank “allow[ed] unqualified individuals to partake in the

mortgage” and loan origination process in “noncompliance with the law.” (Id. at 5.) Corey Crapella

(from HR) reached out later that day and set up a meeting to discuss McDaniel’s allegations with

her. (Id. at 4.) The two met on May 1 and McDaniel stated she would “be submitting supporting

documents” in support of her claims. (Def.’s Ex. 201 at 1.)

Crapella sent a summary of his investigation’s findings on June 3, 2019, which largely

refuted McDaniel’s allegations. (See Def.’s Ex. 217.) First, Crapella noted that Biernacki did not

directly accuse McDaniel of “gaming,” but rather raised a concern to Excellent that certain

employee scorecards were suspicious. (Id. at 1.) The Bank’s policy states that “[o]nly one person

qualifies” to receive origination credit “for any sale.” (Id.) Despite this, McDaniel and another

employee “agreed to split the credit [for a $300,000 loan] 50/50” in February 2019. (Def.’s Ex.

188.) However, because the other employee was $75,000 shy “of meeting her Q1 booked loan

goal,” McDaniel agreed “to relinquish $75,000 of [her] credit and give it to” her colleague. (Id.)11

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With respect to the accusation regarding falsifying a credit card sale, Crapella found that a

report Biernacki viewed summarizing the branch’s sales did not reflect a sale McDaniel made.

(See Def.’s Ex. 217 at 2.) When Biernacki raised this with Excellent, he explained the discrepancy,

11 When the Bank learned of this arrangement in May 2019, the Bank made an exception to

its policy, but explained that future splits would not be permitted. (See Def.’s Ex. 217 at 1; see also

McDaniel Dep. at 366:18-368:5.)

which was due to a reporting error. (See id.) Finally, Crapella noted that “all new hires responsible

for taking loan applications” receive Loan Product Training and supplementary online modules.

(Id. at 2.) McDaniel completed the initial training in May 2018 and Crapella reminded her that she

could re-take the course if she desired. (Id.)

iii. Communications Regarding George Floyd and Racial Diversity

On June 10, 2020, Leto, sent a firm-wide email regarding “the tragic events that unfolded

throughout our country during the last few weeks, including the death of George Floyd.” (Def.’s

Ex. 242 at 1.) The email noted the Bank’s goal of “build[ing] a culture of inclusivity” that

“celebrate[d] that [the Bank is] a company with people of many races, religions, national origins,

disabilities, gender identities, sexual orientations, incomes, backgrounds and more.” (Id.) Nine

days later, Leto sent another email acknowledging Juneteenth and reaffirming the Bank’s

commitment to diversity and inclusion. (Id. at 3.)

On July 8, 2020, McDaniel emailed Leto, Sanchez, and the Bank’s Board of Directors in

response to Leto’s emails. (See Def.’s Ex. 242 at 4-6.) McDaniel believed Leto’s “email addressing

George Floyd’s murder was very cliché and spurious.” (Id. at 4.) She also criticized the Bank for

purporting to celebrate equality and diversity even though it faced allegations of discrimination

from several employees. (See id.) McDaniel reiterated that she believes she has “been retaliated

against by Laura Biernacki”12 and “invit[ed]” the Bank to meet with her “and/or the other plaintiffs

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to discuss a positive solution” with their lawyers. (Id. at 5.)

12 McDaniel’s email also raised new allegations against Biernacki, including that she used

“racial slurs” and that she demanded that McDaniel’s manager give her a written warnings due to

unscheduled PTO days. (Def.’s Ex. 242 at 4-5.) The Bank determined that McDaniel’s allegation

of the use of racial slurs was “unfounded.” (Def.’s Ex. 277 at 1.) It also concluded that, although

Biernacki sought to issue McDaniel “a warning due to attendance,” it was not supported by her

manager or HR. (Id.) McDaniel never received a written warning. (See Def.’s Ex. 242 at 7.)

In response, Sanchez explained that the Bank viewed McDaniel’s email as a demand for

settlement, which she “presume[d] was written by your lawyer for you to send.” (Id. at 7.) Sanchez

reiterated that any issues McDaniel had should be raised with HR rather than the Bank’s executives

and Board of Directors. (See id. at 7-8.) Finally, she informed McDaniel that the Bank would be

conducting “focus group sessions . . . geared towards addressing global rather than individual

concerns” and suggested McDaniel “let Jerry know” if she wanted to join a session. (Id. at 8.)

McDaniel responded and said Sanchez “totally dismissed” the intent of her note by focusing on

settlement of her claims. (Id. at 10.) She also took offense at the suggestion that her lawyer helped

prepare the letter13 and criticized the HR Department for “shuffl[ing] around or overlook[ing]”

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her complaints. (Id.) McDaniel never reached out to sign up for the Bank’s focus group sessions

because she believed participants had already been chosen. (See McDaniel Dep. at 615:17-618:7.)

Procedural History

McDaniel filed a complaint with the EEOC and Pennsylvania Human Relations

Commission (PHRC) on August 3, 2018. (Def.’s SUMF ¶ 62; Pl.’s SDF in Opp. ¶ 62.) The EEOC

issued a Right to Sue Letter on March 7, 2019. (Compl. ¶ 9.) This lawsuit was filed within 90 days

of the Right to Sue Letter and is therefore timely.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate where admissible evidence fails to demonstrate a

genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Material

13 McDaniel supplemented her original EEOC charge against the Bank based on this

allegation. (See Def.’s Ex. 245.) McDaniel’s charge stated that she was “incensed” by Leto’s

emails regarding diversity given “the fact that six lawsuits are pending over racism” against the

Bank. (Id.) She alleged Sanchez’s response was a “racist accusation that [her] letter was written

by [her] lawyer, a white ma[le] and that [she] could not write what [she] did.” (Id.)

facts are those “that could affect the outcome” of the proceeding, and “a dispute about a material

fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the

non-moving party.” Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011). When the movant

does not bear the burden of persuasion at trial, it may meet its burden on summary judgment by

showing that the non-moving party’s evidence is insufficient to carry its burden of persuasion.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Thereafter, the non-moving party may

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact if it provides evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable

finder of fact to find in its favor at trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “The mere existence of a

scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be

evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of

Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

In reviewing the record, “a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.” Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32

F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994); Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011). The

court may not, however, make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence in considering

motions for summary judgment. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150

(2000); see also Goodman v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 665 (3d Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

McDaniel sued the Bank for racial discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work

environment under federal and state law. The Bank seeks summary judgment on all counts.

Because McDaniel failed to proffer sufficient evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for

her on any of her claims, the Court grants the Bank’s motion in full.

Racial Discrimination

McDaniel’s racial discrimination claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-

shifting framework.14 “To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a

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member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position at issue; (3) she suffered a

materially adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances of the adverse employment

action support an inference of discrimination.” Heredia-Caines v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 580

F. Supp. 3d 114, 125 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (citing Whitmore v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 510 F. Supp.

3d 295, 304 (E.D. Pa. 2020)) (italicization added); Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410

(3d Cir. 1999). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer must offer legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action. See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d

759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). “The employer satisfies its burden of production by introducing evidence

which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for

the unfavorable employment decision.” Id. (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

509 (1993)).

If the employer provides non-discriminatory reasons for its actions, the plaintiff must then

prove that the employer’s “explanation is merely a pretext for the discrimination.” Tourtellotte v.

Eli Lilly & Co., 636 F. App’x 831, 842 (3d Cir. 2016). The plaintiff “must point to some evidence,

direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the

employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason

was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” Id.

14 McDaniel asserts racial discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII, and the

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). The same burden-shifting framework applies to

claims brought under each statute. See Blakney v. City of Phila., 559 F. App’x 183, 187 (3d Cir.

2014); Tomaszewski v. City of Phila., 460 F. Supp. 3d 577, 593 (E.D. Pa. 2020).

(quoting Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 2006)). In doing so, the “plaintiff

must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or

contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable

factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence.’” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (quoting

Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992)).

The parties do not dispute that McDaniel is a member of a protected class and the Court

will assume she was qualified for the position she held. However, she is unable to establish a prima

facie case because she has not shown she suffered an adverse employment action.

An adverse employment action is “an action by an employer that is serious and tangible

enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”

Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec.

Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004)). It “must constitute ‘a significant change in employment

status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different

responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’” Anderson v. Mercer Cnty.

Sheriff Dep’t, 815 F. App’x 664, 666 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,

524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).

McDaniel argues that “[t]he treatment that [she] was forced to endure at Bryn Mawr Trust,

particularly at the hand of Ms. Intzes and Ms. Biernacki,” constitutes an adverse employment

action. (Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [Pl.’s Opp.] at 14.) But “Title VII

and section 1981 . . . do not provide relief for general unpleasantness that can occur in the

workplace, even if that unpleasantness may be motivated by racial animus.” Barnes v. Nationwide

Mut. Ins. Co., 598 F. App’x 86, 90 (3d Cir. 2015). The Court does not doubt that McDaniel was

offended or upset by the incidents she endured. Nor does the Court mean to diminish how these

experiences affected her. But the conduct she objects to is not redressable under discrimination

laws absent an adverse employment action.15 See Raffaele v. Potter, No. 09-3622, 2012 WL

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33035, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that an “employee can be

subject to an adverse employment action even if not subject to one of the ‘traditional’ actions (i.e.,

firing, failing to hire, failing to promote, reassignment, or a significant change in benefits), so long

as the employer’s actions affect the terms of conditions of employment”); see also Barnes, 598 F.

App’x at 91 (“Bullying or discrimination of any kind in the workplace is wrong, but not every

wrong is a violation of federal law.”).

McDaniel’s lateral transfer to the Media branch is also not an adverse employment action.

“Employment actions such as lateral transfers and changes of title or reporting relationships have

generally been held not to constitute adverse employment actions.” Stewart v. Union Cnty. Bd. of

Educ., 655 F. App’x 151, 157 (3d Cir. 2016). A transfer may be an adverse employment action if

the employee’s new position “is inferior to, rather than merely different from,” her prior position.

Langley v. Merck & Co., Inc., 186 F. App’x 258, 261 (3d Cir. 2006). But here, McDaniel’s

position, title, duties, and pay remained the same when she began working in Media. (See Def.’s

SUMF ¶ 57; Pl.’s SDF ¶ 57; Def.’s Ex. 121.) Although McDaniel had to learn a new clientele and

felt as if she was “starting over,” her role at the Media branch was not “inferior to” her role at

Ardmore. Langley, 186 F. App’x at 261. Her transfer was therefore not “a significant change in

her employment status” that can be used to establish a prima facie case. Anderson, 815 F. App’x

15 Furthermore, rather than singling out McDaniel or targeting her due to her race, the record

reflects that Biernacki’s conduct was a result of her management style, which appears to have been

demanding, critical, and at times overbearing. (See, e.g., Def.’s Ex. 161 at 4-6, 18, 28-29; Excellent

Dep. at 232:20-233:7.)

at 667 (affirming grant of summary judgment because plaintiff’s transfer to different facility with

no significant change in responsibilities was not an adverse employment action).

Finally, the Corrective Action Notice and annual review McDaniel objected to are not

adverse employment actions. “Disciplinary action or harsh speech that does not materially change

the terms or conditions of employment cannot lay the foundation for a claim of employment

discrimination.” Johnson v. Independence Blue Cross, No. 09-4239, 2013 WL 1874954, at *12

(E.D. Pa. May 3, 2013). Like McDaniel’s transfer to Media, these events did not affect her

responsibilities or pay, and McDaniel offers no other evidence establishing that these incidents

otherwise affected the terms or conditions of her employment. See Friel v. Mnuchin, 474 F. Supp.

3d 673, 686 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that negative performance evaluation

affected terms and conditions of employment); Deans v. Kennedy House, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 2d

393, 410-11 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2014) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that verbal and written

warnings constituted adverse employment actions). Accordingly, they cannot constitute adverse

actions for purposes of a prima facie case.

The Bank is therefore entitled to summary judgment on McDaniel’s race discrimination

claims.

Retaliation

Retaliation claims under Title VII and the PHRA are also subject to the McDonnell-

Douglas burden shifting framework. See Anderson v. Boeing Co., 694 F. App’x 84, 85-86 (3d Cir.

2017). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show “that: ‘(1) she engaged

in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action against her;

and (3) there was a causal connection between her participation in the protected activity and the

adverse employment action.” Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting

Nelson v. Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995)). In the retaliation context, an adverse

employment action must be “materially adverse,” meaning “it well might have dissuaded a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Daniels, 776 F.3d at

195 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe. Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)); see also Swain

v. City of Vineland, 457 F. App’x 107, 111 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that “[a] broader definition of

adverse action” applies to retaliation claims than discrimination claims). To assess whether

protected activity and retaliatory conduct are causally connected, a court may analyze “the

temporal proximity between the two if ‘unusually suggestive,’” or in the alternative, “the

circumstances as a whole, including any intervening antagonism by the employer, inconsistencies

in the reasons the employer gives for its adverse action, and any other evidence suggesting that the

employer had a retaliatory animus when taking the adverse action.” Daniels, 776 F.3d at 196

(quoting LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 2007)).

Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the employer must provide “‘a

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason’ for its conduct.” Moore, 461 F.3d at 342 (quoting Krouse v. Am.

Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500-01 (3d Cir. 1997)). The plaintiff may rebut this explanation by

showing the employer’s reasons for its conduct are pretextual. Id. “[T]he plaintiff must produce

‘sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reasons

were not its true reasons for the challenged employment action.’” Krouse, 126 F.3d at 504 (quoting

Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996)). To cast enough

doubt onto the employer’s proffered reasons, a plaintiff must show “such weaknesses,

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered

legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy

of credence.’” Whitmore, 510 F. Supp. 3d at 309 (quoting Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d

286, 306 (3d Cir. 2007)).

McDaniel argues that once she began reporting instances of purported discrimination, she

was retaliated against “right away.” (McDaniel Dep. at 234:11-16.) She asserts her character has

been tarnished, her career has been disrupted, and she is unable to advance at the Bank. (Pl.’s Opp.

at 5-6.) Her claim fails, however, because she cannot show the Bank took an adverse employment

action as a result of her protected activity.

McDaniel testified that she believes “some of [her] colleagues are afraid to work with [her]

because of the lies that were told about” her. (McDaniel Dep. at 481:17-25.) This, at most, amounts

to a “petty slight[]” or “minor annoyance[]” that is not a materially adverse action. Clarkson v. Se.

Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 14-2510, 2016 WL 1637279, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2016) (finding

“workplace gossip . . . not [a] materially adverse action[]” for purposes of retaliation claim). Nor

did McDaniel suffer financial loss “or any change to the terms of” her employment as a result of

her protected activity. Morrison v. Carpenter Tech. Corp., 193 F. App’x 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2006).

And her “subjective belief that her career” has been disrupted does not constitute an adverse

employment action. See Nagle v. RMA, The Risk Mgmt. Ass’n, 513 F. Supp. 2d 383, 391 (E.D. Pa.

2007) (granting summary judgment on retaliation claims where “Plaintiff has not pointed to any

injury or harm she suffered other than her own subjective belief that her career with [defendant]

was over”). In fact, contrary to McDaniel’s argument that her career has been thwarted since

speaking out against this conduct, she has remained employed at the Bank and was promoted after

filing this lawsuit. (Def.’s SUMF ¶¶ 2-3; Pl.’s SDF ¶¶ 2-3.)

Since McDaniel has failed to establish a prima facie case for her retaliation claims, the

Court will grant summary judgment for the Bank.

Hostile Work Environment

“To establish a hostile work environment claim,” McDaniel must show: “(1) that she

suffered intentional discrimination because of her race . . . ; (2) that the discrimination was severe

or pervasive; (3) that the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) that the

discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances[;] and (5) the

existence of respondeat superior liability.”16 Davis, 2022 WL 970842, at *5 (citing Minarsky v.

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Susquehanna Cnty., 895 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2018)). A hostile work environment exists when a

“workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ that is

‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an

abusive working environment.’” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002)

(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). To determine whether such an

environment exists, “a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including ‘the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance.’” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir.

2013) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).

McDaniel broadly asserts that “the manner in which Ms. Biernacki and Bryn Mawr Trust

have acted towards [her] amounts to intentional discrimination” sufficient to survive the Bank’s

motion for summary judgment. (Pl.’s Opp. at 18.) The Court disagrees.

16 McDaniel’s hostile work environment claims under Title VII and the PHRA “are subject

to the same legal standard, so the Court will analyze them together.” Davis v. Elwyn, Inc., No. 20-

5798, 2022 WL 970842, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2022) (citing Atkinson v. Lafayette Coll., 460

F.3d 447, 464 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006)).

During her tenure at the Bank, McDaniel made numerous allegations of discrimination and

harassment, which the Bank consistently investigated and found to be meritless. See generally

supra Section I. Even though McDaniel experienced these events as racially discriminatory, to

establish a hostile work environment, the plaintiff must show conditions are “objectively hostile,

not just hostile in the plaintiff’s view.” Greer v. Mondelez Global, Inc., 590 F. App’x 170, 173 (3d

Cir. 2014) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). Many of these incidents were isolated or “offhand

comments that are insufficient to support a hostile work environment claim.” Woodard v. PHB

Die Casting, 255 F. App’x 608, 609-10 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Whitmore, 510 F. Supp. 3d at 309

(finding “isolated incidents . . . insufficient to show that the challenged conduct was ‘severe or

pervasive’”). Even those that are clearly objectionable, such as Intzes’s comments and disparaging

remarks, are not “so severe or pervasive as to constitute an objective change in the conditions of

employment.” Lawrence v. F.C. Kerbeck & Sons, 134 F. App’x 570, 572 (3d Cir. 2005). In any

event, the conduct was “not particularly frequent” and was “not physically threatening or

humiliating.” Brooks v. CBS Radio, Inc., 342 F. App’x 771, 777 (3d Cir. 2009). “Although

[McDaniel] may subjectively believe that her treatment was discriminatory, she has not presented

a genuine issue of fact to overcome summary judgment with respect to her hostile work

environment claim.” Hanzer v. Nat’l Mentor Healthcare, LLC, No. 12-363, 2014 WL 1390889, at

*4 (D. Del. Apr. 10, 2014). Accordingly, the Bank’s motion will be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court grants the Bank’s motion for summary

judgment as to all claims.

An Order consistent with this Memorandum will be docketed separately.