BRACEY v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

COREY BRACEY, :

: No. 21-cv-2825-JMY

vs. :

:

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF :

CORRECTIONS, et al. :

MEMORANDUM

Younge, J. September 28, 2022

Currently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by the Defendants. (Motion to Dismiss, MTD, ECF No. 4.) The Court

finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R.

7.1(f). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the

Defendants’ Motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated in various Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

(“DOC”) prisons since 2006, has spent all but five months of the last fifteen years apart from the

general population of prisoners, including in the Restrictive Housing Unit and other units

collectively referred to as Security Level 5 “SL5” units. (Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 22.) As a result,

Plaintiff alleges he was deprived of meaningful social interaction and effective treatment for his

mental illnesses, which were caused and exacerbated by the prolonged isolation. (Id. ¶¶ 23-39,

65-91.) His mental health diagnoses include major depressive disorder and PTSD. (Id., ¶¶ 141-

142, 163.)

Plaintiff claims that he lives in solitary confinement conditions because the DOC has

maintained him on the Restricted Release List, which in turn requires Restrictive Housing Unit

placement. (Id., ¶¶ 95, 97-99, 101, 113, 159.) He was first in a Restrictive Housing Unit at SCI

Graterford in 2006, then spent multiple years in solitary confinement at SCI Fayette, SCI

Cresson, and other prisons until his return to SCI Graterford in 2015. (Id. ¶¶ 101-120.) On

February 3, 2020, the DOC transferred him to SCI Phoenix, where he is currently incarcerated.

(Id. ¶¶ 250, 269.)

Inmates in SL5 housing are given annual psychological examinations “addressing the

suitability of continuing confinement in the SL5 Unit.” (Id. ¶ 126.) Inmates on the Restricted

Release List are reviewed annually. (Id. ¶¶ 72, 74.) The review includes psychological

evaluations and recommendations from the program review committee, which includes the

inmate’s participation but not a forum to address his continued Restricted Release List placement

itself. (Id. ¶¶ 74-75, 85, 177, 241.) The DOC does not disclose its specific standards and

considerations for Restricted Release List review to inmates. (Id. ¶¶ 76-78.)

In July of 2019, Plaintiff appealed his continued placement on the Restricted Release List

and was told it was warranted due to his history of assaultive behavior and his unpredictability.

(Id. ¶¶ 228-29.) Plaintiff grieved this and was provided reasons for his continued Restricted

Release List placement and SL5 housing. (Id. ¶¶ 237-38.) In March of 2020 (as Covid-related

protocols began), Plaintiff grieved his non-receipt of a plan for his release from SL5 housing.

(Id. ¶¶ 279-281.)

In late December 2020, Defendants Jamie Sorber, Mandy Sipple, Joe Terra, and Charles

Hensley (the “SCI Phoenix defendants”) supported Plaintiff’s removal from the Restricted

Release List through a step-down plan and submitted their proposal to Secretary Wetzel and

Deputy Executive Secretary Bickell. Later that month, Sorber, Sipple, Terra and Hensley

rescinded the proposal. (Id. ¶¶ 296-301.) In March 2021, Plaintiff grieved the rescission and

learned that the rescission was because he “ha[d] not yet demonstrated positive adjustment [and

had an] assaultive . . . history.” (Id. ¶¶ 302-303, 311.) In his grievance, Plaintiff stated that his

continued placement on the Restricted Release List was detrimental to his mental health. (Id. ¶¶

306-308.)

In April of 2021, Plaintiff was placed into an intensive management unit, as were all

Restricted Release List inmates, including inmates not considered to have serious mental illness

diagnoses. (Id. ¶¶ 250, 269, 321-327.) From April 2021 until June 25, 2021 – when this action

was filed – Plaintiff alleges that the only mental health treatment he received was medication;

however, he also alleges he had sessions with psychological services specialists. (Id. ¶¶ 339,

340, 345.) He also alleges there was a lack of any plan for his release from the Restricted

Release and SL5 housing. (Id.)

Plaintiff has previously filed lawsuits against the DOC and various correctional officers

during his term of confinement in which he had alleged, inter alia, constitutional violations

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bracey v. Price, No. 09-1662, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170940 (W.D.

Pa. Dec 3, 2012) (summary judgment granted); Bracey v. Rendell, No. 11-217, 2014 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 131072 (W.D. Pa. July 15, 2014), adopted Bracey v. Bread, No. 11-217, 2014 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 129752 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2014), aff’d Bracey v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 686 F.

App’x 130 (3d Cir. 2017) (summary judgment grant); Bracey v. Link, No. 17-cv-2836, 2019 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 8076 (E.D. Pa. Jan 16, 2019) (Settlement Agreement with General Release entered

into between the parties); Bracy v. Valencia, No. 19-1385, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60895 (W.D.

Pa. March 30, 2021).

The lawsuit that Plaintiff filed in 2017 is of specific significance to this lawsuit. Bracey

v. Link, No. 17-cv-2836, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8076 (E.D. Pa. Jan 16, 2019). As will be

explained in more detail below, Plaintiff signed a Settlement Agreement which contained a

General Release in connection with the 2017 lawsuit. (Settlement Agreement and General

Release, MTD Ex. 1, ECF No. 4-1.) For reasons that will be explained in more detail below,

Plaintiff’s 2011 lawsuit and the final adjudication of that action in Bracey v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of

Corr., 686 F. App’x 130 (3d Cir. 2017), is of significance to issues asserted in this action based

on the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The motion to dismiss standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is set

forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). After Iqbal, it is clear that “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to

defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at 678; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “To survive dismissal, ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Tatis v. Allied Interstate,

LLC, 882 F.3d 422, 426 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Facial plausibility is

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678). Instead, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Our Court of Appeals requires us to

apply a three-step analysis under a 12(b)(6) motion: (1) “[the district court] must tak[e] note of

the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim;” (2) “it should identify allegations that,

‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth;’” and, (3)

“[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and

then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Connelly v. Lane

Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).

When a motion to dismiss is granted, the court must decide whether to grant leave to

amend. The Third Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments and, thus, leave to amend

should be freely granted. See, e.g., Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2000); Dole v.

Arco Chem. Co., 921 F.2d 484, 486 (3d Cir. 1990). However, a court need not grant leave to

amend when it would be an exercise in futility. City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset

Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 879 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Leave to amend is properly denied if

amendment would be futile, i.e., if the proposed complaint could not ‘withstand a renewed

motion to dismiss.’”) (quoting Jablonski v. Pan. Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d

Cir. 1988)); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir.

1997) (recognizing that denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where the

pleadings before the court demonstrate that further amendment would be futile).

III. DISCUSSION:

A. Claims Asserted by Plaintiff that Arise from Facts, Omissions, or Conduct that

Predate His Execution of the Agreement in Bracey v. Link, Civil Action No. 17-2836

(E.D. Pa.), Will Be Dismissed from this Litigation:

The Agreement reached between the Parties when they settled Bracey v. Link, No. 17-cv-

2836, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8076 (E.D. Pa. Jan 16, 2019), expressly extinguishes Plaintiff’s

ability to bring a lawsuit for acts, omissions or conduct that occurred prior to him signing the

Agreement. (Settlement Agreement and General Release.) Therefore, claims asserted by

Plaintiff which accrued prior to him signing the Agreement and which arise from operative facts

that occurred prior to that point in time will be dismissed from this lawsuit.

When interpreting the terms of settlement agreement, “Courts will enforce a settlement

agreement if all its material terms have been agreed upon by the parties,” and “[a] settlement

agreement will not be set aside absent a clear showing of fraud, duress or mutual mistake.”

Pennsbury Village Assoc., LLC v. McIntyre, 11 A.3d 906, 914 (Pa. 2011). In Pennsylvania, “it is

well settled that the effect of a release is to be determined by the ordinary meaning of its

language.” Clark Capital Mgmt. Grp v. Navigator Money Mgmt., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

194410, at *8 (E.D. Pa. 2012)). “A settlement will be enforced ‘even if the language of the

release is general’ and no matter “[h]owever improvident the release may be or subsequently

prove for either party.’” Id. (quoting Taylor). Under Pennsylvania law, a release of “unknown

claims will be enforced,” even where a plaintiff argues he “was unaware of the matter at the time

the release was executed.” Winters v. Inv. Sav. Plan for Emps. Of Knight-Ridder, Inc., 174 F.

Supp. 259, 262 (E.D. Pa. 2001), aff’d sub nom., Winters v. Kutrip, 47 Fed. App’x. 143 (3d Cir.

2002).

Plaintiff signed the Agreement on February 26, 2020. (Settlement Agreement and

General Release page 7.) When executing the Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to accept financial

compensation in exchange for relinquishing claims that pre-dated the Agreement. (Id. page 2-3.)

The clear, unambiguous language of the General Release contained within the Agreement makes

its terms applicable to the Defendants in this action and it applies from the beginning of the

world to the date that the agreement was finally executed. The term Defendants is expressly

defined in the Agreement to include, “the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (“Commonwealth”)

and the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC” or “Agency”) (collectively with

Named Individuals, the “Defendants”).” (Id. page 1.) The General Release clearly states that it

is applicable to “Defendants and their respective predecessors, successors, agents, officers,

employees, [etc.]” from two broad categories of claims, as delineated below:

[All Claims] which were or could have been set forth in the [2017 case], and

[claims] which Plaintiff … ever had or now has, for or by reason of any cause,

matter, or anything whatsoever arising out of or related to any claims and/or

allegations in the Litigation or any other claim Plaintiff may have against

Defendants, individually or collectively, including by not limited to all

former/terminated defendants to this Litigation, from the beginning of the world to

the date of this Agreement.

(Id. ¶ 1.)

The Court finds that the Agreement and its General Release are applicable to this lawsuit,

and it will dismiss those claims that arise from facts, omissions or conduct that occurred prior to

Plaintiff signing the Agreement. “Pennsylvania law is clear that where the Parties manifest an

intent to settle all accounts, the release will be given full effect even as to unknown claims.”

Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 896 (3d Cir. 1975); see also id. at

n.27 (“Upholding the validity of the release in these circumstances does not offend public

policy). “A settlement will be enforced ‘even if the language of the release is general’ and no

matter “[h]owever improvident the release may be or subsequently prove for either party.’”

Clark Capital Mgmt. Grp. V. Navigator Money Mgmt., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194410, at *8-9

(E.D. Pa. 2012) (First, where the parties’ prior release was “broad” and “include[d] all acts or

omissions occurring prior to the execution of the release,” the court found that subsequent claims

“must be dismissed with respect to violations occurring prior to the execution of the release.”);

Winters v. Inv. Sav. Plan for Emps. of Knights-Ridder, Inc., 174 F. Supp.2d at 262-63 (“although

unknown, plaintiff could have made a claim for fraud during the privacy suit.”); Taylor v.

Solberg, 778 A.2d 664, 667-68, 566 Pa. 150, 155 (“If such a release can be nullified or

circumvented, then every written release and every written agreement of any kind, no matter how

clear and pertinent, can be set aside whenever one of the parties changes its mind or the injured

party receives an inadequate settlement.”).

B. The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel or Issue Preclusion Prevents Plaintiff from

Asserting Claims Adjudicated in his 2011 Lawsuit (Bracey v. Secy. 686 F. App’x 130

(3d Cir. 2017):

Plaintiff previously filed a lawsuit against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections1

which reached a final adjudication on its merits when the Third Circuit Court of Appeals filed an

opinion in Bracey v. Sec’y Pa Dep’t of Correction, 686 F. App’x 130 (3d Cir. 2017). The Third

Circuit opinion and the final adjudication of issues raised in the prior litigation has preclusive

effect on the ability of Plaintiff to raise issues in this litigation. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks

to advance claims in this lawsuit that were previously litigated, or related claims that arise from

events that occurred before the prior lawsuit was filed, those claims will be precluded.2

Issue preclusion “bars successive litigation of an issue of fact or law … even if the issue

recurs in the context of a different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). As with

claim preclusion, an identity of facts between the two actions is an essential prerequisite for the

application of issue preclusion. Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 233 (E.D. Pa. Feb 4, 2000)

(explaining that issue preclusion requires “that the same general legal rules govern both cases

and that the facts of both cases are indistinguishable as measured by those rules”). Issue

preclusion or collateral estoppel applies where: “(1) the identical issue was previously

adjudicated; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the previous determination was necessary to

1 The lead defendant/appellee in the prior lawsuit was the Secretary of the DOC (then Jeffrey Beard), who

was sued in his official capacity (Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 3, § III, ¶ 3) as Secretary Wetzel and Executive

Deputy Secretary Bickell (among others) are here. “[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than

name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).

2 Based on the Court’s application of the Settlement Agreement and General Release, the Collateral

Estoppel effect of Plaintiff’s 2011 lawsuit is largely a moot point with the exception of its application to

his procedural due process claim.

the decision; and (4) the party being precluded from relitigating the issue was fully represented

in the prior action.” Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 249 (3d

Cir. 2006). Courts in the Third Circuit also consider “whether the party being precluded had a

full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question in the prior action and whether the issue

was determined by a final and valid judgment.” Id.

In the lawsuit that Plaintiff previously filed in the Western District of Pennsylvania, he

challenged the conditions of his confinement and his status on the Restricted Release List, and he

brought claims under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff argued, among

other things, that the manner in which inmates with mental health problems were housed was

unconstitutional and that inmates assigned to the Restricted Housing Unit were denied access to

mental health treatment. Plaintiff also alleged that he was denied due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment when he was assigned to the Restricted Release List and placed in a

Restricted Housing Unit. He further challenged the procedures implemented to review his

continued placement on the Restricted Release List. In describing the prior lawsuit, the Third

Circuit Court wrote, “[t]he manner in which Plaintiff was housed and his RRL designation form

the basis of his [second amended] civil rights complaint against the Commonwealth defendants.”

Bracey v. Sec’y, 686 F. App’x 130, 134 (3d Cir. 2017).

Defendants in the prior lawsuit filed motions for summary judgment in January of 2014,

and United States Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly issued a report and recommendation in

favor of granting defendants’ motions. Bracey v. Rendell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131072, *52-

53 (W.D. Pa. July 15, 2014). United States District Judge Cathy Bisson adopted the report and

recommendation filed by Judge Kelly and entered an order that granted summary judgment in

favor of the defendants. Bracey v. Beard, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129752, *3 (W.D. Pa.

September 17, 2014). After a substantive review of Plaintiff’s claims on appeal, the Third

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order that granted summary judgment.

Bracey v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 686 F. App’x 130, 137 (3d Cir. 2017).

The Court will preclude Plaintiff from relitigating claims that were actually litigated in

the prior lawsuit—claims that were asserted based on facts as pled in the Second Amended

Complaint that was filed on April 25, 2013 in previous litigation. (Prior Complaint, Motion to

Dismiss Ex 3, ECF No. 4-3.) The Court will also preclude Plaintiff from advancing claims based

on facts that occurred prior to his filing of the initial complaint in the prior lawsuit. Plaintiff

conducted discovery, and these claims were subject to judicial review in early 2014 when the

parties filed their motions for summary judgment.

In the present litigation, for example, Plaintiff alleges Constitutional violations in the

conditions of his confinement under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment in relationship to his

designation on the Restricted Release List which in turn required placement in a Restrictive

Housing Unit – at SCI Fayette, SCI Albion, SCI Cresson and SCI Smithfield. (See generally

Complaint ¶¶ 100-119, 379-396 (Count I).) To the extent these claims arise from facts that

predated his filing of the initial complaint in the previous lawsuit, these claims will be dismissed

from this action. The Court applies this logic to Plaintiff’s constitutional claims. (Id. ¶¶ 379-386

(Count I-III).) The Court also applies this logic to Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims

relating to the Restricted Release List placement, treatment, and housing issues—Plaintiff’s

current claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. (Id. ¶¶ 387-396 (Count IV and V).) See Foster v. Twp. of

Pennsauken, Civil Action No. 16-5117, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99035, at *14–15 (D.N.J. June

27, 2017) (“While [claim preclusion] extends to claims that ‘could have been brought’ as well as

those actually brought forth in the prior action, the extent of claims that could have been brought

includes only those that could have been filed on the date of the initial complaint.”); Morgan v.

Covington Twp., 648 F.3d 172, *177 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Res judicata promotes judicial economy

and protects defendants from having to defend multiple identical or nearly identical lawsuits by

“bar[ring] not only claims that were brought in a previous action, but also claims that could have

been brought.”). Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues in the prior action

and lost.

The procedural due process claim (Complaint ¶¶ 385-386 (Count III)) that Plaintiff

makes in relationship to his placement on the Restricted Release List will also be dismissed from

this lawsuit. Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim was litigated in the prior lawsuit, and it

would appear that there has been no change in the operative facts relied upon by the Third

Circuit when dispensing with Plaintiff’s claim. When addressing Plaintiff’s procedural due

process claim in the prior litigation, the Third Circuit Court wrote, “[Plaintiff’s] placement on the

[Restricted Release List] . . . is not a housing placement but it presents a similar procedural due

process issue.” Bracey v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corrections, 686 F. App’x 1309 (E.D. Pa. April 19,

2017). On the issue of Plaintiff’s placement on the Restricted Release List, the Court went on to

write:

In any event, even assuming that Bracey suffered a deprivation of a protected

liberty interest by virtue of his extended placement on the RRL, the periodic review

offered to Pennsylvania inmates who are indefinitely confined in administrative

confinement comports with procedural due process, Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140,

144 (3d Cir.2000), and does so with respect to placement on the RRL as well.

Department of Corrections policy provides that the status of inmates in the SMU

must be reviewed every 90 days. Bracey’s placement on the RRL merely added

another layer of periodic review, review that he actually received, relating to

whether he should be released to the general population. It did not involve a

deprivation of liberty as to which any additional procedural due process would

attach.

Bracey v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corrections, 686 F. App’x 130, 135-136 (E.D. Pa. April 19, 2017).

Plaintiff has not alleged that the procedural safeguards that were in place when he filed

the prior lawsuit have been removed or that these procedural safeguards have been disregarded

by prison staff. To the contrary, Plaintiff admits that he has received periodic as well as annual

reviews regarding his placement on the Restricted Release List – with those reviews including a

psychological evaluation that involved Plaintiff’s participation. (Complaint ¶¶ 114, 121, 177,

214, 241, 293.) Plaintiff cites to an extensive review of his placement status that took place

between February 2020 and January 2021 which included a psychological evaluation and input

with a recommendation by the SCI Phoenix Defendants. (Complaint ¶¶ 275-314.) Plaintiff even

alleges that a plan for his return to the general population was created at that time. (Complaint

¶¶ 297-300.) Although the plan for removal from the Restrict Release List was ultimately

rescinded, the existence of a plan establishes that Plaintiff’s status was reviewed by prison staff.

Further support for dismissal of Plaintiff’s due process claim can be found in the July 8,

2021, memorandum that Secretary John Wetzel sent to inmates who were on the Restricted

Release List at SCI Phoenix. (Secretary Wetzel Memo, Motion to Dismiss Ex. 2, ECF No. 4-2.)

The memorandum outlines the “new approach” that will be applied to evaluating inmates

continued placement on the Restricted Release List. (Id.) The “new approach” provides an

individualized plan for inmates like Plaintiff (id.) which suggests that a process for evaluation is

still in place at SCI Phoenix and other Pennsylvania state prisons.

Given the undisputed procedural safeguards provided for Plaintiff in the form of

continued review of his status on the Restricted Release List, the Court will apply the doctrine of

collateral estoppel to his due process claim. The Third Circuit decision Bracey v. Sec’y Pa.

Dep’t of Corrections, 686 F. App’x 130 (E.D. Pa. April 19, 2017), relied on the existence of

procedural safeguards a continued review when it dispensed with Plaintiff’s claim. Therefore,

Count III of the Complaint will be dismissed.

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity Does Not Bar Plaintiff’s Claims for Injunctive and

Declaratory Relief:

Defendants Secretary John Wetzel, Executive Deputy Secretary Tabb Bickell, Jamie

Sorber, Deputy Superintendents Mandy Sipple, Joe Terra, and Manager Charles Hensley argue

that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Plaintiff’s claims against them in

their official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment precludes private federal litigation against

states, state agencies, and state officials in their official capacities. This immunity is subject to

three basic exceptions: “(1) Congress may specifically abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity by

exercising its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) a state may waive its

sovereign immunity by consenting to suit; or (3) under Ex parte Young, a state official may be

sued in his or her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief.” Hollihan v. Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections, 159 F.Supp.3d 502, 510 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Ex parte Young,

209 U.S. 123 (1908)); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-

70 (1997).

As it pertains to the first exception, it is well-settled that by enacting § 1983 Congress has

not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. (citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)). Second, Pennsylvania has unequivocally withheld consent to

suit under § 1983. Id. “Section 8521 of Title 42 of the Pennsylvania Code clearly states,

‘Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the

Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment of the

Constitution of the United States.’” Id. (citing 42 Pa. C.S. § 8521(b)); see also Lombardo

v. Pennsylvania, Dept. of Public Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Laskaris

v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981). Therefore, Plaintiff can only proceed against

moving Defendants in their official capacity for injunctive or declaratory relief.

In his response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff explicitly represents that he is

not seeking damages against any of the individual Defendants in their official capacities. “The

only relief [he] is seeking against any Defendants in their official capacities is injunctive and

declaratory relief.” (Response in Opposition page 40 n.17; ECF No. 6.) To the extent that

Plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief, the Court will not apply Eleventh Amendment

immunity to bar his claims. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989)

(“official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.”); See

Wongus v. Corr. Emergency Response Team, 389 F. Supp. 3d 294, 299 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (“The

Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims against a state officer in his official capacity for

prospective injunctive relief or claims against state officials in their individual capacity for

money damages.”); and see Kost v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of PA, No. 07-2404, 2009 WL

466166, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2009).

The Court will permit Plaintiff to proceed with his request for injunctive or declaratory

relief and will not dispense with those claims on motion to dismiss. However, Plaintiff’s claim

will be limited based on the Court’s application of the General Release to the claims asserted in

this action, and the Court’s application of doctrine of collateral estoppel arising from the prior

lawsuit. Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed with those injunctive or declaratory claims that

survive.

D. Plaintiff May Proceed with the Remaining Claims Asserted in the Complaint:

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff asserts constitutional claims for violation of the Eighth

Amendment – Conditions of Confinement (Complaint ¶¶ 379-381 (Count I)), and Deliberate

Indifference to Serious Medical Needs. (Complaint ¶¶ 382-384 (Count II).) Plaintiff also asserts

a disability discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132,

(Complaint ¶¶ 387-391 (Count IV)) and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. (Complaint ¶¶

392-396 (Count V).) Plaintiff may proceed with these claims to the extent that they arise from

facts or events that occurred after he signed the Settlement Agreement and General Release—

provided that the claims are not barred by collateral estoppel or issue preclusion and were not

previously litigated.

IV. CONCLUSION:

For these reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in

part. An appropriate order shall follow. As to those claims dismissed, the Court will not allow

amendment of the complaint to replead those causes-of-action because amendment would be

futile.

When a motion to dismiss is granted, the court must decide whether to grant leave to

amend. The Third Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments and, thus, leave to amend

should be freely granted. See, e.g., Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2000); Dole v.

Arco Chem. Co., 921 F.2d 484, 486 (3d Cir. 1990). However, a court need not grant leave to

amend when it would be an exercise in futility. City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset

Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 879 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Leave to amend is properly denied if

amendment would be futile, i.e., if the proposed complaint could not ‘withstand a renewed

motion to dismiss.’”) (quoting Jablonski v. Pan. Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d

Cir. 1988)); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir.

1997) (recognizing that denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where the

pleadings before the court demonstrate that further amendment would be futile).

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John Milton Younge

Judge John Milton Younge