Ambrose v. SAUL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TAMMY AMBROSE, :

:

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-4763

:

v. :

:

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting :

Commissioner of Social Security, :

:

Defendant. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 19th day of September, 2022, after considering the complaint (Doc. No.

1), the administrative record (Doc. No. 12), the report and recommendation filed by United States

Magistrate Judge Timothy R. Rice (Doc. No. 23), the plaintiff’s brief and statement of issues in

support of the request for review (Doc. No. 13), the defendant’s response to the request for review

(Doc. No. 20), and the plaintiff’s objections to the report and recommendation (Doc. No. 24);

accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. The clerk of court is DIRECTED to return this matter to the court’s active docket;

2. The plaintiff’s objections to the report and recommendation (Doc. No. 24) are

OVERRULED;1

3. The report and recommendation (Doc. No. 23) is APPROVED and ADOPTED;

4. The plaintiff’s request for review is DENIED;

5. The final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED; and

6. The clerk of court is DIRECTED to mark this matter as CLOSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Edward G. Smith

EDWARD G. SMITH, J.

1 This court’s review of the contested portion of the report and recommendation is plenary. The court “shall make a

de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which

objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (emphasis added). “Review of a final decision

of the Commissioner of Social Security, however, is limited to determining whether the decision is supported by

substantial evidence.” Abney v. Colvin, No. CIV. A. 13-6818, 2015 WL 5113315, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2015)

(citations omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Further, “[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance

of the evidence.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). In determining whether substantial

evidence exists, the reviewing court may not weigh the evidence or substitute its own conclusion for that of the

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002).

The first issue raised in the plaintiff’s objections relates to whether the ALJ properly evaluated the plaintiff’s

subjective allegations. Pl.’s Obj. to the Magistrate Judge’s R. & R. (“Pl.’s Obj.”) at 1, Doc. No. 24. The second issue

raised in the plaintiff’s objections centers on whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s residual functional

capacity (“RFC”) determination that the plaintiff was capable of sedentary work. Pl.’s Obj. at 3. The plaintiff argues,

“The ALJ failed to explain how, given the available evidence . . ., she included the functional restrictions that she

chose to include in her assessment of Ms. Ambrose’s RFC. The ALJ’s rejection of the only medical opinion created

an evidentiary deficit . . . The ALJ did not obtain evidence to fill this evidentiary void.” Id. at 4.

Evaluating the merits of each claim, this court overrules the plaintiff’s objections because the ALJ properly

evaluated the subjective allegations and substantial evidence does, in fact, support the ALJ’s justification of an RFC

determination that the plaintiff was capable of sedentary work. See R. & R. at 22.

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ “played doctor” by discrediting the evaluations from Dr. Massaro, Scott

Biedenkapp, LCSW, and Dr. McCabe and choosing to rely on other medical evaluations in the record. See Pl.’s Obj.

at 3. However, the case law in this circuit is clear that “[t]he ALJ must review all the medical findings and other

evidence presented in support of the attending physician's opinion of total disability. In doing so, the ALJ must weigh

the relative worth of a treating physician's report against the reports submitted by other physicians who have examined

the claimant.” Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir.1994) (citations omitted); see also Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d

193, 197 (3d Cir. 2011) (permitting an ALJ to give greater weight to certain medical evaluations over others).

Here, the ALJ was faced with conflicting medical reports and permissibly balanced the various medical

opinions. See R. & R. at 25; see also Yots v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 704 F. App’x 95, 97–98 (3d Cir. 2017) (permitting the

ALJ to weigh conflicting medical evidence that supports and conflicts with the applicant’s claims).

The ALJ’s RFC determination chose the middle road “between the insufficient restrictions suggested by

experts Dr. Michael and Dr. Manfared, and the extreme restrictions suggested by Dr. Massaro, Scott Biedenkapp,

LCSW, and Dr. McCabe.” R. & R. 25. The ALJ was within her discretion to discredit the most extreme

recommendations and to go further than the more moderate evaluations. The ALJ supported her middle road decision

by citing multiple medical evaluations finding Ambrose’s “generally mild mental health examinations, normal gait,

normal muscle strength, and other unremarkable tests.” Id. at 25.

The ALJ properly considered the plaintiff’s relevant facts, such as Ambrose’s age, education, reported

activities, and other objective and subjective record evidence. The ALJ reviewed many of Ambrose’s subjective

complaints about the mental and physical impairments she experienced during her activities, including her post-onset

work as a teacher and babysitter.

Because sufficient objective evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination, the court cannot agree with the

plaintiff’s objection to the ALJ’s RFC assessment. While a claimant bears the burden of proving his RFC, before

making a determination that a claimant is not disabled, the ALJ is “responsible for developing [the claimant’s]

complete medical history, . . . making every reasonable effort to help you get medical reports from your own medical

sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). However, an ALJ, not the treating or examining physicians or State agency

consultants must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations. Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d

356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) RFC finding is an administrative, rather than a medical, determination. See id.; see also

Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 197 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The law is clear . . . that the opinion of a treating physician

does not bind the ALJ on the issue of functional capacity.”); Cathers v. Colvin, No. CIV. A. 16-113, 2017 WL

5075278, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2017) (“[A]n ALJ is not required to rely only on any particular physician’s opinion,

and the RFC finding is actually an administrative—rather than a medical—determination.”) (alteration to original).

Here, the ALJ reasonably afforded little weight to the opinions of record for the reasons explained in the

report and recommendation. See R. & R. at 20–22. The rejection of these opinions did not leave an impermissible

evidentiary gap. As the Chandler, Brown, and Cathers courts explain, the ALJ ultimately determines disability and

RFC, so long as it is based on proper evidence. The ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence and

thus, her determination is affirmed.