Opinion

JOHNSON v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Court
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Sep 16, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.9%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

OBE E. JOHNSON : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. : NO. 22-64

:

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE :

MEMORANDUM

KEARNEY, J. September 16, 2022

An incarcerated citizen pro se sues the Internal Revenue Service asking it to send him

COVID-19 stimulus checks he claims are owed to him. We granted the incarcerated person leave

to proceed without paying the filing fees requiring we screen his complaint for merit before

proceeding with issuing summons to begin service. We screened his amended Complaint. He does

not plead whether he exhausted his administrative remedies with the Service. He does not show

how exhausting administrative remedies would be futile. We must dismiss his amended Complaint

without prejudice for him to timely plead how he exhausted his administrative remedies. We will

close the case if he cannot do so under the accompanying Order but nothing in today’s result

precludes the citizen from pursuing his administrative remedies with the Service and then later sue

should he find the Service did not comply with the law.

I. Alleged pro se facts

An unidentified government presently incarcerates Philadelphia business owner Obe E.

Johnson in Puerto Rico. Mr. Johnson did not receive Economic Impact Payments, also known as

“stimulus checks,” from the Acts of Congress granting COVID-19 aid.1 Mr. Johnson does not

plead contact with the Internal Revenue Service seeking the Economic Impact Payments. He also

does not plead filing a tax return for the tax years 2020 or 2021. Mr. Johnson now sues the Internal

Revenue Service to recover the Economic Impact Payments.2

II. Analysis

We granted Mr. Johnson leave to proceed without paying the filing fees given his present

sworn indigency and financial status.3 We granted Mr. Johnson leave to file an amended complaint

after Mr. Johnson first sued the wrong party, the “United States District Court for Philadelphia,”

and failed to state a claim.4 We construed Mr. Johnson’s Motion for leave to file an amended

Complaint as an amended Complaint under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).5 He now sues the Internal

Revenue Service in his amended complaint.6

Congress directs we dismiss a claim filed without paying fees which we find frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief.7 When considering whether to dismiss a complaint for

failure to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), we apply the same standard used under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).8 Under Rule 12(b)(6), we accept all factual allegations

in Mr. Johnson’s amended complaint as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable

to him to determine whether he states a claim to relief plausible on its face.9

We are directed by our Court of Appeals to be “mindful of our ‘obligation to liberally

construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings . . . .’”10 We are to “remain flexible” and “apply the relevant

legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.”11 But “pro se litigants still must

allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim” and “cannot flout procedural rules –

they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.”12

Mr. Johnson now sues the proper government agency. The Service is responsible for

verifying eligibility for Economic Impact Payments and dispersing the payments.13 We liberally

infer Mr. Johnson is seeking an individual Economic Impact Payment, not a small business

payment because small business payments were not in the form of Economic Impact Payments or

“stimulus checks” and Mr. Johnson refers to the Economic Impact Payments or “stimulus checks”

more frequently than small business aid.14

Economic Impact Payments are a creature of tax law.15 Congress through the Coronavirus

Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, codified in part at 26 U.S.C. § 6428 (a), provided

emergency financial assistance during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic through

Economic Impact Payments.16

In Rueda, Judge Hollander recognized Economic Impact Payments under Section 6428

come in the form of a credit against tax owed in the year of the payment.17 Most credits will only

be recognized as a deduction from a taxpayer’s tax burden resulting in a larger refund of smaller

payment when the taxpayer files his taxes.18 Economic Impact Payments, however, are an advance

tax credit distributed to taxpayers immediately rather than forcing taxpayers to wait until tax

season to appreciate the credit.19

Congress in 26 U.S.C. § 7422 created a civil action for the correction of a tax refund.20 The

Supreme Court directs section 7422 claims may only succeed if the claimant exhausted all

administrative remedies.21 We liberally construe Mr. Johnson’s amended complaint as a section

7422 claim.22 Our Court of Appeals recognizes incarcerated persons like Mr. Johnson may file a

Section 7422 claim to recover Economic Impact Payments but require administrative exhaustion.23

Administrative exhaustion is required in all “suits ‘for the recovery of any internal revenue tax.’”24

Tax issues concerning the amount of a refund, including the advance payment of tax credit, are

first assessed by the Internal Revenue Service.25 A taxpayer must file (or amend) a tax return,

protest the Service’s assessment of the tax return, and attend an appeals conference to show he

exhausted all administrative remedies.26 The taxpayer must, at the very least, file a tax return to

qualify as a “taxpayer” under Section 7244.27

The exhaustion requirement may be waived if the exhaustion process would be “arduous,

expensive, and long” and other Judges have found the exhaustion requirement too extreme.28 For

example, Judge Hollander in Amador held it would be too extreme to force a class of taxpayers to

file their tax returns to challenge a policy withholding Economic Impact Payments because their

spouses’ did not have a social security number could never provide the taxpayers with relief.29

Judge Hollander held exhausting the administrative remedies would be “an exercise in futility”

because the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act excluded the class of taxpayers

from receiving Economic Interest Payments.30

Mr. Johnson fails to plead exhaustion of all other avenues of relief. Mr. Johnson has not

alleged he already filed a tax return or exhausted the Service’s other administrative remedies. We

find there is no way to construe Mr. Johnson’s amended Complaint to show filing a tax return

would be useless. Unlike in Amador, there is no official policy from the Service or express

statutory language automatically preventing Mr. Johnson from obtaining relief. Unlike in Amador,

Mr. Johnson filing a tax return with the Service may result in an Economic Interest Payment.

III. Conclusion

Mr. Johnson fails to plead he has already filed a tax return and exhausted the remedies

necessary for a Section 7422 claim. We dismiss Mr. Johnson’s claim against the Internal Revenue

Service without prejudice for Mr. Johnson to timely amend his complaint if he can do so in good

faith to establish exhaustion.

1 ECF Doc. No. 17.

2 ECF Doc. No. 17.

3 ECF Doc. No. 5.

4 ECF Doc. No. 5.

5 ECF Doc. No. 18.

6 ECF Doc. No. 17.

7 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

8 Elansari v. Univ. of Pa., 779 F. App’x 1006, 1008 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229

F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).

9 Id. (quoting Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012)).

10 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333,

339 (3d Cir. 2011)).

11 Yogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704

F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013)).

12 Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245).

13 See I.R.C. § 6428.

14 ECF Doc. No. 17.

15 See e.g., Morton v. United States Virgin Islands, 128 A.F.T.R.2d 2021-7051 (3d Cir. Dec. 29,

2021) (recognizing a section 7422 claim by prisoners seeking Economic Impact Payments has

proper standing but still required administrated exhaustion with the Internal Revenue Service);

Rueda v. Yellen, No. 20-1102, 2022 WL 684143, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 7, 2022) (recognizing the

“stimulus payments” are advanced refunds of a tax credit); Amador v. Mnuchin, 476 F. Supp. 3d

125, 144 (D. Md. 2020) (casting Economic Impact Payments as a tax issue, but waiving the

administrative exhaustion requirement); Scholl v. Mnuchin, 494 F. Supp. 3d 661, 675 (N.D. Cal.

2020), appeal dismissed (Dec. 11, 2020) (casting Economic Impact Payments as a tax issue and

recognizing exhaustion is required for suits to recover any internal revenue tax).

16 PL 116-136, 134 Stat 281; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6428 (a); Morton v. United States Virgin Islands,

128 A.F.T.R.2d 2021-7051 (3d Cir. Dec. 29, 2021).

17 Rueda v. Yellen, 2022 WL 684143, at *1; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6428

18 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 32 (earned income tax credit).

19 Rueda v. Yellen, 2022 WL 684143, at *1.

20 26 U.S.C. § 7422; See, e.g., Morton, 128 A.F.T.R.2d 2021-7051, at *3 n. 6.

21 United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 533 (1995).

22

23 Morton, 128 A.F.T.R.2d 2021-7051, at *3 n. 6.

24 Scholl v. Mnuchin, 494 F. Supp. 3d 661, 681 (N.D. Cal. 2020), appeal dismissed (Dec. 11, 2020)

(quoting Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).

25 See IRC § 7422; United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Min. Co., 553 U.S. 1 (2008).

26 See IRS Publication 5, Your Appeal Rights and How to Prepare a Protest if You Disagree, IRS,

https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-5 (last updated May 17, 2022). The Internal

Revenue Service has also implemented more informal procedures as to Economic Impact

Payments to resolve the issue without requiring a Formal Written Protest. See Economic Impact

Payments, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/coronavirus/economic-impact-payments (last updated May

17, 2022).

27 United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 533 (1995).

28 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 601 (2016).

29 Amador, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 144.

30 Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6428 (a).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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