The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT MERRITT, :
Plaintiff, :
: CIVIL ACTION
v. : NO. 19-2785
:
MICHAEL MANCINI, et al., :
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Schmehl, J. /s/ JLS September 6, 2022
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Robert Merritt brings this suit against Defendants, Officer Eric Sbat and Officer
Michael Mancini, for alleged violations under § 1983. Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment and Statement of Material Facts, Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’
Statement of Material Facts, Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion, and Defendants’ reply. For the
following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted, and this matter is dismissed.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Officer Eric Sbat is a police officer for the City of Allentown, having been employed as
such since 2016. ECF No. 62, Ex. A, Dep. transcript of Officer Sbat, p. 10. Officer Mancini is a
former police officer for the City of Allentown, having worked as a police officer for twenty (20)
years and retiring from his position in December of 2018. Id., Ex. B, Dep. transcript of Officer
Mancini, p. 6.
On December 3, 2018, Officer Mancini was working an extra job for the Allentown Police
Department at the LANTA Bus Station and was on duty 6 a.m. to 9 a.m. Id., Ex. B, p. 7.
Allentown police officers were asked to assist at the LANTA Bus Station because of the
problems the bus station was having with loitering, drug dealing, overdoses, disorderly people,
and trespassing. ECF No. 62, Ex. B, p. 7; Ex. C, Dep. transcript of Ashley Dimmich, pp. 10-11.
People also would frequent the Dunkin’ Donuts located within the bus station without
purchasing anything, instead causing a nuisance, or using drugs. Id., Ex. C, p. 11. Officer
Mancini testified that part of his duties at the bus station and the Dunkin’ Donuts was to ensure
people were not loitering and trespassing without purchasing anything. Id., Ex. B, p. 10. Ashley
Dimmich was a former employee of the Dunkin' Donuts and was at the Dunkin' Donuts in
question on December 3, 2018, the day of the incident in this case, as a patron. Id., Ex. C, pp. 12-
13. Dimmich was familiar with Plaintiff as he had been in the Dunkin' Donuts before while she
was employed there. Id., p. 13. Dimmich does not recall Plaintiff ever purchasing coffee or food
during the times that he would be in the Dunkin' Donuts. Id.
On the date of the incident in this case, Officer Mancini noticed Plaintiff with his head
down while sitting at the Dunkin’ Donuts. Mancini testified that Plaintiff was charging his phone
and appeared to be sleeping. Id., Ex. B, p. 9. Plaintiff testified that he was waiting for a friend to
bring him money to buy a bus ticket, that he had his head down, and that he “might have ordered
some water or something like that.” Id., Ex. D, Dep. of Robert Merritt, pp. 23-24, 27, 33. Officer
Mancini testified that he had to shake Plaintiff to wake him up, and that he then spoke with
Plaintiff, who said he was going to catch a bus at 10:00 a.m., but he did not have a bus ticket on
him. Id., Ex. B, p. 11. After Plaintiff informed Officer Mancini that he did not have a bus ticket,
Mancini told Plaintiff that he had to leave the store. Id., Ex. B, p. 12; Ex. C, p. 16. Plaintiff
refused to leave, became very upset, started to scream, and yell profanity at Mancini. Id., Ex. B,
p. 12-13; Ex. C, p. 16, Ex. D, p. 37. Mancini asked Plaintiff to leave 2 or 3 times. Id., Ex. C., p.
16. Plaintiff continued to refuse and continued screaming, until the manager at the Dunkin’
Donuts asked Mancini to remove Plaintiff because he was disturbing the customers. ECF No.62,
Ex. B, p. 13-14; Ex. C, p. 17. Mancini handcuffed Plaintiff and transported him to Allentown
Police Department. Id., Ex. C, p. 18; Ex. B, p. 15.
On December 3, 2018, Officer Eric Sbat was assigned as the cellblock officer in the
holding cell area of the Allentown Police Department. Id., Ex. A, p. 14. This assignment involves
being responsible for every person that is brought into the holding cell at the Allentown Police
Department. Id. The officer is responsible for the person’s well-being until they go to the prison
or are released. Id. at p. 15.
The Allentown Police Department has policies and procedures relating to the detention of
individuals who are in the custody of the Allentown Police Department. See ECF No. 62, Ex. E,
Cell Block Operations General Order 3-06. This order states that special attention shall be made
to search those areas where items could be secreted, such as jacket linings, hidden pockets, hats,
belts, footwear, clothing seams, pant waists, and pant cuffs. Id., Ex. E. It further states that the
searching officer shall remove all personal property and itemize the property on the prisoner
property form. Id. A prisoner’s property is removed so that prisoners cannot harm themselves
with belts, shoelaces, or other items. Id., Ex. A, p. 23. Officer Sbat and Officer Mancini
explained to Plaintiff the various items that he would have to remove prior to being held in the
holding cell. Id., Ex. A, p. 25; Ex. F, body camera footage of Officer Sbat. Plaintiff was very
upset at the request to remove various items of his belongings. Id., Ex. F. The officers requested
Plaintiff to remove a ring that he was wearing on his finger as per the policy. Id., Ex. F. Plaintiff
refused to take off his ring. Id., Ex. A at p. 33; Ex. F. The officers asked Plaintiff multiple times
to remove the ring and he continued to refuse. Id. Plaintiff told the officers they would have to
“cut his finger off” if they wanted to remove his ring. Id., Ex. A, p. 33, Ex. F. Plaintiff was
advised that he would be held down to have the ring removed and he still refused to remove it
voluntarily. ECF No. 62, Ex. A, p. 33, Ex. F. Therefore, Plaintiff was re-handcuffed and Sbat
attempted to remove the ring; however, Plaintiff balled up his fists so the officer could not
remove it. Id., Ex. A, p. 33; Ex. F. Officer Sbat then performed a wrist lock on Plaintiff, Plaintiff
opened up his hands, the ring was removed, and the handcuffs were removed. Id. Plaintiff’s wrist
was broken during this process. Id., Ex. D, pp. 55-56. Plaintiff was charged with defiant trespass
and disorderly conduct based on his actions on December 3, 2018. Id., Ex. G, affidavit of
probable cause. Neither officer appeared at Plaintiff’s preliminary hearing and therefore, the
charges against Plaintiff were dismissed. Id., Ex. A, pp. 70-71.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c).
“A motion for summary judgment will not be defeated by ‘the mere existence’ of some disputed
facts but will be denied when there is a genuine issue of material fact.” Am. Eagle Outfitters v.
Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986)). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence
might affect the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
In undertaking this analysis, the court views the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. “After making all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor, there
is a genuine issue of material fact if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.”
Pignataro v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 593 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Reliance Ins.
Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1997)). While the moving party bears the initial
burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, meeting this obligation shifts
the burden to the non-moving party who must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint originally contained counts for section 1983 Fourth
Amendment false arrest, malicious prosecution and excessive force against Defendant Mancini,
section 1983 Fourth Amendment excessive force against Defendant Sbat and state law malicious
prosecution against both defendants. Pursuant to a stipulation entered into between the parties,
Plaintiff agreed to dismiss Counts I, III and IV as to Officer Sbat, thereby dismissing all claims
against him except for an excessive force claim. After discovery was completed, Defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming Plaintiff cannot establish the necessary elements
to prove his claims. For the reasons set forth below, I agree and will grant Defendants’ motion
and dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
A. False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution as to Officer Mancini
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from arresting a citizen except
upon probable cause.” Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir.1997). Probable cause is a
defense against false arrest and imprisonment claims under section 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967). “Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the
arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to
believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” U.S. v.
Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir.1990) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 n. 9, 99
S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979)); see also Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir.2000)
(quoting Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir.1995)). The constitutional
validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed the crime.
Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005).
In the instant matter, following Plaintiff’s actions on December 3, 2018, Officer Mancini
charged Plaintiff with disorderly conduct and defiant trespass. Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. 3503(b)(1),
a person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters
or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given by actual communication to
the actor. Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. 5503(a)(2) a person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with
intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, makes unreasonable noise.
On the date in question, Officer Mancini was working the LANTA bus station. Ashley
Dimmich, a former Dunkin’ Donuts employee, testified that Allentown police officers were
frequently in the bus station and the Dunkin’ Donuts because people often came into the Dunkin’
Donuts without buying anything and instead engaged in illegal activity. Mancini noticed Plaintiff
sitting in the Dunkin’ Donuts in a booth with his head down, charging his phone. Mancini
approached Plaintiff, who told him that he did not have any money, nor did he have a bus ticket.
Plaintiff testified that he “maybe” bought a water at the Dunkin’ Donuts, but Plaintiff often came
into the store without purchasing anything. Mancini told Plaintiff that he could not stay at the
store, and Plaintiff admittedly refused to leave, becoming loud and disruptive. Dimmich testified
that a Dunkin’ Donuts employee asked Mancini to have Plaintiff leave the store. Mancini had
probable cause to believe that Plaintiff “knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so”,
remained at the Dunkin’ Donuts “after notice was provided to him by actual communication”
that he could not remain on the property.
Further, Mancini had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for disorderly conduct. Instead of
leaving the Dunkin’ Donuts, Plaintiff admitted that he refused to leave, loudly insisting that he
was permitted to be there. Therefore, Plaintiff clearly created a situation of public inconvenience
and annoyance, and Mancini had probable cause to arrest him.
To establish a claim for malicious prosecution, Plaintiff must show that: (1) the
defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff's
favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff
suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a
legal proceeding. DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 601 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting
Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir.2003)). As discussed previously, probable
cause existed for both charges. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot support a claim for malicious
prosecution. Summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims is
granted.1
B. Excessive Force as to Officers Sbat and Mancini
When an “excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a
free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right ‘to be secure in their persons ... against
unreasonable ... seizures’ of the person.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Such a
1 In his reply brief, Plaintiff attempts to create a genuine issue of material fact as to his malicious prosecution and
false arrest claims by arguing that Mancini had no authority to ask Plaintiff to leave Dunkin Donuts because he was
to be patrolling the bus station and not the Dunkin’ Donuts. In support of this argument, Plaintiff produced for the
first time with his reply brief, documents related to the ownership of Dunkin’ Donuts and meeting minutes and
board disclosures from LANTA. However, Plaintiff failed to produce any of these documents in discovery.
Therefore, I am not permitted to consider them in the context of the instant motion.
However, even if I were to consider the documents belatedly produced by Plaintiff regarding the ownership of the
Dunkin’ Donuts, I find that these documents are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Dimmich, an
independent witness, testified that Allentown Police Officers were often in the bus station and the Dunkin’ Donuts
to curb illegal activity, Plaintiff often came into the store without purchasing anything, Plaintiff’s lack of a bus ticket
and his admission that he refused to leave, as well as the fact that a Dunkin’ Donuts employee asked Mancini to
have Plaintiff leave the store all show that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Mancini had probable cause
to arrest Plaintiff.
claim is analyzed under an “objective reasonableness” standard. Id. at 388. This standard
“requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” Id. at 396. Excessive force, like probable cause, is usually a question of fact, but can be
decided before trial if an officer's use of force was objectively reasonable, even viewing the facts
in favor of the plaintiff. See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 289–90 (3d Cir. 1999).
In the instant matter, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint sets forth an excessive force claim
against Defendants under the Fourth Amendment. Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s excessive
force claim must fail, whether it is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment or whether Plaintiff is
considered a pretrial detainee and his claims are therefore examined under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Leone v. Towanda Borough, 2012 WL 2590387, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 3, 2012)
(noting that the Fourth Amendment protects against excessive force used during an arrest,
whereas the Fourteenth Amendment's protections apply once an arrestee becomes a pretrial
detainee). The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from the use of excessive force by
government officials from the point of seizure until the individual seized becomes a pretrial
detainee. See Bodnar v. Wagner, 2010 WL 56097, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2010). Once the
individual becomes a pretrial detainee, “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides continuing protection.” Bodnar, 2010 WL 56097 at *6 (citing James v. York Cnty.
Police Dep't, 160 F. App'x 126, 131 (3d Cir.2005)).
“Where the seizure ends and pre-trial detention begins is a difficult question.” United
States v. Johnson, 107 F.3d 200, 207 (3d Cir.1997)). But it is clear that the Fourth Amendment
“applies to government conduct during the course of an arrest, and it continues during
transportation of an arrestee to the police station.” See Bodnar, 2010 WL 56097 at * 6; citing
Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633–34 (3d Cir.1995)). After the arrestee arrives at
the station house, however, courts consider factors such as “the length of time in custody,
whether the arrestee has been transferred out of custody of the arresting officers, and whether the
arrestee has been arraigned,” to determine whether the arrestee has become a pre-trial detainee.
Id. (citing Dull v. W. Manchaster Twp. Police Dep't., 2008 WL 717836, at *9 (M.D.Pa. Mar.17,
2008)). Clearly, any claim of excessive force that arose while Mancini was interacting with
Plaintiff at the Dunkin’ Donuts should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, as he was
merely an arrestee at that point.
As to the actions taken by the officers once Plaintiff was in the holding cell, that is a
more difficult question. The short length of time that Plaintiff had been in custody, the fact that
he was still partially in the custody of Officer Mancini, the arresting officer, and the fact that he
was arrested without a warrant and had not yet been arraigned, all lead me to the conclusion that
Plaintiff was not yet a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged excessive force in the holding
cell.2 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment.
First, as to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant
Mancini for his actions at the Dunkin’ Donuts, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint only alleges that
Mancini lent “verbal and physical support” to Officer Sbat, who allegedly struck Plaintiff four
times at the store. Further, the Amended Complaint also states that Officer Sbat hit Plaintiff and
attacked Plaintiff while handcuffed at the Dunkin’ Donuts. However, the record clearly shows
2 The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether pretrial detainees can bring excessive force claims under the
Fourth Amendment. Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th 187, 194 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2021), citing Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 408 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10 (1989).
that Officer Mancini was at the Dunkin’ Donuts alone and Officer Sbat was not present at the
time Plaintiff was taken into custody. ECF No. 62, Ex. A, pp. 17-18. As Plaintiff fails to plead
that Officer Mancini used any force against him at the Dunkin’ Donuts, this claim must fail.
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff had pled Officer Mancini took actions at the Dunkin’
Donuts against Plaintiff, this claim still must fail. Dimmich testified that she did not see Mancini
strike Plaintiff at any time. The summary judgment record is void of any credible evidence that
Mancini used any force against Plaintiff at the Dunkin’ Donuts. Accordingly, this claim must
fail.
Next, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against the officers for actions
taken in the holding cell must be examined. A law enforcement officer's use of excessive force
during an arrest or investigatory stop constitutes an unlawful “seizure” under the Fourth
Amendment. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394; Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, 381 F.3d 235, 240
(3d Cir.2004). To determine whether specific conduct qualifies as excessive force, the court must
examine its objective “reasonableness.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–96. The court should consider
the severity of the crime, the suspect's “immediate threat” to the safety of officers or others,
resistance to arrest, attempts to flee, and access to weapons. Id. at 396; Couden v. Duffy, 446
F.3d 483, 497 (3d Cir.2006). The court should also consider the duration of the law enforcement
officer's use of force, whether the officer was attempting to effect an arrest, and the presence of
accomplices. Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir.1997) (abrogated on other grounds
by Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199 (3d Cir.2007)). The court must examine the use of force from
“the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” without the benefit of hindsight. Graham,
490 U.S. at 396.
Regarding the officers’ conduct in the holding cell, it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s wrist
was broken during his interaction with Officers Sbat and Mancini. To determine whether the
force used by the officers was objectively unreasonable, I must examine the factors set forth
above. Plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct and defiant trespass, which are not severe
crimes. He did not have access to weapons or make any attempt to flee. However, a review of the
video showing Plaintiff’s interaction with the officers in the holding cell shows that he was
extremely resistant to arrest. Plaintiff claims that he tried to comply with the officers’ requests
that he remove his ring and that they refused to wait for him to do so. However, that is
completely contradicted by the video evidence. Rather, Plaintiff was belligerent, used excessive
profanity and absolutely refused to remove the ring from his finger.
The video evidence shows that Plaintiff was combative and resistant from the very
beginning of his interactions with the officers, and that continued up to the time when he was
asked to remove his ring. In fact, he told the officers that they would need to “cut his finger off”
in order to remove his ring. In response to that type of behavior by Plaintiff, Mancini placed
handcuffs on Plaintiff and Sbat attempted to remove the ring. Sbat was forced to resort to using a
wrist lock on Plaintiff to force him to unclench his fist after Plaintiff balled his fist up and
refused to open it. Further, the duration of the use of force was short, as seen in the video. In fact,
the time from when Plaintiff was handcuffed to the time when Sbat managed to remove the ring
was less than thirty seconds. Because Plaintiff was extremely resistant to his arrest, as well as the
short period of time that force was applied to his wrist to remove the ring, I find that there is no
genuine issue of material fact that the force used by the officers was objectively reasonable.3
3 Plaintiff argues that because the General Orders of the Allentown Police Department do not specify that a detainee
cannot wear jewelry, the officers’ actions in using a wrist lock to remove the ring was unreasonable. However, this
does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Courts in this Circuit have held that a “policy manual does not
Therefore, I will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff’s claims.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and this case is dismissed.
An appropriate order follows.
have the force of law and does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation." Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F. Supp. 2d
532 (M.D. Pa. 2008).