EDWARDS v. RICE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GERALD EDWARDS, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION

KAREN B. RICE-SMITH,

Defendant : No. 19-3559

MEMORANDUM

PRATTER, J. JUNE 8, 2022

Gerald Edwards filed this pro se sutt against Karen B. Rice-Smith, an Environmental

Protection Specialist with the Bucks County Department of Health who issued a health code

violation for debris and animals on the Edwards property. After the Court partially granted Ms.

Rice-Smith’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Edwards’s sole remaining claim is a Fourth Amendment

claim for an unlawful search. Mr. Edwards and Ms. Rice-Smith have each filed motions for

summary judgment and other motions.

Because Mr. Edwards has conducted no discovery, has not responded to any discovery

requests, and has produced no admissible evidence in support of his claim, together with the

substantive merits of the defense motion, the Court will grant Ms. Rice-Smith’s motion for

summary judgment and deny Mr. Edwards’s motions.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Rice-Smith is an Environmental Protection Specialist for Bucks County. In this role,

she visited Mr. Edwards’s property at 1652 Prospect Ave, Langhorne, PA 19047 on two occasions:

September 14, 2017 and March 15, 2018. Only the second visit is at issue in this litigation. See

Sept. 30, 2021 Op, at 11, Doc. No. 23.

Between the two visits, Ms. Rice-Smith issued an Official Notice of Violation of the Bucks

County Health Department Rules and Regulations to Mr. Edwards on October 4, 2017. This notice

outlined several health code violations and instructed him to clean up the property within 90 days.

On March 15, 2018, Ms. Rice-Smith returned to the property with her supervisor, Richard

Flack, to see if the conditions there had improved. When Ms. Rice-Smith and Mr. Flack arrived

at the property, several police officers were in the process of arresting Mr. Edwards. Ms. Rice-

Smith and Mr. Flack did not move or touch anything on the property and did not use any devices

to enhance their view. Ms. Rice-Smith heard chickens and, according to her affidavit, she then

called the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) to come to the property out of

concern for the chickens.

The next day, Mr. Edwards received a citation for the condition of his property. Ms. Rice-

Smith and Mr. Flack both stated in their sworn affidavits that “[e]verything that formed the basis

for the citation was observable on the Property by the naked eye.” Rice-Smith Affidavit { 8, Flack

Affidavit 4 9, Doc. No, 32-2. Mr. Edwards was later found guilty of six health code violations

related to chickens (dead and alive), beehives, and debris on the property.

Mr. Edwards raised a variety of claims. The Court dismissed all claims except the Fourth

Amendment search claim for the second visit.! Mr. Edwards has not responded to Ms. Rice-

Smith’s discovery requests and has conducted no discovery of his own.

' Ina recent letter to the Court, Mr. Edwards also purports to “filfe] under 18 U.S.C. [§§] 242 & 241 for

relief’ and alleges various criminal violations by Ms. Rice-Smith’s attorneys. Doc. No. 40, at 4. He seeks

“treble exemplary damages for relief of $500,000.00 dollars.” fd. at 5. However, Mr. Edwards has not

sought leave to amend his complaint, and, in any event, it is not likely that the Court would grant such leave

at this late stage in the proceedings in the absence of very compelling reasons to do so, Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(2). Mr. Edwards alleges no facts to support claims against Ms. Rice-Smith’s attorneys, and Mr.

Edwards has had ample opportunity to assert his claims in this litigation. Additionally, Mr. Edwards does

not have standing to bring criminal charges. See Linda RS. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) □□□

private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”).

Ms. Rice-Smith and Mr. Edwards now each move for summary judgment on the Fourth

Amendment claim. Mr. Edwards also filed a motion to strike Ms. Rice-Smith’s summary

judgment motion and a motion for entry of default. For the reasons that foliow, the Court will

grant Ms. Rice-Smith’s summary judgment motion and deny Mr. Edwards’s motions.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court can grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed, R. Civ. P. 56(a), A “genuine” dispute exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). A factual dispute is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law.” Jd “Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to rebut by

making a factual showing ‘sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Power v. Lockheed

Martin Corp., 419 F. Supp. 3d 878, 888-89 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (quoting Celofex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The Court must draw factual inferences in the non-moving party’s favor.

See Doe v. CARS Prot. Plus, [nc., 527 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 2008).

Generally, “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed.’” Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting stelle vy, Gemble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). For example, the

court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by

name.” Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affs., [65 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999). “However, despite

this liberal interpretation, the same standards for summary judgment apply to pro se litigants,”

Watson v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 629 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485 (E.D. Pa. 2009). “[O]n a motion for

summary judgment, a pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under Rule 56 to point to

competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant’s motion for summary

judgment.” Dawson y. Cook, 238 F.Supp.3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “The party opposing summary judgment, whether pro se or counseled, must present

evidence, through affidavits, depositions, or admissions on file, to show that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Watson, 629 F, Supp. 2d at 485; see also Talbert vy. Corr. Dental Assocs,, No, 18-

ev-5112, 2020 WL 6530317, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2020) (“[T}he same standards for summary

judgment apply to pro se litigants. A pro se [plaintiff] is not permitted to disregard the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and is not relieved of his obligation to cite competent evidence.”).

DISCUSSION

Mz. Edwards alleges that Ms. Rice-Smith conducted a search without a warrant on March

15, 2018. Though Ms. Rice-Smith did look at Mr. Edwards’s property, she did not look anywhere

that was not in plain sight. Applying the plain view doctrine, her visit does not count as a search.

EL Ms. Rice-Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Ms, Rice-Smith argues that Mr. Edwards has not established that she conducted an illegal

search.” She has provided a sworn affidavit that she did not look into private areas of the property,

and Mr. Edwards has failed to conduct any discovery to show otherwise.

“The first step in Fourth Amendment analysis is to identify whether a search or seizure

has taken place.” United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 177 (3d Cir, 2006), Here, the inquiry

turns on whether there is evidence that Ms. Rice-Smith observed only items left outside in plain

view. If an officer merely observes “an item left in plain view,” there is no Fourth Amendment

search. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 n.4 (1983); accord Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,

* Ms. Rice-Smith submits an affidavit stating that she did not conduct a search. However, whether a search

took place under the Fourth Amendment definition of the term is a legal issue to be analyzed by the Court.

+ Mr. Edwards has not alleged or introduced any evidence of a seizure of any property.

133 n.5 (1990). This is because “a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects

privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the plain view of outsiders are not

protected because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.” Katz v. United States,

389 US. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). If “there has

been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy,” then there is no “‘search’ within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Afinnesota vy. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993),

The plain view doctrine applies to observations of environmental code violations on a

person’s property. See, e.g, Singhal v. City of Wilton Manors, No. 06-cv-61653, 2006 WL

8433166, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2006) (citing Katz and noting that “observations made from

vantage points accessible to the public of code violations exposed to the plain view are not covered

by the Fourth Amendment”). The plain view doctrine applies if an officer looks through gaps in

a fence or sees over a fence from a plane, California v. Ctraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 210 (1986), but not □

if the officer climbs over the fence, Com. v. Rood, 686 A.2d 442, 447 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). A

plain view observation also becomes a search if the officer moves the item “even a few inches.”

Arizona v, Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).

As the movant, Ms. Rice-Smith must first “point[] out to the district court... that there is

an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celofex Corp., 477 U.S, at 325.

Ms, Rice-Smith asserts that there is no genuine dispute that she did not touch anything on Mr.

Edwards’s property and that she observed only items left outside in plain view. She introduces

signed affidavits by herself and Mr, Flack, as well as her field investigation reports. Her signed

affidavit states that she did not move anything or touch anything. The field investigation report

for March 15, 2018 notes “piles of junk, wood, etc., as well as chicken coops” that Ms. Rice-Smith

observed “[t]hrough a fence that abuts Mr. Edwards[’s] house.” Doc. No. 32-1, at 26.4

Because Ms. Rice-Smith has pointed to an absence of a genuine dispute, it is Mr. Edwards’s

burden to “present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 257. Mr. Edwards asserts simply that “[a]s stated a sea[r]ch did happen.” Doc. No. 37, at

1. But he includes no evidence to support this allegation. Although he previously alleged that a

group started to “look th[rjough” items on his property, Am. Compl. at 3, he has produced no

evidence. He attaches only a notice issued to him in April 2022 requiring him to cease burning

open fires on his property. Mr. Edwards has presented no evidence that Ms. Rice-Smith observed

anything on his property besides items left outside in plain view.°

Thus, there is no dispute whether Ms. Rice-Smith observed only items left outside in plain

view. Because Mr. Edwards does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such items, Ms.

Rice-Smith did not conduct a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.’ Minnesota,

508 U.S, at 375, The Court will grant Ms. Rice-Smith’s summary judgment motion.’

‘ The investigative report is an admissible public record under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(A) becatse

it reports “factual findings from a legal authorized investigation” in a civil case. Fed. R. Evid.

803(8)(A\(iii); see Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 161-69 (1988).

> Ms. Rice-Smith’s arguments raise an interesting question regarding whether unattended animals trigger

the special needs doctrine. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 1.15 001) (In... special

needs cases, we have tolerated suspension of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant or probable-cause

requirement in part because there was no law enforcement purpose behind the searches in those cases, and

there was little, if any, entanglement with law enforcement.”). She also alludes to the concept of an

administrative (rather than investigatory) search under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Hhrert v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-12 (1996) (describing the “exemption from the need for probable cause

(and warrant), which is accorded to searches made for the purpose of inventory or administrative

regulation”). However, the Court does not reach these issues.

® The Court notes in the alternative that, even if there had been a search within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment, the limited nature of Ms. Rice-Smith’s search—looking through gaps in a fence—would likely

render the search reasonable to address her concerns about the animals on the property.

7 Ms. Rice-Smith also argues that even if there was a violation, she is entitled to qualified immunity. The

Court does not reach this arguinent because there is no dispute regarding whether a violation took place.

H. Mr. Edwards’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Mr. Edwards has also filed a motion for summary judgment on his Fourth Amendment

claim. The motion consists of numbered paragraphs that appear to respond to this Court’s opinion

granting in part and denying in part Ms, Rice-Smith’s motion to dismiss his Amended Complaint.

A party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden to show there are no

genuine disputes of material fact such that no reasonable jury could reach a verdict for the other

side, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Mr. Edwards does not provide any basis for the Court to grant

him summary judgment. Instead, he raises potential disputes that are not actually disputes. For

example, Mr. Edwards asserts that Ms. Rice-Smith is not actually employed by the state of

Pennsylvania as an Environmental Protection Specialist. Doc. No, 29 41. Ms. Rice-Smith

responds that this observation is indeed true because she is an Environmental Protection Specialist

for Bucks County, not the state of Pennsylvania. Doc. No. 33 {1.8 Mr. Edwards does not explain

why this would be relevant to granting him summary judgment.

Mr. Edwards also introduces the following attachments: a printout from the Pennsylvania

Department of Environmental Protection’s website regarding its emergency response program, the

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection’s Environmental Complaint Form; a

printout of the text of Fourth Amendment; excerpts of certain state and county regulations; a copy

of his code violation citation; and transcript excerpts from his hearing for the health code

violations. None of these exhibits show a genuine dispute of any material fact.

Because Mr. Edwards has not met his burden, the Court will deny Mr. Edwards’s motion

for summary judgment.

8 Mr. Edwards also asserts that Ms. Rice-Smith’s references to livestock are “fabrications” and are not in

the field reports. Doc. No. 29 4 19. To the extent this is a dispute regarding whether chickens and roosters

count as “livestock,” it is not relevant to the Fourth Amendment claim. See also Livestock (def. 1), Oxford

English Dictionary (3d ed.) (“[d]omestic animals kept on a farm for use or profit”).

Ik]. Motion to Strike

Mr. Edwards also moved to strike Ms. Rice-Smith’s motion for summary judgment under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). This rule pertains to “any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter” in a “pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f}. A motion for summary

judgment is not a pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7{a) (listing forms of pleadings). Additionally,

Mr, Edwards identifies no “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” for the Court

to strike. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Thus, the Court will deny Mr. Edwards’s motion to strike.

IV. Motion for Entry of Default

Lastly, Mr. Edwards filed a motion for entry of default against Ms. Rice-Smith under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). He appears to assert that she had not yet responded to his

motion for summary judgment. She has since filed a response. See Doc. No, 33, Either way, Rule

55(a) applies to parties who fail to “plead or otherwise defend” against a complaint. Here, Ms.

Rice-Smith filed her answer on October 14, 2021, This was a timely response because it was 14

days after the Court partially denied her motion to dismiss, Fed, R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A). Because

Ms. Rice-Smith is not in default, the Court will deny Mr. Edwards’s motion for entry of default.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Ms. Rice-Smith’s motion for summary

judgment and denies Mr. Edwards’s motions. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

ke SKE

GENFVE.K. PRATTER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE