HIGHTOWER v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RICHARD HIGHTOWER, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

NO. 21-4075-KSM

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

MARSTON, J. April 14, 2022

Tragically, Plaintiff Richard Hightower was violently attacked by his cellmate while

incarcerated at Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility (“CFCF”). Hightower suffered severe

and permanent injuries and was rendered a quadriplegic. (Doc. No. 22.) Hightower brings this

action against Defendants City of Philadelphia (the “City”), Warden John Delaney, Sergeant

Shantel Major, Corizon Health, Inc., and Nurse Danielle McGettigan (collectively,

“Defendants”), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.) Hightower alleges that, by housing him with a

violent inmate and failing to intervene after his cellmate threatened to kill him, Defendants failed

to protect him, acted with deliberate indifference to his safety, and violated his Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.)

The City moves to dismiss, arguing that Hightower has failed to show that the City can

be held liable under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978) because he has not alleged that his constitutional rights were violated by a City practice,

policy, or custom. (Doc. No. 23 at 8–10.) The City also argues that Hightower’s Monell claim

must be dismissed to the extent it is premised on the City’s failure to train its employees because

Hightower does not allege prior instances of misconduct or a pattern of behavior by the City’s

untrained employees. (Id. at 10.) Hightower opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 24.)

For the reasons discussed below, we deny the City’s motion.

I. Factual Background

Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the relevant facts are as follows.

A. Hightower Arrives at CFCF

On September 13, 2019, Hightower, a 58-year-old male,1 arrived at CFCF, where he was

held on non-violent charges. (Doc. No. 22 at ¶ 66.) Hightower was housed in an intake unit,

Unit B1, Pod 4, and was assigned to Cell 21, Bed 3. (Id. at ¶¶ 67, 76, 78.)

B. Tyler Arrives at CFCF and Is Transferred Shortly Thereafter

The month prior, on August 19, Anthony Tyler, a 25-year-old male,2 entered CFCF,

where he was held on violent charges, including aggravated assault, criminal trespass, terroristic

threats, recklessly endangering another person, burglary, possessing an instrument of crime,

simple assault, and criminal mischief. (Id. at ¶ 68.) At the time of his arrival, Tyler had

“multiple stab wounds to his body.” (Id. at ¶ 69.)

That same day, Tyler was transferred to the Detention Center (“DC”) and admitted to the

infirmary for medical treatment of his stab wounds. (Id. at ¶ 70.) Two days later, on August 21,

a nurse medically cleared Tyler of tuberculosis and the DC Infirmary/Public Health Services

Wing (“PHSW”) medically cleared Tyler for housing. (Id. at ¶ 71.)

1 Hightower was 5 feet, 9 inches tall and weighed approximately 165 pounds at the time. (Id. at ¶ 93.)

2 Tyler was 6 feet tall and weighed approximately 182 pounds at the time. (Id. at ¶ 94.)

C. Tyler Returns to CFCF and Is Housed With Hightower, Notwithstanding His

Violent Tendencies and History of Institutional Violence

The next month, on September 13, the same day Hightower arrived, Tyler returned to

CFCF, at which point he was evaluated by Nurse McGettigan and “improperly placed back on

the intake unit.” (Id. at ¶¶ 72–73; see also id. at ¶ 76 (“Because Inmate Tyler was classified on

August 21, 2019 at DC PHSW, he should not have been housed in intake upon his return to

CFCF.”); id. at ¶ 78 (“Tyler was angry for being improperly placed back in an intake unit.”).)3

The following evening, on September 14 around 5:40 p.m., Tyler was assigned to Bed 1

in Hightower’s cell, Cell 21. (Id. at ¶ 77.) CFCF made this assignment notwithstanding Tyler’s

“history of violent behavior and of violence against other inmates and staff” and the fact that

Tyler “suffered from serious mental health illness.” (Id. at ¶ 62; see also id. at ¶ 96; id. at ¶ 109

(“At all times, it was known by the Defendants that Anthony Tyler was a violent offender, with a

violent criminal history, a history of institutional violence, and severe mental health illness.”).)

Tyler was on the “behavioral health caseload” and “was listed as having ‘SMI’ (Serious Mental

Illness).” (Id. at ¶ 95.) In addition, when incarcerated in the past, Tyler had been involved in

fights and had acted violently and/or threatened violence towards staff members and other

inmates within City-operated prison facilities.4 (See id. at ¶ 98 (describing an October 19, 2016

3 Hightower alleges that upon Tyler’s return to CFCF, the correctional staff also incorrectly handled the

requisite medical clearances and intake screenings. (See id. at ¶ 74 (“Upon information and belief, when

Inmate Tyler returned to CFCF, the correctional staff did not receive a medical clearance confirmation per

protocol.”); id. at ¶ 75 (“Upon Inmate Tyler’s return to CFCF, neither the time keeping officer nor the

receiving room nor any other CFCF staff members contacted the triage nurse or any staff members at DC

PHSW to see if Inmate Tyler had his intake screening completed and to learn if he was medically cleared

before being housed.”).)

4 The Court takes judicial notice of Tyler’s First Judicial District of Pennsylvania criminal docket, which

is a matter of public record. See Big Red Mgmt. Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., --- F. Supp. 3d --- , Civil

Action No. 20-2113-KSM, 2022 WL 79623, at *2 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2022) (“On a motion to dismiss,

courts may take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Lapensohn v. Hudson City Savings Bank,

Civil Action No. 19-4576-KSM, 2021 WL 1581402, at *1 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2021) (“In evaluating a

motion to dismiss, we may consider documents that are attached to or submitted with the complaint, and

institutional fighting charge against Tyler, which arose “in connection with an incident in which

he was fighting with another inmate while returning to his housing area.); id. at ¶ 100 (detailing a

June 7, 2017 institutional charge Tyler received for “disturbing other inmates or staff, refu[sing]

to comply with a valid order, and threatening harm, in connection with an incident in which he

was screaming, banging on his bed, and kicking the walls”); id. at ¶ 101 (noting that on July 7,

2017, Tyler was “charged institutionally with fighting, and disturbing other inmates or staff”

because he got into a fight with another inmate, during which “both inmates were injured”); id. at

¶ 104 (explaining that on September 27, 2017, Tyler received an institutional charge “in

connection with an incident in which he was fighting with another inmate and banging on the

gate of a cell”); id. at ¶ 105 (noting that on October 9, 2017, Tyler “was again charged

institutionally with fighting in connection with an incident in which he was violently beating his

cellmate”).)

Further, Tyler had committed other violent crimes and made threats of violence outside

of the institutional setting. (See id. at ¶ 99 (stating that on May 2, 2017, Tyler was arrested and

charged with, among other things, “Terroristic Threats with Intent to Terrorize Another and

Stalking – Repeatedly Commit Acts to Cause Fear,” and that on July 20, 2017, he pleaded guilty

to the former charge); id. at ¶ 99 (noting that on August 18, 2019, Tyler was arrested and charged

with aggravated assault and simple assault, among other things).) During his prior

incarcerations, Tyler had been placed in segregated housing to protect other inmates given his

any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of

public record, orders, and items appearing in the record of the case.” (quoting Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch.

Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006)); see also Coyle v. Talbert, Criminal Action No. 20-CR-195-

KSM, 2020 WL 3960431, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2020) (taking judicial notice of state court criminal

docket because it is a matter of public record). This docket shows that Tyler’s prior arrests, including

those detailed in the amended complaint involving violence, occurred in Philadelphia County and as such

Tyler would have been housed within prison and correctional facilities operated by the City.

violence tendencies. (Id. at ¶ 108 (“Throughout Inmate Tyler’s various incarcerations, his

violent conduct caused him to be placed in segregated housing to keep him from harming other

inmates.”).)

D. Tyler Begins to Act Out and Ultimately Assaults Hightower

After he was placed in Cell 21 with Hightower on September 14, Tyler “began to act out”

and threatened to harm Hightower. (Id. at ¶ 79.) Then, on the evening of September 15, Tyler

“bang[ed] on the door to Cell 21 and scream[ed] out,” making “threats of violence” against

Hightower. (Id. at ¶ 80.)

At some point, Sergeant Major, who was assigned to the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift

covering their unit and pod, went to their cell. (Id. at ¶ 81.) Tyler complained to Sergeant Major

that his cell and “cellee” (i.e., Hightower) were “dirty” and demanded to be moved from that

cell. (Id. at ¶ 82.) Sergeant Major denied Tyler’s request and informed “him that no cell

changes would be made until the 7 [a.m.] to 3 [p.m.] shift.” (Id. at ¶ 83.) “Tyler responded that

if he could not get out of his cell then he would kill his cellmate, [Hightower].” (Id. at ¶ 84.)

Notwithstanding Tyler’s menacing threats to kill Hightower, Sergeant Major did nothing. (Id. at

¶¶ 85–86.)

Later that evening, Hightower fell asleep on the top bunk. (See id. at ¶ 87.) Tyler

grabbed Hightower off the top bunk, pulled him to the cement floor, and “proceeded to brutally

punch and kick [Hightower] [in] the face, upper body, and chest.” (Id.) After the vicious attack,

Sergeant Major entered their cell and pepper sprayed Tyler in the face. (Id. at ¶ 88.) However,

Sergeant Major left the cell when Tyler “came toward her.” (Id.)

Afterwards, once the responding officers arrived, Tyler was handcuffed5 and taken to the

5 As a result of the incident, Tyler was charged “with assault non-staff w/ injuries, assault on inmate by

inmate, disrespecting any staff member, disturbing other inmates or staff, fighting if injury results/weapon

medical unit, while Hightower was transported from his cell to Jefferson Torresdale Hospital.

(Id. at ¶¶ 89–90.) Later, Hightower was airlifted to Thomas Jefferson University Hospital due to

the severity of his injuries. (Id. at ¶ 90.) Doctors worked to treat Hightower’s injuries, but

Tyler’s attack left Hightower paralyzed. (Id. at ¶ 91.)

II. Legal Standard

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must determine whether

the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Although we must accept as true the allegations in the complaint, we are not “compelled to

accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation.” Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2017) (quotation marks

omitted). In other words, a “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which

there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President

of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). “Conclusory assertions of fact and

legal conclusions are not entitled to the same presumption.” Id.

III. Discussion

Hightower brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that Defendants violated his

rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Section 1983 states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

used, refusal to comply with a valid order, and violating any other posted rule or reg[ulation].” (Id. at

¶ 93.) He was found guilty of all charges. (Id.)

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Local governments and municipalities are considered persons under § 1983.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. A governmental entity, however, “may not be held liable for

constitutional torts under § 1983 on a vicarious liability theory rooted in respondeat superior.”

Mulholland v. County of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013). There are two different ways

for a § 1983 claim against a municipality to proceed: “a plaintiff may allege a constitutional

violation caused by the municipal defendant’s ‘official policies and customs,’” or a plaintiff may

“allege municipal liability through a ‘failure-or-inadequacy’ claim.” Benson v. Delaware

County, Civil Action No. 21-2854, 2022 WL 784475, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2022) (cleaned

up); see also Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019).

Here, the City argues that Hightower’s § 1983 claim against it must be dismissed because

Hightower has failed to allege sufficient facts to proceed under either theory. (Doc. No. 23.) We

address each theory in turn, as the “avenues” for stating the two types of Monell claims are

“distinct.” See Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106 (“Although we have acknowledged the close

relationship between policy-and-custom claims and failure-or-inadequacy claims, the avenues

remain distinct: a plaintiff alleging that a policy or custom led to his or her injuries must be

referring to an unconstitutional policy or custom, and a plaintiff alleging failure-to-supervise,

train, or discipline must show that said failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the

constitutional rights of those affected.”); see also Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d

789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (“The pleading requirements are different for failure-to-train claims

because a plaintiff need not allege an unconstitutional policy.”).

A. Policy-or-Custom Claim

1. Relevant Law

To proceed with a policy-or-custom claim, a plaintiff must plead that there is “an

unconstitutional municipal policy or custom.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105. The plaintiff must

“identify the challenged policy, attribute it to the city itself, and show a causal link between

execution of the policy and the injury suffered.” Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903,

910 (3d Cir. 1984). “Policy is made when a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish

municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.”

Mulholland, 706 F.3d at 237 (cleaned up); see also Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105 (“[A] plaintiff

presenting an unconstitutional policy must point to the official proclamation, policy or edict by a

decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish municipal policy on the relevant subject.”).

And a “course of conduct is considered to be a ‘custom’ when, though not authorized by law,

such practices of state officials are so permanent and well-settled as to virtually constitute law.”

Mulholland, 706 F.3d at 237 (cleaned up); see also Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105–06 (“[I]f alleging a

custom, the plaintiff must evince a course of conduct so well-settled and permanent as to

virtually constitute law.”). “To show causation, [the plaintiff] may allege a municipal Defendant

was aware of similar unlawful conduct in the past, but failed to take precautions against future

violations and this failure, at least in part, led to the injuries in question.” Benson, 2022 WL

784475, at *3; see also Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (same).

2. Hightower’s Allegations

In his amended complaint, Hightower alleges that the City maintained a litany of policies,

practices, or customs related to its housing, placement, and classification that resulted in the

violation of his constitutional rights. (See generally Doc. No. 22.) Hightower pleads, inter alia,

that the City had the following customs or practices: “placing and/or housing violent offenders

in cells with other inmates” (id. at ¶ 24; see also id. at ¶¶ 26, 29); “placing and/or housing violent

offenders in cells with non-violent inmates” (id. at ¶ 25); “placing and/or housing inmates with a

history of violence against other inmates and/or prison staff in cells with other inmates” (id. at

¶ 27); “placing and/or housing inmates with severe mental health illness in cells with other

inmates” (id. at ¶ 28); “ignoring threats of harm made by inmates against other inmates” (id. at

¶ 30); “failing to timely respond to threats of harm made by inmates against other inmates” (id. at

¶ 31); “failing to immediately remove an inmate from a cell when the inmate is threatening to

commit violence against his cellmate” (id. at ¶ 32); “failing to adhere to classification protocols

related to inmate housing to ensure the safety of other inmates” (id. at ¶ 34); and “failing to

identify and respond to the improper placement and/or housing of inmates with violent

tendencies and/or a history of violence and/or mental illness” (id. at ¶ 36).

3. Analysis

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Hightower, the Court finds that

Hightower has sufficiently alleged that the City maintained a custom or policy that violated his

constitutional rights.6

Williams v. Delaware County Board of Prison Inspectors involves somewhat similar

facts and is instructive. Civil Action No. 17-4348, 2018 WL 4558190 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2018).

In that case, the plaintiff asserted a Monell claim, alleging that the defendants—the County, the

Board of Prisons, and Community Education Centers, Inc. (“CEC”)—maintained a policy or

6 The City does not appear to dispute that Hightower has a constitutional right to be free from inmate

violence. (See generally Doc. No. 23.) Although Hightower does not specifically plead that he was a

pretrial detainee, it appears as if that was the case from the fact that he entered CFCF on charges shortly

before he was attacked, in which case his constitutional rights arise under the Fourteenth Amendment.

See Benson, 2022 WL 784475, at *2 (“As he was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged attack, the

claims arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. It provides protections at least as

great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.” (cleaned up)).

custom of housing pre-trial detainees with violence-prone inmates, and that the Prison Board and

CEC failed to protect him. Id. at *1, *11. In particular, the plaintiff alleged “CEC and the Prison

Board violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from inmate

violence; the Prison Board and CEC have a policy or custom of holding pre-trial ‘protective

custody’ detainees with violent prone inmates depriving him of his constitutional rights; [and]

the Prison Board and CEC knew [the plaintiff’s] status as a protective custody detainee and knew

of violent prone inmates but nonetheless ‘mixed him in’ with violent prone inmates with

deliberate indifference.” Id. at *12. Noting that the plaintiff had a “clearly established

constitutional right to have prison officials protect him from inmate violence,” the court held that

the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss his

Monell claim. Id. (“At the pleading stage, [the plaintiff] plausibly alleges a policy or custom of

housing pre-trial protective custody detainees with violent prone inmates in violation of his

constitutional right to be free from inmate violence.”).

So too here. Hightower has identified a number of customs and practices, such as

housing inmates with a history of violence or severe mental health illness in cells with other

inmates (see Doc. No. 22 at ¶¶ 24–34, 36), which he alleges resulted in improper placements that

allowed Tyler to attack him (see id. at ¶¶ 40, 45, 52). Hightower has also alleged that Tyler had

a history of violent behavior against other inmates and prison staff; Hightower specifically

alleges other instances of institutional violence by Tyler that occurred at other City-operated

correctional facilities,7 separate and apart from the violent incident involving Hightower. (Id. at

¶¶ 98, 100–01, 105–06.) See Benson, 2022 WL 784475, at *3 (“To show causation, [the

plaintiff] may allege a municipal Defendant was aware of similar unlawful conduct in the past,

7 See supra n.4.

but failed to take precautions against future violations and this failure, at least in part, led to the

injuries in question.”); see also Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (same). The Court finds that

these allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See Williams, 2018 WL

4558190.

Because Hightower has plausibly alleged a specific policy or custom violated his right to

be free from inmate violence, the Court denies the City’s motion to dismiss the policy-or-custom

Monell claim.

B. Failure-or-Inadequacy Claim

1. Relevant Law

“A claim predicated on a failure or inadequacy is subject to the ‘separate, but equally

demanding requirement of demonstrating’ the alleged failure or inadequacy amounts to

‘deliberate indifference.’” Benson, 2022 WL 784475, at *4 (quoting Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106);

see also Wood v. Williams, 568 F. App’x 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Failure to train can be the

basis of Monell liability when the municipality’s ‘failure to train reflects deliberate indifference

to constitutional rights.’” (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989))).

“Additionally, the identified deficiency in a city’s training program must be closely related to the

ultimate injury; or in other words, the deficiency in training must have actually caused the

constitutional violation.” Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014)

(cleaned up).

To state a failure-or-inadequacy claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) municipal

policymakers knew that employees would confront a particular situation, (2) the situation

involved a difficult choice or there was a history of employees mishandling the situation, and (3)

an employee making the wrong choice would frequently cause deprivation of constitutional

rights. Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106; Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798.

“Ordinarily, a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is

necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Thomas, 749

F.3d at 223 (cleaned up); see also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (“Without

notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be

said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional

rights.”). However, “a single incident may be enough where it is ‘so obvious’ the specific failure

will result in a constitutional violation.” Benson, 2022 WL 784475, at *4 (cleaned up); see also

Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10 (explaining that when a city arms its police officers with firearms,

“the need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force can be said

to be so obvious that failure to do so could properly be characterized as ‘deliberate indifference’

to constitutional rights”); Thomas, 749 F.3d at 223. Contra Connick, 563 U.S. at 63–64 (holding

that failure to train prosecutors on their Brady obligations did not fall within the “narrow range

of . . . single-incident liability” since lawyers, as opposed to the average public employee,

already have legal training).

2. Hightower’s Allegations

Here, Hightower alleges that the City “failed to properly train, supervise, and/or monitor

correctional officers and supervisors” on the “the appropriate placement and/or housing of

inmates with violent tendencies and/or a history of violence and/or mental health illness such as

inmate Tyler” (Doc. No. 22 at ¶ 152; see also id. at ¶ 155) and how “to identify, prevent, and

intervene in assaultive conduct” (id. at ¶ 153).8

8 Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 799 n.7 (“We consider allegations of failure to train, supervise, and

discipline together because they fall under the same species of municipal liability.”).

3. Analysis

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Hightower, the Court finds that

Hightower has pleaded sufficient facts to support a failure-or-inadequacy train claim based on a

pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees. Hightower alleges that the

City owns, operates, maintains, and is responsible for its prison and correctional facilities

including CFCF. (Doc. No. 22 at ¶ 6.) Hightower alleges the City was aware of Tyler’s history

of institutional violence because he engaged in multiple other incidents of violence while housed

in the City’s prisons and correctional facilities.9 (Id. at ¶¶ 98, 100–01, 105–06.) Taking these

allegations together, Hightower has alleged that the City’s prison and correctional facility

employees have encountered other instances of inmate-on-inmate violence within the

Philadelphia prison system sufficient to plead the requisite pattern of constitutional violations

needed to establish deliberate indifference for his failure to train claim. Accordingly, the Court

denies the City’s motion to dismiss Hightower’s failure to train claim to the extent it is based on

this theory.

The Court also concludes that Hightower has stated a failure-or-inadequacy claim based

on a single incident. On a motion to dismiss, the defendant bears the burden of showing that the

plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim, and the City has not done so here; rather, the City

focused exclusively on Hightower’s failure to plead facts showing a pattern of constitutional

violations and never addressed the single incident theory. (See Doc. No. at 10.) See Ford v.

County of Mercer, Civil Action No. 14-0648(FLW), 2016 WL 781877, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 29,

2016) (“The Court also declines to dismiss the Monell claim based on failure to train because the

County Defendants have not carried their burden to show that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for

9 See supra n.4.

relief based on . . . a single incident theory of liability. In [their] reply brief, the County

Defendants argue that Connick does not permit a failure to train based on the ‘single incident’ of

housing Defendant Gaines and Boones together, and that Connick permits ‘single incident’

failure to train claims only in situations where the failure to train is ‘patently obvious,’ but

provide no further analysis of the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint. As such, they have

failed to meet their ‘burden of showing that no claim has been presented.’” (citations omitted)).

Here, drawing all inferences in Hightower’s favor, the Court finds that Hightower has

pleaded facts to state a failure to train claim based on a single incident.

Reynolds v. Municipality of Norristown is instructive. There, the plaintiff was involved

in a car accident, and the police officers who arrived at the scene found the plaintiff showing

signs of a head injury—he was “confused, disoriented, and unable to stand, walk, or respond to

the officers’ questions.” Civil Action No. 15–0016, 2015 WL 4450979, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 17,

2017). The officers arrested the plaintiff for driving under the influence (even though there was

no evidence of alcohol or a controlled substance), transported him to the detention facility, and

threw him into a holding cell. Id. Many hours later, the plaintiff was finally transported to a

hospital, and medical professionals discovered hemorrhaging in his brain. Id. at *3. The

plaintiff asserted a failure to train claim against the municipality, alleging that the police officers

were not trained to differentiate a head injury from drug or alcohol use in car accident victims

and that when there is no detectable sign of alcohol or drug use, police officers should first

transport accident victims to a hospital to be evaluated for medical conditions. Id. at *11.

The court denied the municipal defendant’s motion to dismiss the failure-or-inadequacy

claim, holding that although the plaintiff did not state a claim based on a similar pattern of

constitutional violations, he did state a claim based on the single incident theory. Id. at *12. The

court reasoned that the municipality “know[s] to a moral certainty that their police officers will

be required to respond to incidents in which persons who come into their custody have suffered

serious, and sometimes life-threatening, injuries” and that under the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, police officers must provide medical care to pretrial detainees. Id. The

court continued: “The need to train officers how to differentiate between serious head injuries

and intoxication, where those officers have been given the discretion to decide whether to

provide medical treatment to victims of motor vehicle accidents, is so obvious, that the failure to

do so could properly be characterized as deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.” Id.

Hightower alleges that the City failed to train its correctional officers on how to prevent,

identify, and intervene in assaultive conduct. As in Reynolds, the City knows to a moral

certainty that its correctional officers will be required to respond to incidents in which cellmates

threaten to assault or harm their cellmates, and pretrial detainees have a constitutional right to be

free from inmate violence. The need to train correctional officers on how to respond to threats of

violence where one cellmate explicitly threatens to harm another cellmate and those officers

have been given the discretion to decide whether to remove one of the cellmates from the

situation “is so obvious, that the failure to do so could properly be characterized as deliberate

indifference to constitutional rights.”

Accordingly, the Court denies the City’s motion to dismiss the failure-or-inadequacy

claim based on both the pattern of similar conduct theory and the single incident theory.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the City’s motion.

An appropriate Order follows.