WHITE v. MASSINI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIE WHITE, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-CV-1230

:

DARREL MASSINI, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

ROBRENO, J. APRIL 13, 2022

Plaintiff Willie White, an inmate at Lehigh County Jail (“LCJ”), filed this civil right

action pro se naming as Defendants Correctional Officer Darrel Massini, Cliff Knappenberger,

“L.C.J. Prison,” Director Janine Donate, Warden Kyle Russel, and Sgt. Victor Pachionni. Each

is sued in his or her individual and official capacities. White seeks leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant White leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismiss his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

White’s allegations are brief and not entirely clear. He asserts “there was a PREA

incident” involving Defendant Massini. (Compl. (ECF No. 2) at 5.)1 White asserts that, while

he was having a diabetic episode in early 2021, he remembers being shaken awake by a non-

defendant named Sgt. Shaeffer. (Id.) As he was coming to, he felt sexually aroused and saw

Defendant Massini’s hand under his shirt. (Id.) Massini then moved his hand to White’s navel

area and started rubbing his stomach. He states, “a man knows when he’s been touched there,

trust me.” (Id.) He was told to report to the medical unit after he requested mental health

1 The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.

services. (Id.) White believes there was a 12-hour investigation for which he was not called to

participate. (Id.) He seeks money damages and to have Defendant Massini fired and “suspend

his minions that harassed me.” (Id.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant White leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he

is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.2 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss White’s Complaint if it fails to state a claim. The

Court must determine whether the Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quotations omitted). ‘“At this early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the

facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the

plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts

sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.’” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir.

2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory

allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As White is proceeding pro se, the Court

construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v.

Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

III. DISCUSSION

White seeks money damages for unspecified constitutional claims. The vehicle by which

federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is Section 1983 of Title 42 of the

United States Code, which provides in part:

2 Because White is a prisoner, he must still pay the $350 filing fee in installments as required by

the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988).

A. Claims Against Defendant Massini

White appears to assert that he was sexually assaulted by Defendant Massini and asserts

it was a “PREA incident.” To the extent that White seeks to bring a claim under the Prison Rape

Elimination Act, that claim is not plausible. “While the PREA was intended in part to increase

the accountability of prison officials and to protect the Eighth Amendment rights of Federal,

State, and local prisoners, nothing in the language of the statute establishes a private right of

action.” See Walsh v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-2442, 2017 WL 3835666, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug.

31, 2017); see also Williams v. Wetzel, 827 F. App’x 158, 162 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“to

the extent that Williams sought to bring stand-alone civil claims under the PREA and the

Pennsylvania Crimes Code, the District Court did not err in rejecting those claims on the basis

that Williams failed to identify a private right of action for either”); Krieg v. Steele, 599 F. App’x

231, 232 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that “other courts addressing this issue have found that the

PREA does not establish a private cause of action”); Frederick v. Snyder Cty. Prison, No. 18-

707, 2019 WL 1348436, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2019) (same). Thus, White cannot “bring a

private action to enforce obligations set forth in the PREA, whether through the statute itself or

through [an] attempt to enforce the [institution’s] PREA policy via section 1983.” See Bowens v.

Emps. of the Dep’t of Corr., No. 14-2689, 2016 WL 3269580, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2016),

aff’d sub nom., Bowens v. Wetzel, 674 F. App’x 133, 137 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam).

Moreover, to the extent White challenges the quality of the investigation into his PREA

complaints, he has no freestanding right to such an investigation. See Graw v. Fantasky, 68 F.

App’x 378, 383 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that “an allegation of a failure to investigate, without

another recognizable constitutional right, is not sufficient to sustain a section 1983 claim.”).

Accordingly, any claims premised upon violations of the PREA must be dismissed as a matter of

law.

To the extent that White asserts a constitutional claim based on the alleged assault, the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees like White. Jacobs

v. Cumberland Cty., 8 F.4th 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535

(1979)).3 The sexual assault claim is analyzed in the same manner as an excessive force claim.

See Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 473-74 (3d Cir. 2018) (stating that although the Supreme

Court has not addressed sexual abuse of inmates by prison officials, courts have held that the

framework for excessive force claims “has evolved to encompass claims for sexual abuse and

harassment by prison officials as well”). In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court explained

that it was “clear” that the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees from “the use

of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989).

“Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both objective and subjective

components.” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Ricks, 891 F.3d at

3 The Jacobs Court noted that the United States Supreme Court has not yet determined

whether pretrial detainees can bring excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment.

Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 194, n.4 (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 408 (2015) (Alito, J.,

dissenting)).

474 (employing the objective and subjective components test in sexual assault/excessive force

context). “[T]he objective component requires an inquiry into whether the deprivation was

sufficiently serious and the subjective component asks whether the officials acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). In that

regard, a “‘particular measure amounts to punishment when there is a showing of express intent

to punish on the part of detention facility officials, when the restriction or condition is not

rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive government purpose, or when the restriction is

excessive in light of that purpose.’” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 373 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting

Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68); see also Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 504 (3d Cir. 2017). Courts

should consider the totality of the circumstances in evaluating such a claim. Bistrian, 696 F.3d

at 373 (“In evaluating a pretrial detainee’s claim of unconstitutional punishment, courts must

examine the totality of the circumstances within the institution.”). Furthermore, “[i]n

determining whether restrictions or conditions are reasonably related to the Government’s

interest in maintaining security and order and operating the institution in a manageable fashion,”

courts are obligated to keep in mind that “such considerations are peculiarly within the province

and professional expertise of corrections officials . . . .” Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68 n.3.

Plausible allegations of sexual assault meet the standard of impermissible punishment

because sexual assault cannot and does not serve a legitimate governmental objective. In E.D. v.

Sharkey, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that an immigration

detainee, who is entitled to the same due process protections as pretrial detainees, had a clearly

established right “not to be sexually assaulted by a state employee while in confinement,” and

the detainee’s sexual assault allegations against the employee “set forth a plausible violation of

her right to personal bodily integrity protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” 928 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2019) (stating that the alleged sexual assault “could

not have served a legitimate governmental objective and thereby constituted impermissible

punishment.”).

While a sexual assault of a pretrial detainee is actionable under § 1983, White’s

allegation that a sexual assault occurred is not plausible as alleged. He asserts he was aroused

when he awoke and Defendant Massini was touching his stomach, but fails to allege sexual

contact other than the entirely speculative allegation that “a man knows when he’s been touched

there, trust me.” Since the Court cannot say at this time that White can never allege a plausible

claim, the claim against Massini will be dismissed without prejudice and White will be granted

an opportunity to file an amended complaint to attempt to cure this defect.

B. Claims Against LCJ Prison

The § 1983 claim against LCJ Prison is dismissed because a jail or prison is not a

“person” under Section 1983. Cephas v. George W. Hill Corr. Facility, No. 09-6014, 2010 WL

2854149, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2010); Miller v. Curran-Fromhold Corr. Facility, No. 13-7680,

2014 WL 4055846, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) (citing Mitchell v. Chester Cty. Farms Prison,

426 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1976).

C. Claims Against Other Named Defendants

White also names as Defendants Cliff Knappenberger, Director Janine Donate, Warden

Kyle Russel, and Sgt. Victor Pachionni. Other than list them in the caption and the list of

Defendants, White never mentions any of these individuals and makes no allegations that could

be inferred to apply to them. For this reason, the claims against them are not plausible and will

be dismissed without prejudice. White will be allowed to file an amended complaint with regard

to these Defendants as well if he is able to allege plausible civil rights claims against them.4

4 Several of these Defendants appear to hold supervisory positions at LCJ. There are

“two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts

undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014),

reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015). First, a supervisor may be

liable if he or she “‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained

a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Id. (quoting A.M.

ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in

original)). “Second, a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated

in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had

knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.” Id. Generalized

allegations that a supervisory defendant is “in charge of” or “responsible for” an office or facility

are insufficient to allege personal involvement in an underlying constitutional violation. See

Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“Saisi asserted that some

defendants were ‘in charge of agencies that allowed this to happen,’ and that liability stemmed

merely from defendants’ ‘belief’ that their conduct would be ‘tolerated.’ However, a director

cannot be held liable ‘simply because of his position as the head of the [agency].’” (quoting

Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005)).

White also mentions an investigation about the incident in which he was not asked to

participate. He fails to allege how any named Defendant was involved in that investigation or

how his civil rights were violated by not being asked to participate. Generally, “an allegation of

a failure to investigate, without another recognizable constitutional right, is not sufficient to

sustain a section 1983 claim.” Graw, 68 F. App’x at 383 (quotations omitted). White may

nonetheless attempt to amend this aspect of his claim as well.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant White leave to proceed in forma pauperis

and dismiss his claims against LCJ with prejudice. All other claims are dismissed without

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Because the

Court cannot say at this time that White can never state plausible claims against the other named

Defendants, he will be granted the option of filing an amended complaint. An order follows with

additional information about amendment.