MOORE v. THE CHESTER COUNTY COURTS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

VAUGHN MOORE, :

Plaintiff :

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-CV-5230

CHESTER COUNTY COURTS, etal, :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

PRATTER, J. MARCH /ot i022

Vaughn Moore, a prisoner currently incarcerated at the George W. Hill Correctional

Facility, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Moore seeks leave

to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, Mr. Moore will be granted leave to

proceed in forma pauperis, and his Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

In his letter Complaint,' Mr. Moore asserts that he is filing “a 1983 Federal Civil

Complaint” against the “Chester County Courts” for violating his “Contstitutional [sic] Rights,

On November 22, 2021, the Clerk of Court docketed a one-page handwritten letter from Mr.

Moore. (ECF No. 1.) The Clerk of Court treated this letter as a federal civil rights Complaint

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and opened a civil action under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 5(d)(4). By Order dated December 14, 2021, the Court advised Mr. Moore, inter alia,

that his letter Complaint did not meet the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and the applicable federal civil rights statutes. (ECF No. 3.) Mr. Moore was provided thirty (30)

days in which to file an amended complaint to state the basis for his claims against each

defendant. (/d.) Mr. Moore was also provided with a blank copy of the Court’s form complaint

to assist him with the filing of an amended complaint. (/d.) Following the entry of the Court’s

Order, Mr. Moore filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis with an

accompanying prisoner account statement (ECF Nos. 4-5), but chose not to file an amended

complaint. Noted below, because the Court grants Mr. Moore leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, his letter Complaint will be screened in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Civil Rights Appellant Rights, [and] P.C.R.A. Rights.” (Compl. at 1.)? Mr. Moore avers that he

was “injured” when his “P.C.R.A. petition was ignored for 18 years.” (/d.) He asserts that his

injuries have occurred in the form of: “Pain & Suffering, cruel & Unusual punishment, Illegal

Incarceration, False Impisonment [sic], Slander and Mental Anguish.” (/d.) Mr. Moore also

claims that the “State parole Board” and “Judge Stritell” punished him while he “was still in the

guilt” phase. (/d.) Mr. Moore further avers that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “states” that he

“cannot be punished if [he has] an appeal pending.” (/d.)

On June 6, 1996, Mr. Moore was convicted of the following charges: robbery, criminal

conspiracy, possessing an instrument of crime, prohibited offensive weapons, and false

imprisonment for his participation in an armed robbery. See Commonwealth v. Moore, No. 2692

EDA 2019, 2020 WL 3865568, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020); Commonwealth v. Moore, CP-15-

CR-0003807-1995 (C.P. Chester).? On July 22, 1996, Mr. Moore was sentenced to an aggregate

term of nine to eighteen years imprisonment to be followed by twelve years of probation. (/d.)

In December 2018, after Mr. Moore had been released from his custodial sentence, a

bench warrant was issued for a violation of the terms of his probationary sentence. (/d.) The

Honorable Phyllis R. Streitel* held a violation of probation hearing on February 11, 2019 and

found that Mr. Moore had violated the terms of his supervision. (/d.) Judge Streitel imposed a

* The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.

3 The Court takes judicial notice of the public dockets related to Mr. Moore’s conviction. See

Buck v. Hampton Twp., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that courts may consider

matters of public record).

4 Although the Defendant is listed as “Judge Stritell” in the letter Complaint, it appears that Mr.

Moore has misspelled “Judge Streitel” who is listed as a senior judge for the Chester County

Court of Common Pleas. See https://www.chesco.org/600/Honorable-Phy]lis-R-Streitel---

Senior-Ju (last visited March 9, 2022).

sentence consisting of imprisonment and probation, and Mr. Moore was subsequently paroled on

March 12, 2019. Ud.) Another bench warrant was issued on June 14, 2019, and a Gagnon II

revocation hearing was held before Judge Streitel on August 13, 2019. (/d.) Mr. Moore

admitted he was in technical violation of the terms of his supervision, and Judge Streitel revoked

both his parole and probation, sentenced Mr. Moore to back time, and reinstated Mr. Moore’s

probationary sentences. (/d.) Mr. Moore appealed, and his judgment of sentence was affirmed

on July 8, 2020. Moore, 2020 WL 3865568, at *5.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Mr. Moore leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears he

is not capable of prepaying the fees to commence this action.* Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a

claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the

same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to

determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quotations omitted).

“At this early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro

se] complaint as true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor,’ and ‘ask only

whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible []

claim.” Shorter v. United States, 12 F 4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio,

> However, Mr. Moore is a prisoner, and he will be obligated to pay the filing fee in installments

in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations and naked assertions will not

suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Mr. Moore is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his

allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F 4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay

Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). “This means we remain flexible, especially

‘when dealing with imprisoned pro se litigants[.]’” Jd. (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 244). The

Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name

it.” Id. However, ‘““pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support

aclaim.’” Jd. (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245).

Ill. DISCUSSION

The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, that provides in part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988).

A. Claim Against the Chester County Courts

Mr. Moore cannot maintain his federal constitutional claim against the Chester County

Courts, and his claim must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Eleventh

Amendment bars suits against a state and its agencies in federal court that seek monetary

damages. See Pennhurst State Sch. And Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984); A. W.

v. Jersey City Public Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003). The Chester County Court of

Common Pleas, as part of Pennsylvania’s unified judicial system, shares in the Commonwealth’s

Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 241 Gd

Cir. 2005). There is no indication Pennsylvania has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Mr. Moore’s claim against the Chester County Courts is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

B. Claim Against the State Parole Board

Mr. Moore’s claim against the (Pennsylvania) State Parole Board fails because the Board

is also immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Fenton v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of

Corr., No. 18-5484, 2019 WL 398929, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2019) (citing Spuck v. Pa. Bd. of

Prob. and Parole, 563 F. App’x 156, 158 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“As the District Court

correctly determined, the Eleventh Amendment affords the [Pennsylvania Board

of Probation and Parole] protection from suit in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

(citing Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986))). Moreover, as a state agency,

the State Parole Board is not a “person” against whom a civil rights action may be brought

under Section 1983. Fenton, 2019 WL 398929, at *4 (citing Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231,

232 (3d Cir. 1977); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly,

Mr. Moore’s claim against the State Parole Board must be dismissed.

C. Claims Against Judge Streitel

Mr. Moore’s claims against Judge Streitel fail because Judge Streitel is entitled to judicial

immunity. Judges are entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights claims that are based on

acts or omissions taken in their judicial capacity, so long as they do not act in the complete

absence of all jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); Martinez v.

Eagle Disposal, 783 F. App’x 206, 211 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of

federal judicial defendant on the basis of absolute judicial immunity). An act is taken in a

judge’s judicial capacity if it is “a function normally performed by a judge.” Gallas v. Supreme

Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). Because Mr. Moore’s claims against Judge Streitel

are based on acts she took in her judicial capacity while presiding over the probation violation

hearings in which Mr. Moore was a defendant, Judge Stritell is entitled to absolute immunity

from those claims. Accordingly, Mr. Moore’s claims against Judge Streitel will be dismissed

with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Mr. Moore leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismiss his Complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for

failure to state a claim. Mr. Moore will not be given leave to amend because amendment would

be futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002). An

appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Lie