WILLIAMS v. THE GEO GROUP INC.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DANIEL WILLIAMS, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-CV-0365

:

THE GEO GROUP, INC., et al. :

Defendants. :

Pro se Plaintiff Daniel Williams is a pretrial detainee currently confined at the George W.

Hill Correctional Facility (“GWHCF”) in Thornton, Pennsylvania. He filed this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserts claims against the GEO Group, Inc., Delaware

County, and the Delaware County Jail Oversight Board. 1 Williams also filed a Motion to

Proceed in forma pauperis and submitted a copy of his institutional account statement in support

of his application.

For the following reasons, Williams is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. His

Complaint is now subject to the screening requirements under the in formal pauperis statute, 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), will shall be dismissed without prejudice.

Williams will be granted leave to file an amended complaint as set forth more fully

below.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The bulk of Williams’s factual allegations center on a December 14, 2021 incident at

GWHCF. Williams alleges that on this date, prison officials employed by Defendant GEO

Group, Inc. searched his cell and found drugs that were allegedly planted there. Williams states

1 Williams incorrectly refers to the Delaware County Jail Oversight Board in his Complaint as the Delaware County

Jail Oversight Committee.

that in conjunction with the search, “a lot of [his] personal property was taken by the correctional

officers.” He alleges that shortly after the search, Sergeants S. Brown and Richburg “savagely

beat[]” him, “dragged [him] into a cell” while he was handcuffed and “punched and stomped

[him].” Williams further alleges that as a result of this encounter, he “sustained injuries to [his]

thigh, knees, neck, and back,” and that he suffers from “severe psychological trauma.”

Williams also raises a many allegations about the conditions of his confinement at

GWHCF, though none of these allegations are tied to any individual Defendant. For example,

Williams alleges that:

• There was no television “on the block . . . [at] SMU[,] and [in] the hole.”

• The heat did not work “on SMU . . . or on 10C” for a month.

• He could not access the law library.

• He was unable to make a legal call for a month.

• He was not allowed to shower for a week in December, 2021.

• He has not had gym access in two years.

• He was on “constant lockdown without rec or showers.”

• He was “forced to sleep in a cell that had asbestos on the wall.”

• He was twice fired from his job.

• Muslim inmates are not allowed to have religious services.

• He “has never been to medical for a sick call in 30 months.”

• He was “sexually surveilled” on two different occasions.

• The “maximum custody inmates” are not allowed to have jobs, are forced to walk around

with restraints on, and must eat in their cells.

• He was locked in “a feces infested, fly infested urine smelling shower” for over two

hours because “Sgt McCafferty felt like it was what [he] deserved.”

• There is no “black law library” and no Black maintenance workers.

• A corrections officer stated that “you should’ve let that nigger hang.”

• His property was stolen by corrections officers.

Finally, Williams alleges that Defendants violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy

trial and have engaged in racial bias and “widespread discrimination of minorities.” Williams

seeks $25,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court grants Williams leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he

is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.2 Given that, the Court must assess

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) whether the Complaint must be dismissed for failure to

to state a claim.

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the

same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, to proceed, a complaint

must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). In

evaluating a complain under this standard the facts alleged are accepted as true and all

reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff’s favor. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366,

374 (3d Cir. 2021). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

As Williams is proceeding pro se, his allegations are construed liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel,

8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45

(3d Cir. 2013)). Nevertheless, even William’s pro se complaint must allege sufficient facts to

support a claim. Id.

In essence, a complaint must provide the defendant with “fair notice” of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds on which it rests. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92

(3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam)). To provide

fair notice, the complaint must identify who the defendants are and what actions they took in

relation to the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 93. That does not mean that a complaint has to “include

2 Williams is still obligated to pay the filing fee in installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

every name, date, and location of the incidents at issue.” Id. But it does have to have enough

information, stated with enough clarity, that a defendant could “reasonably be expected to

respond.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Williams asserts violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. Accordingly, his claims are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “gives a federal

remedy against state officials who, acting under color of state law, deprive ‘any citizen of the

United States . . . of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [U.S.] Constitution and

laws.’” Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 2019). To state a claim

under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) “the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States”; (2) “committed by a person acting under color of

state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Although Williams raises many claims of alleged constitutional harm, he names only

three Defendants and has not named any individual prison officials involved in the alleged harm

as Defendants. For the reasons stated below, Williams has failed to set forth a plausible claim

against these Defendants.

A. Claims against the GEO Group and Delaware County

The claims Williams seeks to pursue against the GEO Group and Delaware County must

be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The GEO Group is a private corporation under

contract to provide services at GWHCF, and acts under the color of state law for doing so.

Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that

entity contracted to perform medical services for county jail is state actor for purposes of section

1983); French v. GEO Grp., Inc., 2018 WL 4929859, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2018) (“The GEO

Group acts under color of state law by providing services for the George W. Hill Correctional

Facility.”). To hold the GEO Group liable under section 1983, Williams must allege that his

constitutional rights were violated as a result of a custom or policy adopted by the Geo Group.

French, 2018 WL 4929859, at *2. See also Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978). Similarly, to state a claim for municipal liability against Delaware County, Williams

must also allege that the municipal Defendant’s policies or customs caused the alleged

constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. To assert a plausible claim under § 1983

against either of these entities and survive screening pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), Williams

“must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was” to

survive screening. McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citation

and quotation marks omitted).

Policy can be shown “when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish

municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.’”

Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480

(3d Cir. 1990)). “‘Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given course of

conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and

permanent as virtually to constitute law.’” Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850

(3d Cir. 1990)). It is not enough, however, to only allege that a policy or a custom exists.

Rather, a plaintiff “must also allege that the policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his

injuries.” Id. (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996)). This can be

accomplished if a plaintiff “demonstrat[es] an ‘affirmative link’ between the policy or custom

and the particular constitutional violation” alleged. Id. (quoting Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850).

With respect to a custom constituting the proximate cause of an alleged injury, a plaintiff must

establish that the Defendant “had knowledge of similar unlawful conduct in the past, failed to

take precautions against future violations, and that its failure, at least in part, led to [plaintiff’s]

injury.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

Alternatively, a plaintiff can also state a basis for municipal liability by “alleging failure-

to-supervise, train, or discipline . . . [and alleging facts showing] that said failure amounts to

deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those affected.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d

93, 106 (3d Cir. 2019). “This consists of a showing as to whether (1) municipal policymakers

know that employees will confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult

choice or a history of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will

frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id.

As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained,

If the alleged policy or custom at issue is a failure to train or supervise (as it is here),

the plaintiff must show that this failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the

rights of persons with whom the municipality’s employees will come into contact.

Ordinarily, this requires a plaintiff to identify a pattern of similar constitutional

violations by untrained employees that puts municipal decisionmakers on notice

that a new program is necessary. Otherwise, the plaintiff needs to show that failure

to provide the identified training would likely . . . result in the violation of

constitutional rights—i.e., to show that the need for more or different training was

so obvious.

Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal citations, quotation marks

and alteration omitted).

Williams’ allegations fail to plead a claim under either theory of municipal liability

because they are simply too vague, generalized, or conclusory. For example, he alleges that

Defendants had a “policy of not following policy.” He also alleges that Defendants’ “failure to

investigate correctional officer conduct amounts to an unconstitutional custom or

policy.” Williams also alleges that Delaware County has a policy to “hold people for petty

crimes longer than they have to, which results in due process violations.”3 These allegations are

insufficient to state a plausible basis for Monell liability. Williams had pled that a policy exists

but has neither elaborated on “what exactly that custom or policy was” nor provided any factual

details about this custom or policy to state a plausible claim. McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658

(affirming dismissal of claims against a municipality because the plaintiff alleged only that he

was injured by “the City’s policy of ignoring First Amendment right[s]”). Using the words

“custom” and “policy” is not enough. Allegations that simply paraphrase the standard for

municipal liability, are too vague and generalized to support a plausible claim. Id. at 659; see,

e.g., Szerensci v. Shimshock, 2021 WL 4480172, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021) (“Plaintiffs’

conclusory allegation, which generally paraphrases the relevant standard, is insufficient

to state a claim for § 1983 liability under Monell.”) (citing cases).

Williams also fails to tie any alleged custom or policy to the alleged constitutional harms

he suffered. In other words, he has not alleged the requisite affirmative link between a GEO

Group or Delaware County municipal policy or custom and the various alleged constitutional

deprivations. Along these lines, Williams has also failed to allege that the GEO Group or

Delaware County had actual knowledge of prior similar conduct or failed to prevent the

repetition of such conduct, and that this failure led to his injury. The absence of specific

allegations about causation is fatal to Williams’s claims against these municipal Defendants.

See, e.g., Wood v. Williams, 568 F. App’x 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2014).

3 The Court understands this allegation to relate to Williams’s Sixth Amendment claim that his speedy trial right was

violated. Williams alleges no facts to support this claim. But even if Williams had alleged facts, his claim that

Defendants violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial would still fail. This is because “[a] speedy trial

claim necessarily seeks dismissal of the indictment and leads to immediate release from confinement, so it must be

brought through a habeas petition after exhausting state remedies.” Garrett v. Murphy, 2022 WL 313799, at *1 (3d

Cir. Feb. 2, 2022) (per curiam) (citing cases).

The Court understands Williams to also be asserting failure-to-train claims with respect

to the events that occurred on December 14, 2021, i.e., the alleged search of Williams’s cell, the

confiscation of his property, and the subsequent unreasonable force used on him by Sergeants

Brown and Richburg. Related to the search of his cell and the confiscation of his property, he

alleges that Defendants “failed to properly train or supervise its employees . . . in the use of

search and seizure techniques and/or methods to properly confiscate inmates property.” With

respect to the alleged assault by the prison sergeants, Williams alleges that Defendants “had been

aware of these physical abuse allegations in the past and intentionally failed to properly train or

supervise officers for future incidents.”

These allegations are too generalized and conclusory to sufficiently state a claim for

failure-to-train. Williams has not identified where the training was deficient and how that

deficiency amounts to deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights. Nor has he alleged

with any particularity a pattern of similar constitutional violations that would have put GEO

Group and Delaware County on notice that new training was required. See, e.g., Torres v.

Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., 2021 WL 3773687, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2021) (dismissing

failure-to-train claims where allegations were vague and the plaintiff did not allege “facts

showing a pattern of prior incidents that would suggest a need for additional training”).4

4 Even if Williams had plausibly made Monell-type allegations as to the search of his cell and the seizure of his

property, his claims would nevertheless be dismissed, as pled. See Mulholland v. Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, 706 F.3d

227, 238 n. 15 (3d Cir. 2013) (“It is well-settled that, if there is no violation in the first place, there can be no

derivative municipal claim.”). This is because Williams has no “legitimate expectation of privacy and . . . the

Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in [his] prison cell[].” Hudson v. Palmer,

468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme Court has concluded that

the Fourth Amendment right to privacy, to be free from unreasonable searches, is fundamentally inconsistent with

incarceration.”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979) (“Assuming, arguendo, that a pretrial detainee retains

such a diminished expectation of privacy after commitment to a custodial facility, we nonetheless find that the

room-search rule does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).

Similarly, allegations that Defendants violated Williams’s due process rights by confiscating his property

cannot form the basis of an underlying constitutional violation under § 1983 because a prisoner in Pennsylvania

cannot state a constitutional claim based on the loss of his property since there are meaningful post-deprivation

remedies afforded under the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act. See Spencer v. Bush, 543 F. App’x 209, 213 (3d Cir.

Accordingly, Williams has failed to state plausible municipal liability claims against the GEO

Group and Delaware County based on a failure-to-train theory.5

The remainder of Williams’s allegations—those involving the various conditions of his

confinement, racial discrimination at GWHCF, and other incidents of misconduct by prison

officials—also fail to state plausible claims for municipal liability under § 1983. Williams has

not tied any of these alleged constitutional harms to a custom or policy of the GEO Group or

Delaware County. Nor does he allege that the constitutional harm was the result of a failure to

train prison employees or that a municipal failure amounted to deliberate indifference to

Williams’s constitutional rights. Since Williams has failed to allege a basis for municipal

liability against the GEO Group and Delaware County, his claims against those Defendants must

be dismissed.

B. Claims against the Delaware County Jail Oversight Board

Williams also names as a Defendant the Delaware County Jail Oversight Board;

however, he makes no allegations against this Defendant specifically. The Delaware County Jail

Oversight Board oversees GWHCF.6 Because they are “creature[s] of statute,” jail oversight

2013) (“‘[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of

the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post-

deprivation remedy for the loss is available.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533)); Shakur v.

Coelho, 421 F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (explaining that the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act

provides an adequate remedy for a willful deprivation of property); see also Shareef v. Moore, 844 F. App’x 487,

488 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (finding no due process violation where inmate had access to adequate post-

deprivation remedy to address confiscation and destruction of property and legal papers), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.

146 (2021).

5 Williams provides particularized facts about the alleged excessive force committed by Sergeants Brown and

Richburg on December 14, 2021. However, because Williams has not named those individuals as defendants in this

civil action, the Court is asked only to determine whether plausible claims are stated against the municipal

Defendants. Because Williams has not stated a claim for municipal liability, the Court will not at this time address

whether he has stated an underlying constitutional violation based on the use of force on December 14, 2021.

6 The Delaware County Jail Oversight Board was established at a September 25, 2019 Delaware County Council

meeting. See Jail Oversight Board, Del. Cnty. Pa., https://delcopa.gov/departments/prison/JailOversightBoard.html

(last accessed March 15, 2022).

boards are “political subdivision[s] of the government.” Veatch v. Allegheny Cnty. Bureau of

Corr., 282 F. App’x 159, 160 (3d Cir. 2008).7 As political subdivisions, therefore, jail oversight

boards can be subject to liability under § 1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 (“Congress did

intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to

whom § 1983 applies.” (emphasis omitted)). Like the other municipal Defendants named here,

the Delaware County Jail Oversight Board cannot be held responsible for the acts of its

employees on a theory of vicarious liability, or respondeat superior. Id. at 691. Rather, to state

a claim against the Board, Williams must allege a municipal policy or custom that caused his

injury. Id.; see also Murray v. Keen, 2014 WL 940267, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014)

(applying Monell standard to claims against employees of the Allegheny County Jail Oversight

Board); Smith v. Indiana Cnty. Jail, 2013 WL 425144, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2013) (dismissing

§ 1983 claims against Indiana County Prison Board where the plaintiffs failed to allege “direct

participation, whether by custom or express policy” under Monell).

Williams has not made any specific allegations against the Delaware County Jail

Oversight Board. He names the Board in the Complaint’s caption and states only that the Board

“has entered into a professional services contract with the GEO Group, Inc. to administrate the

institution in accordance with the contract.” Without any facts specially alleged against the

Board, the Court is unable to determine what claims Williams asserts against it. As a result,

Williams fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim against the Delaware County Jail Oversight

Board.

7 A Pennsylvania statute explicitly establishes jail oversight boards for each county in the state. See 61 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. § 1723(a) (“There is hereby established in each county a jail oversight board which shall be named the

(Name of County) County Jail Oversight Board.”). Jail oversight boards are provided certain powers and duties

such as the “operation and maintenance of the prison and all alternative housing facilities” and “the oversight of the

health and safekeeping of inmates.” 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1724(a).

IV. CONCLUSION

As set forth more fully above, Williams’s § 1983 claims against the GEO Group, Inc.,

Delaware County, and the Delaware County Jail Oversight Board are dismissed without

prejudice for failure to state a claim. Because the Court cannot say at this time that Williams can

never state plausible § 1983 claims, Williams will be afforded an opportunity to file an amended

complaint if he is capable of curing the defects the Court has identified. Any amended complaint

should clearly describe the factual basis for Williams’s claims against the relevant defendants

and state how each defendant was involved in the alleged denial of his Constitutional rights. If

Williams fails to file an amended complaint within the time specified in the Court’s Order, this

matter will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Wendy Beetlestone, J.

_________________________________________

WENDY BEETLESTONE, J.