AUKAMP-CORCORAN v. LANCASTER GENERAL HEALTH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHYANNE AUKAMP-CORCORAN,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION

NO. 19-5734

LANCASTER GENERAL HOSPITAL t/a PENN

MEDICINE LANCASTER GENERAL HEALTH,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Schmehl, J. /s/JLS February 17, 2022

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Shyanne Aukamp-Corcoran (“Plaintiff”) brings this suit against her

former employer, Lancaster General Hospital t/a Penn Medicine Lancaster General

Health (“Defendant”). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains a cause of action for

Defendant’s alleged failure to accommodate her religious beliefs under Title VII by

refusing to exempt her from Defendant’s influenza vaccination requirement. Before the

Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant and the parties’ Joint Statement

of Material Facts. The motion has been responded to and oral argument has been held.

For the reasons discussed more fully below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

will be granted, and this matter will be dismissed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

56(c). “A motion for summary judgment will not be defeated by ‘the mere existence’ of

some disputed facts but will be denied when there is a genuine issue of material fact.”

Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986)). A fact is “material” if

proof of its existence or non-existence might affect the outcome of the litigation, and a

dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

In undertaking this analysis, the court views the facts in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party. “After making all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving

party’s favor, there is a genuine issue of material fact if a reasonable jury could find for

the nonmoving party.” Pignataro v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 593 F.3d 265, 268 (3d

Cir. 2010) (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1997)).

While the moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact, meeting this obligation shifts the burden to the non-moving party

who must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Lancaster General is a community-based, comprehensive not-for-profit

health system located in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. Joint Statement of Material

Facts (“JSOF”) at ¶ 1. Plaintiff, Shyanne Aukamp-Corcoran, worked for Lancaster

General from 2001 until early 2018. Id. at ¶ 2. In 2015, Plaintiff became a licensed

practical nurse working at Lancaster General’s outpatient facility at Willow Lakes, where

her primary duties involved providing direct care to geriatric patients. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 4.

On average, influenza causes approximately 200,000 hospitalizations each year, and

geriatric patients comprise approximately 63% of patients requiring hospitalization for

influenza-related complications. Geriatric patients account for over 90% of influenza-

related death. JSOF at ¶¶ 5-7. Vaccination is the most effective strategy to protect

healthcare workers from contracting influenza and transmitting it to their patients and use

of a surgical mask is less effective than vaccination at curbing the spread of influenza. Id.

at ¶¶ 9-10. The U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) recommends

annual flu vaccination for everyone in the United States who is at least six months old. Id.

at ¶ 11. The CDC has concluded that it is “especially important” for healthcare workers

“to get vaccinated [for influenza] annually.” Id. at ¶ 15.

The Joint Commission on Accredited Healthcare Organizations (“JCAHO”) is the

organization that establishes accreditation standards for hospitals and other healthcare

facilities in the United States. Id. at ¶ 16. JCAHO requires that healthcare facilities must

adopt disease control plans to maintain accreditation, and those plans must include steps

designed to ensure that at least 90% of an accredited facility’s licensed clinical staff

undergo annual vaccination for seasonal influenza. Id. at ¶ 17.

In 2012, Defendant adopted a system-wide policy requiring influenza vaccination of

all employees, unless a specific exemption was requested and approved. Id. at ¶ 18.

Defendant’s position is that any exemption to its mandatory influenza policy weakens the

efficacy of the organization’s ability to protect patients from a potentially dangerous

communicable disease. Id. at ¶ 20. Defendant has granted 81 medical-based exemptions

to its mandatory influenza policy, and since 2012, it has granted 24 religious-based

requests for exemptions to its mandatory influenza policy. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22.

Plaintiff underwent flu vaccinations in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 and did

not request a religious exemption from Defendant’s mandatory influenza vaccination

policy in those years. JSOF at ¶¶ 23-24. In April of 2017, Plaintiff testified that she began

“researching vaccinations in-depth from a medical perspective.” Id. at ¶ 25. She then

became pregnant during the Fall of 2017 and worried that undergoing influenza

vaccination would increase her risk of miscarriage. Id. at ¶ 26. Sometime after October 1

and before November 2, 2017, Plaintiff asked her midwife to certify her for a medical

exemption from Defendant’s mandatory influenza vaccination policy. Id. at ¶ 27. The

treating midwife at the practice would not certify Plaintiff for a medical exemption. Id. at

¶ 28.

On November 2, 2017, Plaintiff informed Defendant that she was in the process of

requesting that her treating obstetric practice provide her with a medical exemption from

the mandatory influenza vaccination policy. Id. at ¶ 29. On November 15, 2017, Plaintiff

learned that her treating physician refused to certify her for a medical exemption from

Defendant’s influenza vaccination policy. Id. at ¶ 30.

On October 31, 2017, Plaintiff made a post to the Vaccine Re-education Discussion

Forum, a secular Facebook group. Id. at ¶¶ 33-34. In that post, she asked: “Any

recommendation on how to prepare for the flu shot and how to detox while pregnant?” Id.

at Ex. 11, ¶ 34. Members of the Vaccine Re-education Group expressed outrage with

Plaintiff’s situation and encouraged her to avoid vaccination at all costs. Id. Several

members of the group instructed Plaintiff to seek a religious-based exemption to the flu

vaccine requirement. One poster stated, “Get a religious exemption in place, to back up

that you do not agree with putting foreign DNA and toxins in your body . . . and that it

goes against your beliefs.” Another poster said, “What about a religious exemption[?] My

work HAD to accept it.” Yet another member of the group suggested, “Get a religious

exemption. It’s so very easy. All I had to do was say I do not vaccinate for religious

reasons. Depending on which state you are in they can’t question you about your

religion.” JSOF, Ex. 11.

On November 9, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a letter to Defendant requesting a

religious exemption from the mandatory influenza vaccination policy. Id. at ¶ 35. The

Honorable Edward Cahn, retired chief judge of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, served as a third-party reviewer for religious exemption

requests by Defendant’s employees. Id. at ¶ 41. On November 27, 2017, Judge Cahn

interviewed Plaintiff by telephone to discuss her religious exemption request. Id. at ¶ 41.

During that call, Judge Cahn questioned Plaintiff about her claim that her religious beliefs

required her to forgo vaccination. Id. at ¶ 42. When he spoke with Plaintiff on November

27, 2017, Judge Cahn was in possession of her earlier post to the Vaccine Re-education

Group, along with an excerpt of some of the forum members’ responses to Plaintiff’s

post. Id. at ¶ 43. Judge Cahn determined that Plaintiff had a medical objection to the

influenza vaccination requirement, but not a sincerely-held religious objection to

vaccination. Id. at ¶ 44. Accordingly, on November 30, 2017, Judge Cahn authored a

report recommending that Defendant deny Plaintiff’s religious exemption request. Id. at ¶

45. As part of his report, Judge Cahn recommended that Defendant permit Plaintiff to be

vaccinated by December 15, 2017, by which point she would have completed her first

trimester of her pregnancy. Id. at ¶ 46.

Plaintiff did not undergo influenza vaccination by December 15, 2017. JSOF at ¶

47. On December 22, 2017, Defendant informed Plaintiff that her religious exemption

request had been denied and that she would have to undergo influenza vaccination no

later December 29, 2017. Id. at ¶ 48. This marked the first time in the existence of

Defendant’s mandatory vaccination policy that it had denied an employee’s religious-

based exemption request. Id. at ¶ 49. Plaintiff subsequently refused to undergo the

influenza vaccination and Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment effective January

5, 2018. Id. at ¶¶ 50, 52. Her refusal to comply with the vaccination policy is the sole

reason why her employment was terminated. Id. at ¶ 53.

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that the claims contained in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for

religious discrimination should be dismissed. For the reasons set forth below,

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be granted and Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint will be dismissed.

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to

discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect

to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Under Title VII, employees may assert two different theories of religious discrimination:

failure to accommodate and disparate treatment. E.E.O.C. v. Aldi, Inc., 2008 WL 859249,

at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2008); citing Abramson v. William Paterson College of New

Jersey, 260 F.3d 265, 281 (3d Cir. 2001). In the instant matter, Plaintiff presents a claim

for an alleged failure to accommodate based upon Defendant’s refusal to exempt her

from its influenza vaccination requirement.

A. FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE

Title VII failure to accommodate claims are governed by a burden-shifting

framework. E.E.O.C. v. GEO Grp., Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2010). Under this

framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case. Id. If she

does so, the burden then shifts to the employer to show either: (1) it made a good-faith

effort to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s religious belief, or (2) that such an

accommodation would cause an undue hardship to the employer.

To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, the employee must

show: (1) she holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement; (2) she

informed her employer of the conflict; and (3) she was disciplined for failing to comply

with the conflicting requirement. GEO Grp, 616 F.3d at 271, citing Webb v. City of Phila,

562 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2009). The burden then shifts to the employer to show either

(1) it made a good-faith effort to reasonably accommodate the religious belief, or (2) such

an accommodation would work an undue hardship upon the employer and its business.

Id. (citations omitted).

In the instant matter, Defendant first argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima

facie case because she cannot demonstrate that she holds a sincere religious objection to

the influenza vaccine. Defendant then argues that even if Plaintiff could establish a

sincere religious objection to the vaccine, it is still entitled to an entry of summary

judgment because Plaintiff’s requested accommodation would undermine Defendant’s

safety efforts, which would result in an undue burden to Defendant.

1. Sincere Religious Objection

Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that she holds a sincere religious

objection to influenza vaccination. See Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc.,

522 F.3d 315, 319 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Bushouse v. Local Union 2209, UAW, 164 F.

Supp.2d 1066, 1076 (N.D. Ind. 2001). “If the religious beliefs that apparently prompted a

request are not sincerely held, there has been no showing of a religious observance or

practice that conflicts with an employer requirement.” Sidelinger v. Harbor Creek Sch.

Dist., 2006 WL 3455073 at *11 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2006) (internal quotation omitted);

see also Protos v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 137 (3d Cir. 1986)

(“While courts may not inquire into verity of a religious belief, ‘it is entirely appropriate,

indeed necessary, for a court to engage in analysis of the sincerity of someone’s religious

beliefs in . . . the Title VII context.’” (quoting Phillbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757

F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985) aff’d by 479 U.S. 60 (1986)).

Further, “anti-vaccination beliefs” themselves “are not religious” and, therefore, are

not entitled to accommodation under Title VII. Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. of

Southeastern Pennsylvania, 877 F.3d 487, 492 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of

claim based on medical center’s refusal to accommodate employee’s objection to

vaccination). However, anti-vaccination beliefs that are “part of a broader religious faith”

might “in some circumstances” constitute religious beliefs entitled to protection. Id.

In the instant matter, Plaintiff claims that she harbors a Christianity-based objection

to vaccination, believing that her religion “requires her to keep her body pure from

everything that contaminates the body and spirit.” Amended Compl., ¶¶ 18, 21. However,

Defendant argues that “the circumstances surrounding her request very strongly suggest[]

that she was attempting to disguise her medical objection to the flu vaccine as a religious-

based objection.” Dkt No. 25, p. 17. The EEOC has indicated that an employer may deny

a religious accommodation request if the employer “has reason to believe the

accommodation is not sought for religious reasons.” Dkt No. 25, Ex. 22, p. 13.

It is undeniable that both the circumstances and timing surrounding Plaintiff’s

request for a religious-based exemption to Defendant’s vaccine requirement are

suspicious. In terms of the timing, Plaintiff admitted that she only requested her religious-

based exemption after she had researched vaccines “from a medical perspective.” She did

not request a religious exemption until after she unsuccessfully petitioned her midwife

and her medical doctor for a medical-based exemption from the vaccination requirement,

and she admitted that she harbored a medical objection to vaccination at the time that her

religious exemption request was submitted. JSOF at ¶ 37. The EEOC has stated that

employers evaluating the sincerity of an employee’s claimed religious belief may

consider “whether the timing of the request renders it suspect,” for example, when the

religious exemption request “follows an earlier request by the employee for the same

benefit for secular reasons.” Dkt No. 25, Ex. 22, p. 13. That is exactly what occurred in

this matter and the timing of Plaintiff’s request does render it “suspect.”

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s religious beliefs developed only shortly

before she lodged her request for a religious exemption, and that she had not been

religious her entire life. Specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff only developed her

religious beliefs regarding vaccination between November 7 and November 9, 2017, and

then submitted her religious exemption request on November 9, 2017. Plaintiff disputes

this timeline and argues that her religious beliefs opposing vaccination began to evolve in

the spring of 2017.

Obviously, an employee’s long-standing religious practice is much less likely to be

disingenuous than if the employee only adopted the religious belief a short time before

requesting an accommodation. See Hansard v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 1973 WL

129 at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 1973). In this case, most of the evidence points to the fact

that Plaintiff’s alleged religious objection to vaccination developed shortly before her

exemption request was submitted. Plaintiff’s argument that her beliefs began to evolve in

the spring of 2017 as a “natural progression from medical to religious” is unpersuasive,

as she testified that she began researching vaccines in April of 2017 “from a medical

perspective,” not from a religious perspective. Further, Defendant presents multiple

examples of Plaintiff’s testimony that her “natural progression” from medical to

religious-based concerns with the flu vaccine took place between November 7 and

November 9, 2017. Dkt No. 25, Ex. 1, pp. 88, 104, 146, 232-233, 236, 319. The weight

of the evidence presented in this matter does not support Plaintiff’s claim that her

religious objection to vaccination occurred in the spring of 2017. Rather, her claimed

religious objection to vaccination occurred within a few days of her submitting a request

for a religious exemption. Accordingly, I find the timing of Plaintiff’s development of

religious issues with vaccination to be suspicious and find that this timing points to a lack

of sincerity in her religious beliefs.

Further, upon learning that she would be required to undergo vaccination, Plaintiff

consulted a secular, antivaccination Facebook group whose members encouraged her to

submit a religion-based exemption request, despite having no knowledge of Plaintiff’s

religious beliefs. Members of this group also encouraged Plaintiff to resort to fraud, if

necessary, to obtain an exemption. The EEOC has indicated that an employer may deny a

religious accommodation request if the employer “has reason to believe the

accommodation is not sought for religious reasons.” Dkt No. 25, Ex. 22, at p. 13. Clearly,

Plaintiff’s consultation of this non-religious group and the urging of its members to seek

a religious exemption despite lacking all knowledge of Plaintiff’s religious beliefs does

not lead to the conclusion that Plaintiff requested an accommodation for religious

reasons. This is further evidence of a lack of sincerity underlying Plaintiff’s request for a

religious exemption.

In addition, it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not request a religious exemption until

almost seven weeks after the deadline for submitting such an exemption had expired, and

that she failed to provide the required certification from a third party attesting to the

sincerity of her religious beliefs at the time she submitted the request. These actions were

in clear violation of Defendant’s policy addressing exemption requests.

It is also noteworthy that beginning in 2007, Plaintiff refused voluntary influenza

vaccination even though she admits she had no religious opposition to it at that time. Dkt

No. 25, Ex. 1, Pl’s dep, pp. 257-258. She continued to refuse the flu vaccine every year

from 2007 until 2012, when Defendant made it mandatory. Id. at pp. 256-258. Further,

she requested no religious-based exemptions from Defendant’s vaccination requirement

between 2012 and 2017, the first five years that Defendant’s mandatory vaccine policy

was in place.

There is no dispute that Plaintiff had routinely undergone vaccination for many

years after Defendant made it mandatory prior to submitting her exemption request. It is

also undisputed that Plaintiff had multiple tattoos and piercings, and Defendant alleges

that these things do not align with Plaintiff’s claim that the Bible compelled her to keep

her blood “pure under all circumstances and free from contaminates.” As the EEOC

permits an employer to consider “whether the employee has behaved in a manner

markedly inconsistent with the professed belief” in evaluating the employee’s sincerity,

Dkt No. 25, Ex. 22, at p. 13, I find this evidence also does not support the sincerity of

Plaintiff’s claimed religious beliefs.

This evidence leads to the inescapable conclusion that Plaintiff did not hold a

sincerely-held religious belief opposing vaccination. Rather, Plaintiff had a medical

objection to vaccination and claimed a religious-based objection in an attempt to

circumvent Defendant’s mandatory vaccination policy.

In response to this evidence regarding the lack of sincerity of her religious beliefs,

Plaintiff points to a letter authored by Pastor Mike Anderson of the Refton Brethren in

Christ Church as evidence of her alleged sincere religious objection to vaccination. Dkt

No. 25, Ex. 24. In that letter, Pastor Anderson indicated that Plaintiff attends his church,

and that in his opinion, she harbors a sincere religious objection to the flu vaccine. Id.

However, Pastor Anderson did not compose the letter until several weeks after Plaintiff’s

employment with Defendant had ended, and Defendant was not in possession of the letter

when evaluating the sincerity of Plaintiff’s claimed religious objection. Further, Pastor

Anderson stated that “[s]ome Christians feel very strongly that vaccines, including the flu

vaccinations, are wrong and go against their sincerely held religious beliefs,” but he did

not state that members of the Brethren in Christ Church object to flu vaccination. Dkt No.

25, Ex. 24. In fact, the United States Brethren in Christ Church does not require or advise

its congregants to forgo vaccination. Dkt No. 25, Ex. 13. In addition, although his letter

stated that Plaintiff attends his church, Pastor Anderson admitted during his deposition

that she only attended sporadically, and she never underwent the church’s membership

covenant process. Dkt No. 25, Ex. 21, Anderson dep., pp. 14-15, 75-76. Plaintiff had

never discussed her spiritual beliefs with Pastor Anderson before she asked him to write

the letter for her. Id. at pp. 50, 52. I find Pastor Anderson’s letter is insufficient evidence

for Plaintiff to meet her burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination.

Dkt No. 25, Ex. 1, pp. 313-314. In response, Defendant presents

Based on the record before the Court, no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff

had a sincerely held religious objection to the influenza vaccine. Accordingly, Plaintiff

cannot meet her burden and make out a prima facie case of discrimination. Therefore, her

claim must be dismissed.

2. Undue Hardship

Even if Plaintiff could establish a sincerely held religious belief, her claim would

still fail, as Defendant would suffer undue hardship if Plaintiff were permitted to forego

vaccination. Title VII “does not require covered employers to accommodate an

employee’s chosen religious observances in any and all circumstances.” Prise v.

Alderwoods Group, Inc., 657 F. Supp.2d 564, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2009). Instead, an employer

may deny a requested accommodation that would impose “an undue burden on the

employer’s operations.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). An undue burden occurs if the proposed

accommodation would impose more than a de minimis imposition on the employer’s

operations. See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (holding that

an undue burden occurs when the employer is required to assume more than a “de

minimis cost”). As the Third Circuit has held, it “is not difficult” for an employer to

establish undue burden. Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2009).

In examining undue hardship, courts evaluate both economic and non-economic

costs. Id. at 259-60. “[E]mployers must be given leeway to plan their business operations

and possible accommodative options in advance, relying on an accommodation's

predictable consequences along the way.” EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515

F.3d 307, 317 (4th Cir. 2008). Moreover, an employer is not required to grant a proposed

accommodation that “would ‘either cause or increase safety risks or the risk of legal

liability for the employer.’ ” Robinson v. Children’s Hosp. Boston, 2016 WL 1337255

(D. Mass. April 5, 2016).

In this matter, Defendant argues that granting Plaintiff’s religious-based

exemption request would have undermined its patient and employee health efforts,

resulting in an undue burden. In response, Plaintiff first argues that Defendant had

already granted numerous exemptions to its vaccine policy, and that granting an

additional exemption would not have resulted in an undue burden. Plaintiff also argues

that employees of Defendant who are approved for a medical or religious exemption are

permitted to wear a mask in lieu of vaccination and therefore, it would not be an undue

burden if she were permitted to wear a mask as an accommodation.

In support of its position, Defendant presented an opinion from Dr. Daniel Salmon,

an expert on vaccination effectiveness. Dr. Salmon opined that providing non-medical

exemptions to mandatory vaccination programs for healthcare workers increases the risk

that vaccine-preventable disease will spread. See Salmon report, Dkt No. 25, Ex. 2. He

also opined that use of surgical masks is less effective at preventing the spread of

influenza in healthcare facilities than vaccination. Id.

It is undisputed that Defendant had granted 81 medical-based and 24 religious-

based exemptions to employees (JSOF at ¶¶ 21-22) thus increasing the population of

unvaccinated individuals in danger of contracting and spreading influenza throughout the

health system. Plaintiff argues that since Defendant had already granted numerous

exemptions, it would not result in an undue burden to provide one additional exemption

to her.

However, it is important to note that while Dr. Salmon did acknowledge that

medical exemptions to mandatory influenza vaccination must be granted, he did not state

that non-medical exemptions must be granted. To the contrary, Dr. Salmon found that the

granting of non-medical exemptions significantly raises the danger that influenza will

spread. See Docket No. 25, Ex. 2. Any exemption, for whatever reason granted, weakens

Defendant’s ability to protect patients from influenza, and Plaintiff presents no evidence

to the contrary. Clearly, some employees should not undergo vaccination due to medical

complications and must be exempt from the vaccine requirement. However, contrary to

Plaintiff’s argument, these necessary medical exemptions make it even more important

for Defendant to limit the number of additional exemptions to only those individuals who

demonstrate an actual established right to an religious exemption. If exemptions are

extended to employees who have not demonstrated a legal right to exemption, that could

weaken immunity amongst Defendant’s employees as a group, which in turn can lead to

the spread of influenza at Defendant’s facilities. Granting Plaintiff’s religious exemption

request, therefore, even though 24 such requests had already been granted, “could have

put the health of vulnerable patients at risk,” with the potential for increased

hospitalization and death as result. Robinson, 2016 WL 1337255 at *10 (granting

summary judgment for hospital that refused religious exemption to influenza vaccine).

This would result in an undue burden to Defendant. See Together Employees v. Mass

General Brigham Inc., 2021 WL 5234394 (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 2021) (finding that

permitting plaintiffs who were unvaccinated against COVID-19 to continue working at

Defendant hospital without being vaccinated would “materially increase the risk of

spreading the disease and undermine public trust and confidence in the safety of its

facilities,” which would result in an undue burden under both the ADA and Title VII);

see also Does 1-6 v. Mills, 15 F.4th 20, 35-36 (1st Cir. Oct. 19, 2021) (evaluating the

likelihood of success on the merits in the context of a preliminary injunction and

concluding that “hospitals need not provide [a COVID-19 vaccination] exemption . . .

because doing so would cause them to suffer undue hardship”). As stated by Dr. Salmon:

Exemptions granted for medical purposes and those granted for non-

medical reasons involve different risk-benefit analyses. Obviously, an

unvaccinated healthcare worker poses the same risk of acquiring and

transmitting influenza regardless of whether she is exempted from

mandatory vaccination on medical grounds or non-medical grounds. But

when such an employee is granted an exemption on medical grounds, the

benefits of allowing the employee to forgo vaccination in order to avoid

adverse effects that such an employee would experience by undergoing

influenza vaccination outweigh the potential risk such an employee poses

when unvaccinated. The same, however, cannot be said when employees

are provided with exemptions on non-medical grounds, such as for

religious reasons. There is no corresponding medical benefit associated

with granting exemptions for non-medical reasons.

Docket No. 31, Ex. 3. Every single additional unvaccinated employee to whom patients

are exposed adds to the risk to those patients. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument that there

would be no harm in granting her one additional exemption is unpersuasive.

Plaintiff also argues that it would not have been burdensome for Defendant to

permit her to wear a mask in lieu of vaccination. As discussed above, vaccination poses a

serious health threat to some of Defendant’s employees. Those employees are justifiably

excused from the vaccination requirement and permitted to wear a mask instead, as the

direct threat to their health outweighs the benefit to overall patient safety that could result

from them undergoing vaccination. Mask use provides some protection from influenza

for those employees, even though that protection level falls short of what vaccination

would provide. Docket No. 25, Ex. 3, p. 8. However, each unvaccinated employee

permitted to wear a mask increases the risk of influenza transmission to vulnerable

patients. See Salmon affidavit, Docket No. 31, Ex. 2. The fact that other employees have

been permitted to wear a mask instead of undergoing vaccination increases the danger

posed by an additional employee such as Plaintiff receiving an exemption and being

permitted to wear a mask. That danger would result in an undue burden to Defendant.

Defendant has provided evidence that it would have been more dangerous to

allow Plaintiff to wear a mask than it would have been to require that she undergo

vaccination. Plaintiff has presented no evidence to refute that fact. Therefore, even if

Plaintiff did have a sincerely-held religious objection to vaccination, her claim of

discrimination still must fail because Defendant has demonstrated undue hardship.

Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Defendant is warranted because there can be

no dispute that allowing Plaintiff to wear a mask in lieu of undergoing vaccination would

have caused more than a de minimis negative effect on Defendant’s patient and

workplace safety efforts. See Robinson v. Children’s Hosp. Boston, 2016 WL 1337255 at

*10 (granting summary judgment to employer who refused to permit employee involved

in direct patient care to wear a mask in lieu of undergoing influenza vaccination).1

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

granted and Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is dismissed. An appropriate order follows.

1 Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred, but as I am granting Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment on other grounds, I do not reach that argument.