DOE 1 v. PERKIOMEN VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN DOE 1 and JANE DOE 1, in their CIVIL ACTION

own capacity and as parents of CHILD

DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 and JANE DOE 2, in

their own capacity as parents of CHILD

DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, in her own capacity

and as a parent of CHILD DOE 3 and on NO. 22-cv-287

behalf of those similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PERKIOMEN VALLEY SCHOOL DIST.,

JASON SAYLOR, MATTHEW DORR,

ROWAN KEENAN, DON FOUNTAIN,

KIM MARES, REENA KOLAR, SARAH

EVANS-BROCKETT, LAURA WHITE,

and TAMMY CAMPLI,

Defendants.

O P I N I O N

On January 23, 2022, five parents filed the instant suit on behalf of themselves and their

disabled minor children against various government entities and elected officials challenging

Perkiomen School District’s repeal of a universal masking mandate. Plaintiffs have filed a

motion to proceed anonymously due to retaliation they and their children may face if they were

forced to reveal their identities.

Plaintiffs will be allowed to proceed anonymously. Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules

requires parties to a lawsuit to identify themselves in their pleadings, and courts have interpreted

this requirement as an illustration of “the principle that judicial proceedings, civil as well as

criminal, are to be conducted in public.” Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2011)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). In “exceptional” cases, courts will permit parties to

proceed anonymously so long as they establish “(1) a fear of severe harm, and (2) that the fear of

severe harm is reasonable.” Id. (quoting Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est.,

596 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010)). Once a court determines that a plaintiff has alleged a

reasonable fear of severe harm, it must then balance the plaintiff’s interest and fear against the

public’s strong interest in an open litigation process. Id. Courts in the Third Circuit consider the

following non-exhaustive factors in favor of anonymity:

(1) the extent to which the identity of the litigant has been kept confidential; (2) the bases

upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided, and the substantiality of these

bases; (3) the magnitude of the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the

litigant’s identity; (4) whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues presented

or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigant's

identities; (5) the undesirability of an outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party and

attributable to his refusal to pursue the case at the price of being publicly identified; and

(6) whether the party seeking to sue pseudonymously has illegitimate ulterior motives.

Id. at 409 (internal citation and quotations omitted). Against those factors, courts must weigh the

following three factors disfavoring anonymity:

(7) the universal level of public interest in access to the identities of litigants; (8) whether,

because of the subject matter of this litigation, the status of the litigant as a public figure, or

otherwise, there is a particularly strong interest in knowing the litigant’s identities, beyond

the public’s interest which is normally obtained; and (9) whether the opposition to

pseudonym by counsel, the public, or the press is illegitimately motivated.

Id. Ultimately, the decision to allow a plaintiff to proceed anonymously rests within the sound

discretion of the court. See Doe v. Oshrin, 299 F.R.D. 100, 103 (D.N.J. 2014). Applied here, the

Plaintiffs have shown that they have a reasonable and severe fear of retaliation for their lawsuit

due to the heated debate in their District over COVID-19 related masks. They claim that they

fear possible violence against their children in the form of intimidation, bullying and reprisal. In

support of their points, they cite to two news articles which detail intense school board meetings

and state that school board officials have received death threats for their positions on mandatory

masking.1 Turning next to the balancing test, the application of factors indicate that Plaintiffs

should be permitted to proceed anonymously.2

Extent to which the identity of the litigant has been kept confidential: Plaintiffs

allege that neither they nor their minor children have publicly discussed this matter. This factor

thus weighs in favor of permitting the Plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously. See, e.g., Doe v.

Rutgers, 2019 WL 1967021 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2019) (noting that this factor weighs in favor of

plaintiffs who “limit the disclosure of sensitive information to few other people.” (internal

citation and quotation omitted).

Bases upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided, and the substantiality

of these bases: This factor overlaps with the threshold inquiry of “serious reasonable fear”, and

asks “what harm is the litigant seeking to avoid, and is the litigant’s fear reasonable?” Megless,

654 F.3d at 410. As noted previously, Plaintiffs fear retaliation and violence for this suit, due to

the charged nature of the masked mandate debate. This factor thus weighs in favor of

anonymity. See e.g., Doe v. Middlesex Cnty., 2021 WL 130480, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2021)

(stating that cases involving parents and their “minor children fall squarely in the category of

highly sensitive or personal content that justifies anonymous plaintiffs proceeding

pseudonymously” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

1 See, e.g., J.D. Prose, Pa. School Boards Bearing Brunt of Anti-Mask Parents’ Anger, GoErie,

https://www.goerie.com/story/news/2021/09/27/pa-school-board-mask-mandate/5846407001/; Justin Rohrlich,

Covid Has Broken You People: Pennsylvania School District Melts Down Over Mask Battle,

https://www.thedailybeast.com/pennsylvania-school-district-melts-down-over-mask-battle.

2 Notably, in similar suits against school districts in this Circuit, plaintiffs are proceeding anonymously. See, e.g.,

Doe #1 v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 2021 WL 5239734 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 11, 2021); Doe 1 v. N. Allegheny Sch. Dist.,

2022 WL 170035 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2022); Doe 1 v. Upper St. Clair Sch. Dist., 2022 WL 189691 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 21,

2022). However, one court in the Ninth Circuit expressed skepticism that a plaintiff high-school student and her

parents could proceed using pseudonyms but permitted them to do so while they appealed the denial of their motion

for a temporary restraining order. Doe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 2021 WL 5396136, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18,

2021).

The magnitude of the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the

litigant’s identity: Under this factor, the court must ask: “if this litigant is forced to reveal [ ]

her name, will other similarly situated litigants be deterred from litigating claims that the public

would like to have litigated?” Megless, 654 F.3d at 410. The public may have an interest in

maintaining the confidentiality of a litigant’s identity when he or she belongs to a particularly

vulnerable class or when the subject matter is highly personal. See Doe v. Lund’s Fisheries, Inc.,

2020 WL 6749972, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2020). Both circumstances are present here; three of

the litigants are children and are thus members of a vulnerable class, and the subject matter of the

litigation pertains to their disabilities, a highly personal topic. See, e.g., id. at *3 n. 1 (stating that

minors are considered to be members of a vulnerable class); Doe v. Provident Life and Accident

Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 468 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (stating that the public has an interest in permitting

individuals with illnesses, like mental health illnesses, to bring suits and vindicate their rights).

Whether there is an atypically weak interest in knowing the litigant’s identity: The

interest in knowing the Plaintiffs’ identities is diluted here. Rule 5.2 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and this Court’s local rules expressly prohibit the disclosure of any identifying

information pertaining to a minor child and specify that only the child’s initials may be

disclosed; all other information must be redacted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2; E.D. Pa. Civ. R. 5.1.3,

12(b). Accordingly, because the children’s identities cannot be disclosed, permitting them to

proceed anonymously will not impede the openness of this proceeding any further. This factor

also weighs in favor of allowing the parent plaintiffs to proceed anonymously because if they

were required to disclose their identities, the identities of their children would be readily

determinable, and the privacy interests protected by these rules would be undermined. The

analyses under factor 7, the universal level of public interest in access to the identities of

litigants, and factor 8, the existence of a strong interest in knowing the litigant’s identities,

are largely duplicative of this analysis as there is a weak interest in knowing the identities of

these litigants as they are all minor-children, or their parents.

The undesirability of an outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party attributable to

his refusal to pursue the case at the price of being publicly identified: This factor concerns

whether the Does will refuse to pursue this litigation if they are required to publicly identify

themselves. They claim that they will be unable to pursue this litigation out of fear of

intimidation or reprisal. So, this factor too weighs in favor of the Plaintiff’s motion.

The existence of illegitimate, ulterior motives: There do not appear to be any

illegitimate or ulterior motives underlying Plaintiffs’ challenge.

Whether opposition to use of the pseudonym is illegitimately motivated: The

Defendants have not raised any oppositions to the use of pseudonyms.

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion to proceed under pseudonyms shall be

granted.

An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Wendy Beetlestone

_______________________________

WENDY BEETLESTONE, J.