NEWMAN v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHANTELL NEWMAN :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-CV-5681

:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE, et al. :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

GOLDBERG, J. JANUARY 13, 2022

Plaintiff Shantell Newman brings this pro se civil action against the Attorney General[’s]

Office and the FBI of Philadelphia (ECF No. 2 at 2.)1 Newman also filed a Motion for Leave to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant

Newman leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the Complaint.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The gist of Newman’s Complaint is that the Defendants are allegedly responsible for

wrongfully incarcerating Newman’s relative, Josiah Brown.2 (ECF No. 2 at 4.) The Complaint is

best understood as raising claims for civil rights violations based on Brown’s alleged wrongful

imprisonment. (Id.) Newman also claims that “Delaware police” tried to murder her, the FBI

conspired to retaliate against her based on an investigation into police brutality, and that unnamed

individuals placed her in a “mental hospital to attempt to feed [her] medications” and attempted

take her children from her. (Id. at 4-5). It appears she contacted the Attorney General’s Office

1 The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.

2 Newman’s relationship to Brown is not clear from Newman’s filings. Newman refers to Brown

as her “daughter brother” in the Complaint (ECF No. 2 at 4-5). In a handwritten note attached as

an Exhibit to the Complaint (ECF No. 2-1 at 3), Newman identifies Brown as her son.

about these matters but “no help was available.” (Id. at 4.) Based on these allegations, Newman

asks the Court to award her one million dollars and to release video “from [her] time being framed”

and from Brown’s case. (Id. at 5; ECF No. 3). She also seeks Brown’s immediate release from

custody, (ECF No. 4) and the production of video from Brown’s criminal case including Brown’s

“[alleged] confession” (ECF No. 3).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court grants Newman leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears Newman

is incapable of prepaying the fees to commence this civil action.3 Accordingly, the Complaint is

subject to screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires the Court to dismiss

the Complaint if, among other things, it is frivolous. A complaint is subject to dismissal under §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). It is legally baseless if it is “based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory,” Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995), and factually baseless

“when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).

Furthermore, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,

the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The Court’s continuing obligation to

assure its jurisdiction includes an assessment of whether a plaintiff has standing to pursue her

claims. See Seneca Res. Corp. v. Twp. of Highland, Elk Cty., Pa., 863 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2017)

(“Our ‘continuing obligation’ to assure that we have jurisdiction requires that we raise issues of

3 Although Newman provided minimal information in her in forma pauperis application, the Court

exercises its discretion in granting Newman’s application based on, inter alia, the number of

dependents identified by Newman and Newman’s enumerated monthly expenses versus income.

(ECF No. 1 at 3-5).

standing and mootness sua sponte.”); see also Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc.,

554 U.S. 269, 273 (2008) (explaining that Article III of the Constitution limits the power of the

federal judiciary to the resolution of cases and controversies, and that this “requirement is satisfied

only where a plaintiff has standing”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Brought on Behalf of Josiah Brown

Newman is, in part, attempting to bring a claim based on harm suffered by Brown. Under

28 U.S.C. § 1654, parties “may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel” in the

federal courts. Section 1654 thus ensures that a person may conduct his or her own case pro se or

retain counsel to do so. See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882 (3d Cir. 1991)

(“The statutory right to proceed pro se reflects a respect for the choice of an individual citizen to

plead his or her own cause.” (quoting Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d

59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990))). Although an individual may represent herself pro se, a non-attorney may

not represent other parties in federal court. See Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225,

232 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The rule that a non-lawyer may not represent another person in court is a

venerable common law rule.”), abrogated on other grounds by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v.

Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007). Furthermore, “a plaintiff must assert his or her own

legal interests rather than those of a third party” to have standing to bring a claim. See Twp. of

Lyndhurst, N.J. v. Priceline.com, Inc., 657 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted)).

Accordingly, the Court must dismiss any claims raised on behalf of Brown or seeking relief

based on harm that occurred to Brown (or other individuals) because Newman lacks standing to

pursue claims on Brown’s behalf. See, e.g., Chang v. Dep't of Servs. for Child., Youth, & their

Fams., Div. of Fam. Servs., 790 F. App’x 435, 437-38 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (father lacked

standing to address children’s claims on appeal).

B. Newman’s Claims

To the extent Newman raises claims on her own behalf, the Court cannot discern a factual

or legal basis for a claim against the Defendants. Liberally construing the Complaint, the Court

understands Newman to be alleging violations of her civil rights in connection with a conspiracy

by the FBI, Delaware police, and unnamed entities to murder her and retaliate against her in a

variety of ways including feeding her medication based on her investigation of police brutality.

These factually frivolous allegations do not plausibly state a claim. Accordingly, the Court will

dismiss Newman’s claims, without leave to amend, as factually baseless. See, e.g., Caterbone v.

Nat’l Sec. Agency, 698 F. App’x 678, 679 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal as

lacking an arguable basis in fact where underlying allegations were based on plaintiff’s assertion

that he was a “victim of U.S. sponsored mind control and cointelpro harassment program”); Price

v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Civ. A. No. 20-3015, 2020 WL 4368063, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 30,

2020), aff’d, 845 F. App’x 106 (3d Cir. 2021) (finding plaintiff’s allegations to be factually

frivolous where plaintiff asserted that “numerous law enforcement agencies, attorneys, prison

officials, and medical professionals have used neurological and psychological technology to

control the ‘four basic groups of his brain and mental functions’ and “that the use of this

‘technology’ and ‘mind control’ has caused him numerous impairments and drove him to criminal

and erratic behavior).

Moreover, to the extent Newman’s Complaint can be construed as alleging a claim under

Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which provides a basis for

constitutional claims against federal actors in limited contexts,4 such a claim is legally baseless.

“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from

suit.” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). For that reason, “[a] Bivens action is not

available against the United States or one of its agencies.” Dambach v. United States, 211 F.

App’x 105, 107 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Accordingly, there is no legal basis for a Bivens

claim against the Defendants, both of which are federal offices or agencies. Nor can the Court

discern any other basis for a claim here against the named Defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Newman leave to proceed in forma pauperis

and dismiss the Complaint. Any claims raised on behalf of Brown or others are dismissed without

prejudice for lack of standing because Newman cannot prosecute claims on their behalf. See

Thorne v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack Inc., 980 F.3d 879, 896 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Dismissal for

lack of standing reflects a lack of jurisdiction, so dismissal of Thorne’s amended complaint should

have been without prejudice.”). To the extent the Complaint raises claims on Newman’s behalf,

those claims are dismissed as factually and legally frivolous. The Court concludes that amendment

would be futile. An appropriate Order follows.

4 Because expanding Bivens is “a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity,” see Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.

1843, 1857 (2017), a “rigorous inquiry . . . must be undertaken before implying a Bivens cause of

action in a new context or against a new category of defendants.” Vanderklok v. United States,

868 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 2017).