GARZA v. WELLPATH MEDICAL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EDWARD R. GARZA, JR., :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-1179

:

CITY OF CHESTER PA, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

RUFE, J. DECEMBER 28, 2021

Plaintiff Edward R. Garza, proceeding pro se has filed suit concerning the conditions of

his confinement and medical care he has received.1 By Order dated December 20, 2021, the

Court determined that Garza was not able to afford to pay the filing fee in this action and granted

him leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and stated that the case

was still subject to screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2

Garza initiated this case by submitting a letter Complaint that was docketed as the

original Complaint in this action.3 While that complaint was being screened, as required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), Garza submitted an Amended Complaint,4 a Second Amended

Complaint,5 and a Third Amended Complaint, which was submitted twice.6 While each of these

1 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35].

2 See Order of Dec. 20, 2021 [Doc. No. 38].

3 Compl. [Doc. No. 1].

4 Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 12].

5 Second Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 22]

6 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. Nos. 35, 37].

documents addresses the same series of events, some are more comprehensive than others, and

some appear to be attempts to supplement earlier pleadings.

As discussed in the Court’s Order of December 17, 2021, the Court can only consider

facts pled in the most recent Complaint and cannot assemble allegations from multiple

complaints.7 Garza’s Third Amended Complaint—the most recently filed amended pleading—is

the operative pleading in this case and the one subject to screening at this time. For the following

reasons, the Third Amended Complaint will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for

failure to state a claim. Garza will be granted leave to file a fourth amended complaint.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS8

Garza, a prisoner currently incarcerated at State Correctional Institution – Chester (“SCI

Chester”), filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his

constitutional rights with respect to his conditions of confinement at SCI Chester and the medical

care he has received while incarcerated. Garza named the following Defendants in this action:

(1) Kenneth Eason, acting Superintendent of SCI Chester; (2) Paul G. Little of WellPath Medical

Contractors, the “head doctor” at SCI Chester; (3) Crozer-Chester Medical Center;9 and (4) John

7 See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original

pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity . . . [T]he most recently filed amended complaint becomes the

operative pleading.”).

8 The facts set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Garza’s Third Amended Complaint, which was docketed

on December 10, 2021. Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35]. The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF

docketing system.

Two copies of the Third Amended Complaint were received by the Court and docketed. See Third Am. Compl.

[Doc. Nos. 35, 37]. The Court will cite to the first copy of the Third Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 35.

9 The Complaint refers to this Defendant as “Crozer Hospital”; however, the Court will refer to this Defendant by its

proper name, Crozer-Chester Medical Center.

Wetzel, who served as Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at all periods

relevant to Garza’s complaint.10

Garza alleges that sometime prior to February 23, 2021, he broke his ankle.11 On

February 23, 2021, Garza was transferred from another prison to SCI Chester, and he asserts that

during the transfer process, the “guards disregarded [his] condition” and “chained [him] on [his]

ankles and refractured [his] ankle as [he] step[ped] off the prisoner transport bus [at] SCI

Chester[.]”12 Garza asserts that he was later “examined by Nurse Ford, Nurse Ackerman, and

given crutches by head Nurse Bah Rahmatullah[.]”13 Garza claims that his fellow inmates

“helped [him] on to the top tier” of his housing unit while “C.O. Adams and Sgt. Brill

disregarded [his] condition with [the] crutches.”14 Garza has not named Adams or Brill as

Defendants. Garza alleges that he remained on the top tier of the housing unit for several more

days, including February 25, 2021, when he was seen by Dr. Nicholson “for his condition[.]”15

According to the allegations of the Third Amended Complaint, on the evening of

February 25, 2021, Garza “was given a phone call” sometime between 8:00 and 8:15 pm.16

Garza alleges that he “approached the steps on the top tier and as [he] tried to go down[,] [he]

fell, going head over heels landing uncons[c]ious and” breaking his right hand.17 Garza asserts

10 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 1–2.

11 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 3.

12 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 3.

13 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 3.

14 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 3.

15 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 3.

16 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 3.

17 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 3.

that he was “put on to a stretcher and escorted to Crozer [H]ospital[.]”18 Garza believes that as a

result of his fall he “fractured [his] spine and . . . still [has] a broken hand.”19 Once at the Crozer

Hospital Trauma Unit, Garza asserts that he “experienced harsh treatment and for some odd

reason the acting doctor sodomized [him] in front of almost 10 people and took it as a joke while

[he] screamed for help.”20 Garza alleges that as a result of the events of February 2021, he has

spent the last ten months “in wheelchairs, walkers, [and] physical therapy” and that his hand is

still broken.21

Based on these allegations, Garza seeks (1) a declaration that Defendants violated his

Constitutional rights;22 (2) injunctive relief directing Defendants to “proceed with proper

adjustments to spine and fix [his] broken hand” without subjecting him to harassment or

malicious acts;23 and (3) $500,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive

damages.24

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As Garza has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint if it fails to state

18 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 3.

19 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 3.

20 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 4.

21 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 4.

22 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 5. “Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct”

and is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” See Corliss v. O’ Brien, 200 F. App’x

80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also Andela v. Admini. Office of U.S. Courts, 569 F.

App’x 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“Declaratory judgments are meant to define the legal rights and

obligations of the parties in the anticipation of some future conduct.”). Accordingly, Garza’s request for a

declaration that his rights were violated is improper and will be dismissed.

23 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 5.

24 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 6.

a claim.25 Whether a complaint fails to state a claim is governed by the same standard applicable

to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires the Court

to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”26 “At this early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court

will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences

in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . .

contains facts sufficient to state a plausible . . . claim.’”27 Conclusory allegations are not

sufficient to state a claim.28 As Garza is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations

liberally.29

III. DISCUSSION

Garza’s Third Amended Complaint explains that he seeks to bring claims for violations

of his constitutional rights, including “deliberate indifference to [a] medical condition, unsafe

conditions, and sexual discrimination.”30 Garza specifically alleges that his rights under the

Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment have been violated.31

25 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

26 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted); see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,

240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to assess a proceeding filed in forma pauperis under §

1915(e)(2)(B)).

27 Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th

Cir. 2015)).

28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

29 Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F. 4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45

(3d Cir. 2013)).

30 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 4.

31 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 5.

Tort claims alleging violations of constitutional rights may be brought in federal court

under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. “To state a claim under § 1983, a

plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United

States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color

of state law.”32 “A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the

alleged wrongs” to be liable.33 In other words, “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . .

§ 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”34

A. Claims Against Crozer-Chester Medical Center

Liberally construed, the Court understands Garza’s Complaint to allege that the medical

personnel who treated him at Crozer-Chester Medical Center were deliberately indifferent to his

serious medical needs in violation of his constitutional rights. To state a claim under § 1983, the

defendant must act under color of state law, meaning that the defendant “exercised power

possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the [defendant] is clothed with

the authority of state law.35

Whether a defendant is acting under color of state law depends on whether there is “such

a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may

32 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

33 See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d

Cir. 2020) (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207) (“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal

direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.’”).

34 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

35 Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141,

146 (3d Cir. 1998)).

be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”36 To answer that question, the Third Circuit has

“outlined three broad tests generated by Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine whether state

action exists: (1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the

exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the private party has acted with the help of or in

concert with state officials; and (3) whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of

interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the

challenged activity.”37

Multiple courts in this Circuit have recognized that Crozer-Chester Medical Center is a

private hospital and that the Medical Center and its employees are not state actors subject to

liability under § 1983.38 Here, Garza has not set forth facts to support his contention that Crozer-

Chester Medical Center or its employees (none of whom are named as Defendants) meet any of

the foregoing tests; therefore, he has failed to allege that Crozer-Chester Medical Center is a state

actor subject to liability under § 1983.39 Accordingly, the § 1983 claims against Crozer-Chester

Medical Center will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to

state a claim. Garza will not be permitted to amend these claims as it appears that amendment

would be futile.40 The Court notes that the dismissal of the § 1983 claims does not affect

36 Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted).

37 Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotations and alteration omitted).

38 See, e.g., Klavan v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 60 F. Supp. 2d 436, 440–44 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that Crozer-

Chester Medical Center and its employees are not state actors under any applicable tests); see also Schneller v.

Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., Civ. A. No. 06-0698, 2009 WL 737337, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2009), aff'd sub nom.

Schneller ex rel. Schneller v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 387 F. App’x 289 (3d Cir. 2010) (dismissing claims against

Crozer-Chester Medical Center because there was no state action).

39 Cf. Carver v. Plyer, 115 F. App’x 532, 537 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a private hospital is not a state actor under

applicable legal tests)

40 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that leave to amend claims

dismissed on screening should be generally be granted “unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”).

Plaintiff’s ability to assert any state-law claims, including allegations of assault, battery, or

medical malpractice, against Crozier-Chester Medical Center or its employees in the appropriate

state court.

B. Claims Against Defendants Kenneth Eason and John Wetzel

Garza names Kenneth Eason, the acting Superintendent of SCI Chester, and John Wetzel,

the former Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, as Defendants in this

action. With respect to Eason, Garza asserts, in a conclusory fashion, that Eason is “legally

responsible for [the] overall operation of the Department and each institution under [its]

jurisdiction, including SCI Chester.”41 With respect to Wetzel, there are no allegations against

him in the body of the Third Amended Complaint; he is only listed as a Defendant in the caption.

In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was personally involved in the

events and alleged constitutional violation giving rise to the claims.42

To the extent Garza seeks to hold either Eason or Wetzel liable because of their

supervisory roles at SCI Chester or within the Department of Corrections, respectively, there are

“two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts

undertaken by subordinates.”43 First, a supervisor may be liable if he or she “‘with deliberate

indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which

directly caused [the] constitutional harm.”44 “Second, a supervisor may be personally liable

41 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 2.

42 See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

676 (explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).

43 Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes,

575 U.S. 822 (2015).

44 Id. (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration

in original)).

under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate

them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s

unconstitutional conduct.”45 However, generalized allegations that a supervisory defendant is “in

charge of” or “responsible for” an office or facility are not sufficient to allege personal

involvement in an underlying constitutional violation.46

In the Third Amended Complaint, Garza makes no allegations describing how either

Superintendent Eason or Secretary Wetzel were personally involved, by way of their actions or

inactions, with any alleged constitutional violations with respect to Garza’s medical care or

otherwise. Moreover, there is not a single allegation suggesting that either Eason or Wetzel

established and maintained a policy, practice, or custom that resulted in an alleged violation of

Garza’s constitutional rights. Garza also does not allege any facts from which the Court could

infer that either of these Defendants directed others to violate Garza’s rights, or had knowledge

of, and acquiesced in, unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates. Rather, Garza simply

alleges that Eason is “legally responsible for [the] overall operation of the Department and each

institution under [its] jurisdiction, including SCI Chester,”47 and makes no allegations

45 Id. (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1995).

46 See Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347,

354 (3d Cir. 2005)) (“Saisi asserted that some defendants were ‘in charge of agencies that allowed this to happen,’

and that liability stemmed merely from defendants’ ‘belief’ that their conduct would be ‘tolerated.’ However, a

director cannot be held liable ‘simply because of his position as the head of the [agency].’”.

47 Garza alleges that “[e]ach defendant is sued individually and in his official capacity.” Third Am. Compl. [Doc.

No. 35] at 2. To the extent the Third Amended Complaint brings claims for money damages against Eason or Wetzel

in their official capacities as employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, those claims must be

dismissed because they are essentially claims against the Commonwealth that are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. “Eleventh Amendment immunity bars actions for retroactive relief against state officers acting in their

official capacity.” Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 309–10 (3d Cir. 2020). “Congress did not abrogate

Eleventh Amendment immunity via § 1983” and Pennsylvania has not waived its immunity in federal court. Id. at

310; see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521–22. “Because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Department of

Corrections is a part of the executive department of the Commonwealth, it shares in the Commonwealth’s Eleventh

Amendment immunity.” Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Since

Garza’s official capacity claims for damages against Department of Corrections officials and employees are barred

by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court will dismiss those claims with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

whatsoever as to Wetzel.48 Accordingly, Garza’s claims against Superintendent Eason and

Secretary Wetzel will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Garza will be

granted leave to file a fourth amended complaint with respect to any potential claims against

these Defendants.

C. Claims Against Paul G. Little of WellPath Medical Contractors

The Court understands Garza’s Third Amended Complaint as seeking to raise claims

under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs—

specifically, his original ankle fracture and the injuries he incurred after his fall, and to the unsafe

conditions of his confinement that culminated in his fall—specifically, being housed on the top

tier when he was on crutches.49

1. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

To state a constitutional claim based on the failure to provide medical treatment, a

prisoner must allege facts indicating that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his

serious medical needs.50 A prison official is not deliberately indifferent “unless the official

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.”51 “A medical need is serious . . . if it is one that has

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. To the extent Garza also seeks injunctive relief against these

Defendants, the Eleventh Amendment does not necessarily preclude claims for injunctive relief. However, at this

time, Garza has not alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible deliberate indifference claim against these Defendants

in their official capacities. Accordingly, that claim will be dismissed without prejudice to amendment.

48 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 2.

49 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 4–5.

50 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).

51 Id. at 837.

been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”52 Deliberate indifference is

properly alleged “where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment

but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-

medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical

treatment.”53 A serious medical need exists where “failure to treat can be expected to lead to

substantial and unnecessary suffering, injury, or death.”54 Allegations of medical malpractice and

mere disagreement regarding proper medical treatment are insufficient to establish a

constitutional violation.55 Like other constitutional claims, deliberate indifference claims also

require that the defendant “must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable.56

Garza has not alleged a plausible deliberate indifference claim with respect to Defendant

Little. The Third Amended Complaint does not set forth any factual allegations demonstrating

that Little had any personal involvement in, or awareness of, Garza’s medical condition with

respect to either his initial ankle fracture or his subsequent injuries after he fell down the steps

from the top tier.57 Garza simply alleges that Little is the “head doctor” at SCI Chester and he is

52 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (quotations omitted).

53 Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

54 Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991).

55 See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).

56 See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

57 The Court notes that nearly all the factual allegations in Garza’s Third Amended Complaint describe action or

inaction by prison officials and medical personnel who are not named as Defendants in this action. While the Court

construes Garza’s allegations liberally, the Court is unable to speculate which individuals identified in passing in the

Third Amended Complaint Garza might seek to hold liable under § 1983. If Garza chooses to file a fourth amended

complaint, he is reminded that only those individuals or entities clearly identified in the caption of the fourth

amended complaint will be considered defendants in this case and that he must clearly state the factual allegations

that support a claim for relief against each defendant.

“legally responsible for the overall operation of SCI Chester’s medical department and welfare

of all inmates” including Garza.58 These broad, conclusory statements are insufficient to state a

plausible deliberate indifference claim against Little at this time. As noted above, supervisory

defendants may not be held liable solely based on the acts of their subordinates or their high-

level positions in a facility. Rather, they must have had some personal involvement in the

underlying wrongs, and the Third Amended Complaint does not allege that Dr. Little was

involved in the alleged violations of Garza’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court will

dismiss these claims without prejudice and will grant Garza leave to file a fourth amended

complaint to set forth sufficient factual allegations, if he is able, that would state a plausible

claim against Little or any other specific medical personnel involved in his medical treatment

and care.59

2. Deliberate Indifference to Unsafe Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment governs claims brought by convicted inmates challenging their

conditions of confinement.60 “Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both objective and

58 Third Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 35] at 2.

59 Little is sued in his official capacity as well as his individual capacity. Assuming the official capacity claims

should be construed against WellPath, Little’s employer, Garza has also failed to state a plausible claim. “[A]

private health company providing services to inmates ‘cannot be held responsible for the acts of its employees under

a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.’” Sims v. Wexford Health Sources, 635 F. App’x 16, 20 (3d

Cir. 2015) (quoting Natale v. Camden Cnty Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 2003)). Rather, to hold a

private health care company like WellPath liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

that the provider had “a relevant . . . policy or custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional violation [he]

allege[s].” Natale, 318 F.3d 575, 583–84; see also Lomax v. City of Phila., Civ. A. No. 13-1078, 2017 WL 1177095,

at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017) (citations and quotations omitted) (“Because [defendant] is a private company

contracted by a prison to provide health care for inmates, . . . it can only be held liable for constitutional violations if

it has a custom or policy exhibiting deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.”). Garza’s Third

Amended Complaint makes no such allegation that there was a policy or custom in place by WellPath that resulted

in a violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the claim against Little in his official capacity—essentially a

claim against WellPath—must be dismissed. However, as the Court cannot say at this time that Garza can never

state a plausible claim against WellPath, the dismissal will be without prejudice, and he will be permitted an

opportunity to file a fourth amended complaint if he can cure the defect the Court has identified.

60 Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005).

subjective components.”61 The objective component requires an inquiry into whether “the

deprivation [was] sufficiently serious” and the subjective component asks whether “the officials

act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind[.]”62 In general, a prisoner must assert that

prison officials acted with deliberate indifference, meaning that they consciously disregarded a

serious risk to the detainee’s health or safety.63

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on the conditions of confinement, a

prisoner must establish that prison officials’ acts or omissions denied him “the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities.”64 Such necessities include “food, clothing, shelter, medical care

and reasonable safety.”65 A prisoner must also establish that the defendants acted with deliberate

indifference.66 A claim based on mere negligence is insufficient to allege a plausible Eighth

Amendment violation.67

While Garza couches his claim in terms of deliberate indifference to the unsafe

conditions of his confinement, the Court reads this claim liberally to assert an Eighth

61 Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007).

62 Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).

63 See Seiter, 501 U.S. at 298–99; see also Wilson v. Burks, 423 F. App’x 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837) (“‘[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.’”); Edwards v. Northampton Cnty., 663

F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (“[W]e agree with the District Court and find no

reason to apply a different standard here as we have applied the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard both in cases

involving prisoners and pretrial detainees.”).

64 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir.

2010) (stating that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison

officials provide “humane conditions of confinement.”).

65 Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000).

66 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.

67 See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (“It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in

good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that

conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring

official control over a tumultuous cellblock.”).

Amendment claim for failing to prevent harm to Garza who was put on crutches but remained

housed on the top tier in his housing assignment. “In order to state such a claim, ‘an inmate must

show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.’” 68

To satisfy this requirement: (1) “objectively, the alleged deprivation must have

been “sufficiently serious,” in that the “inmate must show that he is incarcerated

under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm;” and (2) subjectively,

the prison official must have had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” manifesting

“deliberate indifference” to the inmate’s health or safety.”69

With respect to Little, the allegations of Garza’s Third Amended Complaint are

insufficient to set forth a plausible Eighth Amendment claim for failure to prevent harm with

respect to his housing assignment on a top tier after being put on crutches. Garza does not set

forth any allegations that Little himself, as opposed to other prison officials or medical

personnel, had personal involvement in the decision to provide him with crutches when he

fractured his ankle, or had any personal involvement in determining the appropriate housing

assignment for him after he was put on crutches. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss this claim

for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). However, it is possible that Garza

could state a plausible claim under this legal theory if given the opportunity to set forth

additional facts or to name additional Defendants.70 Accordingly, Garza will be granted leave to

file a fourth amended complaint on this issue.

68 See Ridgeway v. Smock, Civ. A. No. 20-200, 2021 WL 1725045, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2021), report and

recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1723207 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2021) (quotations omitted).

69 Id.

70 See Ridgeway, 2021 WL 1725045, at *7 (denying corrections defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim where prisoner, suffering from a foot injury, was issued crutches but remained housed on the top tier of his

housing unit and subsequently fell down a flight of steps injuring his lower back and requiring hospital treatment).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Garza’s Third Amended Complaint for

failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The dismissal of Garza’s Third

Amended Complaint is without prejudice to Garza’s right to file a fourth amended complaint in

the event he can cure the defects outlined above and state a plausible claim against a defendant

personally involved in the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. An appropriate Order

follows.