WRIGHT v. HEAD OF SECURITY AT DRC STEW

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTR ICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAHIKA JAMAL WRIGHT :

Plaintiff :

:

v. : CIVL ACTION NO. 20-CV-5888

:

HEAD OF SECURITY AT DRC STEW :

et al., :

Defendants :

M E M O R A N D U M

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J. MARCH 18, 2021

Plaintiff Rahika Jamal Wright, a prisoner currently incarcerated at SCI Houtzdale, filed

this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, raising claims based on conditions in which he was

previously confined. He also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons,

the Court will grant Wright leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the Complaint in its

entirety for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), with leave to amend.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

Wright names three Defendants in his Complaint: (1) the “Head of Security at DRC Stew,”

who appears to have been head of security at a halfway house operated by Gaudenzia DRC at 3200

Henry Avenue in Philadelphia (“Gaudenzia”); (2) Lt. Brown, identified as a “White Shirt” at SCI

Phoenix; and (3) C/O A. Jones, identified as an officer at SCI Phoenix. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.)2 The

Complaint suggests that Wright was a prisoner at the time of all relevant events, and that he is

raising claims based on the conditions under which he was previously confined at Gaudenzia and

1 The facts set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Wright’s Complaint.

2 The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.

SCI Phoenix. However, the sparse and general nature of Wright’s allegations make it difficult to

understand the factual contours of his claims.

Wright alleges that in November 2018, he was “assaulted” at Gaudenzia. (Id. at 3.) He

claims to have sustained injuries to his right femur, pelvis, and hip in connection with the assault.

(Id. at 4.) Wright further alleges that he was x-rayed at SCI Phoenix, which revealed he had bone

spurs, and that a doctor told him he needed a M.R.I. (Id.) It is not clear when this x-ray happened

relative to the assault or whether this allegation relates the assault. Wright also claims that he was

“sexually harassed repeatedly” when he was placed in a “P.O.C.” at SCI Phoenix. (Id.) Wright

also notes that the medical staff at SCI Houtzdale, where he is currently incarcerated, informed

him that he has arthritis in his back and spine. (Id.) It is again unclear how this allegation relates

to anything that happened at Gaudenzia or SCI Phoenix.

Wright claims to have experienced “mental anguish, pain & suffering, sexual harassment,

[and] cruel & [unusual] punishment.” (Id.) He seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $5

million. (Id.) After filing his Complaint, Wright filed a “Motion for Addendum” in which he

appears to clarify that his claims are based upon the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth

Amendment. (ECF No. 6.) This Motion does not include any additional factual allegations.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court grants Wright leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he is

incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.3 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies. This statute requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to

state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by

3 However, as Wright is a prisoner, he will be obligated to pay the filing fee in installments in

accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to

determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations

omitted). The Court must “accept all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff,” but disregard “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, legal conclusions, and conclusory statements” in determining whether a plaintiff has

stated a claim. City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp, 908 F.3d 872, 878

(3d Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted). In other words, conclusory allegations do not suffice to state

a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Wright is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his

allegations liberally. Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).

III. DISCUSSION

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by

the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Importantly, “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged

wrongs.” See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). In other words, to state

a claim for a constitutional violation under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege that each named state-

actor defendant violated his constitutional rights. Wright has not done so here for the following

reasons.

A. Events that Occurred at Gaudenzia

The Court understands Wright to be attempting to bring a claim against the Head of

Security at Gaudenzia based on allegation that he was assaulted at that facility. Wright does not

provide any additional facts in support of this allegation, so the Court cannot discern who allegedly

assaulted him, what the circumstances of the incident were, how the assault came about, and how

the Head of Security was involved. When presented with a pro se complaint, the Court must

“apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.”

Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999). While it is possible that

Wright is bringing an excessive force claim, failure to protect claim, or some other type of claim

against the Head of Security based on this incident, the Court cannot discern the factual contours

of the claim with sufficient clarity to apply the applicable law. See generally Bracey v.

Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 571 F. App’x 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“To establish a

failure to protect claim, inmates must demonstrate that (1) they are ‘incarcerated under conditions

posing a substantial risk of serious harm’; and (2) the prison official acted with ‘deliberate

indifference’ to their health and safety.” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)));

Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (“In an excessive force claim, the central

question is ‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).

In any event, since Wright has not provided any details about what the Head of Security did or did

not do that led to a violation of Wright’s constitutional rights in the context of this incident, he has

failed to state a claim against this Defendant.

B. Events that Occurred at SCI Phoenix

The Court also understands Wright to be bringing claims against Defendants Brown and

Jones, both officers at SCI Phoenix, based on events that took place at that facility. These claims

are also not adequately pled. Wright notes that he received an x-ray at SCI Phoenix and that he

was told he needed a M.R.I. Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates

the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. However, Wright does not provide any

additional facts to suggest his medical care was delayed or denied in a manner indicative of

deliberate indifference, nor has he alleged any facts from which it could be inferred that these two

non-medical Defendants were involved in or responsible for Wright’s medical care.

Wright also claims that he was “sexually harassed repeatedly” when he was placed in a

“P.O.C.” at SCI Phoenix. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Wright does not provide any details that would clarify

what he means by “sexually harassed,” so it is not clear whether he is describing verbal taunts,

touching, or serious sexual abuse. This again makes it difficult for the Court to apply the applicable

law. Compare Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[P]rison sexual abuse can

violate the Constitution.”) with Washington v. Rozich, 734 F. App’x 798, 801 (3d Cir. 2018) (per

curiam) (“Verbal harassment of a prisoner, although distasteful, does not violate the Eighth

Amendment.” (citing McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1291 n.3 (10th Cir. 2001) and DeWalt v.

Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000)). Wright also does not allege how Defendants Brown

and Jones were personally involved in these events. In other words, he failed to allege what these

Defendants did or did not do so as to provide a basis for their liability. In sum, Wright has not

stated a plausible basis for a claim against either of these Defendants based on the events at SCI

Phoenix.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Wright leave to proceed in forma pauperis

and dismiss his Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2(B)(ii). The dismissal of Wright’s Complaint is without prejudice to him filing an

amended complaint in this case with more information about the facts giving rise to his claims.4

Wright’s “Motion to Addendum,” which in essence could be understood to ask the Court to apply

the applicable law to the Complaint, is granted, and the Court has applied the most relevant laws

in assessing Wright’s claims. An appropriate Order follows, which provides further instruction

about amendment.

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO

Judge, United States District Court

4 In his Complaint, Wright mentions that medical staff at SCI Houtzdale informed him that he has

arthritis. This allegation does not suggest any basis for a constitutional violation, especially against the

named Defendants who do not work at SCI Houtzdale. Accordingly, it is not clear to the Court that this

allegation was intended to raise a legal claim. However, in the event Wright sought to pursue claims based

on events at SCI Houtzdale pertaining to his medical care, he should note that SCI Houtzdale is located in

the Western District of Pennsylvania, so he should pursue any such claims in a separate lawsuit filed in that

district. See 28 U.S.C. § 118(c).