“Attorneys performing their traditional functions will not be considered state actors solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court.”
How later courts described this case
- “Attorneys performing their traditional functions will not be considered state actors solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court.”
- “A federal court will only consider Younger abstention when the requested relief would constitute federal interference in state judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CARLOS GONZALEZ, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-CV-4831
:
JUDGE DOUGLAS G. REICHLEY, et al.:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM
PAPPERT, J. NOVEMBER 9, 2020
Carlos Gonzalez, a prisoner currently incarcerated at Lehigh County Prison,
filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Gonzalez seeks leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, Gonzalez will be granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, and his Complaint will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I
Gonzalez has named the following Defendants: Judge Douglas G. Reichley,
Assistant Prosecutor Lisa Rene Cipoletti, and Attorney Gavin Holihan.1 (ECF No. 2 at
1-2.)2 Briefly stated, Gonzalez avers that his 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendment rights
have been violated by the Defendants with respect to the criminal prosecution of
1 According to the criminal docket for the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County,
Gonzalez has been charged with one count of aggravated harassment by a prisoner with an
offense date listed as August 28, 2020. See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, Docket No. CP-39-
CR-0002526-2020 (Lehigh Cty. Court of Common Pleas). Douglas G. Reichley is listed as
the assigned judge, and Gonzalez avers in his Complaint that Lisa Cipoletti is the assigned
prosecutor. (ECF No. 2 at 3.) It further appears from the criminal docket that Gavin
Holihan has represented Gonzalez during his criminal proceedings. See Commonwealth v.
Gonzalez, Docket No. CP-39-CR-0002526-2020 (Lehigh Cty. Court of Common Pleas).
2 The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.
charges pending against him. (Id. at 3.) Specifically, Gonzalez expresses
dissatisfaction with preliminary rulings related to video footage and discovery. (Id. at
3.) Gonzalez asserts that the prosecutor withheld certain evidence and his “attorney,
court appointed, never file[d] a motion” or told him about the evidence. (Id.) Gonzalez
also avers that he questioned Judge Reichley in “open court” and the judge “angrily”
told him that the discovery is “sensitive” and Gonzalez “cannot view [his] discovery or
get a copy” and “can only view it in [his] attorney’s presence.” (Id.)
Gonzalez alleges that he has reported his court appointed attorney, Holihan, to
the disciplinary board because “he has an obligation to represent [and] defend” him, but
Holihan is “not fulfilling his duties.” (Id. at 3-4.) Gonzalez further avers that Judge
Reichley “is supposed to be protecting [Gonzalez’s] constitutional rights, [but] he is
letting [Gonzalez’s] lawyer and prosecutor pervert justice.” (Id. at 4.) Gonzalez
contends that he is “being aggressively pursued in serious charges, by a corrupt judge, a
corrupt lawyer and prosecutor.” (Id.)
Gonzalez seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $100,000 for “pain and
suffering” and “liv[ing] in constant fear.” (Id.) Gonzalez seeks “true justice how [his]
founding fathers intended for the Constitution to be and for [his] 14th Amendment
protections and [his] right to a fair trial.” (Id.) Finally, Gonzalez requests that “Judge
Reichley step down, Lisa Cipoletti step down and for Gavin Holihan to be reprimanded
for misconduct.” (Id.)
II
The Court will grant Gonzalez leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it
appears that he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.3
Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which requires the Court to dismiss
the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough,
184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the
complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations
omitted). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Id. As Gonzalez is proceeding pro se,
the Court construes his allegations liberally. Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d
Cir. 2011). The Court may also consider matters of public record. Buck v. Hampton
Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).
III
A
To the extent Gonzalez is asking this Court to manage or interfere in his state
criminal case, the Court must abstain from deciding his claims. In Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court “established a principle of
abstention when federal adjudication would disrupt an ongoing state criminal
proceeding.” Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 202 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing Younger).
3 However, as Gonzalez is a prisoner, he will be obligated to pay the filing fee in
installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
“Younger abstention is only appropriate in three types of underlying state cases: (1)
criminal prosecutions, (2) civil enforcement proceedings, and (3) civil proceedings
involving orders in furtherance of the state courts’ judicial function.” PDX N., Inc. v.
Comm’r New Jersey Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., No. 19-2968, 2020 WL 6192954,
at *6 (3d Cir. Oct. 22, 2020) (internal quotations omitted).
Younger abstention “is premised on the notion of comity, a principle of deference
and ‘proper respect’ for state governmental functions in our federal system.” Evans v.
Court of Common Pleas, Delaware Cty., Pa., 959 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1992). Comity
concerns are especially heightened when the ongoing state governmental function is a
criminal proceeding. Id. The specific elements that warrant abstention are that “(1)
there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings
implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate
opportunity to raise federal claims.” Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989).
The Younger requirements are clearly met in this case. First, the criminal
proceeding against Gonzalez is still pending. Second, the state proceedings implicate
the important interest of enforcing the Commonwealth’s criminal laws. Third, the
criminal proceedings provide Gonzalez an adequate opportunity to argue in the state
forum that he should be provided with discovery and afforded a fair trial. This Court
may assume that the state procedures will afford him an adequate remedy. See Kelm v.
Hyatt, 44 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1
(1987)) (“Initially, we must presume that the state courts are able to protect the
interests of the federal plaintiff.”). Further, there is nothing in the Complaint to
indicate that Gonzalez falls within any of the narrow exceptions to the Younger
doctrine.4
As Gonzalez appears to ask this Court to direct the state court to provide him
with discovery, and the removal of Judge Reichley as assigned judge and Cipoletti as
prosecutor, his requested remedies will interfere with pending state proceedings. See
also Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 882 (3d Cir. 1994) (“A federal court will only
consider Younger abstention when the requested relief would constitute federal
interference in state judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings”). Accordingly, it is
appropriate to abstain from entertaining the Complaint out of deference to the state
judicial process. Accord Peay v. Massiah-Jackson, 133 F. App’x. 31, 32 (3d Cir. 2005)
(per curiam); see also Ellis v. Mondello, Civ. A. No. 05-1492, 2005 WL 1703194, at *3
(D.N.J. 2005) (“[A]ssuming the criminal action is still pending in a state trial or
appellate court, review of the state court proceedings would be barred; a district court
cannot interfere in a pending state criminal action in order to consider issues that a
plaintiff can raise there.”). To the extent Gonzalez is pursuing claims for monetary
damages, those claims fail as well for the reasons which follow.
B
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.
4 See Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 53-54; Hall v. Pennsylvania, Civ. A. No. 12-2373, 2012 WL
5987142, *2 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (citing Loftus v. Twp. of Lawrence Park, 764 F. Supp. 354, 357
(W.D. Pa. 1991)) (exceptions are to be narrowly construed).
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To the extent that Gonzalez seeks monetary damages,
his claims fail for the following reasons.
a
Since Gonzalez’s claims against Judge Reichley are based on acts he took in his
judicial capacity while presiding over the criminal matter in which Gonzalez is a
defendant, those claims lack a legal basis because Judge Reichley is entitled to absolute
immunity from those claims. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978);
Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
b
Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for acts
that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” such as
“initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). Because it appears to the Court that Gonzalez bases his claims
against Cipoletti for acts she has taken while pursuing criminal charges against him,
any such claims lack a legal basis because prosecutors are entitled to absolute
immunity.
c
Gonzalez’s claims against his former criminal defense attorney are based on his
performance as Gonzalez’s defense counsel, but the law is settled that criminal defense
attorneys are not state actors for purposes of § 1983. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
312, 325 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when
performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal
proceeding.”) (footnote omitted); Clark v. Punshon, 516 F. App’x 97, 99 (3d Cir. 2013)
(per curiam) (noting that a court-appointed attorney is not a state actor for purposes of
§ 1983); Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999)
(“Attorneys performing their traditional functions will not be considered state actors
solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court.”). Thus, the Court must
dismiss Gonzalez’s claims against the Holihan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
for failure to state a plausible claim.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Gonzalez leave to proceed in
forma pauperis and dismiss his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Gonzalez will not be given leave to amend because amendment would be futile. The
Court will dismiss Gonzalez’s claims for damages with prejudice and will dismiss his
claims for injunctive relief without prejudice. See Eldakroury v. Att’ y Gen. of N.J., 601
F. App’ x 156, 158 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (explaining that non-merit based
dismissals, such as a dismissal pursuant to Younger must be without prejudice). An
appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
__/s_/_ G__e_r_a_l_d__ J_._ _P_a_p__p_e_r_t_ __________________
GERALD J. PAPPERT, J.