COLLINS v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

STEVEN COLLINS, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-CV-314

:

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., :

Defendants. :

GOLDBERG, J. APRIL 7, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Steven Collins, a pretrial detainee at Curran Fromhold Correctional Facility

(“CFCF”), initially filed this suit on January 16, 2020 without paying the filing fee or moving to

proceed in forma pauperis. In an Order filed on January 24, 2020, Collins was directed to cure

that defect. He file a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and his inmate account

statement (ECF Nos. 4, 6) on February 20, 2020, and an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5) on

February 21, 2020. Named as Defendants in the original Complaint were the City of Philadelphia,

the Philadelphia County Prison System, and the Philadelphia County Sheriff’ Office.1 For the

following reasons, Collins will be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, and the Amended

Complaint will be dismissed in part with prejudice and in part without prejudice pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

1 The Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading, see Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854

F.3d 209, 220 (3d Cir. 2017) (amended complaint supersedes the earlier pleading and renders the

original pleading a nullity), merely lists the Defendants as “City of Philadelphia et al.” (ECF No.

6 at 1, 2.) For purposes of this Opinion, I will consider the Amended Complaint to have named

all three Defendants.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Collins’s factual allegations are straightforward. He alleges that on December 17, 2019 he

boarded a prison transport bus to go from CFCF to the Philadelphia Criminal Justice Center for a

proceeding in his case. (ECF No. 5 at 3.) The bus driver hit a wall while leaving CFCF, but the

bus did not stop to check if those aboard were injured and no police report was written at that time.

(Id.) When the bus arrived at the Criminal Justice Center, “the police came and made a police

report of the accident and we were located and taken to the hospital.” (Id.) Collins asserts that he

is “still in need of medical treatment to my lower back, neck and shoulder.” (Id. at 4.) He seeks

money damages as relief. (Id.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Collins appears to be unable to pay the filing fee in this matter, I will grant him

leave to proceed in forma pauperis.2 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which

requires the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a

complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard

applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v.

McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the

complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted).

Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Id. As Collins is proceeding pro se, I construe his

allegations liberally. Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).

2 Because Collins is a prisoner, under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, he

must still pay the filing fee in full or in installments.

III. DISCUSSION

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by

the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

a. Claim Against the Philadelphia County Prison System

As the Third Circuit has held, “the Philadelphia Prison System, [a] department[ ] of the

City of Philadelphia itself, [is] not [a] proper defendant[ ]” in an action brought under § 1983.

Russell v. City of Philadelphia, 428 Fed. App’x 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 53 Pa. Con. Stat.

Ann. § 16257; Bey v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F. Supp. 2d 422, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1998)); see also

Durham v. Philadelphia Prison Sys., Civ. A. No. 18-2113, 2018 WL 3105589, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June

25, 2018) (explaining that the “Philadelphia Prison System is not an entity that is subject to suit

separate from the City of Philadelphia.”) (citing 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 16257). Because the

Philadelphia Prison System is not considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983, Durham, 2018

WL 3105589 at *2 (citing Peele v. Philadelphia Prison Sys., Civ. A. No. 12-4877, 2015 WL

1579214, at *2 (E.D. Pa. April 8, 2015)), Collins’s claim against it is dismissed with prejudice.

b. Claim Against the Philadelphia Sheriff’s Office

Although municipalities and other local government units are deemed “persons” subject to

liability under § 1983, Monell v. Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), sheriff’s

departments cannot be sued in conjunction with a county because they are merely arms of the

county, not separate entities. Dobson v. Owens, Civ. A. No. 89-2163, 1989 WL 37140, at *1 (E.D.

Pa. Apr. 13, 1989) (holding that Philadelphia Sheriff’s Department is not a person for § 1983

purposes); Open Inns, Ltd. v. Chester County Sheriff Dept., 24 F. Supp. 2d 410, 417 (E.D. Pa.

1998) (dismissing claim against sheriff’s department because it is only a sub-unit of the county);

see also Bosenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997) (for purposes of §

1983 claims, municipalities and police departments are treated as single entity). The Philadelphia

Sheriff’s Department is an agency of the City. See 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13132(c) (“Subject to the

provisions of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter and the First Class City Home Rule Act . . . ,

the Council of the City of Philadelphia shall have full powers to legislate with respect to the

election, appointment, compensation, organization, abolition, merger, consolidation, powers,

functions and duties of the Sheriff . . . .”) Because Collins has named the City of Philadelphia as

a Defendant, the Sheriff’s Department, a branch of the City, cannot be sued as an individual entity.

Accordingly, the claim against the Sheriff’s Department is dismissed with prejudice.

c. Claim Against the City of Philadelphia

In his Amended Complaint, Collins does not specify the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction

over his claim against the City of Philadelphia.3 To the extent that he seeks to bring a civil rights

claim pursuant to § 1983 arising from the traffic accident, that claim is not plausible for several

reasons.

First, to plead a basis for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the

municipality’s policy or custom caused the violation of his constitutional rights. See Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “To satisfy the pleading standard, [the

plaintiff] must . . . specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of York,

PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). “‘Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final

authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation,

policy, or edict.’” Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting

Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). “‘Custom, on the other

3 The original Complaint, now superseded, specified the claims therein were § 1983 claims

brought pursuant to the Court’s federal question jurisdiction.

hand, can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed

or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.’” Id. (quoting

Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). A plaintiff illustrates that a custom was

the proximate cause of his injuries by demonstrating that the defendant “had knowledge of similar

unlawful conduct in the past, failed to take precautions against future violations, and that its failure,

at least in part, led to his injury.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Here, Collins

has failed to allege that he was injured due to a municipal policy or custom.

Second, courts addressing a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment claim that he or she

was injured while being transported to or from prison have generally evaluated those claims using

the “deliberate indifference” standard.4 See, e.g., Brown v. Missouri Dep’t of Corr., 353 F.3d

1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). A prison official is not deliberately indifferent “unless

the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must

both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994).

Courts addressing claims similar to those raised by Collins have concluded that allegations

of negligent driving such as being involved in a collision, even when coupled with the absence of

safety restraints, do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference sufficient to state a claim. See

Otero v. Catalogne, Civ. A No. 08-282, 2010 WL 3883444, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2010)

(dismissing deliberate indifference claim where “despite Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that

Defendant Canada ‘intentionally’ drove recklessly with ‘total disregard’ for Plaintiff’s safety,

4 The Fourth Circuit analyzes claims against transport drivers who have injured inmates in

the course of transport as excessive force claims. See Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia,

878 F.3d 89, 99 (4th Cir. 2017).

Plaintiff has not alleged that he asked Defendant Canada to stop driving recklessly, and that such

a request was consciously ignored”).5 In other words, “[t]he common thread running through the

. . . cases upholding inmates’ Eighth Amendment claims against transport drivers is that, in each

case, the court found that the driver had consciously disregarded the inmate’s pleas to stop driving

recklessly and thereby manifested indifference for the inmate’s safety.” Otero v. Catalogne, No.

08-282 ERIE, 2010 WL 3883444, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2010).

Here, Collins’s only allegation is that the Sheriff’s Department employee driving the bus

was involved in an accident and did not immediately stop and create a report of the incident.

However, that allegation amounts, at most, to negligence since nothing in the Amended Complaint

suggests that the bus driver acted with an intent to harm Collins or drove in a consistently reckless

manner over Collins’s or other inmates’ complaints. Collins also admits that a police report was

completed once the bus arrived at the Criminal Justice Center. Collins has at most alleged that he

5 See also Bryant v. Downs, Civ. A. No. 09-1670, 2010 WL 2593564, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June

28, 2010) (dismissing deliberate indifference claim where plaintiff alleged that “the drivers

continually slammed on the breaks or took turns too quickly, which resulted in the prisoners being

thrown back and forth across the van, as they had no seat belts”); Grisby v. Cotton, Civ. A. No.

08-214, 2009 WL 890543, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2009) (dismissing constitutional claim where

inmate alleged that the defendant “was traveling in excess of the posted speed limit and collided

with a white truck, which was apparently stopped at a red light” while the inmate’s hands were

shackled to his feet and he was not wearing a seatbelt). In contrast, where the inmate’s allegations

of reckless driving are coupled with allegations that the driver intended harm, refused to slow

down after being asked, or declined to fasten an inmate’s seatbelt despite the inmate’s

protestations, courts have found a basis for deliberate indifference. See Rogers v. Boatright, 709

F.3d 403, 409 (5th Cir. 2013) (prisoner stated claim where he alleged that defendant “operated the

prison van recklessly, knowing that there was a substantial risk that [plaintiff] would be injured if

the van stopped abruptly because [plaintiff] was shackled in leg irons and handcuffs and was not

provided with a seatbelt” and because defendant “told another officer that other inmates similarly

had been injured the prior week and during other incidents, which ‘happen [ ] all the time.’”);

Brown, 353 F.3d at 1040 (“We conclude Brown stated a claim against the five COs involved in

transporting the inmates, as he alleged he asked them all to fasten his seatbelt, but they refused.”);

see also Scott v. Becher, 736 F. App’x 130, 133 (6th Cir. 2018) (rejecting qualified immunity

where the defendant “was driving above the speed limit, swerving, and generally driving

recklessly” and when the inmates begged him to slow down, “refused, laughed, and instead

accelerated”).

was in a traffic accident as a result of bad driving and has thus failed to state a plausible deliberate

indifference claim.6

Even setting aside the Monell deficiency, the only other possible basis for a constitutional

claim is that medical treatment for Collins’s injury was delayed because the bus proceeded to the

Criminal Justice Center before taking those aboard to a hospital. This constitutional claim is also

assessed under the deliberate indifference standard, and courts should consider whether the prison

official was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need.7 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 837.

“A medical need is serious, . . . if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring

treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a

doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d

Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted). Deliberate indifference is properly alleged in this context

“where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally

refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3)

prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier,

182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

6 Similarly, Collins failed to state a claim using an excessive force standard because nothing

in his allegations suggests that the Defendant used force maliciously or sadistically to cause him

harm. See Kingsley v. Hendrick, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (holding that “the Due Process

Clause protects a pretrial detainee from use of excessive force that amounts to punishment”).

7 As Collins was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events in question, the Fourteenth

Amendment governs his claims. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005).

However, the standard under the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment for claims

related to the type of claim Collins seeks to assert is essentially the same for purposes of the

analysis. See Parkell v. Morgan, 682 F. App’x 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam); see also

Moore v. Luffey, No. 18-1716, 2019 WL 1766047, at *3 n.2 (3d Cir. Apr. 19, 2019) (declining to

address whether a new standard applies to claims raised by pretrial detainees based on issues

related to medical care).

Collins has not alleged that a prison official or other municipal employee knew of his need

for medical treatment and delayed or prevented him from receiving that treatment. However, I

cannot say, at this time, that Collins will never be able to allege a plausible claim arising from the

bus accident. Accordingly, his claim against the City will be dismissed without prejudice and he

will be granted leave to file a second amended complaint if he is capable of curing the deficiencies

identified in this Opinion.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Collins’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will

be granted and his Amended Complaint will be dismissed in part with prejudice and in part without

prejudice pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B). Collins will be permitted leave to file a second amended

complaint if he is able to cure the defects identified in this Opinion regarding his claims against

the City of Philadelphia.

An appropriate Order follows.