HOPE v. FAIR ACRES GERIATRIC CENTER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CARL LOUIS ROBINSON, as Executor : CIVIL ACTION

of the Estate of Georgia A. Hope, : NO. 15-06749

:

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

:

FAIR ACRES GERIATRIC CENTER, :

et al. :

:

:

Defendant. :

M E M O R A N D U M

Eduardo C. Robreno, J. March 20, 2020

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Carl Louis Robinson, grandson of the late Georgia

Ann Hope, brings this case in a representative capacity as the

executor of Ms. Hope’s estate (“Plaintiff”). This case involves

allegations that Ms. Hope suffered deprivation of her federal

statutory rights while a resident of Fair Acres Geriatric

Center, a nursing home owned by Delaware County. Plaintiff named

as defendants Fair Acres Geriatric Center; Delaware County City

Council; William D’Amico, nursing home administrator for Fair

Acres; Dr. James Bonner, medical director for Fair Acres; Dr.

Franklin Vogel, Jr., DPM, treating podiatrist at Fair Acres;

Tracey Dale-Williams, head nurse at Fair Acres; Dr. Walter

Lewis, primary care physician at Fair Acres; Teri Farr, director

of nursing for Fair Acres; and an unspecified number of John and

Jane Does, employees at Fair Acres.

The case has a long factual and procedural history. The case

began when the original plaintiff, Ms. Hope,1 filed her initial

complaint against Fair Acres alleging, among other claims,

violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and

Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. § 201-1 et seq. (“UTPCPL”).

Fair Acres filed a motion to dismiss the initial complaint, and

the Court granted the motion with leave to amend the § 1983 and

UTPCPL claims.

Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint reasserting the §

1983 claim against Fair Acres and sought leave to join

additional defendants including Delaware County Council, William

D’Amico, Dr. James Bonner, Dr. Franklin Vogel, and Dr. Walter

Lewis. Fair Acres moved to dismiss the amended complaint.

On July 25, 2016, the Court granted Fair Acres’ motion to

dismiss for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be

1 Ms. Hope died and current plaintiff, Carl Robinson, was appointed as

executor of her estate and substituted as the plaintiff in this action.

grant and denied Plaintiff’s motion to join the additional

defendants as moot. Plaintiff appealed.

On February 14, 2018, the Third Circuit vacated the Court’s

July 25 order and remanded to this Court for adjudication of

Plaintiff’s “§ 1983 claim under a failure-to-train theory of

liability.” Robinson v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 722 F. App’x

194, 200 (3d Cir. 2018).

On August 16, 2019, the Court granted Dr. Lewis’ and Dr.

Vogel’s motions for summary judgment, finding they were not

state actors, and then dismissed them from the case. ECF No.

116; ECF No. 126. Therefore, the case proceeded to trial on a

failure-to-train theory of liability against defendants Fair

Acres Geriatric Center, Delaware County City Council, William

D’Amico, and Dr. James Bonner (“Defendants”).2

Following an eight-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict

in favor of Defendants. At the conclusion of trial, the Court

set a scheduling order for the filing of post-trial motions

directing Plaintiff to file, in support of any post-trial

motions, a memorandum of law “including specific citations to

the record.” ECF No. 204 at 2; see also ECF No. 212. Plaintiff

2 Prior to trial, Plaintiff dropped the claim against Tracey Dale-Williams.

Tr. 08/29/19 at 3-4, ECF No. 198; Tr. 09/25/19 at 2:14-18, ECF No. 213. The

Court dismissed Teri Farr finding that she was not a policymaker. Tr.

10/04/19 at 72, ECF No. 220. The remaining defendants proceeded to trial in

their official capacities. Tr. 10/02/19 at 122, ECF No. 218.

brings the current motion, ECF No. 207, and accompanying

memorandum of law, ECF No. 223, seeking post-trial relief by

raising arguments in a shotgun style approach. Almost

universally, the Plaintiff’s memorandum of law fails to provide

pinpoint citations to the record identifying where the alleged

trial errors were made and fails to provide legal support for

the arguments now raised. On this basis alone, the motion could

be denied. However, for the sake of completeness, the Court will

address each of the arguments raised by Plaintiff seriatim.

II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

a. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 50(a)

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a).

Motions under Rule 50(a) must be brought before the case is

submitted to the jury. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2) (“A motion for

judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before the

case is submitted to the jury.”). The current motion, brought

after the jury returned its verdict, will be denied as untimely.

b. Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 50(b)

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). If

the Court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of

law under Rule 50(a), the moving party may renew the motion

after the jury reaches a verdict. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).

Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if the “[C]ourt finds

that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient

evidentiary basis” to find for the nonmoving party. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 50(a)(1). Judgment as a matter of law “is an extraordinary

remedy when urged by an unsuccessful plaintiff who bore the

burden of proof at trail.” Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am.,

Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 921 (3d Cir. 1986). “In order to grant the

motion, the district court ‘“must be able to say that there is

insufficient evidence for permitting a different finding.”’” Id.

(quoting Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Co., 407 F.2d 443, 446 (3d

Cir. 1968)). A renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law

brought pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 50(b) must be based on the

same grounds as a pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of

law made by the moving party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 advisory

committee’s note to 2006 amendment.

Plaintiff’s post-trial motion, ECF No. 207, and supplemental

post-trial memorandum, ECF No. 223, fail to point to any pre-

verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule

50(a). The renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 50(b) therefore will be denied.3

III. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

“[E]ven when judgment as a matter of law is inappropriate,”

a new trial may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59. Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002,

1017 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d

715, 735 (3d Cir. 1988)). Rule 59 permits the Court to grant a

new trial “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore

been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59(a)(1)(A). Although Rule 59 does not enumerate specifics,

“[a] court may grant a new trial on the grounds of: (1) improper

admission or exclusion of evidence; (2) improper instructions to

the jury; (3) misconduct of counsel; (4) newly discovered

evidence; or (5) a finding that the jury’s verdict is against

the weight of the evidence.” Davis v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of

Am., 153 F. Supp. 2d 598, 600 (E.D. Pa. 2001).

3 Additionally, in denying Plaintiff’s Rule 50(b) motion, the Court notes

that: (1) the evidence shown at trial provided a legally sufficient basis for

the jury to find for the Defendants and (2) the Plaintiff makes no showing

that the amount of evidence (even including Dr. Mayer’s testimony, which the

Court reviewed in its entirety) so overwhelmingly favored Plaintiff that

reasonable jurors could not have reached a verdict for Defendants. In the

Court’s view, the evidence clearly supports a finding that all of Ms. Hope’s

federal rights were met, and that her injuries were the natural and

unavoidable result of her poor vascular status and overall health decline due

to age—not the result of any statutorily-deficient training regarding

infection control by Defendants.

When a party brings a motion for a new trial predicated

upon a theory of trial error, the Court must determine “(1)

whether an error was in fact made, and (2) ‘whether that error

was so prejudicial that refusal to grant a new trial would be

inconsistent with substantial justice.’” Prum v. Crisante, 2016

WL 7201233, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2016) (Robreno, J.)

(quoting Farra v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1021,

1026 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (internal citations omitted)). However,

“new trials because the verdict is against the weight of the

evidence are proper only when the record shows that the jury’s

verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the

verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our

conscience.” Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344,

1353 (3d Cir. 1991). “[T]he purpose of this rule is to ensure

that the trial court does not supplant the jury verdict with its

own interpretation of the facts.” Olefins Trading, Inc. v. Han

Yang Chem. Corp., 9 F.3d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 1993).

Further, “[u]nless justice requires otherwise, no error in

admitting or excluding evidence—or any other error by the court

or a party—is ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside

a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a

judgment or order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. “At every stage of the

proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that

do not affect any party's substantial rights.” Id.

The Plaintiff’s motion4 involves allegations of trial error

which fall into three categories: (1) improper admission or

exclusion of evidence, (2) improper instructions to the jury,

and (3) that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the

evidence. The Plaintiff’s motion also argues for a new trial

based on two alleged pretrial errors: (1) the granting of

summary judgment in favor of Drs. Lewis and Vogel; and (2) the

Court’s order severing Plaintiff’s claim under the Pennsylvania

Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.

a. Admission and Exclusion of Evidence

Plaintiff argues that the Court made numerous evidentiary-

ruling errors which warrant a new trial. The Court will discuss

each alleged error seriatim.

i. “MIL to Preclude Bradbury Testimony”

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred and abused its

discretion by failing to grant Plaintiff’s “MIL to Preclude

Bradbury.” ECF No. 223 at 25. Plaintiff’s memorandum does not

cite to anywhere in the record where this “MIL to Preclude

Bradbury” was made, nor does Plaintiff’s memorandum provide a

4 Plaintiff’s motion is styled as a “Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. [P.] 59 and 60.” ECF No. 207 at 4; ECF No. 223 at 28. However, the Court

finds that Plaintiff’s motion and memorandum provide no argument to support

the application of Rule 60. Rather, the appropriate rule for evaluating

Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial is Rule 59 and the Court will proceed

accordingly.

single argument for why the Court’s alleged denial of

Plaintiff’s “MIL to Preclude Bradbury” was error. See ECF No.

207; ECF No. 223. While there is no one in the record with the

name “Bradbury,” the Court assumes that the Plaintiff is

referring to Trina Bradburn. Trina Bradburn never testified.

Further, if per chance Plaintiff is referring to the note of Dr.

Bradburn (Defendant’s Exhibit Number 2-109) admitted into

evidence, Plaintiff did not object to its publication. See Tr.

09/30/19 at 116-17, ECF No. 216 (“No objection.”). Plaintiff’s

motion will be denied.

ii. “MIL to Preclude Brady”

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred and abused its

discretion by failing to grant Plaintiff’s “MIL to Preclude

Brady.” ECF No. 223 at 25. Plaintiff’s memorandum does not cite

to anywhere in the record where this motion “MIL to Preclude

Brady” was made, nor does Plaintiff’s memorandum provide a

single argument for why the Court’s alleged denial of

Plaintiff’s “MIL to Preclude Brady” was error. Still, the Court

will assume that Plaintiff’s mention of “Brady” is referring to

Theresa Brady MSN, CRNP, CWS and to Plaintiff’s motion, at ECF

No. 163, which sought to preclude Ms. Brady’s testimony. Theresa

Brady never testified. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion regarding

“MIL to Preclude Brady” will be denied.

iii. “MIL to Preclude Cumulative Testimony”

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred and abused its

discretion by failing to grant Plaintiff’s “MIL to Preclude

Cumulative Testimony.” ECF No. 223 at 25-26. The argument is

wholly conclusory. Plaintiff provides no legal support for the

argument, and the post-trial motion and memorandum do not cite

to anywhere in the record where there was discussion of this

“MIL to Preclude Cumulative Testimony.” See ECF No. 223; ECF No.

207. However, the Court will assume that Plaintiff is referring

to Plaintiff’s motion in limine to preclude cumulative testimony

of Defendants’ experts on causation. ECF No. 145. The motion in

limine sought to prevent Ilene Warner-Maron, Ph.D., R.N., and

Bruce E. Silver, M.D., from both testifying on the issue of

causation on the grounds that their testimony at trial would be

cumulative. Id.; see Fed. R. Evid. 403. Dr. Warner-Maron never

testified. Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion as

frivolous.5

iv. “MIL to Preclude Dr. Silver”

5 While the Court need not evaluate the merits of its ruling on Plaintiff’s

motion in limine to determine that the post-trial motion is frivolous because

Dr. Warner-Maron never testified, the Court notes that its ruling on the

motion in limine was not in error. The Court found that Defendants intended

to call Dr. Warner-Maron to testify regarding nursing-care training and Dr.

Silver to testify regarding medical-care training. See Tr. 09/25/19 at 17:9-

12, ECF No. 213. The Court therefore properly denied the motion in limine

because the testimony it sought to exclude was not actually cumulative. See

Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred and abused its

discretion in denying Plaintiff’s “MIL to Preclude Dr. Silver.”

See ECF No. 223 at 26.6 The argument is largely conclusory;

however, Plaintiff makes a passing allegation in the memorandum

that Dr. Silver, the Defendants’ expert, was permitted to

testify in areas outside of his expertise to criticize

Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Mayer. Id. at 33.

During Defendants’ questioning of Dr. Silver, Defendants

asked Dr. Silver whether the removal of Ms. Hope’s toenail by

Dr. Vogel, a consultant podiatrist who treated Ms. Hope at Fair

Acres, met the standard of care. Tr. 10/03/19 at 125:5-9, ECF

No. 219. Plaintiff objected that “Dr. Silver is not a Podiatrist

and should not be able to opine on issues related to Podiatry.”

Id. at 136:3-6. The Court overruled the objection, finding that

Dr. Silver, as a Gerontologist was qualified to “render opinions

in the area of the standard of care for medical [staff] and

nurses in a nursing home environment” and therefore could

appropriately give his opinion on the removal of Ms. Hope’s

toenail. Id. at 138:13-15.

The Court finds that it did not err in its ruling regarding

Dr. Silver because the admitted testimony met Federal Rule of

6 The Court notes that Plaintiff fails to make any argument regarding, or

mention of, Dr. Silver in the post-trial motion, ECF No. 207. Plaintiff’s

first post-trial mention of Dr. Silver is in the supplemental memorandum in

support of the motion. ECF No. 223.

Evidence 702’s requirements of qualification, reliability, and

fit. See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Schneider ex rel. Estate of

Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003). The Court

therefore will deny Plaintiff’s motion.

Further, even assuming that it was error for the Court to

admit Dr. Silver’s testimony regarding the toenail, Plaintiff

cannot show any resulting prejudice that would warrant a new

trial. Plaintiff’s own expert Dr. Mayer, a vascular surgeon, was

also allowed to testify about the standard of care Ms. Hope

received during the toenail removal. See Tr. 10/03/19 at 138:13-

15, ECF No. 219; Tr. 10/02/19 at 67, ECF No. 218.

v. “MIL to Preclude Pre-existing Conditions”

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred and abused its

discretion by failing to grant Plaintiff’s “MIL to Preclude Pre-

existing Conditions.” ECF No. 223 at 25-26. Plaintiff’s post-

trial memorandum does not cite to anywhere in the record where

this “MIL to Preclude Pre-existing Conditions” was made, nor

does Plaintiff raise any arguments as to why he believes the

Court erred regarding this matter. See ECF No. 207; ECF No. 223.

However, the Court will assume that Plaintiff is referring to

Plaintiff’s motion in limine to preclude Defendants from

questions about Ms. Hopes’ pre-existing medical conditions and

history of smoking, ECF No. 142, and the oral motion to

reconsider the same issue. Tr. 09/25/19 at 8-9, ECF No.213.

At a hearing prior to trial, the Court denied the motion in

limine, finding that “Ms. Hope’s preexisting conditions and past

smoking are highly probative of the [causal] nexus” between the

Defendants’ alleged failures and Ms. Hope’s injuries. Id. at

8:1-4 and 9:17-22. Ms. Hope’s preexisting conditions are indeed

highly probative of causation. The Court’s denial of the motion

to preclude evidence about pre-existing conditions was therefore

appropriate. See Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403. Plaintiff’s post-trial

motion regarding Plaintiff’s “MIL to Preclude Pre-existing

Conditions” will be denied.

vi. “MIL to Preclude Statement in Exhibit A”

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred and abused its

discretion by denying Plaintiff’s “MIL to Preclude Statement in

Exhibit A.” ECF No. 223 at 26. There is no “Exhibit A,” or any

exhibit for that matter, attached to any of Plaintiff’s post-

trial filings. See ECF No. 207; ECF No. 223. Plaintiff’s

memorandum does not identify what “Exhibit A” is. Because

Plaintiff’s post-trial motion and memorandum fail to identify

the exhibit Plaintiff seeks to challenge, the motion will be

denied.7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)(B).

vii. “MIL to Preclude Warner Testimoony [sic]”

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred and abused its

discretion by failing to grant Plaintiff’s “MIL to Preclude

Warner Testimoony [sic].” ECF No. 223 at 25-26. Plaintiff’s

post-trial memorandum does not cite to anywhere in the record

where this “MIL to Preclude Warner Testimoony [sic]” was made,

nor does Plaintiff provide any authority in support of this

argument. See ECF No. 223; ECF No. 207. Still, the Court will

assume that Plaintiff is referring to Plaintiff’s motion in

limine to exclude portions of the expert testimony of Ilene

Warner-Maron, Ph.D., R.N. ECF No. 141. Dr. Warner-Maron never

testified. Therefore, Plaintiff’s post-trial motion regarding

“MIL to Preclude Warner Testimoony [sic]” will be denied.8

viii. “MIL to Preclude Inappropriate Remark”

7 To the extent Plaintiff’s reference to a “MIL to Preclude Statement in

Exhibit A” refers to ECF No. 185, Plaintiff’s arguments are considered by the

Court below in its discussion of Plaintiff’s post-trial argument that the

Court erred in denying Plaintiff’s “MIL to Preclude Inappropriate Remark.”

See infra Section III(a)(viii).

8 Further, the Court held that “of course the testimony of Ms. Ilene Warner-

Maren [sic] should be limited to nursing practice and should not spill over

to the area of Physician treatment or standard of care for Physician

treatment.” Tr. 09/25/19 at 15:9-13, ECF No. 213. Plaintiff has not made it

clear what Plaintiff is concerned about regarding Dr. Warner-Maron.

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred and abused its

discretion by failing to grant Plaintiff’s “MIL to Preclude

Inappropriate Remark.” ECF No. 223 at 25-26. Plaintiff’s post-

trial motion and memorandum make no reference or citation as to

what “inappropriate remark” Plaintiff refers. However, the Court

will assume that Plaintiff is referring to Plaintiff’s “Motion

in Limine to Preclude Defendants from Questions about Statements

Made in Exhibit ‘A.’” ECF No. 185.

Plaintiff filed the motion seeking to exclude evidence

about a remark made by Plaintiff himself, which was memorialized

in a note written by an unidentified Fair Acres nurse dated

sometime in March of 2014. See Id., Exh. A. The nurse’s note

states that Plaintiff told Fair Acres staff that “sometimes

people just need a good ass whooping and maybe they are just

stupid.” Id. Plaintiff’s motion sought to preclude the

introduction of the note and remark on the grounds that the

nurse’s note constituted hearsay and that any references to

Plaintiff’s remark therein would be more prejudicial than

probative. Id.; Tr. 09/30/19 at 242-43, ECF No. 216; see Fed. R.

Evid. 802, 403.

Following a hearing on the motion, the Court directed

Defendants to alert the Court if, at some point during trial,

they intended to use the remark or the note. Tr. 09/30/19 at

247, ECF No. 216. Upon alerting the Court, the Court would go to

sidebar with counsel for the parties and determine whether

Plaintiff had opened the door to allowing the evidence. Id. at

247. Defendants, however, never alerted the Court so that it

could hold a sidebar. And while the nurse’s note itself was

never used in cross-examination of Plaintiff, Defendants did ask

him whether he “remember[ed] telling the Nurses why people

cannot listen and sometimes people just need a good ass-

whooping, and maybe they were just stupid.” Tr. 10/01/19 at

112:14-17, ECF No. 217. Plaintiff did not object to this

question. See id. at 112-13.

The Court agrees that Defendants should have alerted the

Court before questioning Plaintiff regarding his remark.

However, because Plaintiff did not object or raise the matter to

the Court during trial the objection is waived. Had he done so,

the Court could have stricken the remarks or given the jury a

curative instruction. Therefore, because the Court finds that

Plaintiff failed to object to Defendants’ questioning concerning

the remark and that its inclusion did not affect a substantial

right of Plaintiff, the motion for a new trial on this basis

will be denied.9 Fed. R. Evid. 103; Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.

9 To the extent Plaintiff’s post-trial argument for a new trial is that the

unidentified nurses’ note constituted hearsay, the argument is meritless. The

note was not admitted into evidence, nor shown to the jury, nor used in cross

examination. Tr. 10/01/19 at 112-13, ECF No. 217.

ix. “MIL re Health Surveys”

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred and abused its

discretion by “granting in full or substantial part . . . MIL re

Health Surveys.” ECF No. 223 at 27. The argument, like nearly

all of Plaintiff’s evidentiary arguments, is wholly conclusory.

Plaintiff’s motion and memorandum do not point to anywhere on

the record where the Court allegedly erred. See ECF No. 207; ECF

No. 223. Nor did the memorandum supply any authority supporting

Plaintiff’s argument. Id. The post-trial filings fail to even

identify what “Health Surveys” Plaintiff is referring to. Still,

the Court will assume that Plaintiff is referring to the Court’s

decision regarding Defendants’ “Motion in Limine to Exclude any

Evidence, Testimony, or Argument Related to Department of Health

Surveys.” ECF No. 130. The motion concerned deficiency citations

issued by the Pennsylvania Department of Health to Fair Acres

(“DOH Surveys”).

In their motion in limine, Defendants argued that all

evidence, testimony, or argument related to any DOH Survey

should be precluded as not relevant, inadmissible hearsay, and

as unfairly prejudicial with a high risk of misleading the jury

and confusing the issues before the Court. See ECF No. 130-1 at

4; Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403.

Prior to trial, the Court held oral argument on the motion.

See Tr. 09/25/19 at 23, ECF No. 213. Plaintiff argued that “the

point of [the DOH Surveys] [was] to establish notice to the

facility of nursing and management practices.” Id. at 23:15-16.

The parties disputed whether the DOH Surveys related to the

issue of training. Id. at 28-29. The Court stated that “if [the

DOH Surveys] relate to the training, it seems to me, then, you

have your opportunity to both cross-examine and present

evidence.” Id. at 29:12-14. However, because the parties had not

provided the Court with copies of the DOH Surveys Plaintiff

sought to rely on, the Court could not rule on the motion in the

abstract. Id. at 29. The Court then ordered Plaintiff to

“identify specifically what statements in [the DOH Surveys] she

intends to offer, and the basis for admissibility” so that the

Court could determine the admissibility of each DOH Survey. Id.

at 38:8-9. In response, Plaintiff identified two DOH Surveys

that Plaintiff believed to be relevant: (1) a DOH Survey dated

November 20, 2014, (“Survey Number One”), ECF No. 180; and (2) a

DOH Survey dated November 21, 2013, (“Survey Number Two”), ECF

No. 181.

At trial, while questioning Dr. Bonner, medical director of

Fair Acres, Plaintiff asked Dr. Bonner about the DOH Surveys.

Tr. 09/27/19 at 27, ECF No. 215. Defendants objected, arguing

that the questioning went to the “pending motion in limine”

regarding DOH Surveys. Id. at 26-27. The Court overruled

Defendants’ objection, stating that the Court would “let them

question [Dr. Bonner] on those two Surveys, as of cross.” Id. at

28:12-13.

Again during trial, Defendants asked the Court to discuss

the pending motion in limine regarding the DOH Surveys. Tr.

09/30/19 at 180:12-14, ECF No. 216. The parties discussed the

contents of both Survey Number One and Survey Number Two, but

the Court ultimately decided not to rule on the motion, choosing

instead to “defer discussion of th[e] matter until later.” Id.

at 195:22-23.10

The only other mention of the surveys—revealed by the

Court’s own review of the record—was during Plaintiff’s

questioning of Defendants’ expert, Dr. Silver. Tr. 10/04/19 at

50, ECF No. 220. Plaintiff asked Dr. Silver about surveyors’ use

of “F-Tags” in surveys. Id. at 50. Dr. Silver answered the

question before Defendants objected to Plaintiff’s questioning

by arguing the questioning went “well beyond the scope of

direct.” Id. at 52:4-5. The Court told Defendants “Okay. So,

when [Plaintiff] asks a question, you object, and we will go

10 The Court notes that, as to Survey Number Two, the Court told Plaintiff it

“ha[d] a sense that I should probably admit it” because the survey contained

such trivial information that its admission would likely have no effect on

the jury’s decision. Tr. 09/30/19 at 189:1-2, ECF No. 216.

on.” Id. at 52:8-9. No further questions regarding the DOH

Surveys were asked of Dr. Silver.

Plaintiff has not identified any portion of either Survey

Number One or Survey Number Two that Plaintiff tried to admit

but the Court excluded nor proffered any question that Plaintiff

wanted to propound but was prevented from asking. Therefore,

Plaintiff suffered no prejudice. The Court will deny Plaintiff’s

motion.11

x. “MIL re Negligence”

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred and abused its

discretion by “grant[ing] in full or substantial part . . . MIL

re Negligence.” ECF No. 223 at 27. Plaintiff makes no further

explanation regarding this alleged error. See ECF No. 207; ECF

No. 223. The Court assumes that Plaintiff is referring to

Defendants’ “Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiff from

Offering Any Evidence, Testimony or Argument Related to

Negligence.” ECF No. 131. Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit.

11 The Court further notes that Survey Number Two is only a citation finding

that Fair Acres failed to send a piece of paper, documenting an incident

between two patients, to the right government agency. ECF No. 181; see Tr.

09/30/19 at 187-88, ECF No. 216. Survey Number Two never concludes whether

the incident between two patients actually occurred and therefore it is not

relevant to training of medical staff or even to the care that Fair Acres’

residents receive. It would therefore not have been error for the Court to

exclude it as not relevant to the action. Fed. R. Evid. 402.

Defendants brought the motion due to a concern that

Plaintiff would offer testimony concerning the Defendants’

breach of the standard of care applicable to medical malpractice

and state law actions. Defendants argued that this type of

testimony would confuse the jury into thinking that the case was

a medical malpractice case. See Id. at 7-8. Consistent with this

understanding, the Court ultimately instructed the jury

regarding the standard of care in a § 1983 case and refused to

instruct the jury on the standard of care for negligence in

medical malpractice cases. Instructing the jury on the standard

of care in medical malpractice cases would have confused the

jury as to what standard of care to apply. See Fed. R. Evid.

403. The Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.

xi. “MIL to Preclude Plaintiff Testimony”

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred and abused its

discretion by “grant[ing] in full or substantial part . . . MIL

to Preclude Plaintiff Testimony.” ECF No. 223 at 27. The post-

trial motion and memorandum provide no further explanation of

what Plaintiff is referring to. See ECF No. 207; ECF No. 223.

The Court assumes that Plaintiff is referring to Defendants’

“Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiff’s Testimony.” ECF No.

129.

Plaintiff’s argument misses the mark. The Court did not

grant the Defendants’ motion “in full or substantial part.” ECF

No. 223 at 27. Rather, the Court ordered the motion be granted

in part and denied in part. Specifically, the motion was

“[d]enied to the extent that [Plaintiff] will be allowed to

testify as to perceptions; granted to the extent that

[Plaintiff] will not be allowed to testify as to an opinion,

either medical or failure to train.” Tr. 09/25/19 at 46:5-8, ECF

No. 213. This ruling was appropriate because Plaintiff is not

qualified to offer opinions based on scientific, technical, or

other specialized knowledge about medical care or the failure to

train medical professionals. Fed. R. Evid. 701. The post-trial

motion on this basis will be denied.

xii. “MIL to Preclude Photographs”

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred and abused its

discretion by “grant[ing] in full or substantial part . . . MIL

to Preclude Photographs.” ECF No. 223 at 27. Plaintiff makes no

further explanation of the argument. See ECF No. 207; ECF No.

207. The Court assumes that Plaintiff is referring to

Defendants’ “Motion in Limine to Preclude Photographs of Ms.

Hope’s Foot and Amputation Site.” ECF No. 128.

Because the Court did not grant Defendants’ motion in full

or in substantial part, the Plaintiff’s argument also misses the

mark. In fact, the Court rejected Defendants’ arguments that the

photographs were not relevant and that the probative value of

the photographs was substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice. Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403. Defendants also

argued that certain of the photographs should be excluded to the

extent they were needlessly cumulative. ECF. No 128 at 5; Tr.

09/25/19 at 21, ECF No. 213. Plaintiff agreed that the number of

photographs could be reduced, and that Plaintiff was “happy to”

remove any duplicative photos. Id. at 18:22, 19:8-9. Plaintiff

requested only that “the number of photographs show[] the

sequence, or photographic chronology of the wound.” Id. at

18:22-24. The Court agreed, stating that “to the extent that

[the photographs] show some progression, then they wouldn’t be

cumulative.” Id. at 22:20-21.12 Therefore, the photographs

showing the progression were admitted and shown to the jury.

Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.

xiii. Evidentiary Rulings Regarding Dr. Mayer

Plaintiff argues that the Court’s various evidentiary

rulings regarding Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. David A. Mayer, M.D.,

12 Further, the Plaintiff’s post-trial motion and memorandum do not mention

any photograph that Plaintiff was thereafter prevented from using. The

Court’s own review of the record did not identify any later trial rulings

regarding photographs adverse to Plaintiff.

F.I.C.S, who testified at trial by way of pre-recorded video

deposition, constituted error warranting a new trial.

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred by granting in part

Defendants’ motions in limine concerning Dr. Mayer’s testimony.

The Court’s order permitted Dr. Mayer to testify as to “general

surgery, vascular surgery, and bariatric surgery;” to “the

standard of care and the medical treatment Ms. Hope personally

received from physicians and nurses;” and to “the medical

causation of Ms. Hope’s injuries.” ECF No. 182. However,

Plaintiff’s current motion seems to challenge certain

limitations placed on Dr. Mayer’s testimony by the Court’s

order. See ECF No. 223 at 26-27. Namely, Plaintiff challenges

the Court’s finding that Dr. Mayer could not: (1) provide expert

testimony as to “training policy and procedure for a

Pennsylvania skilled nursing facility;” (2) provide expert

testimony as to “the quality of nursing education or training at

Fair Acres Geriatric Center;” and (3) “testify that any

treatment constituted ‘abuse’ or ‘neglect.’” ECF No. 182; see

ECF No. 223 at 26-27.

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that (4) the Court erred by

denying Plaintiff’s motion to exclude evidence about a fraud

investigation by the New York Attorney General into a previous

employer of Dr. Mayer’s. See Id. at 27.

1. Preclusion of expert testimony by Dr. Mayer

as to nursing home administration and

nursing education and training

As to Plaintiff’s first two arguments, that Dr. Mayer

should have been allowed provide expert testimony on the

training policy and procedures for a Pennsylvania skilled

nursing facility and on the quality of nursing education or

training at Fair Acres, the Court will deny the motion because

Dr. Mayer is not qualified to testify and his opinion on these

issues is unreliable.

The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by

Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides as follows:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand

the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness

qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education, may testify thereto in the form

of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based

upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the

product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the

witness has applied the principles and methods reliably

to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

The Third Circuit has “explained that Rule 702

embodies a trilogy of restrictions on expert testimony:

qualification, reliability and fit.” Schneider ex rel. Estate of

Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing In

re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741–743 (3d Cir.

1994) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.

579 (1993)).

Qualification “refers to the requirement that the witness

possess specialized expertise,” and the Third Circuit has

interpreted this requirement liberally, holding that “a broad

range of knowledge, skills, and training qualify an expert.”

Schneider, 320 F.3d at 404 (quoting Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741).

For an expert’s opinion to be reliable, the expert must

have “good grounds” for his belief, which means the “opinion

must be based on the ‘methods and procedures of science’ rather

than on ‘subjective belief or unsupported speculation.’” Paoli,

35 F.3d at 742 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590). The Paoli

court provided factors that, in light of Supreme Court and Third

Circuit precedent, “a district court should take into account in

evaluating whether a particular scientific methodology is

reliable.” Id. These factors are:

(1) whether a method consists of a testable

hypothesis; (2) whether the method has been subject to

peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error;

(4) the existence and maintenance of standards

controlling the technique's operation; (5) whether the

method is generally accepted; (6) the relationship of

the technique to methods which have been established to

be reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert

witness testifying based on the methodology; and (8) the

non-judicial uses to which the method has been put.

Id. at 743 n.8 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 950 and United

States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985)).

As to Rule 702’s fit requirement, “the expert's testimony

must be relevant for the purposes of the case and must assist

the trier of fact.” Schneider, 320 F.3d at 404. Accordingly,

“Rule 702's ‘helpfulness' standard requires a valid scientific

connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to

admissibility.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92.

First, Dr. Mayer is not qualified to give expert opinion on

nursing home administration or nursing education. Before trial,

the Court heard argument on Dr. Mayer’s qualification on these

issues and found Dr. Mayer to be unqualified. Tr. 09/26/19 at

17-20. Plaintiff made an oral motion for reconsideration. Tr.

09/27/19 at 71-72, ECF No. 214. The Court afforded Plaintiff the

opportunity to submit a written request that Dr. Mayer possessed

the skills, education, and professional background necessary to

testify by way of opinion. Id. at 72. Plaintiff failed to

provide any further evidence to the Court. Tr. 09/30/19 at 127-

29, ECF No. 216. Still, the Court allowed Plaintiff to make an

oral argument on behalf of the qualification of Dr. Mayer. Id.

The only evidence Plaintiff provided was that “Dr. Mayer has 15

years of working in a nursing home.” Id. at 127:25. The Court

held that “in the absence of more than that,” Dr. Mayer could

not testify as to nursing home administration and nursing

education. Id. at 128.

Second, even if the Court were to find Dr. Mayer qualified,

his opinion regarding administration, training, and education

procedures for a skilled nursing home facility and its employees

is not reliable. Fed. R. Evid. 702. Both Dr. Mayer’s additional

and supplemental reports, see ECF No. 151, Exh. A & B, focus

almost entirely on the quality of the individual care Ms. Hope

received. Expert opinion regarding individual medical care does

not reliably prove anything regarding training efforts at a

facility-wide level. At the very least, Dr. Mayer’s report fails

to present a scientifically reliable method for connecting the

information relied upon to a conclusion that could support an

opinion on policy and training. The closest Dr. Mayer’s reports

came to discussing the training of Fair Acres staff is the

following:

Such observations [regarding Ms. Hope’s individual

medical care] are not isolated events. My review of Fair

Acres’ compendium of citations, which included some 30

deficiencies in patient care (putting the facility in

the 97th percentile for deficiencies among similar

providers) for the calendar year 2014 alone, showed

similar egregious violations of residents’ right to

fundamental medical care.

ECF No. 137, Exh. C at 3.

Dr. Mayer has provided no “good grounds” for his opinion

regarding the adequacy of training and supervision at Fair

Acres. The “Materials Reviewed” in his reports do not include

any literature on the administration of nursing care facilities

or on the relationship between training and patients’ health

outcomes. He identifies no “method [or] procedure of science,”

but rather concludes after reviewing the 30 deficiencies in

patient care that there had been “similar egregious violations

of residents’ right to fundamental medical care.” Id. The

opinion is therefore not reliable.13

Finally, even if the Court’s ruling on Dr. Mayer’s

qualification, reliability, and fit was in error, the error does

not justify a new trial. Plaintiff’s counsel told the Court she

“believe[d] that the failures and evidence of deliberate

indifference are so obvious . . . . [t]hat [Plaintiff] wouldn’t

even need an Expert.” Tr. 09/25/19 at 95:5-20, ECF No. 213. The

13 With the entire trial record now in front of the Court for review, it is

even more clear that Dr. Mayer’s reliance on the deficiency citations to form

his opinion regarding facility-wide training, administration, and education

of Fair Acres and its staff does not meet Rule 702’s reliability requirement.

Plaintiff’s own argument at trial, that only two of the DOH Surveys were

relevant to the case, supports the conclusion that Dr. Mayer’s opinion on

nursing home administration and staff training is unreliable. The 30

deficiency citations relied on by Dr. Mayer are the same “DOH Surveys”

discussed above. See supra Section III(a)(ix). At trial, when the Court

directed Plaintiff to identify any DOH Surveys that Plaintiff believed were

relevant to the case, Plaintiff only identified two as being relevant to the

case. Tr. 10/02/19 at 19, ECF No. 218. Plaintiff cannot argue now that Dr.

Mayer’s opinion regarding nursing home administration and training meet Rule

702’s reliability requirement when Dr. Mayer’s own reports state that the

opinion is based almost entirely (twenty-eight of the thirty DOH Surveys) on

information that Plaintiff believes is not relevant to the case.

exclusion of Dr. Mayer’s expert opinion therefore does not

warrant a new trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. Plaintiff’s motion will

be denied.

2. Preclusion of testimony by Dr. Mayer that

any treatment constituted “abuse” or

“neglect”

Plaintiff argues that the Court’s preclusion of testimony

by Dr. Mayer that treatment constituted “abuse” or “neglect”

warrants a new trial. See ECF No. 223 at 26-27. Plaintiff’s

motion and memorandum provide no legal authority in support of

Plaintiff’s position that the Court’s ruling on this matter

justifies a new trial. See ECF No. 207; ECF No. 223. The Court’s

order that Dr. Mayer not testify that a treatment constituted

“abuse” or “neglect” helped prevent potential jury confusion as

to the applicable legal standard in this case and was therefore

reasonably excluded. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. This case was about

failure to train under § 1983—not “abuse” or “neglect” by

Defendants. Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial based on the

Court’s order that Dr. Mayer not testify that any treatment

constituted “abuse” or “neglect” will be denied.14

14 Further, even if it were error to order the exclusion of Dr. Mayer’s

testimony that included those legal standards, Plaintiff did not suffer

prejudice warranting a new trial. Testimony of Dr. Mayer regarding “abuse”

and “neglect” still made its way to the jury, see Tr. 10/02/19 at 75:15-19,

ECF No. 218 (“There was evidence of malnutrition, failure to feed Ms. Hope,

3. Denial of Plaintiff’s motion to exclude

evidence of the fraud investigation

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred by denying

Plaintiff’s motion to exclude testimony by Dr. Mayer regarding a

fraud investigation by the New York Attorney General into Dr.

Mayer’s past employer, Park Avenue Stem Cell. See Tr. 10/02/19

at 42, ECF No. 218. The basis for Plaintiff’s objection during

trial was that the testimony was not relevant and was

prejudicial. See id. at 38. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion

as untimely. Id. at 41. Dr. Mayer’s testimony was presented by

way of a pre-recorded video deposition. Prior to trial, the

Court allowed each party to designate which portions of the

video testimony they wanted shown to the jury. ECF No. 182.

Defendants designated the testimony regarding the fraud

investigation to be shown to the jury. See ECF No. 184.

Plaintiff did not object to the Defendants’ designation of the

fraud testimony. See Tr. 9/30/19 at 129-30, ECF No. 216. The

Court then ordered that, prior to playing the video deposition

at trial, the Plaintiff’s “bibliographer, in conjunction with

both parties,” prepare a video file “edited in accordance with

failure to ensure that she had adequate fluids and didn’t become dehydrated,

a failure to insert a feeding tube in a timely manner, which again would be

evidence of abuse and neglect of a patient.”), 76:10-12 (testifying that Ms.

Hope’s pressure sore was “considered [a] never event[] in a nursing home . .

. th[at] should never happen absent abuse and neglect of the patient”).

the parties’ designations and in accordance with the objections

[to designations that were] sustained.” ECF No. 190 at 3. The

edited video contained the fraud testimony. Plaintiff not having

objected to the designation prior to trial, as directed by the

Court, the objection was untimely. The motion will be denied.

b. Alleged Improper Instructions to the Jury

Plaintiff argues that the verdict is the product of errors

of law based on the Court’s alleged improper instructions to the

jury. Plaintiff’s arguments regarding alleged jury-instruction

error fall into two categories: (1) failure to charge the jury

with specific statutory and regulatory language, and (2) failure

to charge the jury on both failure to train and failure to

supervise.

First, as to the alleged failure to charge the jury with

specific statutory and regulatory language, Plaintiff argues:

The verdict is the product of errors of law

and, inadequacy, and incompleteness of the Court's

charge, specifically on the applicability of the

Federal Nursing Home Reform Amendments to the case

at hand, failure to charge the jury on the federal

and state laws and regulations applicable to

nursing homes and related to the care of

Plaintiff[’]s decedent including abuse and neglect.

ECF No. 223 at 28-29 ¶ 3.

The Court disagrees. The Court finds that it adequately

instructed the jury of Ms. Hope’s applicable federal rights. See

Tr. 10/04/19 at 119:6-11, ECF No. 220 (“In this case, the right

implicated is the right of a nursing home resident to have

sufficiently trained Medical and Nursing Staff provide medical,

nursing, and related services, including nutrition and

hydration, in a manner promoting quality of life, and to

maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and

psychosocial wellbeing of residents.”); See also Grammer v. John

J. Kane Regional Centers-Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520 (3d Cir.

2009).15

Second, as to the alleged error by the Court in failing to

charge the jury on both failure to train and failure to

supervise, Plaintiff argues:

The verdict is the product of errors of law

and, inadequacy, and incompleteness of the Court's

charge, specifically . . . the failure of the Trial

Court to charge the jury on Failure to Train and

Supervise which was in clear contravention of the

Mandate and Order of the Third Circuit Court of

Appeal of April 4, 2017 that did include failure to

supervise as applicable to this case.

ECF No. 223 at 28-29 ¶ 3.

The Court disagrees. The Court finds that it adequately

instructed the jury regarding failure to train. See Tr. 10/04/19

15 To the extent Plaintiff argues that it was error for the Court not to read

each regulation aloud as part of the jury instructions, see ECF No. 207 at

12-16, Plaintiff’s argument is mistaken. Throughout the course of litigation,

Plaintiff’s counsel has failed to recognize the difference between a federal

right under § 1983 and a statute or regulation. See Grammer, 570 F.3d at 525

(“[A] Plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right—not merely a

violation of a federal law—to seek redress.”).

at 119-23, ECF No. 220. The Court’s instruction regarding

failure to train, which did not mention a failure to

“supervise,” does not warrant a new trial.

First, the instruction is consistent with the Third

Circuit’s mandate in this case that Hope “sufficiently pleaded a

§ 1983 claim under a failure-to-train theory of liability.”

Robinson v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 722 F. App’x 194, 200 (3d

Cir. 2018) (emphasis added).16 At a status and scheduling

conference with the parties following remand from the Third

Circuit, this Court stated that “the Third Circuit . . .

returned the case for further proceedings concerning the failure

16 Although the Third Circuit opinion mentions the word “supervise” twice, it

is clear that the opinion focused on a failure-to-train theory. The first

mention of the word “supervise” is included only in a recitation of

Plaintiff’s complaint. 722 F. App’s at 199 (“Hope alleged Fair Acres ‘failed

. . . to properly supervise [staff].’”). The second mention of the word is as

follows:

Hope did, however, plead adequate facts to support her

contention that Fair Acres demonstrated deliberate

indifference through its failure to properly train and

supervise its staff. In order for a failure-to-train claim to

support Monell liability, a plaintiff must show “that in

light of the duties assigned to [the relevant employees,] the

need for more or different training is so obvious, and the

inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of

constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the

[municipality] can reasonably be said to have been

deliberately indifferent to the need.”

722 F. App’x at 199 (alterations in original) (quoting City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)).

The word supervision is mentioned only as an introduction to the Third

Circuit’s discussion of Plaintiff’s surviving claim for failure-to-train §

1983 liability. In fact, the Third Circuit held that Plaintiff’s claims

survived the motion-to-dismiss stage because of Plaintiff’s evidence

“regarding the number and character of deficiency citations issued to Fair

Acres” which the Third Circuit held “sufficiently pleaded a § 1983 claim

under a failure-to-train theory of liability.” 722 F. App’x at 199-200 (“Hope

alleged only generally that training was inadequate, the inadequacy of

training can plausibly be inferred from Hope’s allegations regarding . . .

deficiency citations.” (emphases added)).

to train. . . . And so far as I can, those claims are still

viable or present here. And we’ll see which ones the plaintiff

wants to proceed on.” Tr. 08/01/19 at 4:17-22, ECF No. 106.

Plaintiff made no objection that a failure to “supervise” theory

still remained.

Second, the Court notes that in its August 30, 2019, order

it confirmed that “Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim for

violations of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Amendments

(‘FNHRA’) against all remaining defendants under a failure-to-

train theory of liability.” ECF No. 126 at 2, n.1. Plaintiff

made no objection following the order until Plaintiff’s last-

minute objections to the Court’s proposed jury instructions. At

that time, the Court granted Plaintiff time to provide support

for the proposition that the word “supervision” needed to be

included in the jury instructions. Plaintiff did not submit any

support for this argument. Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.

c. Alleged Jury Verdict Against the Weight of the

Evidence

Plaintiff argues that the verdict is contrary to the weight

of the evidence. Because the jury’s verdict in this case did not

result in a miscarriage of justice nor did it shock the

conscience, this Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for a new

trial based on the weight of the evidence.

Plaintiff argues:

The verdict is contrary to the weight of the

evidence which shows that the Plaintiff was not

provided, based on the comprehensive assessment of

a resident and consistent with the resident's needs

and choices, the necessary care and services to

ensure that a resident's abilities in activities of

daily living did not diminish unless circumstances

of the individual's clinical condition demonstrate

that such diminution and skin breakdown was

unavoidable. She was entitled to these services as

a Medicaid/Medicare recipient as a matter of law.

ECF No. 223 at 28 ¶ 1; ECF No. 207 at 4.

The Court disagrees. The Court finds that the evidence

supports a jury finding that Ms. Hope received all care and

services to which she had a federal right, and that the injuries

she suffered were an unavoidable result of her vascular

condition and advanced age unrelated to any infection control

measures on the part of Defendants. Testimony was heard from Dr.

Bonner, medical director at fair acres; Dr. Lewis, Ms. Hope’s

primary care physician while at Fair Acres; Mr. D’Amico, the

Nursing Home Administrator of Fair Acres; Nurse Tracey Dale-

Williams; Nurse Patricia Paolino; and Plaintiff, Carl Robinson.

Expert testimony was also heard from Plaintiff’s expert Dr.

Mayer and from Defendants’ expert Dr. Silver. At trial,

Defendants offered evidence of Ms. Hope’s diagnoses at the time

of admission to Fair Acres. See ECF No. 225 at 13. Defendants

also presented evidence of the unavoidable progression of Ms.

Hope’s injuries through, among other things, the results of a

Doppler ultrasound, the treatment records regarding dry

gangrene, and Dr. Silver’s expert testimony that the injuries

were unavoidable. See ECF No. 225 at 10-16; Tr. 10/03/19, ECF

No. 219.

Plaintiff argues:

The verdict is contrary to the weight of the

evidence which shows that the Plaintiff was not

provided the necessary services to maintain good

nutrition, grooming, and personal and oral hygiene,

and the evidence overwhelmingly established that

the defendants contributed to injury of the death

of Plaintiff's Decedent by failing to train and

supervise the Defendants and their staff on the

requirements of care.

ECF No. 223 at 28, ¶ 2; ECF No. 207 at 4.

The Court disagrees. The Court finds that the evidence

supports a jury finding that Ms. Hope received all care and

services to which she had a federal right and that Plaintiff was

provided necessary services to maintain good nutrition,

grooming, and personal oral hygiene. For example, Defendants

provided evidence that Ms. Hope’s declining nutrition was due to

Mr. Robinson’s refusal to put a feeding tube in Ms. Hope at an

appropriate time, not due to any failure on Defendants’ part.

See, e.g., Test. of Dr. Lewis, Tr. 09/30/19 at 122, ECF No. 216.

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to make a

showing that, on the weight of the evidence, the jury’s verdict

resulted in a miscarriage of justice, the motion will be denied.

See Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d

Cir. 1991).

d. Plaintiff’s Additional Arguments for a New Trial

Plaintiff’s post-trial motion and accompanying memorandum

raise two additional arguments on which Plaintiff believes the

Court should grant a new trial: (1) the Court’s dismissal of Dr.

Lewis and Dr. Vogel and (2) the severing of the Plaintiff’s

Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law

claim.

i. Dismissal of Dr. Lewis and Dr. Vogel

Plaintiff makes an entirely conclusory argument for a new

trial based on alleged error by the Court in dismissing Dr.

Lewis, a consultant primary care physician who treated Ms. Hope

at Fair Acres, and Dr. Vogel, a consultant podiatrist who

treated Ms. Hope at Fair Acres, from the case. Plaintiff’s

motion and memorandum are wholly conclusory and provide no basis

on which Plaintiff believes the Court erred in dismissing Dr.

Lewis and Dr. Vogel. See ECF No. 207; ECF No. 223. Plaintiff

simply asserts that (1) the Court “erred as a matter of law and

abused its discretion in denying . . . Plaintiff’s Objections

and Answer to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.

126) which did prejudice the Plaintiff”; and (2) the Court

“erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in

dismissing Defendants, Drs. Lewis and Vogel, from the case which

did prejudice the Plaintiff.” ECF No. 207 at 11 ¶¶ 9-10; ECF No.

223 at 25 (identical language). The Court will construe the

motion as a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of Drs. Lewis and Vogel on the § 1983

claim.17

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(g), “[m]otions for

reconsideration or reargument shall be served and filed within

fourteen (14) days after the entry of the order concerned, other

than those governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).”

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) concerns motions to amend

or alter a judgment and thus does not apply to interlocutory

decisions. See Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Moria S.A., 222 F. Supp. 2d

616, 669 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Because partial summary judgment

17 On August 16, 2019, this Court ruled on motions for summary judgment by

Drs. Lewis and Vogel on the two claims raised against them: (1) the § 1983

claim and (2) the survival action under Pennsylvania law. See ECF No. 116 at

2, n.1. The Court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of Drs.

Lewis and Vogel on the § 1983 claim but denied their motion as to the

survival action claim because the motion’s only argument for dismissal of the

survival action was a statute of limitations argument and the Court found the

claims were timely. Id. Subsequently, at a hearing held August 29, 2019,

Plaintiff agreed that, following the Court’s dismissal of the § 1983 claim on

summary judgment, no other claims remained against Drs. Lewis and Vogel. See

Tr. 08/29/19 at 3-4, ECF No. 198; see also Sullivan v. Warminster Twp., 765

F. Supp. 2d 687, 707 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[S]urvival actions are not substantive

causes of action; rather, they provide a vehicle through which plaintiffs can

recover for unlawful conduct that results in death.”). Thereafter, by order

dated August 30, 2019, the Court dismissed Drs. Lewis and Vogel on the basis

that the Court had already granted summary judgment in their favor on the §

1983 claim and that no other claims remained against them. ECF No. 126. The

August 30, 2019, order did not make any ruling against Plaintiff. See ECF No.

126. Thus, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s motion as a motion for

reconsideration of the Court’s August 16, 2019, order granting summary

judgment for Drs. Lewis and Vogel on the § 1983 claim. ECF No. 116.

orders are interlocutory decisions, a party against whom summary

judgment was entered against as to less than all claims against

all parties may not seek relief under Rule 59(e). See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 54(b); Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259 F.3d

135, 143-44 (3d Cir. 2001). The Court’s dismissal of Drs. Lewis

and Vogel was an interlocutory decision, and therefore Local

Rule 7.1(g)’s fourteen-day time limit applies to a

reconsideration motion regarding their dismissal. Thus,

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s grant of

partial summary judgment and resulting dismissal of Dr. Lewis

and Dr. Vogel will be denied as an untimely.18

Even if Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration were timely,

the motion would be denied for lack of merit. A Motion for

Reconsideration will be granted when the party seeking

reconsideration establishes “(1) an intervening change in the

controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was

not available when the court . . . [issued its previous

decision]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or

fact or prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Café v.

Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999); N. River Ins. Co.

18 Plaintiff’s instant motion for reconsideration of their dismissal was filed

on October 15, 2019, more than 14 days after both the Court’s granting of

summary judgment in favor of Drs. Lewis and Vogel on August 16, 2019, ECF No.

116, and the Court’s order dismissing Drs. Lewis and Vogel on August 30,

2019. ECF No. 126.

v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff raises no arguments that support reconsideration on

any of those bases. The Court granted summary judgment on the §

1983 claim in favor of Drs. Lewis and Vogel upon a finding that

Drs. Lewis and Vogel were not state actors for purposes of §

1983 liability. ECF No. 116 at 2-5, n.1. Plaintiff cites no

authority for reconsideration of that conclusion.19 The Court

finds that its reasoning in dismissing Drs. Lewis and Vogel is

still correct. For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal of Drs. Lewis and Vogel

will be denied.

ii. Severing of Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices

and Consumer Protection Law Claim

Plaintiff’s motion makes a wholly conclusory argument for a

new trial based upon the Court’s severing of the Plaintiff’s

claim under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer

Protection Law, 73 P.S. § 201-1 et seq. (“UTPCPL”). See ECF No.

207 at 17 ¶ 18, 18 ¶ 21. Plaintiff’s memorandum in support of

the motion makes no mention of the issue. See ECF No. 223. The

19 Because the Court is denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Drs. Lewis and Vogel, it need not consider

the survival action against them. See Sullivan v. Warminster Twp., 756 F.

Supp. 2d 687, 707 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[S]urvival actions are not substantive

causes of action; rather, they provide a vehicle through which plaintiffs can

recover for unlawful conduct that results in death.”).

Court finds that Plaintiff’s post-trial motion regarding

severance of the UTPCPL claim is meritless.

On August 20, 2019—prior to severing the UTPCPL claim—the

Court issued a rule to show cause, returnable at a hearing to be

held August 29, 2019, as to why the claim should not be severed.

ECF No. 117 at 1-2. At the hearing, Plaintiff made no argument

that the claim should not be severed. See Tr. 08/29/19, ECF No.

198. The Court then severed the UTPCPL claim by order dated

August 30, 2019. ECF No. 126 at 4. Plaintiff made no motion for

reconsideration of the order severing the UTPCPL claim until

October 14, 2019, when Plaintiff filed the post-trial motion

currently before the Court. ECF No. 207. Therefore, the Court

will deny Plaintiff’s motion because it is an untimely motion

for reconsideration. See E.D. Pa. Loc. R. Civ. P. 7.1(g).20

20 Even if the motion were not untimely, Plaintiff’s argument lacks any

support.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, the Court may “sever

any claim against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. A district court has broad

discretion in deciding whether to sever a claim. See Grigsby v. Kane, 250 F.

Supp. 2d 453, 456 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (observing that a district court has

“virtually unfettered discretion in determining whether or not severance is

appropriate”). When a claim is severed pursuant to Rule 21, it “become[s]

[an] entirely independent action[] to be tried, and judgment rendered

thereon, independently.” Kimmel v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, 747 F.

Supp. 2d 427, 434–35 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). In other words, “[s]everance pursuant to Rule 21 essentially

creates a separate case, the disposition of which is final and appealable.”

Graudins v. Retro Fitness, LLC, 921 F. Supp. 2d 456, 468 (E.D. Pa. 2013).

Plaintiff raises no arguments against the Court’s prior conclusion that

the UTPCPL claim “involves a separate issue, separate evidence, and separate

legal standard than the § 1983 claim.” ECF No. 126 at 4, n.2 (“For the

Court’s convenience, to avoid prejudice to Defendants, and to minimize

confusion, the Court will consider the UTPCPL claim separately, taking the

motion for summary judgment on this issue under advisement. Therefore, this

claim will not proceed to trial with the § 1983 claim on September 25,

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s

post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the

alternative, for a new trial.

2019.”). Plaintiff’s motion may therefore be properly denied for lack of

merit.