TALLEY v. IONATA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

QUINTEZ TALLEY : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. :

:

CO IONATA, CO ROBERTSON, CO :

COSTANZO, CO HARROR, SGT. :

BROWN, LT TAYLOR, J. YODIS, JOHN :

WETZEL, PA DEPARTMENT OF :

CORRECTIONIS, UNKNOWN :

CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS, CHIEF :

SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL :

PROTECTION DIVISION and SCI :

GRATERFORD’S (CISM) CORRECTIONS :

INSTITUTIONAL SAFETY MANAGER : NO. 19-1723

MEMORANDUM

Savage, J. September 5, 2019

Talley, a prisoner incarcerated at SCI Fayette, raises claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Rehabilitation Act

(“RA”) against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and numerous prison officials

based on events that occurred in 2017 at SCI Graterford. In a May 29, 2019 Order, we

dismissed the following claims: (1) the § 1983 claims raised against the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections or the individual defendants in their official capacities; (2) the

ADA claim against the individual defendants; and (3) the RA claims against the individual

defendants. (Doc. No. 5.) We directed service of the Complaint so plaintiff could

proceed on his remaining claims. Id. Talley seeks reconsideration of the May 29, 2019

Order.

A party may move for reconsideration “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or

to present newly discovered evidence.” Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm., L.P., 769 F.3d

837, 848 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),

a judgment may be altered or amended only where: (1) there has been an intervening

change in controlling law; (2) new evidence has become available; or (3) there is a need

to correct a clear error of law or fact, or to prevent manifest injustice. Id. at 848–49

(citation omitted); Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted);

N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995). The

decision to alter or amend a judgment is generally discretionary. See 12-59 James Wm.

Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 59.30 (2018) (“Courts have considerable discretion in

determining whether to grant or deny a motion to alter or amend[.]”); see also Creghan v.

Procura Mgmt., Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-1847, 2014 WL 12605481, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19,

2014) (citing Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677

(3d Cir. 1999)).

We did not clearly err in dismissing the § 1983 claims against the DOC and the

individual defendants in their official capacities. See, e.g., Kokinda v. Pennsylvania

Dep't of Corr., No. 17-3165, 2019 WL 2577750, at *2 (3d Cir. June 24, 2019) (“Even with

such liberal construction, we agree with the District Court’s summary disposition of

Kokinda’s claimed violations of §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986 against the DOC and

the individual Commonwealth defendants sued in their official capacities because those

claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”). Although any § 1983 official capacity

claims for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief would not be barred, those claims

are moot because Talley is no longer incarcerated at SCI Graterford which is no longer

operational. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985) (explaining that “official-

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capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State”); Sutton

v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (“An inmate’s transfer from the facility

complained of generally moots the equitable and declaratory claims.”).

Nor did we clearly err in dismissing any claims against the individual defendants

for damages liability under Title II of the ADA and the RA. See Kokinda, 2019 WL

2577750, at *2 (“Kokinda’s claims for individual damages liability under Title II of

the ADA fail for the simple reason that there is no such liability.”); Matthews v.

Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 613 F. App’x 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e agree with the

Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Circuits that Title II of the ADA does not

provide for suits against state officers in their individual capacities.”); Emerson v. Thiel

Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Because the individual defendants do not receive

federal aid, [plaintiff] does not state a claim against them under the Rehabilitation Act.”).

Although Talley is correct that he may plead official capacity claims against individual

defendants under the ADA and RA, any such claims would be duplicative of those brought

against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Accordingly, he is not entitled to

reinstate those duplicative claims. See Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.

303, 783 F.3d 634, 644 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The district court correctly dismissed these

defendants in their official capacity because the Staneks also sued the District.”); Love-

Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The district court correctly held that

the § 1983 claim against Martin in his official capacity as Superintendent is essentially a

claim against the Board and thus should be dismissed as duplicative.”); see also

Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 166 (“As long as the government entity receives notice and an

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opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be

treated as a suit against the entity.”).

For these reasons, Talley’s request for reconsideration is denied.

/s/ TIMOTHY J. SAVAGE J.

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