St. Timothy's Episcopal Church v. City of Brookings

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

MEDFORD DIVISION

ST. TIMOTHY’S EPISCOPAL CHURCH, -

by and through THE DIOCESE OF OREGON,

DBA THE EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF Case No. 1:22-cv-00156-CL

OREGON, an Oregon nonprofit corporation,

REVEREND JAMES BERNARD .

‘LINDLEY, vicar of St. Timothy’s Episcopal

Church,

Plaintiffs,

v.

OPINION AND ORDER

CITY OF BROOKINGS, an Oregon

municipal government, :

Defendant.

CLARKE, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiffs bring this cause of action against the City of Brookings, Oregon, under the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) and the First

Amendment of the United States Constitution. Full consent to magistrate jurisdiction was

entered on August 15, 2022 (#15). The case comes before the Court on motions for summary

judgment filed by both parties, as well as a motion to dismiss filed by the Defendant. For the

reasons below, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (#57) is GRANTED, and Defendant’s

motions for summary judgment (#54) and dismissal (#75) are DENIED. Final Judgment will be

entered on behalf of the Plaintiffs.

Pace 1 — OPINION AND ORDER □

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment shall be granted when the record shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material of fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The

moving party has the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists.

- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076

(9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). The court cannot weigh the evidence or determine the truth but may

only determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d

796, 800 (9th Cir. 2002). An issue of fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable

Jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

When a properly ‘supported motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts to

the opposing party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Jd. at

250. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a motion

summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the

opposing party must, by affidavit or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate specific facts □

which show there is a genuine issue for trial. Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. In assessing whether

a party has met its burden, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party. Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1995).

REGULATORY BACKGROUND

“Congress enacted RLUIPA and its sister statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

of 1993 (“RFRA”) . . . ‘in order to provide very broad protection for religious liberty.” Holt v.

Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356 (2015) (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, □□

693 (2014)). Under RLUIPA, “[nJo government shall impose or implement a land use regulation

3 __fPINIAN ANT) □

in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a

religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the

burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means

of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).

Prior to 1990, the Supreme Court employed a balancing test in free exercise cases,

“consider[ing] whether a challenged government action that substantially burdened the exercise

of religion was necessary to further a compelling state interest.” Holt, 574 U.S. at 357, But, in

Employment Division v. Smith, 494 US. 872 (1990), the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause

does not excuse a person of her obligation to comply with a neutral, generally applicable law that

incidentally burdens her religious exercise. Congress responded to Smith by enacting RFRA, “in

order to provide greater protection for religious exercise than is available under the First

Amendment.” Holt, 574 U.S. at 357. RFRA prohibits the government from “substantially

burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion[,] even if the burden results from a rule of general

applicability,” unless the government demonstrates that doing so “is the least restrictive means of

furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. The Supreme Court,

however, held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to actions of the state and local governments

because the statute exceeded Congress’s enforcement power under Section S ofthe Fourteenth □ □

Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

- Intent on providing this protection at all levels, Congress then enacted RLUIPA. Asco-

sponsors Senators Orrin Hatch and Ted Kennedy observed, RLUIPA “ig a targeted bill that

addresses the two frequently occurring burdens on religious liberty” and “is based on three years

of hearings... that addressed in great detail .. . the need for legislation.” 146 Cong. Rec.

16,698, 16,698 (2000) Goint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy); see also U.S. Dep’t of

Pace 2? _ OPINION AND ORDER

Justice Civil Rights Div., Report on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act 3-4 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-

document/file/1319186/download. Indeed, as Professor Doug Laycock testified to the Senate

Committee on the Judiciary, “if there is any area of regulation where you can make a clear record

of widespread discrimination, it would be zoning and land use regulation.” Congress’

Constitutional Role in Protecting Religious Liberty: Hearing Before the S. Comm on the

Judiciary, 105th Cong. 43 (1997) (statement of Douglas Laycock, Professor, University of

Texas), This “substantial record” of “cumulative and mutually reinforcing” evidence

“demonstrates that land use regulation is a substantial burden on religious liberty.” Douglas

Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 755, 770 (1999).

The discriminatory regulations that prompted RLUIPA were sometimes found to be “by

. design,” sometimes by “neutral application,” and “sometimes by both.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-219,

at 18 (1999). In other words, RLUIPA addresses. both “intentional discrimination caused by

abuse in the regulation of land uses” and “covert” discrimination that was masquerading in the

form of neutral zoning laws.” Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA and

Federalism: Evaluating the Creation ofa Fr ederal Statutory Right and its Impact on Local

Government, 40 Urb, Law, 195, 256 (2008). Congress recognized “a nationwide problem”:

churches “are frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also in the highly

individualized and discretionary processes of land use regulation.” 146 Cong. Rec. 16,698,

16,698—99 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy).

As the Supreme Court has recognized, the protection offered to religious liberty through.

RLUIPA is quite broad. For example, “Congress defined ‘religious exercise’ capaciously to

include ‘any exercise of religion’”’—even if not an exercise that is “compelled by, or central to, a

Dace 4d _ OPTNION AND ORDER .

system of religious belief.” Holt, 574 U.S. at 358 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)).

“Congress mandated that this concept ‘shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of

religious exercise.” /d, (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g)). RLUIPA may even “require a

_ government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on

religious exercise.” /d. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c)).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

a. Fistory of St. T imothy ’s Meal Service. .

Since 1953, St. Timothy’s Episcopal Church (“St. Timothy’s”) has operated at 401 Fir

Street in Brookings. See Pls.” Mot. Summ. J. (“Pls. Mot.”) 3, (#43). The City of Brookings (“the

City” or “the Defendant”) adopted its current zoning code in 1989. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (Def.

Mot.”) 12, | 3 (#54); see also Brookings, Or. Mun. Code (“Brookings Code”) § 17.01.030.

‘ Under the code, St. Timothy’s was zoned as an R-1 single-family residential district. Pls. Mot. 3;

Def. Mot. 12, 4 3. Churches are one of 21 non-single-family residential uses—including.

hospitals, nursing homes, day care facilities, country clubs and golf courses, public halls, and

bed-and-breakfasts—that may operate in R-1 districts subject to a conditional use permit.

Brookings Code § 17.20.040(B). Because St. Timothy’s pre-dated the Brookings Code, it

operated under a “de facto conditional use permit.” Def. Mot. 12, 3.

St. Timothy’s, along with other churches in Brookings, began offering free lunchtime

meals to persons in need in 2009. Def. Mot. 13, 4; Pl. Mot. 3. The City was fully aware of this

activity. From 2009 to 2018, Ron Hedenskog managed St. Timothy’s meal service. Decl. of

Samantha Sondag (“Sondag Decl.”’) Ex. 3, Dep. of Ronald William Hedenskog (“Hedenskog

Dep.”) 12:1-3, (#51-3). For approximately six of those years, from 2012 to 2018, Mr.

Hedenskog also served as the City’s Mayor. Hedenskog Dep. 13:4—-10, 16:8-9, Def. Mot. 16, □ □

Pace _ ODINTION AND ORDER

11. Anthony Baron, the City’s Public Works and Development Services Director, testified that

he has known about St. Timothy’s meal service since 2012, when he first began working for the

City. Sondag Decl. Ex. 4, Dep. of Anthony Baron (“Baron Dep.”) 15:25-16: 14 (#51-4).

According to Plaintiffs, providing free meals to persons in need is “fundamental” to their

Episcopalian faith. Decl. of the Rev. James Berard Lindley (“Lindley Decl.”) 2, (#48); Decl.

of the Rev. Diana Akiyama (“Akiyama Decl.”) Ex. 3, at 1-3 (#44). Reverand Lindley, St.

Timothy’s vicar, stated that “[i]t is my deeply held religious belief that feeding the hungry,

respecting the dignity of every human being, and building community are necessary acts during

our time on Earth.” Lindiey Decl. { 2. He described St. Timothy’s free meals program as “acts of

worship critical to my Christian faith.” Jd. J 4. City officials testified that, while they disagree

with the Rev. Lindley’s views on this question, they have no basis to question the sincerity of his

beliefs. Hedenskog Dep. 45:15-46:11; Baron Dep. 15:8-11; Sondag Decl. Ex. 1, Dep. of Janelle

Howard (“Howard Dep.”) 65:14-16, (#51-1). □

Mayor Hedenskog testified that the number of individuals who use St. Timothy’s meal

services increased significantly since 2009. Hedenskog Dep. 15:7-14. Concurrent with a rise in

homelessness in Brookings, the number of people St. Timothy’s served per day tripled, and St.

Timothy’s increased its meal service from one day to at least three days per week. Hedenskog

Dep. 13:4-10, 15:7-14. From 2015 to March 2020, St. Timothy’s was serving free meals on

Saturdays, Sundays, Tuesdays, and every other Monday. Lindley Decl. | 6; Def. Mot. 15, § 8.

When the Covid-19 Pandemic hit, other churches in the Brookings area stopped serving meals.

Thus, from April 2020 through early 2022, due to the unavailability of other free meal services in

Brookings, St. Timothy’s increased their ministry and served meals five to six times per week.

Raga & _fyPINiTO] ANT) □□ □□□ .

Lindley Decl. 8. For approximately twelve years, St. Timothy’s meal service operated without

interference from the City. _

b. Car camping permit, neighbor complaints, and City response. .

In early 2021, as part of a City-sponsored program to help people who were homeless,

the City issued St. Timothy’s a permit to host individuals living in cars on its property (“Rule

2020-1 permit”). No other churches in Brookings applied for a Rule 2020-1 permit. In response

to the issuance of this permit and the resulting group that gathered to stay overnight in the

parking lot, a neighbor urged the City to “reconsider allowing vagrants to continue to live at St.

Timothy’s church,” citing concerns about “public safety and the personal expenses of

homeowners living next to the church.” Howard Dep. Ex. 15, at 93-113 51-1). Another

resident complained that St. Timothy’s “hand[ed] out food all day and let transients hang out

there and stroll over to the park to hang out.” id. Ex. 3, at 10.

In April 2021, the neighbors presented the City with a “Petition to Remove Homeless

from St. Timothy Church,” which similarly asked the City to reconsider “allowing vagrants” to

continue to “live and congregate at St. Timothy’s Church.” See id. at 7-9. At a City Council

meeting, the petition’s author complained about “people just showing up in the middle of the

night” engaging in “very suspicious behavior[.]” He further claimed that he had recorded

“multiple crimes committed on [his] [video] cameras,” but that authorities had declined to

prosecute.

Around the same time that neighbors began complaining about trespassing and criminal

activity at St. Timothy’s, the church began participating in the Brookings Police Department’s

“Property Watch” program. Under this program, St. Timothy’s signed an agreement authorizing

police officers to enter St. Timothy’s without prior notice or authorization to curb nuisance

7. OPINION ANT ORMER .

issues and trespassing. Lindley Decl. § 10; see also Baron Dep. 38:9-16. On June 7, 2021, St.

Timothy’s Rule 2020-1 permit expired, and St. Timothy’s ceased hosting people residing in

vehicles on church property. Howard Dep. Ex. 3, at 1-6,

Tn response to the complaints about people congregating at St. Timothy’s, and despite the

church’s cessation of the car camping program and cooperation with law enforcement, the City

reported St. Timothy’s to various public health agencies, purportedly to ensure that St. Timothy’s

meal service “complies with the state’s food sanitation requirements.” Sondag Decl. Ex. 14,

Email from Dan Lawler to Erica Vaness (June 23, 2021 11:52 AM PDT). There is no evidence in

the record that the City had previously raised health concerns over St. Timothy’s meal service.

Nevertheless, at a City Council workshop on June 7, 2021, the City stated that St. Timothy's may

be operating an unpermitted “commercial kitchen.” Howard Dep. Ex. 3.

St. Timothy’s responded to these allegations by applying for and receiving a license to

serve meals from the Oregon Health Authority “‘OHA”). Lindley Decl. 7 11 & Ex. 2. About a.

month later, on July 29, 2021, the City—citing the OHA license it had prompted St. Timothy’s to

obtain— notified St. Timothy’s that it was illegally. operating.a “commercial kitchen” and a

“restaurant” Ina single-family residential district. Howard Dep, Ex. 7; Def. Mot. 16, { 12.

Restaurants are not an allowed non-single-family residential use like churches, hospitals, golf

courses, and bed-and-breakfasts, Brookings Code § 17.20.040(B). There is no evidence in the

record that the City had previously questioned whether St. Timothy’s meal service was permitted

under the zoning code. .

c. The Ordinance.

Three months later, on October 25, 2021, the City enacted an ordinance amending the

zoning code to create a new conditional permitted use for residential districts, namely, -

Dace 8 _ MDINION ANITNN ORNMNER

“[bjenevolent meal services,” and restricting how often such meal services could occur. See

Brookings Code § 17.20.040(V) (“the Ordinance”), The Ordinance defines “[b]enevolent meal

services” as “a periodic food service operation that provides food to the public without charge.”

id. § 17.08.020, The Ordinance requires organizations providing benevolent meal services to

obtain conditional use permits subject to several conditions, including that such meals may be

served no more than two days per-week, Id. § 17.124.050(A): This limitation applies regardless

of whether providing “benevolent meal services” was the property’s “primary use” or “in

combination with another use permitted outright or conditionally[.]” Id. § 17.20.040(V ).

On November 30, 2021, the Diocese sent a letter advising the City that the Ordinance

violated the Oregon and federal constitutions, as well as RLUIPA, and notified the City of its

intent to sue should the City not repeal or amend the Ordinance. Akiyama Decl., J 4, Ex. 3. The

City did not respond to that letter. Jd.

. d. The Lawsuit. . .

On January 28, 2022, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking a declaration that the Ordinance

is unlawful and an injunction against its enforcement. For more than a year, the parties

progressed through discovery in this case. St. Timothy’s continued serving meals three to four

days a week and the City refrained from issuing a notice of violation to St. Timothy’s under the

Ordinance, That changed on April 14, 2023, when the City delivered a “Notice of Abatement” to

St. Timothy’s. The Notice stated in pertinent part: "

St. Timothy’s is operating a Benevolent Meal Service without a

conditional: use permit in addition to a variety of other social

services, including an outreach clinic, a day program, and an

advocacy program in violation of 17.01.040 Compliance with code

provisions in the Brookings Municipal Code (BMC).

You are hereby directed to abate this violation by applying for a

Conditional Use Permit within ten (10) days from the date of receipt

Dace 0 _MPTINTOA ANT? prer

of this notice. Failure to abate the violation may warrant issuance of

a citation and imposition of a civil penalty of up to $720.00. Each ~

day’s violation constitutes a separate offense. In addition, the City

may abate the violation and the cost of the abatement will be charged

to you.

Howard Dep.-106:6-107:22, Dep. Ex. 18.

. ‘Before filing a motion for a temporary restraining order, St. Timothy’s requested that the

City refrain from enforcing and assessing fines pursuant to the Notice of Abatement during the

pendency of this case. The City agreed to do so until a “summary judgment decision” with

respect to the “benevolent meal services,” but not with respect to St. Timothy’s “other social

services.” Sondag Decl. 18. Thus, to avoid daily $720 fines for, among other things, opening □

its doors to the public on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, St. Timothy’s filed with the City

objections to and an appeal of the notice as it pertained to St. Timothy’s’ other “social services.”

See, e.g., id. Ex. 17 at 12-55 (June 27, 2023, Agenda Packet). Since then, St. Timothy’s has been

defending its charitable ministries as “church uses” in a parallel proceeding. Jd. So far, the City

Planning Commission has denied St. Timothy’s objections, the City Council has affirmed the .

decision by the Planning Commission, and St. Timothy’s is appealing the case to the Land Use

Board of Appeals (LUBA) of Oregon.

DISCUSSION

The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment on all claims. For the reasons

below, Plaintifts are entitled to summary judgment on the RLUIPA claim. Tt is not necessary to □

reach the merits of the other three claims. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.

_ Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 205 (2009) (courts do not decide constitutional questions if statutory basis

for resolution exists); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Arizona, 738 F.2d 1021, 1023 (9th Cir. 1984)

Rana 1. OYDTANTOA] ANTS ORMER

(same). Therefore, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the City’s motions

are denied. Final judgment shal! be entered for the Plaintiffs.

As a preliminary matter, there can be no genuine question that St. Timothy’s feeding

ministry is a sincerely held religious belief. The legal analysis of this issue is discussed below,

but as a general, practical matter, feeding the hungry and caring for the most vulnerable members

of a community is at the very heart and foundation of the Christian tradition. The textual,

Biblical support for this practice is well established: .

For there will never cease to be poor in the land: Therefore, I

command you, “You shall open wide your hand to your brother, to

the needy and to the poor, in your land.” .

Deuteronomy 15:11. ,

Then the righteous will answer him, saying, “Lord, when did we see

you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you drink? And when

did we see you a stranger and welcome you, or naked and clothe

you? And when did we see you sick or in prison and visit you?” And

the King will answer them, “Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one

of the least of these my brothers, you did it to me.”

Matthew 25:37-40. □□

John answered, “Anyone who has two shirts should share with the

- who has none, and anyone who has food should do the same.”

Luke 3:1], ©

Regarding the Episcopalian tradition.in particular, St. Timothy’s feeding ministry is in

keeping with the “core beliefs that guide the Episcopal church: feed the hungry, respect the

dignity of every human being, and build community.” Lindley Dep. J 2. In her deposition, Right

Reverend Diana D. Akiyama states that members of the Episcopal Church “have been given a

mandate by Jesus Christ as stated in the scriptures to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, to

. Dana 11 CYDTKITOS ANT) ORMER -

comfort the afflicted”; indeed, this is “at the heart of... our Christian call.” Akiyama Dep. °

39:24-40:7. Plaintiffs point to the Book of James as demonstrative of this principle:

What good is it... if you say you have faith but do not have works?

Can faith save you? If a brother or sister is naked and lacks daily

food, and one of you says to them, “Go in peace; keep warm and eat

your fill,” and yet you do not supply their bodily needs, what is the

good of that? So faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead.

James 214-17,

_ There can be no genuine dispute that feeding the hungry faithfully upholds one of the

most admirable tenants of the Christian religion.

A. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted because the City’s Ordinance

violates RLUIPA. .

RLUIPA prohibits the government from implementing a land use regulation that imposes

a substantial burden on religious exercise unless the government can show that the regulation is

the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. §

2000ce(a)(1). RLUIPA provides for strict scrutiny of even generally applicable, facially neutral

zoning laws “pursuant to which governments may make ‘individualized assessments’ of the

property at issue.” Int’? Church of Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059,

1066 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

A plaintiff has the initial task of proving that a challenged regulation substantially

burdens their religious exercise. Then the burden shifts to the government to prove, under a strict

scrutiny analysis, that its action was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling

interest. /d. at 1066-67; 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). The government cannot satisfy its burden by

“rely[ing] on ‘broadly formulated’ governmental interests”; rather, strict scrutiny requires

“specific application” of the asserted interest and regulation to the community at hand. Mast v.

Fillmore Cnty., Minn., 141 S. Ct. 2430, 2432 (2021) (Gorsuch, J. concurring) (citing Fulton v.

as __apITON ANT ARNER

City of Phila., 141 8. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021); Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao □

do Vegeral, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006)).

Here, the Ordinance violates RLUIPA because there is no genuine dispute that (1) the

Ordinance is a Iand use regulation that substantially burdens Plaintiffs feeding ministry, which is

an exercise of Plaintiffs’ religion; (2) the City has not articulated a “compelling government

interest” served by burdening that exercise; and, even if the City had identified a compelling

interest, (3) the Ordinance is not the least restrictive means to achieve it.

1. Under RLUIPA, the Ordinance is a Jand use regulation that substantially burdens

Plaintiffs’ feeding ministry, which is a religious exercise.

a. The Ordinance is a land use regulation, to which RLUIPA applies.

Under RLUIPA, a “land use regulation” is “a zoning or landmarking law, or the

application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land

(including a structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement,

servitude, or other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such

an interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5). “RLUIPA applies when the government may take into

account the particular details of an applicant’s proposed use of land when deciding to permit or

deny that-use.” Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 986 (9th

Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(2)(C)). In other words, when a land use code requires an

application for a permit that “results in a case-by-case evaluation of the proposed activity of

religious organizations,” that is an “individual assessment regime” under RLUIPA. Midrash

Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1225 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Konikov v.

Orange County, 410 F.3d 1317 ( 11th Cir. 2005) (when zoning code provides process “for

_ individualized assessments,” RLUIPA applies). -

Daga 12 _ OPTININN AND aprnEr ‘

As a matter of law, the Ordinance is a “land use regulation” subject. □□ RLUIPA. It is a □

zoning law that on its face and in its application limits Plaintiffs’ use of the iand at 401 Fir Street,

including the church affixed to that property. Like the Brookings Land Development Code more

generally, the Ordinance permits the City to take into account particular details of an applicant’s

use of land, including the days and times of the week that a church provides “benevolent meal

services.” BMC 17.124.050. In other words, when a church or an organization applies for a

conditional use permit under the Ordinance, the City proceeds with an individualized assessment,

which includes evaluating whether the church is in compliance with the limitations of the

Ordinance, Thus, RLUIPA applies to the Ordinance.

The City argues that Plaintiffs cannot bring this claim because they have not submitted an

application for a conditional use permit under the Ordinance, and therefore the City has not

conducted an individualized assessment in this specific case. The Court disagrees. Nothing in

RLUIPA requires that the individualized assessment actually take place in order for RLUIPA to

apply. It is sufficient that the Ordinance “permits” the City to conduct an individualized

assessment in the process of evaluating any permit application. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ce(2)(C)).

Moreover, the City has conducted an individualized assessment in this case. On April 14,

2023, the City sent St. Timothy's a “Notice of Abatement,” which stated in pertinent part:

St. Timothy’s is operating a Benevolent Meal Service without a

conditional use permit in addition te a variety of other social

services, including an outreach clinic, a day program, and an

advocacy program in violation of 17.01.040 Compliance with code

provisions in the Brookings Municipal Code (BMC).

Howard Dep. 106:6, Ex. 18. This Notice was clearly the result of the City taking into account St.

Timothy’s particular activities and use of the land to determine compliance with the code. Thus,

Dace 1d — OPINION AND ORDER

RLUIPA does not require that an individualized assessment actually take place, but even if it did,

that condition would be met in this case. □

b. St. Timothy’s feeding ministry is a religious exercise.

RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not

compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).

“Religious exercise” is defined broadly because “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the _

centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’

interpretations of those creeds.” Shakur vy. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Hernandez v. C.LR., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)). “The use. .. of real property for the purpose of

religious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses . . .

the property for that purpose.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B). oe

There is no genuine dispute that Plaintiffs’ feeding ministry is a “religious exercise”

under RLUIPA. Courts across the country have recognized that ministering to the poor is an

exercise of a sincerely held “religious duty to feed the hungry and clothe the naked.” Harbor

Missionary Church Corp. v. City of San Buenaventura, 642 F. App’x 726, 729 (9th Cir. 2016)

(discussing church’s “homeless ministry”); Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment

of D.C., 862 F. Supp. 53 8, 544, 546 (D.D.C. 1994) (ministering to poor is “in every respect”.

. “religious activity and a form of worship” and “the concept of acts of charity as an essential part

of religious worship is a central tenet of ali major religions”); Chosen 300 Ministries, Inc. v. City

of Phila., 2012 WL 3235317, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2012) (“Acts of charity are central to

Christian worship.”); see also Micah’s Way v. City of Santa Ana, 2023 WL 4680804, at *5 (C.D.

Cal. June 8, 2023) (faith-based organization plausibly alleged that “food distribution activities

TS __MDPINTION ANT ORNHER

are religious exercise” because such “charitable activity [was] pursuant to the teachings and □

_ words of Jesus Christ”).

- Here, it is undisputed that St. Timothy’s has been providing meals to the hungry for over

a decade. The City Manager, Mayor, Council President, and Public Works Director all testified

they had no reason to question the validity of Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. Howard Dep. 64:17-

65:16; Hedenskog Dep. 45:15-46: 11; Deposition of Ed Schreiber 8 (“Schreiber Dep.”) 53:16-25;

Baron Dep. 15:8-11. Even without this undisputed evidence, it is not for the Court to “inquire

into the truth or falsity of stated religious beliefs.” Jnt’l Church, 673 F.3d at 1069.

c. The Ordinance substantially burdens Plaintiffs’ religious exercise by limiting

the number of days that they can provide benevolent meal services.

A substantial burden is one that is “oppressive to a significantly great extent.” Guru

. Nanak, 456 F.3d at 988 n.12 (citation omitted). “A substantial burden exists where the

governmental authority puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to

violate his beliefs.” Int’! Church, 673 F.3d at 1067 (internal quotation marks and citation □

omitted). Restrictions that “substantially limit” an intended religious use of a property create a

substantial burden under RLUIPA. DiLaura v. Twp. Of Ann Arbor, 112 F. App’x 445, 446 (6th

Cir. 2004). .

Last year, the Central District of California held that where a city has represented “that

continued distribution of food will be met with ‘issuance of administrative fines,”” it has

“plausibly put pressure on [the plaintiff] to modify its behavior and violate its beliefs by

abandoning its charitable practices,” Micah’s Way, 2023 WL 4680804, at *5 (citation omitted)

(denying motion to dismiss).

Here, it is undisputed that St. Timothy’s either provides or hosts a benevolent meal

service three to four times per week and that, in the past, St. Timothy’s has provided a

Dane 1h. FYDTNTON ANID ORDER

benevolent meal service up to six times per week. The clergy and the members of St. Timothy’s

have provided food to the hungry for over a decade, and they believe it is a central tenant of their

faith to do so. The Ordinance requires that any applicant fora conditional use permit must agree

to limit their benevolent meal service to two days per week. By limiting the number of days per

week that St. Timothy’s can provide benevolent meal service, the Ordinance forces Plaintiffs to □

choose between acting in accordance with their faith or facing a fine of $720 per day. The

Ordinance thus puts “substantial pressure” on Plaintiffs “to modify their behavior and to violate

their beliefs.” The Ordinance imposes a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise.

- 2. The City has not identified any compelling government interest served by limiting

the number of days that benevolent meals can be provided.

- Plaintiffs have carried their burden to show a prima facie case under RLUIPA. The

- burden now shifts to the City to show a compelling government interest. Only “interests of the

highest order” are considered compelling governmental interests. Jnt’? Church, 673 F.3d at 1071

(quoting /n Grace Church v, City of San Diego, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (S.D. Cal. 2008)).

“Broadly formulated interests” do not withstand strict scrutiny. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1881

(citation omitted); Mast, 141 8. Ct. at 2430. Rather, the government “must show ‘a compelling

interest in imposing the burden on religious exercise in the particular case at hand, not a

compelling interest in general.’” Grace Church, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (quoting Westchester

Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353 (2d Cir. 2007)).

The City asserts two categories of justification for the Ordinance: (1) “protect[ing] the

public welfare, maintain[ing] peace and order, and prevent[ing] crime”; and (2) facilitating the

provision of “benevolent meal services” in residential areas, which were “not allowed” under thé

BMC prior to adopting the Ordinance. Sondag Decl., Ex. 19 (Responses to Interrogatories 7, 9,

10). Neither is a compelling government interest under RLUIPA.

Dace 17 _ OPTNION AND ORDER.

First, protecting the public welfare, maintaining peace and order, and preventing crime

are all certainly compelling government interests in a broad, general sense. However, the City

has not articulated how the specific provisions of the Ordinance that limit meal service to two

days per week, or even three days per week if the amendment to the Ordinance is enacted, serve

to protect public welfare, maintain peace and order, or prevent crime in practical application. The

Court can find no logical, causal relationship between the limitation and these interests. .

Second, the City seeks to reframe the intention of the Ordinance by asserting that the

provisions do not limit benevolent meal service at all, but are, in fact, “permissive.” The City

argues that, without a conditional use permit, Plaintiffs would not be allowed to serve meals at

all. This argument is belied by the uncontested facts of this case, which include St. Timothy’s

_ decade-long record of benevolent meal service, with City knowledge, and without City

interference. Additionally, the City has not moved to restrict the number of days that meal

services can be provided at any of the other 20 non-single-family residential use types that serve

meals to the public, such as golf courses, daycare facilities, or hospitals. It is unclear why a

church serving meals to the public for free would be considered a “‘reStaurant” under the City

zoning laws, but a golf course or bed and breakfast serving paid meals would not. This blatant

inconsistency undermines the idea that without the Ordinance and a conditional use permit, St.

Timothy’s would be disallowed from serving meals at all. If the other non-single-family □

residential uses can serve meals unrestricted, why not a church? Thus, the idea that the

Ordinance’s limitation is permissive instead of restrictive defies any stretch of the imagination.

Similarly, “[o]ne way to evaluate a claim of compelling interest is to consider whether in

the past the governmental actor has consistently and vigorously protected that interest.” Grace _

Church, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1140-41. Alleged governmental concerns “ring hollow” when the

Page 18 OPINION AND ORDER

government has been “complacent” about a subject for many years only to “suddenly burst into

action.” Cottonwood Christian Cir v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203,

“1225, 1228 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Here, the City has long permitted, and arguably even supported

benevolent meal services at St. Timothy’s, without limitation as to the number of days such

meals could be provided. This undisputed fact is fatal to their argument that the Ordinance’s

restrictions are intended to promote public welfare, peace, and order, and to deter crime.

Plaintiffs also assert that the City’s identified interests are not compelling because they

are “post-hoc rationalizations.” The “strict scrutiny analysis requires not only that the

government’s stated purpose is a compelling interest, but that it is also a genuinely-held

purpose.” Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (emphasis added). “To be a compelling interest,

the State must show that the alleged objective was the legislature’s ‘actual purpose’” and “the □

legislature must have had a strong basis in evidence to support-that justification[.]” Shaw v.

Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 n.4 ( 1996). “[P]ost-hoc rationalizations provide an insufficient basis to

find a compelling governmental interest”; rather, “the court must look to the compelling interest

asserted by defendants at the time of the ban.” Native Am. Council of Tribes v. Weber, 897 F.

Supp. 2d 828, 849 (D.S.D, 2012), aff'd, 750 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2014); Masonry Bldg. Owners of

Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1306 (D. Or. 2019) (“[S]hifting post-hoc rationalizations

do little to advance the City’s stated purposes for passing the Ordinance.”).

Plaintiffs argue that the facts in the record show that the City’s stated interests of public

welfare, maintaining peace and order, and preventing crime were not “genuinely-held” purposes

behind enactment of the Ordinance. Plaintiffs point to the fact that the City used St. Timothy’s

acquisition of an OHA commercial kitchen permit to suddenly disallow their food service, even

though acquiring the permit would serve-to ensure public health and safety. Sondag Decl. Exs. □

Dage 10. MPTINTON ORHEPR

13, 15; Howard Dep. Exs. 7, 11. Meanwhile, food prepared at home and brought to a church

potluck would not be subject to the Ordinance, even though no food safety regulations would

serve to ensure health and sanitation practices for that food. Plaintiffs also point to comments by

City officials that St. Timothy’s ministry included “vagrants,” who were a “blight” on

Brookings, and that City officials believed the Ordinance could “reduce the amount of activity”

in that area. Baron Dep. Ex. 43; Baron Dep. 27:22-28:8; Hedenskog Dep. 71:5-12, 73:7-12

(Ordinance “limit{s] the impact” of “indigent individuals hanging around the meal service

location”).

Significant evidence exists in the record to show that the City of Brookings intended the

Ordinance to restrict St. Timothy’s service to the homeless population and other individuals in

need, and to reduce the number of such people congregating in the area around St. Timothy’s

Church. However, such a finding is not material to the Court’s ruling that the Ordinance violates

RLUIPA, as concluded. below. Moreover, the City disputes Plaintiffs’ contention that the

Ordinance was intended to limit service to any specific population or to reduce any specific

population in a given area. The Court is conscious of its role not to weigh disputed facts. Given

that reaching a conclusion on this issue is not material to the legal analysis, the Court declines to

make a finding regarding the true intentions behind the City’s enactment of the Ordinance.

3. Even if the City’s stated interest was compelling, the Ordinance is not the least

restrictive means to achieve that interest.

Even if the City could articulate a genuinely-held, compelling government interest, it also

bears the burden of showing that the regulation is the least restrictive means of advancing that

interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. A government “cannot meet its burden to prove least restrictive

means unless it demonstrates that it has actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less

restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice.” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d

Dage 771 _ OPINION ANT) oemae □

989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, even if the City legitimately wanted to allow benevolent meal

service that was previously disallowed, the City has not shown that the Ordinance was the least

restrictive means to achieve that purpose. No explanation has been provided for the restriction

on the number of days that meal service can be offered under the Ordinance, and the City has not

shown that it considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive measures. □

For all of the reasons above, the Ordinance violates RLUIPA.

4; The Court is not required to reach Plaintiff's constitutional claims due to

Plaintiff's success on the merits of the RLUIPA claim. ,

As discussed above, because Plaintiffs prevail under RLUIPA, the Court need not reach

Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v, Holder, 557

U.S. 193, 205 (2009) (courts do not decide constitutional questions if statutory basis for

resolution exists); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Arizona, 738 F.2d 1021, 1023 (9th Cir. 1984)

(same). Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is therefore granted in its entirety.

B. The Defendant’s motions are denied.

Defendant City of Brookings’ motion for summary judgment is denied for all of the

reasons discussed above, The Ordinance violates RLUIPA, and Plaintiffs are entitled to summary

judgment. .

Defendant City of Brookings’ motion to dismiss seeks to moot this case due to the City’s

recent amendment to the Ordinance, which allows benevolent meal service up to three days per

week, instead of the prior limitation of two days per week. It is unclear to the Court whether the

amendment has been officially adopted as part of the Ordinance. Even if it has been adopted, it

is not sufficient to avoid summary judgment on the merits of this case. Plaintiffs have submitted

. undisputed evidence in the record that St. Timothy’s currently serves benevolent meals three to

_ four times per week, and there have been times in the recent past that meals have been served up

Dace 21 _ OPTNION AND ORDER .

to six times per week. Therefore, the amendment to the Ordinance does not materially change the

circumstances of this case. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.

CONCLUSION

The City of Brookings is very fortunate to have Reverand Lindley and the entire _

congregation of St. Timothy’s as compassionate, caring, and committed members of the

community. Consistent with their faith, and with the City’s full awareness, St. Timothy’s has

cared for vulnerable people in the community for decades, including during the early days of the

Covid-19 pandemic when there were few, if any, other accessible resources in the area. The

clergy and the congregation at St. Timothy’s have shown that they have been prepared to work

with the City to care for those in need, and at the same time preserve the livability of the area for

their neighbors by cooperating with law enforcement when necessary. The homeless are not

“vagrants,” but are citizens in need. This is a time for collaboration, not ill-conceived ordinances

that restrict care and resources for vulnerable- people in our communities.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (#43) is GRANTED,

and Defendant’s motions for summary judgment (#54) and dismissal (#75) are DENIED. Fi

Judgment will be entered on behalf of the Plaintiffs. |

DATED this_27 day of March, 2024.

MARKD.CLARKE

United States Magistrate Judge

Page 99 _MDINTION ANT) apree