Nogowski v. St Charles Medical Center

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

LOUISE ANN NOGOWSKI, Civ. No. 6:23-cv-00027-AA

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

ST. CHARLES MEDICAL CENTER,

Defendant.

________________________________________

AIKEN, District Judge:

Defendant St. Charles Medical Center filed a Motion to Dismiss which is now

before the Court. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”), ECF No. 6. For the reasons

below, the Motion is GRANTED, and plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, is

DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

Defendant employed plaintiff Louise Nogowski as a Registered Nurse (RN) in

the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) at its largest hospital in Bend, Oregon for around 20

years. ECF No. 1 ¶ 4. During the time when plaintiff was working as an RN in the

ICU, the COVID-19 pandemic was underway. Id. ¶ 8. In August 2021, Oregon

Governor Kate Brown issued an executive order (“vaccine mandate” or “mandate”)

requiring healthcare workers to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by October 18,

2021. MTD at 1; see also OAR § 333-019-1010. To comply with the mandate,

defendant announced to all its employees its intent to require vaccination against

COVID-19. ECF No. 1 ¶ 10.

On about September 28, 2021, plaintiff submitted a COVID-19 Vaccine

Religious Exception Request Form seeking a religious exception to the vaccination

requirement. Compl. ¶ 10; Durr Dec. ¶ 2, Ex. 1.1 Plaintiff’s request contains brief,

statements describing her religious bases for declining the COVID-19 vaccine. This

included:

As a child of god I believe I have been given free will to make my

choices understanding that those choices have consequences both good

and bad. Therefore I will not give up my free will to be forced to do

something I don’t believe is in my best interest.

Id. at 2. Plaintiff also stated she would need the accommodation “until I no

longer need it to practice bedside nursing.” Id. In response to the question asking

for information about references to verify her sincerely held religious belief, plaintiff

wrote: “My husband-Brandon. I don’t have a church as I don’t trust people who only

approve of you when you make them look good.” Id. at 3. In response to a question

asking her to identify alternative accommodations in lieu of vaccination, plaintiff

stated that she requested to wear a mask or work remotely from home conducting

1 The Court may rely on outside documents incorporated by reference in the

complaint on which the complaint “necessarily relies.” United States v. Ritchie, 342

F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th

Cir. 2001). Plaintiff relies on her submitted exception request and other

correspondence with defendant in her Complaint. See Compl ¶ 10. The Court may

therefore consider plaintiff’s application statements here.

utilization reviews. Id.

Defendant granted plaintiff’s application and on October 18, 2021, they

placed her on unpaid administrative leave. ECF No. 1 ¶ 11. Defendant terminated

plaintiff’s employment as an indefinite leave of absence when the vaccination

mandate was extended in January 2022. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges that defendant

placed her on unpaid leave “based on her sincerely held religious beliefs” and in

“retaliation for expressing those beliefs.” Id. ¶ 17. This action followed.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under the federal pleading standards, a

pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim and allege

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While a pleading does not require

“detailed factual allegations,” it needs more than “a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. Legal conclusions without any

supporting factual allegations need not be accepted as true. Id.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings claims for (1) unlawful employment discrimination based on

religion in violation of ORS 659A.030(1)(a); and (2) unlawful discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.2 Plaintiff

alleges that St. Charles Medical Center subjected her to discriminatory treatment

by engaging in a series of adverse employment actions culminating in plaintiff’s

termination.

In its motion to dismiss, defendant asserts that plaintiff fails to allege facts

establishing that her objections to the vaccine are religious and that her beliefs do

not conflict with the vaccine mandate. MTD at 13-18. Therefore, in defendant’s

view, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII

or Oregon law. Defendant also argues that even if plaintiff could demonstrate

religious discrimination, plaintiff’s requested accommodation would have

constituted undue hardship to defendant’s operations. MTD at 18-22.

Defendant moved to dismiss over four months ago. Plaintiff failed to

respond. The Court treats plaintiff’s failure to respond as a concession on the

merits. Sweet v. Clark Cnty. WA Off. of Indigent Def., No. 3:18-cv-00124-YY, 2018

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122516, at *6 (D. Or. June 19, 2018); (citing Helmen v. Nationwide

2 Oregon Revised Statute § 659A.030(1)(a) and Title VII both prohibit employers

from engaging in religious discrimination with respect to an individual’s

employment terms. This means that under the Oregon statute, claims are

evaluated using the same criteria as under Title VII. Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630

F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1277,

1284 (D. Or. 2009).

Life Ins. Co., 189 F. App’x 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2016) and Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d

52, 54 (9th Cir, 1995)). In so deciding, the Court has considered “(1) the public's

interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring

disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic

alternatives.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992), as

amended (May 22, 1992).

I. Legal Framework

Title VII explicitly encompasses “all aspects of religious observance and

practice, as well as belief” within its definition of “religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).

Title VII failure-to-accommodate claims are analyzed under a two-part, burden-

shifting framework. Tiano v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 681 (9th Cir.

1998). A plaintiff must first plead a prima facie case of religious discrimination. Id.

If an employee articulates a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to

show that it made good-faith efforts to reasonably accommodate the religious

practice or that it could not accommodate without undue hardship. Id.

To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination based on an

employer’s failure to accommodate, the plaintiff must allege that (1) they hold a

genuine religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement; (2) they informed

their employer about this belief and the resulting conflict; and (3) that the employer

took adverse employment actions against them due to their inability to meet the job

requirement. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2004).

An employee’s request for a religious exemption from a COVID-19

vaccination mandate can be declined if it is determined that the employee’s belief

lacks authentic religious significance. Tiano, 139 F.3d at 681 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-2(a)(1)). The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)

provided Title VII guidance on religious accommodations to COVID-19 vaccine

mandates. The EEOC explained that “an employee's request for an exemption from

a COVID-19 vaccination mandate can be denied on the grounds that the employee's

belief is not truly religious in nature.” Doe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 19 F.4th

1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2021). That guidance underscores that objections to COVID-19

vaccines “purely based on social, political, or economic views or personal preferences

. . . (including about the possible effects of the vaccine)” are not religious beliefs

under Title VII.3 Therefore, a court need not take “conclusory assertions of

violations of religious beliefs at face value.” Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of the Cal. State

Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2023). And a “threadbare reference” to the

plaintiff's religious beliefs cannot satisfy the first element of a prima facie case.

Gage v. Mayo Clinic, No. CV-22-02091, 2023 WL 3230986, slip op. at *3 (D. Ariz.

May 3, 2023).

Courts distinguish between what is genuinely grounded in religious belief

and what is rooted in secular or scientific principles. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406

U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (plaintiff’s claim that their subjective rejection of the

3 What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act,

and Other EEO Laws, EEOC (Oct. 25, 2021), available at

https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-

rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws#L.

“contemporary secular values accepted by the majority” did not have a foundation in

religious belief); Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs’

claims must originate from religious beliefs rather than purely secular philosophical

concerns); Finkbeiner v. Geisinger Clinic, 623 F. Supp. 3d 458, 465 (M.D. Pa. 2022)

(dismissing religious accommodation claims under Title VII related to COVID-19

vaccine mandate and finding plaintiff’s purported beliefs related to “free will” were

more isolated moral teaching and not religious); Brox v. Hole, 590 F. Supp. 3d 359,

367 (D. Mass. 2022) (dismissing religious accommodation claims and finding

plaintiff’s opposition to COVID-19 vaccine was not religious where he claimed God

instilled plaintiff with a strong immune system and preference for natural

medicines).

Here, defendant convincingly argues that plaintiff’s stated religious basis for

exemption is too broad and vague to sufficiently allege religious beliefs that conflict

with obtaining a COVID-19 vaccine.

Plaintiff’s allegations about her purported beliefs giving rise to her opposition

to the COVID-19 vaccine are closer to personal beliefs or “isolated moral teachings,”

as seen in cases cited above, rather than religious beliefs afforded protection under

Title VII or Oregon law.

Plaintiff’s complaint relies on her request for exemption, which includes her

description of her religious beliefs and why they limit her ability to receive the

COVID-19 vaccine. Plaintiff’s exception request form refers vaguely and in

conclusory fashion to herself “[a]s a child of god.” Durr Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1. Plaintiff

further states, “I believe I have been given free will to make my choices

understanding that those choices have consequences both good and bad. Therefore,

I will not give up my free will to be forced to do something I don’t believe is in my

best interest.” Id. Plaintiff also claims that she does not belong to “a church as I

don’t trust people who only approve of you when you make them look good.” Id. at

2.

Defendant asserts that these statements related to “free will” and acting in her own

“best interest” fail to demonstrate a sincerely held religious beliefs under any

definition. Courts have dismissed religious discrimination cases, including at the

motion-to-dismiss stage, on that basis. See Finkbeiner, 623 F. Supp. at 465 (M.D.

Pa. 2022) (plaintiff’s purported opposition to COVID-19 vaccine and related safety

measures based on her “free will” and “God given right to make [her] own choices”

not religious in nature and dismissing religious discrimination claims); Fallon v.

Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr. of Se. Pa., 877 F.3d 487, 492 (3d Cir. 2017) (granting motion

to dismiss and finding plaintiff’s purported opposition to flu vaccine not religious

where plaintiff simply claimed vaccines did more harm than good, and despite

plaintiff’s assertions that he is “Buddhist”).

Accordingly, plaintiff fails to allege facts giving rise to an inference of a

sincere religious opposition under this framework. Plaintiff alleged a general

religious opposition to the vaccine mandate under the principle of free will. She

stated no details or specifics about the vaccine that conflicted with the specifics of

her religion. Other districts have similarly concluded. See Finkbeiner, 623 F. Supp.

3d at 465-466 (rejecting plaintiff’s religious objection to employee vaccination

mandate based on their belief they have a “God-given right to make their own

choices,” stating this objection would amount to “a blanket privilege” and a

“limitless excuse for avoiding all unwanted obligations”). Plaintiff also presented

limited reference evidence to verify her sincerely held religious belief, listing only

her husband, and clarifying that she doesn’t attend church or any other place of

worship. Because plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Title VII or Oregon law,

the court does not reach defendant’s affirmative defense of “undue hardship”—the

second part of the burden-shifting framework.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6. is

GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED without prejudice

and final judgment will be entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED and DATED this _2_4_t_h_ day of October 2023.

__/s_/_A_n_n__ A__ik_e_n______________

ANN AIKEN

United States District Judge