Alberto-Toledo v. Pulver

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

URIEL ALBERTO-TOLEDO, Case No. 3:20-cv-01557-MC

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

WASHINGTON COUNTY; PAT

GARRETT; CAPRICE MASSEY;

ANDREW PULVER,

Defendants.

_______________________________

MCSHANE, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee appearing pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

that Washington County officials and a deputy district attorney violated his Fourth Amendment

rights by unlawfully detaining him pursuant to a United States Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) administrative detainer. Defendants Washington County, Pat Garrett, and

Caprice Massey (collectively, the Washington County defendants) move for dismissal of

plaintiff’s claims on grounds of absolute immunity.

Because the Washington County defendants relied on facially-valid court orders when

transferring plaintiff to ICE custody and placing a hold on his release, their motion is

GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and its

incorporated documents. See generally Sec. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 34); McMahon Decl. Exs. 1-

5 (ECF No. 47); Sec. McMahon Decl. Ex. 1 (ECF No. 53); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues

& Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a

court may examine “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference” and “matters of

which a court may take judicial notice”).1

On June 6, 2019, plaintiff was arrested on state law charges in Washington County and

booked into the Washington County Jail. The next day, plaintiff posted bail and was released

from custody pending trial.

On January 8, 2020, plaintiff was arrested and taken into custody by U.S. Marshals on a

federal charge of Illegal Reentry. Apparently, plaintiff was held at the Multnomah County

Inverness Jail during the pendency of his federal charge.

On March 13, 2020, Deputy District Attorney (DDA) Pulver filed a motion to show cause

why plaintiff’s bail and pretrial release should not be revoked in his Washington County case.

On March 16, 2020, the state court revoked plaintiff’s bail and issued a warrant for his

arrest. The court also imposed a new bail amount of $250,000.

On March 24, 2020, Washington County Circuit Court Judge Rebecca Guptill issued an

“Order to Transport Defendant from Multnomah County Inverness Jail,” which stated that

1 The McKinney declaration (ECF No. 48) proffered by defendants was not considered in

resolving their motion to dismiss.

plaintiff was “in the custody of the above-named facility” and his appearance was required

before the state court in Washington County. McMahon Decl. Ex. 1 (ECF No. 47-1). The Order

to Transport ordered plaintiff to be released to the Washington County Sheriff for his court

appearance and provided that “when the above-entitled matter has been completed, [plaintiff]

shall be returned to the Multnomah County Inverness Jail (ICE Custody).” Id.

On March 27, 2020, plaintiff pled guilty to a charge of Illegal Reentry in federal court

and was sentenced to time served. He remained at the Multnomah County Inverness Jail on a

hold from Washington County.

On March 30, 2020, Judge Guptill signed an Amended Order to Transport stating that

plaintiff was “in the custody” of ICE rather than Multnomah County and directing plaintiff’s

release to the Washington County Sheriff for his appearance in state court. Sec. McMahon Decl.

Ex. 1 (ECF No. 53-1). The Amended Order also provided that “when the above-entitled matter

has been completed, [plaintiff] shall be returned to the custody of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE).” Id.

Also on March 30, 2020, ICE issued a Warrant for Arrest and Immigration Detainer

directed to the Washington County Jail. McMahon Decl. Ex. 3. (ECF No. 47-3). The warrant

authorized immigration officers to arrest plaintiff and the detainer directed Washington County

Jail officials to detain plaintiff for up to forty-eight hours after the conclusion of his state court

proceedings. Id. Ex. 3 at 2. Washington County officials did not execute the warrant and instead

stamped it with the following language:

Detainer request declined

Federal Dist. Court ruled unconstitutional

See Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County (D. Or. April 11, 2014)

Information provided pursuant to ORS 181A.820

Id. Ex. 3 at 1.

On or around March 30, 2020, plaintiff was transported and booked into the Washington

County Jail. The next day, plaintiff appeared before the state court and a preliminary hearing was

set for April 3, 2020.

On April 1, 2020, plaintiff posted bail a second time in his Washington County case and

signed a release agreement. On April 2, 2020, Washington County jail officials transferred

plaintiff to the custody of ICE instead of releasing him on bail.2

While in ICE custody, plaintiff missed his April 3, 2020 court appearance in Washington

County and DDA Pulver requested that the state court revoke plaintiff’s bail due to his failure to

appear. The court revoked plaintiff’s bail and imposed a new bail amount of $5,000,000.

On April 3, 2020, Judge Guptill also issued a third transport order stating that plaintiff

was “presently in the custody of ICE” and must be “brought before this Court” for his

appearance on state charges. McMahon Decl. Ex. 4. The Order further provided that, “when the

above-entitled matter has been completed, [plaintiff] shall be returned to the custody of

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).” Id.

On April 8, 2020, plaintiff was taken to the Washington County Jail, where “an ICE hold

was again lodged against him.” Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 74.

Plaintiff grieved the issue of his “illegal detention” arising from the ICE hold. Id. ¶ 78.

Washington County Jail officials informed plaintiff that the “signed” and “active” transport order

authorizing plaintiff’s release from ICE custody to Washington County custody “allows ICE to

2 The Court’s previous Order indicated that on “April 2, 2020, plaintiff was transported to

the Multnomah County Jail and taken into ICE custody.” See Order dated July 15, 2021, at 3

(ECF No. 32). Plaintiff contends that he was not taken to Multnomah County but instead was

remanded directly into ICE custody while at the Washington County Jail and transported to an

ICE holding facility. Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. at 1-2 & Decl. (ECF No. 51). The Court relied on

the language of the March 24, 2020 transport order and acknowledges plaintiff’s clarification.

place a transport detainer” on plaintiff and requires his return to ICE custody once his state court

charges are adjudicated. Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 2 (ECF No. 51 at 8-9).

In September 2020, plaintiff filed this § 1983 action.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that the Washington County defendants violated his Fourth Amendment

rights on April 1, 2020 by refusing to release him after he posted bail and continue to violate his

rights by enforcing an ICE detainer that prevents his release on bail.3 Plaintiff seeks

compensatory damages arising from the failure to release him and injunctive relief requiring

Washington County to remove the ICE hold. The Washington County defendants contend that

they are entitled to absolute immunity from suit because they simply complied with Judge

Guptill’s transport orders when they transferred plaintiff to ICE custody and placed an ICE hold

against him after his return to Washington County custody.

It is well established that corrections officials who are “charged with executing facially

valid court orders enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for conduct prescribed by those

orders.” Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2013). As explained by the

Ninth Circuit, “officials who simply enforce facially valid court orders are ‘performing functions

necessary to the judicial process’” and “must not be required to second-guess the courts if that

process is to work fairly and efficiently.” Id. at 1042 (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889,

895-96 (9th Cir. 2003)). Accordingly, “absolute immunity is necessary to free prison officials

from the fear of litigation and ‘insure that such officials can perform their function without the

need to secure permanent legal counsel.’” Id. at 1040 (quoting Valdez v. City & Cty. of Denver,

3 Plaintiff also brings claims against DDA Pulver and alleges that he falsely informed the

state court that plaintiff was in ICE custody. Those claims are not at issue in this motion.

878 F.2d 1285, 1288 (10th Cir. 1989)). “Absolute immunity applies even where a prisoner

claims that the order at issue is invalid or the order is later overturned.” Id. at 1039.

Here, Judge Guptill’s transport orders stated that plaintiff was in ICE custody and ordered

his release to Washington County custody to appear in state court proceedings. The March 24,

2020 Order to Transport ordered plaintiff’s return “to Multnomah County Inverness Jail (ICE

custody)” after his state court appearance, and the March 30, 2020 Amended Order to Transport

clarified that plaintiff “shall be returned to the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(ICE).” McMahon Decl. Ex. 1; Sec. McMahon Decl. Ex. 1. The April 3, 2020 Order to Transport

likewise ordered plaintiff to “be returned” to ICE custody. McMahon Decl. Ex. 4. Nothing on the

face of these orders suggests that they are invalid, and Washington County Jail officials were

complying with the transport orders when they released plaintiff to ICE custody and

subsequently placed an ICE hold against him.

Plaintiff nonetheless maintains that the Washington County defendants cannot rely on the

transport orders in asserting absolute immunity because he was not returned to the Multnomah

County Inverness Jail as required by the March 24, 2020 Order and he was no longer in ICE

custody when the March 30, 2020 Amended Order was issued. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 32-33;

Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. at 2. I find it immaterial that plaintiff was not returned to the

Multnomah County Inverness Jail before his transfer to ICE custody on April 2, 2020. The

transports orders required plaintiff’s return to “ICE custody” and the March 30, 2020 order

omitted the directive that plaintiff be transported to the Multnomah County Inverness Jail.

Granted, plaintiff may not have been in ICE custody when Judge Guptill issued the

Amended Order of Transport on March 30, 2020, negating the basis for his “return” or transfer to

ICE custody on April 2, 2020. As of that date, plaintiff had been sentenced to time served in his

federal case and Washington County jail officials had declined to execute the ICE warrant and

detainer. Nonetheless, even if the underlying factual basis for the Amended Order was incorrect,

Washington County jail officials are not required to “second-guess the courts” when enforcing

facially-valid court orders. Engebretson, 724 F.3d at 1042. Washington County officials

complied with Judge Guptill’s transport orders when they transferred plaintiff to ICE custody

instead of releasing him on bail, and Washington County officials are absolutely immune from

§ 1983 liability.

Plaintiff is correct that absolute immunity generally does not extend to municipalities

such as Washington County and does not bar his claim for injunctive relief. See Monell v. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978) (holding that “municipal bodies sued under § 1983

cannot be entitled to an absolute immunity”); Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir.

2013) (stating that absolute immunity is not a bar to injunctive relief). Regardless, plaintiff

cannot sustain these claims against Washington County or Sheriff Garrett.

In order to state a § 1983 claim against the County, plaintiff must allege that (1) the

County had a policy, custom, or widespread practice that caused the violation of his

constitutional rights; (2) the County failed to properly train its officers and the failure to train

amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s rights; or (3) the individual who violated

plaintiff’s constitutional rights had final policy-making authority or ratified a subordinate’s

unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it. Rodriguez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 891

F.3d 776, 802-03 (9th Cir. 2018); see Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 694. As discussed above, the

transport orders required plaintiff’s return to ICE custody, and plaintiff’s allegedly unlawful

detention did not arise from a policy, custom, or practice of the County. It should go without

saying that Washington County’s compliance with facially-valid court orders does not amount to

an unconstitutional policy.

Finally, plaintiff cannot obtain the requested injunctive relief in this Court. Plaintiff seeks

an injunction requiring Sheriff Garrett to remove the ICE hold, which would allow plaintiff to

eventually obtain his release on bail. As construed by the Court, plaintiff’s claim is based on the

allegation that Washington County Jail officials issued the current ICE hold against him due to

the ICE arrest warrant and detainer, which do not provide probable cause for plaintiff’s extended

detention. See Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 95-98; see also Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 6-7 (ECF No.

11); Pl.’s Reply in Supp. at 2-3 (ECF No. 23); Order dated July 15, 2021 (ECF No. 32).

However, as noted above, Washington County Jail officials declined to execute the ICE arrest

warrant and detainer. See McMahon Decl. Ex. 3.4 Instead, the third transport order signed by

Judge Guptill on April 3, 2020 requires plaintiff’s “return” to ICE custody and prohibits

Washington County Jail officials from releasing plaintiff on bail. Id. Ex. 4.5

Consequently, plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief would effectively invalidate or

modify an order issued in plaintiff’s state court criminal proceeding. This Court will not interfere

with a pending state criminal proceeding absent “extraordinary circumstances,” which are not

present in this case. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971). Plaintiff may seek relief from

4 The Court may consider the ICE warrant and detainer in ruling on defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss because plaintiff referenced an administrative ICE warrant in his Second Amended

Complaint. See Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60-61, 98. Even if the Court’s consideration of the

unexecuted warrant and detainer converts defendants’ motion into one for summary judgment,

the undisputed facts of record establish that the Orders To Transport issued by Judge Guptill

require plaintiff’s return to ICE custody. Thus, plaintiff cannot establish genuine issues of

material fact to defeat summary judgment.

5 The Court was unaware of the third transport order until the Washington County

defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss and had accepted as true plaintiff’s allegation that

the continuing ICE hold arose from the administrative warrant and detainer issued by ICE.

the third transport order in state court, and he apparently has done so. See McMahon Decl. Ex. 5

(motion filed by plaintiff in Washington County seeking a reduction in bail and removal of the

ICE hold). Further, the Washington County defendants represent that they will honor any

changes to plaintiff’s detention status if the state court rules in his favor and vacates or modifies

the order requiring plaintiff’s return to ICE custody.

Accordingly, this Court will not interfere with a state court criminal proceeding in these

circumstances.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the Washington County defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

(ECF No. 46) is GRANTED, and plaintiff’s claims against Washington County, Pat Garrett, and

Caprice Massey are DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 17th day of March, 2022.

s/ Michael J. McShane

MICHAEL J. MCSHANE

United States District Judge