Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United States Secret Service

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 18, 2012 Decided August 30, 2013

No. 11-5282

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.,

APPELLEE

v.

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-02312)

Mark B. Stern, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued

the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Tony West,

Assistant Attorney General, Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S.

Attorney, Beth S. Brinkmann, Deputy Assistant Attorney

General, and Michael S. Raab and Abby C. Wright, Attorneys.

Brad P. Rosenberg, Trial Attorney, entered an appearance.

James F. Peterson argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee. Paul J. Orfanedes entered an appearance.

David Murray was on the brief for amici curiae Bloomberg

L.P., et al. in support of appellee.

David L. Sobel, Anne L. Weismann, and Melanie Sloan were

2

on the brief for amici curiae Citizens for Responsibility and

Ethics in Washington, et al. in support of appellee.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and SENTELLE and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Chief Judge: Judicial Watch filed a Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA) request with the Secret Service, seeking

records of every visitor to the White House Complex over a

period of seven months. The Secret Service denied the request,

arguing that the requested documents are not “agency records”

subject to disclosure under FOIA. The district court rejected

that argument and ordered the agency to release the records or

assert specific FOIA exemptions on a document-by-document

basis. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

In both the 1974 FOIA Amendments and the 1978

Presidential Records Act, Congress made clear that it did not

want documents like the appointment calendars of the President

and his close advisors to be subject to disclosure under FOIA.

Granting Judicial Watch’s request for certain visitor records,

however, would effectively disclose the contents of those

calendars. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that

such records are not “agency records” within the meaning of

FOIA.

In addition to the President and his advisors, the White

House Complex also houses components that Congress did

intend to subject to FOIA. We conclude that records of visits to

those components are “agency records” subject to disclosure

under the Act.

3

I

In 1951, the year after two men attempted to assassinate

President Truman just across the street from the White House,

Congress permanently authorized the Secret Service to protect

the President and Vice President. See Pub. L. No. 82-79, § 4, 65

Stat. 121, 122 (1951) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a)). Upon

signing the legislation, Truman reportedly remarked: “Well, it

is wonderful to know that the work of protecting me has at last

become legal.” PHILIP H. MELANSON, THE SECRET SERVICE:

THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF AN ENIGMATIC AGENCY 54 (2002).1

In 1984, three years after an attempt on the life of President

Reagan, Congress made acceptance of such protection by the

President, Vice President, President-elect, and Vice President-

elect mandatory. See Pub. L. No. 98-587, 98 Stat. 3110 (1984)

(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a)).2

1

The Secret Service began protecting presidents part-time in

1894, and full-time (albeit with only two officers) after the

assassination of President William McKinley in 1901. See Secret

Service History, U.S. SECRET SERVICE, http://www.secretservice.gov/

history.shtml (2012). Until 1951, the agency’s authority to protect the

President derived solely from annual congressional appropriations to

the Department of the Treasury, of which it was then a component. Id.

In 2002, the Secret Service became a component of the Department of

Homeland Security. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.

107-296, § 821, 116 Stat. 2135, 2224 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 381).

2

The statute also authorizes Secret Service protection for other

individuals, including members of the President’s family, former

presidents, and major presidential candidates. It provides that

protection “may be declined” by those individuals, but does not extend

the option to the President, Vice President, President-elect, or Vice

President-elect. 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a).

4

The Secret Service’s authorizing statute extends protection

not only to the persons of the President and Vice President, but

also to the buildings in which they live and work, including the

White House Complex. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056A(a)(1)-(2); White

Decl. ¶ 5. The White House Complex includes the White

House, the Eisenhower Executive Office Building (EEOB), their

surrounding grounds, and the New Executive Office Building.

White Decl. ¶ 4. Those buildings house offices for the President

and the Vice President, as well as their staff and advisors.

In order to carry out its statutory responsibilities, the Secret

Service monitors and controls access to the White House

Complex. It accomplishes this task through an electronic system

known as the White House Access Control System (WHACS).

WHACS has two principal components: the Worker and Visitor

Entrance System (WAVES) and the Access Control Records

System (ACR).

WAVES records are generated in the following way.

Generally, when the President, Vice President, or a member of

their staffs wants to receive a visitor at the White House

Complex, an authorized White House pass holder must submit

information about the visitor and visit to the Secret Service. See

Mem. of Understanding Between White House Office of

Records Mgmt. & U.S. Secret Serv. Records Mgmt. Program ¶ 4

(May 17, 2006) (MOU). That information includes (inter alia)

the visitor’s name, the date and location of the planned visit, and

the name of the pass holder submitting the request. Id.

“Ordinarily, this identifying information is provided to the

Secret Service electronically. An authorized . . . pass holder

enters the information into a computer that automatically

forwards it to the Secret Service for processing.” Droege Decl.

¶ 6. The information may also be provided to the Secret Service

in other ways, including by telephone and email, in which case

5

Secret Service personnel transmit the information electronically

to the WHACS server. Id.; White Decl. ¶ 7.3

Once a visitor is cleared into the White House Complex, he

or she is generally issued a badge. ACR records are generated

(and WAVES records updated) whenever the visitor swipes the

badge over one of the electronic pass readers located at the

White House Complex’s entrances and exits. MOU ¶ 5; Droege

Decl. ¶ 7; White Decl. ¶¶ 9, 10. ACR records include the pass

holder’s name, the time and date of the swipe, and the post at

which the swipe was recorded. MOU ¶ 5.

According to the government, the information contained in

WHACS records is provided to and used by the Secret Service

“for two limited purposes”: to perform a background check on

the visitor, and to verify the visitor’s admissibility at the time of

the visit. MOU ¶ 12; White Decl. ¶ 7. Once the visit ends, the

information “has no continuing usefulness to the Secret

Service.” MOU ¶ 13.

Because the Secret Service has “no continuing interest” in

the information, “[s]ince at least 2001, it has been [its] practice

. . . to transfer newly-generated WAVES records” to the White

House every 30 to 60 days on compact discs. White Decl. ¶ 11;

Droege Decl. ¶ 10; see MOU ¶ 14; Lyerly Decl. ¶ 10 (May

2006). The Secret Service erases the transferred records from

the WHACS servers and overwrites them with new records.

MOU ¶ 14; White Decl. ¶ 11. Prior to October 2004, the Secret

Service did not keep copies of the transferred WAVES records.

Lyerly Decl. ¶¶ 10, 11 (May 2006); see MOU ¶ 14. In October

2004, however, the Secret Service began retaining copies of the

3

The Secret Service may add additional information to WAVES

records that it learns through a background check. Lyerly Decl. ¶ 8

(Sept. 2006); White Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8.

6

transferred WAVES records on compact discs, due in part to

then-pending litigation. MOU ¶ 16; Lyerly Decl. ¶ 13 (Sept.

2006); Droege Decl. ¶ 10.

“At least as early as 2001 (at the end of the Clinton

Administration), and upon revisiting the issue in 2004, the

Secret Service and the White House recognized and agreed that

ACR records should be treated in a manner generally consistent

with the treatment of WAVES records.” White Decl. ¶ 13;

Droege Decl. ¶ 11. In particular, “[t]he White House and the

Secret Service . . . determined that ACR records should be

transferred to the [White House] and deleted from the Secret

Service’s computers like WAVES records.” White Decl. ¶ 13;

see MOU ¶ 15. Since at least 2006, the Service has transferred

ACR records to the White House, generally every 30 to 60 days.

Droege Decl. ¶ 11; see White Decl. ¶ 13 (stating that ACR

records dating from 2001 were also transferred in 2006). Once

again, however, the Service has retained copies of the records

due in part to pending litigation. Droege Decl. ¶ 11; White

Decl. ¶ 13; MOU ¶ 15.

The volume of FOIA litigation regarding White House

visitor records increased in 2006. In that year, a FOIA request

was filed for all WHACS records pertaining to visits scheduled

with Vice President Dick Cheney or his staff. See Wash. Post

v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 459 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C.

2006). A steady march of similar requests followed. They

included requests for records of every visit by lobbyist Jack

Abramoff, see Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 579 F.

Supp. 2d 143, 145 (D.D.C. 2008); every visit by lobbyist

Stephen Payne, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash.

(CREW) v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 592 F. Supp. 2d 127,

129 (D.D.C. 2009); and every visit by eighteen health care

7

executives,4 to name only a few.5 The Secret Service refused

each request, asserting that WAVES and ACR records are not

“agency records” subject to FOIA, but rather are “Presidential

records” subject to the more restrictive disclosure regime

established by the Presidential Records Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C.

§§ 2201 et seq. See, e.g., CREW, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 131; Wash.

Post, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 65.

In May 2006, the White House and the Secret Service

executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU

memorialized the parties’ historical practice and intentions

regarding WHACS records, as described above. It also stated

the parties’ joint “agreement” that WHACS records are

“Presidential Records,” and “are not the records of an ‘agency’

subject to the Freedom of Information Act.” MOU ¶ 17.

In 2008, a suit arising out of a FOIA request for WHACS

records reached this court for the first time. The request sought

records of every visit by nine “conservative Christian leaders.”

CREW v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 527 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78

(D.D.C. 2007). We dismissed that appeal for lack of

jurisdiction. See CREW v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 532

F.3d 860, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2008). After further proceedings in the

district court, the parties settled the dispute. See Joint Mot. to

Vacate, CREW v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 06-1912

(D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2009).

4

See Letter from Gregory B. Craig, Counsel to the President, to

Anne L. Weismann (Sept. 3, 2009) (Craig Letter), available at

http://whitehouse.gov/assets/blog/9 3 09 Ltr to Weismann.pdf.

5

For other such requests, see Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret

Serv., 579 F. Supp. 2d 151, 152 (D.D.C. 2008) (every visit by any of

eight named lobbyists); Craig Letter (every visit by sixteen specified

coal industry executives).

8

The present litigation involves the latest and broadest FOIA

request for WHACS records. On August 10, 2009, Judicial

Watch asked the Secret Service for “[a]ll official visitors logs

and/or other records concerning visits made to the White House

from January 20, 2009 to present.” The Service denied the

request on October 8, 2009, reiterating its position that WAVES

and ACR records are not “agency records” subject to FOIA, but

rather are “Presidential records” subject to the PRA. The

Service noted, however, that Judicial Watch could secure

discretionary release of some of those records pursuant to a

voluntary disclosure policy that the Obama administration had

announced the previous month. See The White House, White

House Voluntary Disclosure Policy: Visitor Access Records

(Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/

VoluntaryDisclosure (J.A. 42).6

On December 7, 2009, Judicial Watch filed suit to compel

disclosure pursuant to FOIA. Thereafter both sides moved for

summary judgment. The district court ruled in favor of Judicial

6

The Obama administration announced that, going forward, it

would release most WAVES and ACR records 90 to 120 days after

they are created. The policy excepts the release of records that would

threaten national security or the security of staff, reveal particularly

sensitive meetings, or disclose personal guests of the families of the

President or Vice President. To implement the policy, White House

Complex staffers who submit visitor information must designate visits

regarded as sensitive. The White House stated that the new policy

would not apply to records created before September 15, 2009 because

it would be too difficult to retroactively sort those earlier records,

which do not include such designations. See Tibbits Decl. ¶¶ 15-16,

27-37. But the White House said it would respond to individual

requests seeking records created between January 20, 2009 and

September 15, 2009, if the requests “are reasonable, narrow, and

specific.” See White House Voluntary Disclosure Policy,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/VoluntaryDisclosure.

9

Watch. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 803 F.

Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2011). The court held that WHACS

records qualify as “agency records” subject to FOIA, and it

rejected the Secret Service’s contentions that disclosure would

raise separation-of-powers concerns and place impermissible

burdens on senior White House advisors. Id. at 60-62. The

Secret Service then filed an appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1), and the district court issued a stay of its order

pending appeal. See Order, Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret

Serv., No. 09-2312 (Nov. 14, 2011).7

II

Under FOIA, agencies must make requested records

available “to any person,” unless one of nine specific

exemptions applies. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A); see id.

§ 552(b)(1)-(9). The Act grants federal district courts

jurisdiction “to order the production of any agency records

improperly withheld from the complainant.” Id. § 552(a)(4)(B)

(emphasis added). The question at issue on this appeal is

whether WHACS records are “agency records.”

7

A FOIA disclosure order is injunctive in nature, and is therefore

immediately appealable as an interlocutory order, if it “requires the

disclosure of documents for which the agenc[y] claim[s] no basis for

non-disclosure beyond the argument already rejected by the district

court.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 412 F.3d 125, 128

(D.C. Cir. 2005); see CREW, 532 F.3d at 863-64. In this case, the

district court directed the Secret Service to disclose any records that

are not subject to a FOIA exemption, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9), and

that can be identified as such without undue burden. Judicial Watch,

803 F. Supp. 2d at 62. Because the Service represents that it has

identified at least one record for which it has no basis for non-

disclosure beyond the arguments already rejected by the district court,

see Ulmer Decl. ¶ 4; Oral Arg. Recording at 14:30, we have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

10

A

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

on this question de novo. See Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. Dep’t

of Agric., 455 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A court may

grant summary judgment only if there is “no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). On “summary judgment

the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). In

FOIA cases, “‘[s]ummary judgment may be granted on the basis

of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of

detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are

not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record

or by evidence of agency bad faith.’” Consumer Fed’n, 455

F.3d at 287 (quoting Gallant v. NLRB, 26 F.3d 168, 171 (D.C.

Cir. 1994)).

Although the district court ruled against the Secret Service,

it nonetheless relied heavily on both the 2006 MOU and

declarations by Secret Service and White House officials to

describe the purpose, generation, and use of WHACS records,

as well as the government’s intentions, understandings, and

practice regarding those records. See Judicial Watch, 803 F.

Supp. 2d at 53-54, 56-60. See, e.g., MOU ¶¶ 10-16; Droege

Decl. ¶ 12 (stating that the MOU “documented what was then

understood to be past practice and interests regarding WAVES

and ACR records”). Judicial Watch has never contested any of

those factual descriptions. And because the case was decided

against the Service on summary judgment, we are bound by

them. Oral Arg. Recording at 45:45 - 47:00 (acknowledgment

11

by Judicial Watch).8 We are not, however, bound by the MOU’s

legal assertions that WHACS records “are at all times

Presidential Records,” “are not the records of an ‘agency’

subject to [FOIA],” and “are under the exclusive legal custody

and control of the White House.” MOU ¶¶ 17-18.

B

As both the Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly

noted, while FOIA “limited access to ‘agency records,’” it “did

not provide any definition of ‘agency records.’” Forsham v.

Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 178 (1980); see U.S. Dep’t of Justice v.

Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 (1989); Consumer Fed’n, 455

8

See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 134 (2004)

(reciting the facts “in the light most favorable to” the respondent

“[b]ecause th[e] case was decided against [her] on the [petitioner’s]

motion for summary judgment”); Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1054 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981)

(“Because [the appellant] did not contest the Government’s [factual]

assertions[,] . . . Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

requires this court to take the Government’s assertions as true. . . . In

other words, failure to raise a genuine issue as to a material fact

constitutes a concession that the uncontested fact is true for purposes

of summary judgment.”); see also Malik v. District of Columbia, 574

F.3d 781, 783 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

In a footnote to its brief, Judicial Watch appears to treat the MOU

with some skepticism, noting that it was executed by the Bush

Administration just four months after Judicial Watch and CREW

submitted their 2006 FOIA requests relating to visits by lobbyist Jack

Abramoff. See Judicial Watch Br. 10 n.3; see also Judicial Watch,

803 F. Supp. 2d at 58 n.3. Given the summary judgment posture of

this case, however, there is no room for such skepticism in our legal

analysis.

12

F.3d at 287; Tax Analysts v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 845 F.2d

1060, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff’d, 492 U.S. 136 (1989);

McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Nonetheless, we do know two things that help us define the

scope of the term.

The first thing we know is that, as the Supreme Court held

in Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,

Congress did not intend the word “agency” to include the

President, his “‘immediate personal staff[,] or units in the

Executive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the

President.’” 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980) (quoting H.R. REP. NO.

93-1380, at 232 (1974) (Conf. Rep.)). We have collectively

referred to those staff and units as the “Office of the President,”

Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1295

(D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156, and do so

here as well for ease of reference.9

Because the Office of the President is not an agency for

FOIA purposes, documents generated by staff or units within

that Office are “not ‘agency records’ when they [are] made.”

Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156.10 It is therefore undisputed that a

9

As noted below, this court has held that records of the Vice

President and his immediate staff are likewise not agency records for

purposes of FOIA. See infra Part IV.A (citing Wilson v. Libby, 535

F.3d 697, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); see also Schwartz v. U.S. Dep’t of the

Treasury, No. 00-5453, 2001 WL 674636 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 2001)

(unpublished order), aff’g 131 F. Supp. 2d 142, 147-48 (D.D.C. 2000);

Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993). We therefore

include them within the collective descriptor, “Office of the

President.”

10

Accord Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 143; Armstrong v. Exec.

Office of the President, 1 F.3d at 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Meyer, 981

F.2d at 1293 n.3; McGehee, 697 F.2d at 1107 n.53; Ryan v. Dep’t of

13

requester could not use FOIA to compel the President or his

advisors to disclose their own appointment calendars or visitor

logs. See Oral Arg. Recording at 23:45 (acknowledgment by

Judicial Watch). In part, Congress exempted such records from

FOIA -- and later subjected them to the Presidential Records Act

instead -- in order to avoid serious separation-of-powers

concerns that would be raised by a statute mandating disclosure

of the President’s daily activities. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Bush,

924 F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice,

617 F.2d 781, 788 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

The second thing we know is that not all documents in the

possession of a FOIA-covered agency are “agency records” for

the purpose of that Act. See Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 617 F.2d

781, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1980). As the Supreme Court instructed in

Tax Analysts, the term “agency records” extends only to those

documents that an agency both (1) “create[s] or obtain[s],” and

(2) “control[s] . . . at the time the FOIA request [was] made.”

492 U.S. at 144-45. From this instruction, we know that not all

records physically located at an agency are “agency records.”

See, e.g., Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 157-58 (summaries of Henry

Kissinger’s telephone conversations as National Security

Advisor that he brought from the White House to the State

Department); Consumer Fed’n, 455 F.3d at 288-93 (personal

appointment calendar kept on an agency computer); Goland v.

CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 344-48 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (congressional

hearing transcript in the possession of the CIA). Nor are all

documents that are generated by an agency “agency records.”

See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. IRS, 359 F.3d 595, 600-02

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (portions of IRS document generated in

response to a congressional request). Rather, to determine

whether a document is an agency record under Tax Analysts, we

must “focus[] on a variety of factors surrounding the creation,

Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

14

possession, control, and use of the document.” Consumer

Fed’n, 455 F.3d at 287 (quoting Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Inc. v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 742 F.2d 1484, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

We discuss each of these points in greater detail in the

following two parts. In Part III, we examine the manner in

which Tax Analysts and the “control” tests this court has adopted

to implement the Court’s instruction apply to WHACS records.

In Part IV, we examine Congress’ intention to exclude the

President’s appointment calendars from FOIA, and the

importance of construing the Act to avoid the significant

separation-of-powers concerns that would arise if the Act were

construed in a way that effectively permitted requesters to

reconstruct those calendars. Both examinations lead us to

conclude that WHACS records that reveal visitors to the Office

of the President are not “agency records.”

There is a subset of WHACS records, however, that reveals

nothing about visits to the Office of the President. Those

records are generated by visits to components of the White

House Complex that are not part of that Office, and that are

themselves “agencies” covered by FOIA. We discuss those

WHACS records in Part V, and conclude that they are “agency

records” subject to FOIA.

III

As noted above, Tax Analysts instructs that a document is

not an “agency record” unless an agency both (1) “create[s] or

obtain[s]” it, and (2) “controls” it at the time of the FOIA

request. 492 U.S. at 144-45. Turning briefly to the instruction’s

first prong, we note some uncertainty as to which entity

“created” the WHACS records. That question was not at issue

in Tax Analysts, a case involving paper documents that were

created by one author, at one time, and in one place. See id. at

15

139-40 (FOIA request for district court tax opinions obtained by

the Department of Justice). The “creator” of an electronic

record, by contrast, is more ambiguous. WHACS records, for

example, exist only because a White House employee

specifically requested that a particular visitor be admitted to the

White House Complex. Most of those records were not

generated by or at the Secret Service, but rather by electronic

entries made at the White House Complex -- first by staff of the

Complex, and then by a visitor’s swipe. See supra Part I;

Judicial Watch Br. 7 (“ACR records are created when a visitor

swipes his or her pass upon entering or exiting the White House

Complex.”); cf. supra note 3 (describing additions the Secret

Service may make to WHACS records).

But we need not delve into the creation question more

deeply at this point because there is no dispute that the Secret

Service ultimately “obtained” the WHACS records, thus

satisfying the first prong of Tax Analysts. This leaves us with

the second prong: whether the Secret Service “controlled” the

records at the time of Judicial Watch’s FOIA request.

A

In the usual case, this circuit looks to four factors to

determine “whether an agency has sufficient ‘control’ over a

document to make it an ‘agency record.’” Tax Analysts, 845

F.2d at 1069. They are:

[1] the intent of the document’s creator to retain or

relinquish control over the records; [2] the ability of

the agency to use and dispose of the record as it sees

fit; [3] the extent to which agency personnel have read

or relied upon the document; and [4] the degree to

which the document was integrated into the agency’s

record system or files.

16

Id. The circuit first announced this test in our own decision in

the Tax Analysts case, which the Supreme Court subsequently

affirmed, albeit on different grounds. Since then, we have

reaffirmed the four-factor test on several occasions. See Judicial

Watch, Inc. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 646 F.3d 924, 926-27

(D.C. Cir. 2011); United We Stand, 359 F.3d at 599; Burka v.

U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 87 F.3d 508, 515 (D.C.

Cir. 1996).

This is the test upon which the district court relied in

granting summary judgment in favor of Judicial Watch, see

Judicial Watch, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 57-60, and it is the test that

Judicial Watch urges us to apply on appeal, see Judicial Watch

Br. 9; Oral Arg. Recording at 23:00.11 For reasons discussed in

Part III.B, we conclude that this test does not fully capture the

“control” issue in this case. Even by its own terms, however,

the four-factor test is indeterminate as applied to WHACS

records.

1. The district court found that “the first factor of the

determination, intent, weighs in favor of the Secret Service’s

assertion that the records are not under agency control.”

Judicial Watch, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 57. The MOU “is

unequivocal in asserting that the control over WAVES and ACR

records is at all times maintained by the [White House] and not

the Secret Service.” 803 F. Supp. 2d at 58. It further states that

“any information provided to the Secret Service” for the creation

of such records “is provided under an express reservation of

White House control.” MOU ¶ 19. And the requisite intent is

11

The Court’s decision in Tax Analysts stated that “control”

means “that the materials have come into the agency’s possession in

the legitimate conduct of its official duties.” 492 U.S. at 145. We

have regarded the four-factor test as a gloss on that statement. See

Judicial Watch v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 646 F.3d at 926-27.

17

present regardless of who is regarded as the records’ creator, as

the MOU provides that “the White House at all times asserts,

and the Secret Service disclaims, all legal control over any and

all WHACS records.” Id. ¶ 24.

For these reasons, we agree with the district court that “[t]he

‘intent’ factor of the analysis . . . weighs in the defendant’s

favor.” 803 F. Supp. 2d at 58. Judicial Watch does not dispute

the point. Judicial Watch Br. 8. Resolution of the remaining

three factors, however, is more complicated.

2. The district court concluded that the second factor, “the

ability of the agency to use and dispose of the records as it sees

fit,” weighs against the Secret Service. Judicial Watch, 803 F.

Supp. 2d at 58. We are not so sure. Although it is undisputed

that the Service has authority to use the records, it does not have

the ability to use and dispose of them “as it sees fit.” According

to the MOU, the Service may use the records for only “two

limited purposes”: “to perform background checks to determine

whether, and under what conditions, to authorize [a] visitor’s

temporary admittance to the White House Complex,” and “to

verify the visitor’s admissibility at the time of the visit.” MOU

¶ 12; see Droege Decl. ¶ 5. Likewise, the MOU provides that

the Service will transfer the records to the White House within

60 days of the visit, and then purge them from its system. MOU

¶ 14; see White Decl. ¶ 11. At least with respect to WAVES

records, this practice predates the MOU. See Droege Decl.

¶¶ 10-11. And while the agency began retaining copies of

WHACS records in 2004, it did so principally because of

pending litigation. See id.; MOU ¶ 16. It is plain that if the

current litigation ends in the Service’s favor, the agency will

revert to its prior practice of transferring all WHACS records to

the White House.

18

The district court characterized as “circular” the Secret

Service’s argument that, “‘because the President and Vice

President retain control of WAVES and ACR records (as set

forth in the MOU), the Secret Service lacks disposal authority

over these records.’” Judicial Watch, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 59

(quoting Mem. in Support of Def.’s Cross-Motion for Summ. J.

at 19-20). The court thought the argument circular because it

viewed its validity as dependent upon the Service winning its

claim that the documents are not agency records. Id. We think

this misapprehends the Service’s argument.

In deciding whether a document is an agency record under

FOIA, we examine how the agency would treat the records in its

normal course of operations, in the absence of pending FOIA-

related litigation. Cf. Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 151-52 (“Most

courts which have considered the question have concluded that

the FOIA is only directed at requiring agencies to disclose those

‘agency records’ for which they have chosen to retain

possession or control.” (emphasis added)). The Secret Service

has pointed to evidence that demonstrates restrictions on its

ability to use and dispose of WHACS records: a longstanding

practice of turning all such records over to the White House,

Droege Decl. ¶¶ 10-11, and a written agreement restricting the

Service from using and retaining those records in ways other

than those specified therein, MOU ¶¶ 12-14. As we explained

in United We Stand -- and as we discuss in more detail in

Section III.B -- restrictions on use and disposal imposed by a

governmental entity not covered under FOIA may have a

substantial bearing on the second Tax Analysts factor. See

United We Stand, 359 F.3d at 600; Goland, 607 F.2d at 347

(examining “the conditions attached to [a document’s]

possession” by its creator).

3. The district court concluded that “the third factor -- the

extent to which Secret Service personnel have read or relied

19

upon the documents -- cuts strongly against the Secret Service.”

Judicial Watch, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 59. With this, we agree. It

is true, as the Secret Service argues, that its personnel read and

rely upon the documents only for the limited purposes the

records serve: to enable the Service to perform background

checks and verify admissibility at the time of a visitor’s

entrance. But the agency reads and relies upon the documents

for those purposes without restriction, and the third factor

requires no more.

4. The final of the four factors is “the degree to which the

document[s] w[ere] integrated into the [Secret Service’s] record

system or files.” Tax Analysts, 845 F.2d at 1069. The district

court concluded that this factor “weighs against the Secret

Service.” Judicial Watch, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 60. Given the

Service’s acknowledgment that “WAVES and ACR records do

reside on the Secret Service’s servers as part of the [WHACS]

data system,” id. (quoting Mem. of Law in Support of Def.’s

Cross-Motion for Summ. J. at 21); see Lyerly Decl. ¶¶ 19, 20

(Sept. 2006), we agree that the records were in the agency’s files

at least at one time.

But we have some reservations about the degree to which

they were or are integrated into the Secret Service’s overall

record system. The WHACS computer servers are physically

located in the White House Complex (in the EEOB), and they

contain WAVES- and ACR-related data only. Nelson Decl.

¶ 3.12 Although WAVES and ACR records are uploaded to the

WHACS servers when they are created, they are removed from

those servers within 60 days. See MOU ¶¶ 14-15; White Decl.

12

Both the primary and secondary (backup) WHACS servers are

located in the EEOB. A tertiary server is located at a Secret Service

location as a “backup to a backup” in case of an emergency. Nelson

Decl. ¶ 3.

20

¶ 11 (stating that [WHACS] records are downloaded and burned

onto CDs for transfer to the White House every 30 to 60 days,

and that “active WAVES data on the servers older than 60 days

are purged daily and overwritten on the servers”); Droege Decl.

¶ 11 (regarding ACR records). Due to pending litigation, it

appears that the documents are thereafter transferred to compact

disc storage, where they are no longer used by the Service.

MOU ¶ 16; Droege Decl. ¶¶ 10, 11. And but for the pending

litigation, they would be removed from the Service’s files

entirely. Lyerly Decl. ¶ 26 (Sept. 2006).

5. In sum, we conclude that one of the factors in the four-

factor control test unambiguously favors the Secret Service’s

position, one unambiguously favors Judicial Watch’s position,

and two are relatively uncertain. This circuit’s descriptions of

the four-factor test do not make clear what to do when the

factors point in different directions, with different intensities.

Nor do our descriptions make clear whether the factors should

receive equal weight. In Tax Analysts itself, we suggested that

“all four factors” must be present before “an agency has

sufficient ‘control’ over a document to make it an ‘agency

record.’” 845 F.2d at 1069. But we have also subsequently

described the test as a “totality of the circumstances test.”

Consumer Fed’n, 455 F.3d at 287 (quoting Bureau of Nat’l

Affairs, 742 F.2d at 1490).

Our past application of the test reveals its considerable

indeterminancy. In some cases, we have heeded the suggestion

in Tax Analysts, finding that documents were not “agency

records” when fewer than all four factors pointed in that

direction.13 In other cases, we have found that documents were

13

See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 646 F.3d at

928 (holding that documents transferred to FHFA by entities for which

it was the conservator were not agency records, notwithstanding the

21

“agency records” even though fewer than four factors indicated

as much.14

Accordingly, if the four-factor test were the only relevant

consideration, we would be left with an uncertain result. That

uncertainty would redound to the benefit of Judicial Watch, in

light of the Supreme Court’s instruction that the “burden is on

the agency to demonstrate, not the requester to disprove, that the

materials sought are not ‘agency records,’” Tax Analysts, 492

U.S. at 142 n.3. But the four-factor test is not the only test

relevant to the FOIA request at issue in this case. Rather, we

have indicated that a somewhat different control test applies

when there are “special policy considerations” at stake. Paisley

v. CIA, 712 F.2d 686, 693 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated in part

on other grounds, 724 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Such special

considerations are at stake here.

B

In a series of cases stretching from 1978 to 2004, this circuit

has indicated that the standard, four-factor control test does not

apply to documents that an agency has either obtained from, or

prepared in response to a request from, a governmental entity

not covered by FOIA: the United States Congress. See United

We Stand, 359 F.3d at 599. In those cases, we have said,

entities’ intent to relinquish control and FHFA’s ability to use and

dispose of the documents as it saw fit); Consumer Fed’n, 455 F.3d at

290, 293 (concluding that an employee’s personal electronic calendar

was not an agency record, notwithstanding that it was on the agency’s

computer system).

14

See, e.g., Burka, 87 F.3d at 515 (finding that data tapes were

agency records notwithstanding that they were not in the agency’s

files).

22

“special policy considerations . . . counsel in favor of according

due deference to Congress’ affirmatively expressed intent to

control its own documents.” Paisley, 712 F.3d at 693 n.30. In

such cases, whether an agency’s “response is subject to FOIA

turns on whether Congress manifested a clear intent to control

the document.” United We Stand, 359 F.3d at 596. This focus

renders the first two factors of the standard test effectively

dispositive.

The first case in this line was Goland v. CIA, in which a

FOIA requester sought disclosure of the CIA’s copy of a

congressional hearing transcript that a congressional committee

had marked “secret.” 607 F.2d at 343. In concluding that the

transcript was not an agency record, we explained that

“Congress exercises oversight authority over the various federal

agencies, and thus has an undoubted interest in exchanging

documents with those agencies to facilitate their proper

functioning in accordance with Congress’ originating intent.”

Id. at 346. Subjecting the document to FOIA, we said, would

force Congress “either to surrender its constitutional prerogative

of maintaining secrecy, or to suffer an impairment of its

oversight role.” Id. And because “on all of the facts of the case

Congress’ intent to retain control of the document [wa]s clear,”

we ruled that the transcript was a congressional document rather

than an agency record. Id. at 348. In light of “the conditions

attached to its possession,” we concluded that the CIA “is not

free to dispose of the Transcript as it wills, but holds the

document, as it were, as a ‘trustee’ for Congress.” Id. at 347.

In several subsequent cases, we concluded that

congressional documents in the hands of agencies were agency

records. In so doing, however, we reaffirmed the Goland

analysis, finding the documents covered by FOIA only because

Congress had not clearly expressed an intent to retain control

over them. See Paisley, 712 F.2d at 696 (finding that documents

23

created by the CIA in response to congressional requests for

information were agency records because there were insufficient

“indicia of congressional intent” to control the documents); Holy

Spirit Ass’n for the Unification of World Christianity v. CIA, 636

F.2d 838, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that, “even if” requested

CIA documents generated in response to congressional inquires

were “once excluded from the FOIA as congressional records,”

they were “no longer covered by that exemption because

Congress failed to express with sufficient clarity its intent to

retain control over the[m]”); Ryan, 617 F.2d at 786 (holding that

responses to a questionnaire the Attorney General had sent to all

Senators were agency records, because the Senators “gave no

indication that they wished to limit [the Attorney General’s] use

of them,” and because there was “no evidence . . . that the

President in any way diminished the Attorney General’s control

over the[] documents”).

The culmination of this line was our decision in United We

Stand America, Inc. v. IRS. That case concerned documents the

IRS had created in response to a request for information from a

congressional committee. 359 F.3d at 597-98. Direct

application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Tax Analysts was

“not so simple,” we said, because “the connection between

Congress and the requested records implicates considerations

not at issue in Tax Analysts.” Id. at 599.15 Reviewing our

15

Tax Analysts did not present the problem of a non-FOIA entity

exerting control over documents in the hands of a FOIA agency.

Although it did involve records that had been created by another

Branch -- copies of district court tax decisions that were in the

possession of the Justice Department -- the courts did not object to

their release. We made this clear in our own opinion below, noting

that the decisions at issue in the case “remain unencumbered by

judicial limitations on dissemination,” Tax Analysts, 845 F.2d at 1069,

and that decisions upon which courts did place limits “probably would

24

previous cases, we found that “their focus on congressional

control . . . reflects the considerations that underlie the second

factor [in the four-factor test]: the agency’s ability to use or

dispose of the record as it sees fit.” Id. at 600. “Emphasizing

that Congress’s intent to control and the agency’s ability to

control ‘fit together in standing for the general proposition that

the agency to whom the FOIA request is directed must have

exclusive control of the disputed documents,’” we held that, if

“‘Congress has manifested its own intent to retain control, then

the agency -- by definition -- cannot lawfully “control” the

documents.’” Id. (quoting Paisley, 712 F.2d at 693).

Ultimately, we found that there were “sufficient indicia of

congressional intent to control” those portions of the IRS

documents that would reveal Congress’ requests to the agency,

id., and therefore found that those portions were not agency

records.16

The instant case resembles United We Stand in several

important respects. First, this case also involves documents that

an agency created in response to requests from, and information

provided by, a governmental entity not covered by FOIA.

WHACS records are created in response to requests by the

Office of the President17 to grant visitors access to the White

not be considered ‘agency records,’” id. at 1068 n.18.

16

At the same time, we found that Congress had not manifested

an intent to control certain other documents, or parts of other

documents, that would not reveal the requests that Congress had made

to the agency. United We Stand, 359 F.3d at 601. Judicial Watch has

not argued that there are WHACS records, or parts of any such

records, that would not reveal visitor information transmitted by the

White House to the Secret Service.

17

In Part V, we address WHACS records created in response to

requests by White House components that are not part of the Office of

25

House Complex, and they contain visitor information provided

by that Office. See MOU ¶ 11 (“The information contained in

WHACS Records originates with White House pass holders,

visitors, and workers as a result of White House business.”).18

Second, as in United We Stand, the non-covered entity -- here,

the White House -- has “manifested a clear intent to control” the

documents. Id. at 597; see supra Part III.A.1; MOU ¶ 19

(“[A]ny information provided to the Secret Service for the

creation” of such records “is provided under an express

reservation of White House control.”). And that means the

agency is not free to use and dispose of the documents as it sees

fit. See supra Part III.A.2; see, e.g., MOU ¶ 22 (providing that

the Secret Service “will regularly transfer all WHACS Records

in its possession” to the White House and that it “will not retain

its own copies of any WHACS Records”).19 Third, again as in

United We Stand, disclosing the records would reveal the

the President.

18

As noted above, the Secret Service may add information to

some WAVES records that its own personnel learn through

background checks. Supra note 3; see Lyerly Decl. ¶ 8 (Sept. 2006);

White Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8. But the creation of that information is generated

in response to the White House’s request for visitors’ access; its

disclosure would reveal information provided by the White House

(e.g., the identities of visitors); and the White House has asserted

control over all WHACS records. MOU ¶ 18. Those portions of

WAVES records therefore also fall within the compass of United We

Stand. See, e.g., 359 F.3d at 601-02 (permitting the agency to

withhold portions of its response to Congress that would reveal

Congress’ request).

19

Moreover, given the limitations imposed on the Secret Service’s

use of the documents, it is plain that the Service does not have

“‘exclusive control of the disputed documents.’” United We Stand,

359 F.3d at 600 (quoting Paisley, 712 F.2d at 693) (emphasis added).

26

specific requests made by the non-covered entity -- here, the

Office of the President’s requests for visitor clearance.

If anything, the indicia of White House control in this case

are even stronger than the indicia of congressional control in

United We Stand. There, the Joint Committee on Taxation had

demanded only a limited scope of confidentiality and hence

asserted control over only a limited subset of documents. 359

F.3d at 600-01. Here, the White House has manifested its intent

to control the entirety of the WHACS records, all of which it

expects the Secret Service to transfer to it. See MOU ¶ 15. The

expression of that intent is not merely “general,” United We

Stand, 359 F.3d at 602. Rather, it explicitly extends to each of

the “‘particular records’” at issue, id. (quoting Paisley, 712 F.2d

at 695).20

Judicial Watch and its amici argue that the analysis of

United We Stand and its predecessors should be limited to

documents created by or at the instance of Congress, not the

White House.21 Subjecting the latter to FOIA, they say, would

20

Amici for Judicial Watch argue that, because the MOU in this

case was “[e]xecuted after litigation ensued” over the status of White

House visitor logs, it should be given no weight. CREW Br. 16. But

the MOU was executed well before this litigation ensued and well

before the creation and transfer of the documents at issue in this case.

See Holy Spirit, 636 F.2d at 842 (holding that a congressional letter

written “as a result of . . . this litigation long after the actual transfer

to the CIA” was insufficient, but stating that “we do not adopt

appellant’s position that Congress must give contemporaneous

instructions when forwarding congressional records to an agency”

(emphasis added)).

21

Judicial Watch is correct that we have not previously held that

the analysis of Goland and its progeny extends to presidential

communications. But we have certainly suggested that it does. See

27

not analogously force the President “either to surrender [a]

constitutional prerogative of maintaining secrecy, or to . . .

suffer an impairment of [an] oversight role,” United We Stand,

359 F.3d at 599 (quoting Goland, 607 F.2d at 346).

But the Office of the President has comparable

constitutional prerogatives, which we will discuss in more detail

in Part IV. In particular, the Executive has a “constitutional

prerogative” to “maintain[] the autonomy of its office and

safeguard[] the confidentiality of its communications.” Cheney

v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 385 (2004); see id. (noting

that “special considerations control” in such circumstances).

Indeed, Congress crafted FOIA to avoid intruding on the

confidentiality of presidential communications. See Ryan, 617

F.2d at 788 n.19; Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1071-72 (D.C.

Cir. 1971); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380, at 232 (Conf. Rep.).

Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, 742 F.2d at 1491-92 (“[W]here documents

originate within the Congress, the judiciary, and FOIA-exempt

executive agencies, sometimes special policy considerations militate

against a rule compelling disclosure of [such] records . . . merely

because such documents happen to come into the possession of an

agency.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ryan, 617 F.2d at 785

(stating that the Goland standard also responds to the “severe

problem” that would be created if “materials from the President’s

immediate staff [that] come into the possession of an agency” are

automatically deemed agency records); see also id. at 786 (concluding

that documents were records of the Justice Department because there

was “no evidence . . . that the President in any way diminished [the

agency’s] control over these documents” and “no indication that [the

documents] will ever be transmitted to or seen by the President or his

staff”). Nonetheless, the question has never been squarely presented.

See Paisley, 712 F.2d at 693 n.30 (“We express no view here on

whether a different analysis would be warranted were the creating

body other than Congress.”).

28

It is true, as amici argue, that our prior cases involved inter-

branch communications while the communications at issue here

are intra-branch. CREW Br. 11. But that does not make the

separation-of-powers issues here any less substantial. Indeed,

in one respect they are more substantial: whatever

encroachment upon congressional authority we might engender

by applying FOIA to congressional communications, it was

Congress that passed the Act and Congress that can amend it.

No such solution is available to the President if Congress, in

enacting FOIA, authorized an intrusion into the confidentiality

of his communications.

Subjecting WHACS records to FOIA would thus confront

the President with a dilemma similar to the one that concerned

us in Goland and United We Stand -- forcing him either to

“surrender [his] constitutional prerogative of maintaining

secrecy” regarding his choice of visitors (and therefore of

outside advisors), or to decline to cooperate with the executive

branch agency entrusted with (and necessary for) his personal

protection, United We Stand, 359 F.3d at 599 (quoting Goland,

607 F.2d at 346). Given 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) -- which bars the

President from declining Secret Service protection -- it is not

even clear he would have the latter choice.

These considerations persuade us that the United We Stand

test is appropriate in this case. And, as discussed above, we find

sufficient indicia of presidential control over WHACS records

of visits to the Office of the President to satisfy that test. An

additional but related consideration, discussed in the following

Part, confirms the wisdom of construing the term “agency

records” to exclude those records from the scope of FOIA.

29

IV

In this Part, we discuss separation-of-powers concerns that

provide an additional -- and more fundamental -- reason to find

that the logs of visits to the Office of the President are not

“agency records” within the meaning of FOIA.

A

As a result of amendments enacted in 1974, FOIA defines

an “agency” as any “establishment in the executive branch of the

Government (including the Executive Office of the President).”

5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1). In Kissinger, the Supreme Court held that

“the legislative history is unambiguous . . . in explaining that the

‘Executive Office’ does not include the Office of the President.”

445 U.S. at 156. “The Conference Report for the 1974 FOIA

Amendments,” the Court said, “indicates that ‘the President’s

immediate personal staff or units in the Executive Office whose

sole function is to advise and assist the President’ are not

included within the term ‘agency’ under the FOIA.” Id.

(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380, at 232 (Conf. Rep.)). In light

of this clear expression of congressional intent, the Court held

that documents generated by such staff or units are “not ‘agency

records’ when they [are] made.” Id.; accord Tax Analysts, 492

U.S. at 143.

In the years since the Kissinger case, this circuit has applied

Kissinger’s understanding of the scope of the term “agency” to

find that individuals employed in the “Office of the President,”

Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 1 F.3d at 1295; the

“White House Office,” Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1293 n.3

(D.C. Cir. 1993); the National Security Council, Armstrong v.

Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1996);

and the “Office of the Vice President,” Wilson v. Libby, 535

F.3d 697, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2008), are among those whose

30

documents are excluded from FOIA. It is therefore undisputed

that Judicial Watch may not obtain the appointment calendars

(or visitor logs) of those individuals -- or of the President or

Vice President himself -- by sending a FOIA request to the

White House Complex, where employees of those units work.

See Oral Arg. Recording at 23:45. Their calendars are simply

not “agency records” as FOIA defines the term.

As we have explained, however, the President and his staff

cannot retain effective physical control over their calendars.

Congress requires the President to accept the protection of the

Secret Service. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a). And in order to

protect the President, the Secret Service must monitor and

control access to the building in which the President lives and

works. See id. § 3056A; White Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5. To accomplish

this, the Service requires presidential staff to request access for

visitors, and thereafter requires logging of those visitors’

entrances to and exits from the White House Complex. Those

procedures result in WHACS records that replicate in key

particulars the content of the President’s appointment calendars

and those of his staff, including the name, time, and appointment

of the visitors who enter the White House Complex to see them.

See supra Part I; MOU ¶ 11. The President thus has little choice

but to permit the Secret Service to reconstruct his appointment

calendars. Hence, if the Secret Service must disclose WHACS

records, a FOIA requester will effectively receive copies of

those calendars.

There is good reason to doubt that Congress intended to

require the effective disclosure of the President’s calendars in

this roundabout way. As Kissinger noted, Congress’ exclusion

of the papers of the President (and his advisors) from the

coverage of FOIA was quite intentional. And where Congress

has intentionally excluded a governmental entity from the Act,

we have been unwilling to conclude that documents or

31

information of that entity can be obtained indirectly, by filing a

FOIA request with an entity that is covered under that statute.22

As noted in Section III.B, the cases in which we have barred

such end runs have involved “special considerations” attendant

to requiring the disclosure of documents or information

generated by Congress itself -- namely, separation-of-powers

concerns that would arise were we to construe FOIA to cover

such documents or information. But the Supreme Court has

made clear that separation-of-powers concerns can also arise in

the context of communications by the President and his close

advisors. As the Court said in Cheney, “special considerations

control when the Executive Branch’s interests in maintaining the

autonomy of its office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its

communications are implicated.” 542 U.S. at 385 (emphasis

added); see id. at 382 (declaring that “the public interest requires

that a coequal branch of Government ‘afford Presidential

confidentiality the greatest protection consistent with the fair

administration of justice,’” and identifying that interest as a

“separation-of-powers consideration[]” (quoting United States

v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974))).

Those concerns are implicated here. Construing the term

“agency records” to extend to White House visitor logs --

regardless of whether they are in the possession of the White

House or the Secret Service -- could substantially affect the

22

See United We Stand, 359 F.3d at 603 (“Congressional

documents . . . are not subject to FOIA at all and, for the same reason,

neither are the portions of the [agency’s] response that would reveal

the Joint Committee request.”); Goland, 607 F.2d at 346 (“It may be

assumed that plaintiffs could not easily win release of the Hearing

Transcript from the House of Representatives; we will not permit them

to do indirectly what they cannot do directly because of the fortuity of

the Transcript’s location.”).

32

President’s ability to meet confidentially with foreign leaders,

agency officials, or members of the public. And that could

render FOIA a potentially serious congressional intrusion into

the conduct of the President’s daily operations. See Nixon, 418

U.S. at 705-06 (1974) (“[T]he protection of the confidentiality

of Presidential communications has . . . constitutional

underpinnings.”); Ryan, 617 F.2d at 788 n.19 (stating that a

“[f]ailure to exempt presidential staff from the FOIA would

raise a constitutional issue of separation of powers”).

The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of

“interpreting statutes to avoid deciding difficult constitutional

questions where the text fairly admits of a less problematic

construction.” Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S.

440, 455 (1989); see id. at 465-67. In Public Citizen, it

employed that canon in a closely related case involving the

Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). That Act requires

(inter alia) that records of “advisory committees” be made

available to the public unless they fall within a FOIA exemption,

and it defines an advisory committee as any committee

“utilized” by the President or an agency in the interest of

obtaining advice or recommendations. 491 U.S. at 451-52

(quoting 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 3(2)). Although the Court had “no

doubt” that the Executive “utilized” -- “in one common sense of

the term” -- the American Bar Association’s Standing

Committee on the Federal Judiciary to obtain advice regarding

judicial nominations, the avoidance canon “tip[ped] the balance

decisively against FACA’s application.” Id. at 452, 465. In the

Court’s view, there was “no gainsaying the seriousness of [the]

constitutional challenges” that applying FACA to the Standing

Committee would engender. Id. at 467. Those included the

concern that extending FACA to the President’s consultations

with the Committee “would potentially inhibit the President’s

freedom to investigate, to be informed, to evaluate, and to

consult during the nomination process.” Id. at 488 (internal

33

quotation marks omitted). The Court was “loath,” it said, “to

conclude that Congress intended to press ahead into dangerous

constitutional thickets in the absence of firm evidence that it

courted those perils.” Id. at 466.

This court, sitting en banc, has likewise employed the

constitutional avoidance canon to resolve a FACA case. On

remand from the Supreme Court’s decision in Cheney, we

construed FACA narrowly so as not to cover an energy policy

group composed of the Vice President and other senior

government officials, even if private parties were also involved

or influential, as long as the private parties lacked a vote or a

veto. In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en

banc). Without deciding whether application of FACA to such

a committee would be constitutional, we concluded that

“separation-of-powers considerations,” including “‘the

Executive Branch’s interest in maintaining the autonomy of its

office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its

communications,’” dictated the narrow construction. Id. at 727-

28 (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at 385). See also Ass’n of Am.

Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 909, 910 (D.C.

Cir. 1993) (declining to apply FACA to a presidential health

care task force in order “to avoid the difficult constitutional

issue” that would follow from “restrict[ing] the President’s

ability to seek advice from whom and in the fashion he

chooses”).

We have also employed the canon directly in the FOIA

context. In Judicial Watch v. Dep’t of Energy, we addressed the

question of whether certain documents of the same energy

policy group at issue in Cheney were “agency records” for

purposes of FOIA. 412 F.3d 125 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Once again

citing Cheney’s admonition that “‘special considerations control

when the Executive Branch’s interest in maintaining the

autonomy of its office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its

34

communications are implicated,’” we concluded that the

documents were not “agency records.” Id. at 132 (quoting

Cheney, 542 U.S. at 385).

Indeed, this court utilized the avoidance canon in the case

that was relied on both by Congress in drafting the 1974 FOIA

Amendments, and by the Kissinger Court in adopting the “sole

function” test that was cited in the legislative history of those

amendments. Prior to the amendments, FOIA contained nothing

to indicate whether it applied to the President or his advisors. In

Soucie v. David, we interpreted the Act as excluding “the

President’s staff” and those units whose “sole function [is] to

advise and assist the President.” 448 F.2d at 1075. We did so

in order to “avoid” the “[s]erious constitutional questions [that]

would be presented” if it were “necessary for the court to

consider whether the disclosure provisions of the Act exceed the

constitutional power of Congress to control the actions of the

executive branch.” Id. at 1071-72; see McGehee, 697 F.2d at

1108; Ryan, 617 F.2d at 788 n.19.

In subsequently adding the term “Executive Office of the

President” to the Act, the Conference Report for the 1974

Amendments (cited in Kissinger) explained that “the conferees

intend the result reached in Soucie v. David,” specifically stating

that “[t]he term is not to be interpreted as including” the staff

and units that Soucie had excluded. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380, at

232 (Conf. Rep.); see Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156; Meyer, 981

F.2d at 1291-92. Thus, it appears that not only this court, but

Congress as well, wished to avoid the serious separation-of-

powers questions that too expansive a reading of FOIA would

engender. When that is the case, it is doubly our obligation to

seek a construction that avoids constitutional conflict. See

Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1247-48 (D.C. Cir.

2012).

35

Finally, although the preceding considerations suggest that

WHACS records may be a poor fit for FOIA, the same

considerations make them a better fit for the Presidential

Records Act (PRA), which Congress enacted in 1978 to avoid

the very “separation of powers concerns” and “outside

interference with the day-to-day operations of the President and

his closest advisors” that we have just described, Armstrong v.

Bush, 924 F.2d at 290; H.R. REP. NO. 95-1487, at 6 (1978).

Unlike FOIA’s treatment of “agency records,” the PRA gives

the President “virtually complete control” over “Presidential

records” during his term of office. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d

at 290; see also 44 U.S.C. § 2204(b).23 And it defines

“Presidential records” to include

documentary materials, or any reasonably segregable

portion thereof, created or received by the President,

his immediate staff, or a unit or individual of the

Executive Office of the President whose function is to

advise and assist the President, in the course of

conducting activities which relate to or have an effect

upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or

other official or ceremonial duties of the President.

44 U.S.C. § 2201(2).

There are good reasons to think that WHACS records fall

within this definition of “Presidential records.” First, those

records are “created or received” by the President and his staff,

44 U.S.C. § 2201(2). As we have noted, see supra Part III,

23

Cf. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(f)(1) (“Upon the conclusion of a

President’s term of office, . . . the Archivist of the United States shall

. . . make [Presidential] records available to the public as rapidly and

completely as possible consistent with the provisions of this Act.”).

36

many WAVES and ACR records are arguably “created” by

White House staff and White House pass readers on servers

physically located in the White House Complex. See MOU

¶¶ 4-5; White Decl. ¶¶ 8-10; Nelson Decl. ¶ 3. And the White

House “receives” those records from the Secret Service within

30 to 60 days of the visits with which they are associated. See

MOU ¶ 14. Second, WHACS records are created “in the course

of” “the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, official,

[and] ceremonial duties of the President,” 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2).

They are generated whenever the President consults agency

officials, negotiates with foreign heads of state, or speaks with

private organizations or individuals at the White House. And

they are essential to ensuring that the President can go about

these core activities without risking his security or that of his

family and staff. WHACS records thus track quite nicely the

definition of “Presidential records” found in the PRA.

We are mindful of the fact that Congress did not intend the

PRA to diminish the scope of FOIA. See 44 U.S.C.

§ 2201(2)(B) (providing that the “term ‘Presidential records’

. . . does not include any documentary materials that are

. . . official records of an agency (as defined in [5 U.S.C.

§ 552(e)])”); see Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 1

F.3d at 1290, 1292; Bloomberg Br. 7. But that does not make it

irrelevant to our analysis. When Congress enacted the PRA in

1978, no case had considered whether materials anything like

WHACS records were subject to FOIA. Accordingly, the

PRA’s definition of “Presidential records” bears on Congress’

understanding of the scope of FOIA at the time of the PRA’s

passage, and hence on the scope of the records it intended to

subject to the quite different disclosure regime of the PRA. Cf.

FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 626 n.8 (1982) (noting that

“Congress’ definition of ‘records’” in the PRA “was helpful to

us in determining that an agency must create or obtain a record”

before it can be held subject to FOIA).

37

In sum, the avoidance canon confirms our conclusion that

WHACS records do not fall within the scope of FOIA, but are

instead subject to the regime established by the PRA.

B

The district court concluded that “the Constitutional

avoidance doctrine is not applicable here because the Court is

not faced with the interpretation of an ambiguous statute.”

Judicial Watch, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 60. “[E]ven if defendant’s

concerns about the intrusion on the confidentiality necessary for

the President and Vice President to discharge their constitutional

duties are valid ones,” the court said, “they do not serve as a

license for the court to transmute the meaning of an

unambiguous statute.” Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks

omitted). But as we noted in Part II.B, the statute is not only

ambiguous, it is opaque: Other than excluding records of the

Office of the President, the term “agency records” is “defined

neither in the Act nor its legislative history.” Tax Analysts, 492

U.S. at 142. And “[n]either the language of the statute nor the

legislative history provides much guidance in fleshing out the

meaning of the term.” Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, 742 F.2d at

1488. Indeed, as we said in Ryan v. Department of Justice,

“when the requested documents are in the possession of an

agency but were created by an entity not defined as an ‘agency’

under the FOIA[, including] . . . the President’s immediate

personal staff and units in the Executive Office whose sole

function is to advise and assist the President[,] . . . FOIA does

not specify a test for determining what is an agency record.”

617 F.2d at 784-85.24

24

See also McGehee, 697 F.2d at 1108 (“[T]he question whether

a document in the possession of one agency that originated in another

constitutes an ‘agency record’ for the purposes of the FOIA is not

governed by either the terms of the statute, the legislative history or

38

The district court also thought, and Judicial Watch and its

amici argue here, that any separation-of-powers concerns arising

from extending FOIA to WHACS records could be mitigated by

the Executive’s “ready recourse” to FOIA Exemption 5.

Judicial Watch, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 61; CREW Br. 20; Oral Arg.

Recording at 28:00 - 28:40.25 If such an argument applies in this

case, however, it would also have applied in the cases that

narrowly construed the coverage of FACA, since FACA

likewise authorizes the withholding of records under the FOIA

exemptions. See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 446-47 (citing 5

U.S.C. App. 2 § 10(b)); In re Cheney, 406 F.3d at 726. Indeed,

this argument would also have applied in Soucie and the other

cases in which we employed the avoidance canon to hold that

FOIA does not cover the records of presidential advisors

because to do otherwise would present “serious constitutional

questions.” Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1071-72; see Judicial Watch v.

Dep’t of Energy, 412 F.3d at 132; Ryan, 617 F.2d at 788 n.19.

But it was not applied in any of those cases.

Of course, there might be little consequence to resolving

constitutional concerns by relying on the Executive’s assertion

of Exemption 5, rather than on the meaning of “agency records,”

if WHACS records were generally exempt from withholding

under that exemption. But Judicial Watch and its amici

certainly do not think that is so. In another district court case

precedent.”).

25

Exemption 5 protects from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-

agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law

to a party . . . in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). It

incorporates, inter alia, “the presidential communications privilege,

the state secrets privilege, and the deliberative process privilege,”

Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 473 F.3d 312, 321

(D.C. Cir. 2006).

39

presenting almost the identical question, they argued -- and the

court agreed -- that WHACS visitor records do not fall within

Exemption 5 because they consist only of the names of the

visitor, visitee, and date and time of the visit. CREW, 592 F.

Supp. 2d at 118-19. Although that court said “there may exist

some hypothetical situation” in which the exemption would

apply, id. at 119, Judicial Watch has been hard put to suggest

one. At oral argument, for example, it was unwilling to say the

exemption would extend to WHACS records revealing visits

between Israeli officials and National Security Council

personnel who work on issues relating to Iran’s nuclear program

-- meetings that could be taken to signal discussions about

possible military action. See Oral Arg. Recording at 36:30 -

44:08.26

In any event, there are no decisions of this court that

address whether the presidential communications privilege

contained in Exemption 5 extends to the names of visitors to the

President and his staff. And it seems to us that deciding that

question would be at least as difficult -- and present separation-

of-powers questions at least as serious -- as deciding the

question now before us. We see nothing to be gained by trading

one difficult question for another. Cf. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 389-

90 (“Once executive privilege is asserted, . . . [the] inquiry

places courts in the awkward position of evaluating the

Executive’s claims of confidentiality and autonomy, and pushes

to the fore difficult questions of separation of powers and checks

and balances. These occasion[s] for constitutional confrontation

between the two branches should be avoided whenever

possible.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

26

Judicial Watch did suggest that records revealing a visit to the

President by (and the identities of) the Navy SEALs who killed Osama

bin Laden would be exempt. Oral Arg. Recording at 44:08 - 44:41.

40

Moreover, even if a significant subset of WHACS records

would be protected by Exemption 5, the burden of identifying

those records on a document-by-document basis is substantial

enough to make that an ineffective way of mitigating the kind of

separation-of-powers concerns at issue here. In this case,

Judicial Watch’s FOIA request covers every visitor record from

January through August 2009 -- a total of almost 500,000

records. Droege Decl. ¶ 16. And we cannot be blind to the

precedent we would set by holding that those records are

covered by FOIA: such a holding would in all likelihood be

followed by subsequent requests covering the next four years,

and then each month thereafter.27

In Cheney, the Supreme Court reviewed a discovery order,

issued by a district court in a case in which the plaintiffs alleged

a violation of FACA, directing the Vice President and other

senior officials to produce information about a task force

established to give advice to the President. 542 U.S. at 372.

Notwithstanding that the district court’s order permitted the

government to assert privileges to protect individual sensitive

documents from disclosure, the Court held that mandamus could

be available to block such discovery. The ability of the

27

The burden is particularly great with respect to the records at

issue here because many if not most of the personnel with knowledge

of the purpose of the January through August 2009 visits no longer

work at the White House. See Tibbits Decl. ¶¶ 27, 33 (regarding

national security staff). The burden going forward is reduced because,

under the voluntary disclosure policy adopted by the White House in

September 2009, employees who thereafter submit visitor requests

must designate visits that are sensitive. See supra note 6; Tibbits

Decl. ¶¶ 15-16. But flagging a visit as “sensitive” is not the same as

deciding whether it is covered by a FOIA exemption, a decision that

still imposes a considerable burden on the senior staff of the President

and Vice President, who may be the only ones who can make such

judgments. See Tibbits Decl. ¶¶ 35, 37.

41

recipients to assert privileges, the Court said, was insufficient to

“dismiss[] the[] separation-of-powers concerns” raised by the

potential intrusion into “Presidential confidentiality.” Id. at 382-

83. “Given the breadth of the discovery requests,” the Court

declined to require the government to “bear the burden of

invoking executive privilege with sufficient specificity and of

making particularized objections.” Id. at 388 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Because the burden at issue here is comparable,

a similar determination is warranted.

We therefore find no reason not to, and every reason to,

apply the canon of avoiding serious constitutional questions in

construing the meaning of “agency records” under FOIA.

C

In sum, two sets of considerations lead us to conclude that

WHACS records disclosing visitors to the Office of the

President are not “agency records.” First, although application

of our usual, four-part control test for classifying documents as

“agency records” leads to indeterminate results in this case, the

modified control test set forth in United We Stand is applicable

and indicates that WHACS records are not agency records.

Second, that judgment is confirmed by application of the canon

of constitutional avoidance. In order to avoid substantial

separation-of-powers questions, we conclude that Congress did

not intend to authorize FOIA requesters to obtain indirectly from

the Secret Service information that it had expressly barred

requesters from obtaining directly from the President.

Judicial Watch and its amici fear that this case will open the

floodgates to White House efforts to circumvent FOIA. See

Judicial Watch Br. 11; CREW Br. 25. Judicial Watch worries

that, “[i]f an MOU is all that was necessary to remove records

from the ambit of FOIA, by assigning ‘legal custody’ away from

42

the agency, then wide swaths of agency records are subject to

removal from agency access.” Judicial Watch Br. 11. This is a

serious argument, and if such an MOU were all that were

necessary -- or if any record touching on White House

communications were necessarily exempt from FOIA -- there

would indeed be cause for serious concern. But that is not our

holding.

First, we grant no deference to the MOU’s assertion that

WHACS records are “at all times Presidential records . . . under

the exclusive legal custody and control of the White House.”

MOU ¶ 17-18 (emphasis added). As we have explained, that is

an issue we decide de novo. See supra Part II.A. Because this

case was decided on summary judgment, however, we do accept

the MOU’s representations as to the way in which both parties

have historically regarded and treated the documents. See id.

Second, the circumstances that lead us to give effect to the

MOU in this case are rare. There are very few instances in

which a construction of FOIA would put the President on the

horns of a dilemma between surrendering his confidentiality and

jeopardizing his safety. It is the presence of this unacceptable

choice, comparable to the choice Congress faced in United We

Stand and Goland, that is central to our understanding that the

President exercises control over these visitor logs.

Third, and most important, the kind of information at issue

here is in many ways sui generis. This case involves a category

of documents that effectively reproduces a set of records that

Congress expressly excluded from FOIA’s coverage. We are

not confronted with an attempt to protect information that would

otherwise be subject to FOIA. Rather, the White House seeks

to protect information that would not even arguably be subject

to the Act, but for the President’s need for Secret Service

protection. Again, we regard these circumstances as unique.

43

V

Finally, we note that there is a subcategory of WHACS

records as to which our holding does not apply. There are

several offices located on the grounds of the White House

Complex, including the Office of Management and Budget

(OMB) and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), that

this court has held are not part of the President’s immediate staff

and whose “sole function” is not to “advise and assist the

President.” Those offices are “agencies” under FOIA, and their

records are “agency records” subject to disclosure. See, e.g.,

Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d at 559; Pac.

Legal Found. v. Council on Envtl. Quality, 636 F.2d 1259, 1263

(D.C. Cir. 1980).28

For the reasons discussed in Part III.A, application of the

four-part control test to WHACS records that reveal visits to

those offices is indeterminate. And because the “burden is on

the agency to demonstrate, not the requester to disprove, that the

materials sought are not ‘agency records,’” Tax Analysts, 492

U.S. at 142 n.3, that indeterminacy resolves the matter in

28

The White House website includes a list of units covered by

FOIA. In addition to OMB and the CEQ, the website lists the Office

of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the Office of the U.S.

Trade Representative (USTR), and the Office of Science Technology

Policy (OSTP). OSTP, FOIA Reading Room,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/library/

compliance/foia; see Center for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of U.S.

Trade Representative, 718 F.3d 899, 904 (D.C. Cir. 2013)

(adjudicating a FOIA claim regarding the USTR); Soucie, 448 F.2d at

1075 (holding that the Office of Science and Technology, predecessor

of OSTP, was covered by FOIA); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1)

(defining “agency” to include “the Executive Office of the President”);

H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380, at 232 (Conf. Rep.). See generally Meyer,

981 F.2d at 1291-94.

44

Judicial Watch’s favor -- unless special considerations of the

kind discussed in Parts III.B and IV counsel otherwise.

For the White House offices that are themselves covered by

FOIA, there are no such special considerations. First, although

the White House (through the MOU) has asserted control over

all WHACS records, including records relating to those offices,

it has not asserted control over the information they reveal. To

the contrary, the government acknowledges that the records of

those offices -- including the calendars of their personnel -- may

be obtained by FOIA requests made directly to them. See Oral

Arg. Recording at 50:50 - 51:17; Gov’t Reply Br. at 15-16.

Thus, subjecting the WHACS records of those offices to FOIA

would not permit a requester to obtain anything it could not

obtain directly from the office itself. Second, at oral argument

the Secret Service acknowledged that revealing the contents of

those calendars would not pose separation-of-powers concerns.

See Oral Arg. Recording at 53:15 - 53:40. Accordingly, neither

of the special considerations that drive our decision to limit the

reach of the term “agency records” applies to WHACS records

that reveal visitors to offices that are subject to FOIA but happen

to be located in the White House Complex.

Nor can we discern any other reason for construing “agency

records” not to apply to such records. They plainly do not fall

within the coverage of the Presidential Records Act. See 44

U.S.C. §§ 2201(2), (2)(B). The Secret Service has not suggested

that disclosing WHACS records relating to those offices would

undermine its ability to protect the President. See Oral Arg.

Recording at 54:33 - 54:40. And if disclosing particular records

did threaten the President’s security, we are confident they

would be shielded from disclosure by one or another FOIA

exemption. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (exempting

records compiled for law enforcement purposes whose

production “could reasonably be expected to endanger the life

45

or physical safety of any individual”). Such claims can, if

necessary, be raised on remand. The government does maintain

that it would be less burdensome for the requesters to get the

information directly from the offices themselves, but that too is

a contention that can be made to the district court.

At oral argument, the Secret Service raised the possibility

that there may be some visitors whose appointments are with

FOIA-subject agencies, but who later walk over to the White

House Office and meet with the President or his staff. See Oral

Arg. Recording at 57:21 - 57:38. Perhaps so. But we have

received no indication that WHACS records for such visitors

would reveal that they had meetings anywhere other than at the

locations of their scheduled visits. See MOU ¶ 4 (stating that

the records disclose “the time and location of the planned visit”

and “the actual time and place of the visitor’s entry into and exit

from the White House Complex”). To the extent the records

would reveal such exempt information, we agree that they are

not agency records. Cf. United We Stand, 359 F.3d at 603-04

(holding that portions of agency records may be redacted as non-

agency records). But it is impossible at this point to determine

whether any records might be subject to withholding on this

basis. We leave it to the district court to make that

determination in the first instance, aided as necessary by

affidavits and further factual development.

VI

Because FOIA contains no definition of “agency records,”

and because application of our standard four-part test is

indeterminate, this is a difficult case. The opinion of the district

court, and the briefs of Judicial Watch and its amici, contain

serious and substantial arguments in support of that court’s

holding. But Congress did make clear that it intended to place

documents like the President’s appointment calendar beyond the

46

reach of FOIA. Construing the statutory text in light of both that

intent and the canon of avoiding constitutional separation-of-

powers concerns, we hold that WHACS records that disclose the

kind of information contained in such documents are not agency

records within the meaning of FOIA. At bottom, we do not

believe Congress intended that FOIA requesters be able to

obtain from the gatekeepers of the White House what they are

unable to obtain from its occupants.

We reiterate that our disposition is narrower than that

sought by the Secret Service in two important respects. We do

not attach any legal significance, beyond its factual descriptions,

to the 2006 MOU between the Secret Service and the White

House. Further, we hold that, subject to any applicable

exemptions, the Secret Service may not withhold WHACS

records that reveal visitors to those offices within the White

House Complex that are themselves subject to FOIA. Those

documents are “agency records.”

The judgment of the district court is reversed as to those

WHACS records that would disclose visitors to the Office of the

President. It is affirmed as to those that would disclose visitors

to offices in the White House Complex that are covered by

FOIA. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

So ordered.