Blake v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

EMILY D. BLAKE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-20-962-AMG

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting )

Commissioner of Social Security,1 )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Emily D. Blake (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for

judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (“SSA”) denying her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”)

under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34. (Doc. 1). The

Commissioner has answered the Complaint and filed the Administrative Record (“AR”)

(Docs. 11, 12), and the parties have fully briefed the issues (Docs. 18, 22, 23). 2 The parties

have consented to proceed before the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c)(1). (Docs. 15, 16). Based on the Court’s review of the record and issues

presented, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.

1 Kilolo Kijakazi is the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration and is

substituted as the proper Defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

2 Citations to the parties’ briefs refer to the Court’s CM/ECF pagination. Citations to the

Administrative Record refer to its original pagination.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed an application on October 15, 2018, for DIB, alleging a disability

onset date of March 3, 2018. (AR, at 185-188). The SSA denied the application initially

and on reconsideration. (Id. at 66-83, 84-108). Then an administrative hearing was held

on January 29, 2020. (Id. at 41-65). Afterwards, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 7-35). The Appeals Council

subsequently denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Id. at 1-6). Thus, the ALJ’s decision

became the final decision of the Commissioner. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1051

(10th Cir. 2009); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.

II. The Administrative Decision

At Step One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since March 3, 2018, the alleged onset date. (AR, at 12). At Step Two, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “obesity, seronegative

rheumatoid arthritis, hyperthyroidism, and depression.” (Id.) At Step Three, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff had no impairment or combination of impairments that met or

medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Id. at 14). The ALJ then

determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). Specifically, I find

that the claimant can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds

frequently. She can sit for six hours in an 8-hour workday with normal

breaks. She can stand and/or walk for six hours in an 8-hour workday with

normal breaks. Push and pull limits consistent with lifting and carrying

limitations. She is able to do complex, work like activities but at a minimum

(defined during the hearing as semi-skilled) she can understand, remember

and carry out simple and some more detailed instructions (defined during the

hearing as semi-skilled) with routine supervision. She can relate to

supervision and others on a superficial (defined during the hearing as

occasional) work basis and adapt to a work environment. However, she

should avoid even moderate exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights

and moving machinery.

(Id. at 15-16). Then, at Step Four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to perform

any of her past relevant work. (Id. at 27). At Step Five, however, the ALJ found when

“[c]onsidering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional

capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the

claimant can perform” such as a routing clerk, marker, or bench assembler. (Id. at 28).

Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability since March 3, 2018. (Id.

at 29).

III. Claims Presented for Judicial Review

On appeal, Plaintiff raises two issues. (Doc. 18). First, Plaintiff contends generally

that “[t]he ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical source evidence.” (Id. at 3). Upon

further examination of Plaintiff’s largely disorganized argument, Plaintiff appears to more

specifically argue that the ALJ improperly discounted the two residual functional capacity

statements provided by Dr. Ashraf, Plaintiff’s rheumatologist, in part due to (1) the ALJ’s

faulty reliance on the consultative exam by Dr. Williams, wherein the ALJ failed to

articulate persuasiveness, supportability, or consistency, and also due to (2) the ALJ’s

failure to properly credit the physical disability parking placard application signed by Dr.

Wilcox, wherein the ALJ failed to explain supportability or consistency; in addition to (3)

the ALJ’s incorrectly interpreting and relying on Dr. Wilcox’s “unremarkable

examination” of Plaintiff in January 2020. (Id. at 3-6). This discussion dovetails into an

argument that the ALJ improperly analyzed the November 2018 letter of Dr. Wilcox,

Plaintiff’s treating physician, by failing to articulate persuasiveness, supportability, or

consistency. (Id. at 6-8). Finally, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly analyzed the

opinions of Ms. Kraft, a social worker, as unpersuasive. (Id. at 8-10). As her second issue

on appeal, Plaintiff contends that “[c]laimant is credible/consistent[,]” that the ALJ did not

adequately consider Plaintiff’s symptoms and consistency, and the ALJ “never explained

why she rejected the complaints by Claimant, as required.” (Id. at 3, 13-15). These errors,

Plaintiff maintains, require remand. (Id. at 15).

In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly evaluated the medical

source opinions and evidence pursuant to the new medical evidence regulations. (Doc. 22,

at 1). The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ appropriately discounted Dr. Ashraf’s

medical opinion after concluding it was unsupported by both Dr. Ashraf’s treatment

records and other medical evidence in the record. (Id. at 5-8). Likewise, the Commissioner

argues that the ALJ reasonably concluded that Dr. Wilcox’s opinions were not persuasive,

as they were not supported by his own medical findings or consistent with the other

objective medical evidence. (Id. at 8-9). The Commissioner further claims that the October

2018 application for a physical disability parking placard, signed by Dr. Wilcox, does not

qualify as a medical opinion. (Id. at 9-10). The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ

correctly found Ms. Kraft’s two opinions “not persuasive, as they were not consistent with

or supported by the record as a whole.” (Id. at 10-13). Finally, the Commissioner argues

that the ALJ reasonably concluded that Plaintiff’s symptom testimony was not consistent

with the evidence. (Id. at 13-15). “Because the ALJ applied the proper legal standards and

substantial evidence supports his findings,” the Commissioner asks the Court to affirm the

decision. (Id. at 15).

IV. The Disability Standard and Standard of Review

The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A

physical or mental impairment is an impairment “that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). A

medically determinable impairment must be established by “objective medical evidence”

from an “acceptable medical source,” such as a licensed physician or a licensed and

certified psychologist; whereas the claimant’s own “statement of symptoms, a diagnosis,

or a medical opinion” is not sufficient to establish the existence of an impairment. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1521; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502(a), 404.1513(a). A plaintiff is disabled

under the Social Security Act “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments

are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,

considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

Social Security regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a

disability claim. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th

Cir. 1988) (explaining five steps and burden-shifting process). To determine whether a

claimant is disabled, the Commissioner inquires: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in

any substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment

or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets an impairment listed in

Appendix 1 of the relevant regulation; (4) considering the Commissioner’s assessment of

the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”),3 whether the impairment prevents the

claimant from continuing claimant’s past relevant work; and (5) considering assessment of

the RFC and other factors, whether the claimant can perform other types of work existing

in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v).

Plaintiff bears the “burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability under steps one,

two, and four” of the SSA’s five-step procedure. Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729,

731 (10th Cir. 2005). If the plaintiff makes this prima facie showing, “the burden shifts to

the Commissioner to show the claimant has the [RFC] to perform other work in the national

economy in view of [claimant’s] age, education, and work experience.” Id. “The claimant

is entitled to disability benefits only if [Claimant] is not able to perform other work.” Bowen

v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 142 (1987).

This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s final decision is limited “to

determin[ing] whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether

the agency’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Noreja v.

Commissioner, SSA, 952 F.3d. 1172, 1177 (10th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Substantial

evidence is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d

3 RFC is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [a claimant’s] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1545(a).

1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). “It means – and means only – such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill,

139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A court’s

review is based on the administrative record, and a court must “meticulously examine the

record as a whole, including anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ’s findings

in order to determine if the substantiality test has been met.” Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d

1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005). While the court considers whether the ALJ followed the

applicable rules of law in weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases, the court

will “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency.”

Vigil v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Even if a court might have reached a different conclusion, the Commissioner’s decision

stands if it is supported by substantial evidence. See White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 908

(10th Cir. 2002).

V. The ALJ Adequately Considered the Challenged Medical Opinions and

Medical Records.

A. Applicable Analysis

Under the applicable regulations,4 the ALJ does “not defer or give any specific

evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s)[,] . . . including

those from [the claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Rather, the ALJ

4 The regulations governing the agency’s evaluation of medical evidence were revised

effective March 27, 2017. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical

Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017), as amended in 82 Fed. Reg. 15132 (Mar. 27,

2017).

considers the persuasiveness of the opinions using five factors: supportability; consistency;

relationship with the claimant; specialization; and other factors, such as “a medical source’s

familiarity with the other evidence in a claim.” Id. § 404.1520c(c). Supportability and

consistency are the most important factors. Id. § 404.1520c(a). “Supportability” examines

how closely connected a medical opinion is to the medical source’s objective medical

evidence and supporting explanations: “The more relevant the objective medical evidence

and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical

opinion(s)[,] . . . the more persuasive the medical opinions . . . will be.” Id. §

404.1520c(c)(1). “Consistency,” on the other hand, compares a medical opinion to the

other evidence: “The more consistent a medical opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence from

other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the

medical opinion(s) . . . will be.” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(2). The ALJ must articulate how

persuasive he finds a medical opinion. Id. § 404.1520c(b). In doing so, the ALJ is required

to “explain how [he] considered the supportability and consistency factors for a medical

source’s medical opinions.” Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2).5

B. The ALJ Adequately Considered Dr. Ashraf’s Medical Opinions.

Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ improperly discounted the two residual

functional capacity statements provided by Plaintiff’s rheumatologist Dr. Ashraf. (Doc.

18, at 3-6). As to those opinions, the ALJ found:

5 An ALJ must consider, but need not explicitly discuss, the remaining factors (relationship

with the claimant, specialization, and other factors) unless there are differing medical

opinions on an issue and those opinions are equally well-supported and consistent with the

record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2), (3).

The medical opinions provided by Ashraf are not persuasive. His opinions

are inconsistent with the longitudinal medical evidence of records, including

his findings, as documented above. Despite an opinion of debilitating

rheumatoid arthritis, the claimant only required follow-up every three

months with Dr. Ashraf. More importantly, the objective evidence of record

is inconsistent with his medical opinions. Beyond findings of a “few MCP

tenderness” without any swelling documented in July and October 2018, Dr.

Ashraf’s findings were unremarkable (8F). Consultative examination in

March 2019 revealed strong grip strength. It further revealed no redness,

swelling, or tenderness in any of the claimant’s extremities. She was able to

secure and grasp objects without issue (31F). Physical examination with Dr.

Ashraf in September 2019, the same month as the majority of medical

opinion, was unremarkable. The claimant exhibited a full range of motion

of her hands without swelling or tenderness. Dr. Ashraf further noted that

the claimant was doing better now on HCQ (40F). Physical examination

with Dr. Wilcox, family physician in January 2020 was unremarkable.

Musculoskeletal examination was normal. Gait and status was normal (45F).

(AR, at 26).

The decision reflects that the ALJ considered Dr. Ashraf’s medical opinions and his

treatment notes. The ALJ articulated that she did not find the opinions persuasive. She

expressly considered the supportability and consistency factors. The ALJ explained that

she found Dr. Ashraf’s opinions to be unpersuasive because they were unsupported by and

inconsistent with Dr. Ashraf’s own treatment records and with other evidence in the record,

including the consultative exam by Dr. Williams and the January 2020 examination by Dr.

Wilcox. (Id. at 26). The ALJ therefore met the requirements of the regulations in

evaluating Dr. Ashraf’s medical opinions. Plaintiff’s request that the Court find otherwise

is nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, and this Court must decline that

request. Allman v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 1326, 1333 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Concluding otherwise

would require us to reweigh the evidence, a task we may not perform.”). “The ALJ was

entitled to resolve [] evidentiary conflicts and did so.” Id.

Plaintiff claims, in his argument regarding the opinions of Dr. Ashraf, that the ALJ

failed to articulate the persuasiveness, supportability, or consistency of the consultative

exam by Dr. Williams and failed to explain the supportability or consistency of the physical

disability parking placard application authorized by Dr. Wilcox. (Doc. 18, at 5-6). Neither

of these are medical opinions; therefore, they do not require the medical opinion analysis.

“A medical opinion is a statement from a medical source about what [a claimant] can still

do despite [his or her] impairment(s)” and whether a claimant has a limitation or restriction

in the ability to perform physical, mental, or other demands of work or to adapt to

environmental conditions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2). Although Dr. Williams examined

Plaintiff — and the ALJ correctly considered Dr. Williams’ objective medical findings as

part of the record — Dr. Williams did not assess Plaintiff with any specific limitations and

thus did not render a “medical opinion” requiring analysis. (AR, at 878-86). Likewise, the

application for a physical disability parking placard signed by Dr. Wilcox does not

constitute a “medical opinion” under the regulations. (AR, at 887); see Moore v. Colvin,

2014 WL 5765665, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 5, 2014) (“The court finds that the checking of

a box on the application for a parking placard, standing alone, does not qualify as a medical

opinion that the ALJ was required to discuss.”).

C. Dr. Wilcox’s November 2018 Letter Is Not A Medical Opinion.

Plaintiff’s argument includes discussion of records from Dr. Wilcox, Plaintiff’s

treating physician, and the specific allegation that “[t]he ALJ failed to examine Dr.

Wilcox’s opinion for persuasiveness, supportability, or consistency. As discussed, Dr.

Wilcox agreed [Plaintiff] needs a reduced workload, supra.” (Doc. 18, at 8). Plaintiff

appears to be referring to Dr. Wilcox’s November 2018 letter. As to that letter, the ALJ

noted:

In a letter dated November 2, 2018, Dr. Wilcox noted a treating relationship

with the claimant since 2012. He indicated that the claimant had numerous

medical conditions that could affect her ability to work. He noted treatment

for anxiety, depression, idiopathic hypersomnia, hypothyroidism, and

chronic fatigue. He noted that the claimant’s “current conditions” reduced

her ability to stand, bend, lift, and carry objects. He indicated that the

claimant might have problems with social interaction due to anxiety.

However, he further indicated was unable to provide an opinion about the

claimant’s ability to work (11F/3, 12F, and 13F).

(AR, at 23). Indeed, in his letter, Dr. Wilcox takes great pains not to opine on whether

Plaintiff’s impairments – which he notes are largely diagnosed and treated by other

providers – might limit or restrict her ability to work. (AR, at 667). He notes that “[s]he

certainly suffers from certain medical conditions that could affect her ability to work.” (Id.)

(emphasis added). However, he goes on to say that,

[i]n terms of her ability to work related to these conditions I really cannot

say. She has no one condition that would total[l]y preclude any employment

but the totality of her illness would certainly make it a challenge for her but

does this mean she is totally unable to work I cannot say.

(Id.) Dr. Wilcox’s November 2018 letter is thus not a “medical opinion” because it does

not opine on “what [Plaintiff] can still do despite [her] impairment(s)” and whether she has

a limitation or restriction in the ability to perform physical, mental, or other demands of

work or to adapt to environmental conditions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2). Plaintiff

concedes as much in her appeal. (See Doc. 18, at 7) (“Although Dr. Wilcox did not want

to opine on Claimant’s ability to work (T 556, 667) . . . .”). Accordingly, the ALJ did not

err by failing to analyze its persuasiveness.

D. The ALJ Adequately Considered Ms. Kraft’s Medical Opinions.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly analyzed the medical opinions of

Ms. Kraft, a social worker that had a treating relationship with the Plaintiff during the

relevant timeframe. (Doc. 18, at 8-10). In her analysis of the medical opinion evidence,

the ALJ considered three letters authored by Ms. Kraft. (AR, at 23-24). As to those letters,

the ALJ found:

To the degree they offer any medical opinion at all, I find Ms. Kraft’s letters

unpersuasive. Medical opinions about pain and fatigue related to physical

conditions are largely outside Ms. Kraft’s area of expertise. Additionally,

there is little to no support for a finding of a moderate response to work

pressure, supervision, and co-workers or that work outside the home was a

near impossibility due to chronic pain and/or fatigue. The medical evidence

reveals that the claimant had a positive response to medication for

seronegative rheumatoid arthritis and hypothyroidism (39F and 40F).

Mental status examinations have remained largely unremarkable as

documented (8F/8, 39F/1, 19, and 45F). Further, her mental health

complaints have been managed on an outpatient basis with sporadic

counseling and medication provided by her primary care physician (10F,

14F, and 45F). There is little to no evidence that a referral for medication

evaluation with a psychiatrist or additional psychological services as

intensive outpatient programs or services has been considered or required.

(Id. at 24).

The ALJ’s decision to discount Ms. Kraft’s assertions about Plaintiff’s physical

conditions was supported by substantial evidence, as she explained her not unreasonable

view that Ms. Kraft is a social worker and thus not qualified to offer a medical opinion on

Plaintiff’s physical limitations. As to Plaintiff’s mental conditions, the ALJ articulated that

she found opinions in the letters “unpersuasive,” with “little to no support” and inconsistent

with the other medical evidence in the record including that Plaintiff’s “mental health

complaints have been managed on an outpatient basis with sporadic counseling and

medication provided by her primary care physician.” (Id.) Although Plaintiff disputes the

ALJ’s characterization of Plaintiff’s mental health treatment as “sporadic,” the ALJ’s

analysis rests on the entirety of the objective medical evidence, including Plaintiff’s

“largely unremarkable” mental status examinations. (Id.) The ALJ conducted the required

analysis of Ms. Kraft’s opinions, and her assessment was supported by substantial

evidence.

VI. The ALJ Adequately Considered Plaintiff’s Symptoms and Consistency.

A. Applicable Analysis

When evaluating a claimant’s symptoms,6 an ALJ must consider:

1. Daily activities;

2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other

symptoms;

3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;

4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an

individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms;

5. Treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has received

for relief of pain or other symptoms;

6. Any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used to

relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back,

standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and

7. Any other factors concerning an individual's functional limitations and

restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.

Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p: Titles II & XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in

Disability Claims, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7-8 (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017).

6 The SSA defines “symptom” as “the individual’s own description or statement of his or

her physical or mental impairment(s).” SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304, at *2.

The ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s “statements about the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are consistent with the objective medical

evidence and the other evidence of record.” Id. at *7.7 If they are consistent, then the ALJ

“will determine that the individual’s symptoms are more likely to reduce his or her

capacities to perform work-related activities.” Id. If they are inconsistent, then the ALJ

“will determine that the individual’s symptoms are less likely to reduce his or her capacities

to perform work-related activities.” Id. Consistency findings are “peculiarly the province

of the finder of fact,” and courts should “not upset such determinations when supported by

substantial evidence.” Cowan v. Astrue, 552 F.3d 1182, 1190 (10th Cir. 2008). Provided

the ALJ sets forth the specific evidence he relies on in evaluating the consistency of the

claimant’s subjective complaints with other evidence, the ALJ “need not make a formalistic

factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence.” Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1167

(10th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). “[C]ommon sense, not technical perfection, is

[the reviewing court’s] guide.” Id. Furthermore, the ALJ is entitled to resolve evidentiary

conflicts. Allman v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 1326, 1333 (10th Cir. 2016).

7 “This evaluation, previously termed the ‘credibility’ analysis, is now termed the

‘consistency’ analysis. See SSR 16-3p (superseding SSR 96-7p). In practice, there is little

substantive difference between a ‘consistency’ and ‘credibility’ analysis. See Brownrigg v.

Berryhill, 688 F. Appx. 542, 545-46 (10th Cir. 2017) (finding that SSR 16-3p was

consistent with prior approach taken by Tenth Circuit). Therefore, Tenth Circuit decisions

regarding credibility analyses remain persuasive authority.” Tina G.B., v. Kijakazi, 2021

WL 3617449, at *3, n.2 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 16, 2021). See also Olson v. Comm’r, SSA, 843

F. App’x 93, 97, n.3 (10th Cir. 2021) (“The Commissioner no longer uses the term

‘credibility’ in evaluating a claimant’s statements. The analysis, however, remains

substantially the same.”) (internal citation omitted).

B. The ALJ’s Symptom Analysis Is Supported By Substantial Evidence.

Plaintiff contends that “[c]laimant is credible/consistent” and asserts that the ALJ

did not adequately consider Plaintiff’s symptoms and consistency and “never explained

why she rejected the complaints by Claimant, as required.” (Doc. 18, at 3, 13-15). The

ALJ considered Plaintiff’s testimony at the administrative hearing as subjective evidence

of Plaintiff’s symptoms. (AR, at 16-18). In doing so, the ALJ found that:

[a]s for the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of his or her symptoms, they are inconsistent because the

alleged severity of pain and result on her functioning is not supported by the

medical evidence of record, which documents near-normal examinations and

no pain management with changes suggestive of breakthrough pain.

In this case, although the medical evidence documented the existence of

impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce a certain degree

of symptoms, the pivotal question is not whether such symptoms exist, but

whether those symptoms occur with such frequency, duration or severity as

to reduce the claimant’s residual functional capacity or to preclude all work

activity on a continuing and regular basis. Bearing this in mind, I find that

restricting the claimant to performing the range of light work described above

adequately addresses the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the

claimant’s alleged symptoms as well as precipitating and aggravating factors.

(Id. at 17). In making this determination, the ALJ states that she has “considered the

objective medical evidence, statements made by the claimant and other individuals, and

other[] factors,” specifically including the factors set forth in Social Security Ruling 16-

3p, supra. (Id.) The ALJ thus considered the appropriate factors and adequately articulated

her analysis that Plaintiff’s subjective statements of her symptoms were not consistent with

the objective medical evidence of record, including specifically “near normal

examinations” and lack of history of pain management. The ALJ’s determination is

supported by substantial evidence and therefore the Court will not upset it. Cowan, 552

F.3d at 1190.

VII. Conclusion

Having reviewed the medical evidence of record, the transcript of the administrative

hearing, the decision of the ALJ, and the pleadings and briefs of the parties, the undersigned

AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner for the reasons discussed above.

SO ORDERED this 30th day of March, 2022.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16