Opinion

Dixon v. Regional University System of the Oklahoma Board of Regents

Court
District Court, E.D. Oklahoma
Filed
Jan 24, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.5%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MARCI D. WALKINGSTICK DIXON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-19-391-GLJ

)

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. the )

Regional University System of the )

Oklahoma Board of Regents d/b/a )

Northeastern State University, )

)

Defendant. )

)

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on motion by Plaintiff Marci D. Walkingstick

Dixon to quash certain pending subpoenas duces tecum Defendant issued to non-parties.

Specifically, Defendant issued subpoenas duces tecum to two of Plaintiff’s subsequent

employers seeking her complete personnel files. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s

Motion to Quash Subpoenas (“Motion to Quash”) [Docket No. 162] is hereby GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her original Complaint in this case on November 15, 2019, then filed

an Amended Complaint on February 4, 2020. See Docket Nos. 2, 13. Plaintiff alleged

claims of gender discrimination, race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work

environment as to Northeastern State University (“NSU”) in violation of Title VII, claims

against NSU for discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, and a

claim against Dr. Reif for retaliation for use of FMLA leave.

On March 29, 2023, the Court granted Dr. Reif’s Motion for Summary Judgement,

dismissing him entirely, and granted in part Defendant NSU’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, dismissing all claims against NSU except for Plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim pursuant to Title VII. See Docket No. 126.

Although the Seventh Amended Scheduling Order provided a discovery cutoff date

of February 6, 2023, NSU served document subpoenas on Pima Community College in

Tucson, Arizona and Yavapai College1 on or around December 29, 2023. See Docket No.

161. Although the Notice included two copies of the document subpoena served on

Yavapai College, both subpoenas apparently seek the production of the “Complete

Personnel File of Marcia Walkingstick Dixon, including but not limited to accommodation

requests, all performance evaluations, leave requests, compensation, and complaints made

by or about Plaintiff Dixon.” See Docket No. 161. Such documents were to be produced

to the Oklahoma Attorney General’s Office in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on January 19,

2024. Id.

On January 4, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel contacted NSU’s counsel indicating

Plaintiff’s objection to the subpoenas and requesting a meet and confer. See Docket No.

162. NSU’s counsel neither responded to Plaintiff’s request, id., nor apparently notified

the subpoenaed entities of Plaintiff’s objection. Pima Community College and Yavapai

1 Although not identified on the subpoena duces tecum or the notice, the Court presumes the

subpoena directed to Yavapai College is Yavapai College in Yavapai County, Arizona.

College produced documents pursuant to the subpoenas on January 10 and 11, 2024,

respectively. See Docket No. 164. On January 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed her Motion to

Quash, seeking to quash the subpoenas as irrelevant and exceeding the appropriate scope

of discovery in this case. See Docket No. 162.

ANALYSIS

A subpoena duces tecum issued to a third party is “discovery” within the meaning

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rice v. U.S., 164 F.R.D. 556, 556–57

(N.D.Okla.1995). Indeed, NSU’s Response concedes it was seeking discovery through the

two subpoenas duces tecum. See Docket No. 164, pp. 2-4. Accordingly, discovery

conducted pursuant to a Rule 45 subpoena must be concluded by the deadline specified in

the court’s Scheduling Order. Grant v. Otis Elevator Co., 199 F.R.D. 673, 675

(N.D.Okla.2001); Rice, 164 F.R.D. at 558. “Rule 45 subpoenas sought after the discovery

cut-off date are improper attempts to obtain discovery beyond the discovery period and

should be quashed on this basis.” Alfwear, Inc. v. Kulkote, LLC, 2020 WL 4196446 , at *

2 (D. Utah July 21, 2020) (citing Hickey v. Myers, 2013 WL 2418252, at *5 (N.D.N.Y.

June 3, 2013) (“When a party issues subpoenas after the discovery deadline has passed to

obtain documents the party was aware of before the discovery cutoff date, the subpoenas

and discovery requests should be denied.”)); see also 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &

ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2459 (3d ed.).

“Regardless of the moving party’s standing to challenge a subpoena directed to a nonparty,

courts possess the inherent power to quash an untimely subpoena.” Dedmon v. Continental

Airlines, Inc. 2015 WL 1740095, at *2 (D. Colo. April 14, 2015) (citing Galloway v.

Islands Mechanical Contractor, Inc., 2013 WL 163985, *4 (D. V.I. Jan. 14, 2013);

Peterbilt of Great Bend, LLC v. Doonan, 2006 WL 3193371, *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 1, 2006)).

Although not raised by either party, the subpoenas at issue were served over ten

months after the close of discovery in this case. The Seventh Amended Scheduling Order

set a discovery deadline of February 6, 2023, and NSU offers no explanation or justification

for its untimely issuance of the document subpoenas. Moreover, NSU concedes that it has

long been aware of the belatedly requested documents and that the request “is not new.”

See Docket No. 164, p. 3. Thus, notwithstanding the defective nature of the Motion to

Quash,2 the Court has the inherent authority to quash such untimely subpoenas. Although

the documents may have already been produced pursuant to the subpoenas, the Court

nonetheless exercises its inherent authority and quashes these untimely issued subpoenas.

It is also deeply troubling to the Court that NSU’s counsel in particular seems to

have engaged in gamesmanship in obtaining the requested documents. NSU’s counsel

2 Since 2013, a subpoena must be issued from the court where the action is pending, but a subpoena

may only be quashed by a court for the district where compliance is required. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

45(a)(2), (d)(3). Defendant properly issued the subpoenas from the Eastern District of Oklahoma,

see Docket No. 161, as the Court where the action is pending. However, both subpoenaed non-

parties are located outside of the Eastern District of Oklahoma and the subpoenas facially

command compliance in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Id. Therefore, this Court is not the proper

court in which to seek to quash the subpoenas. See, e,g,, Deselms as Trustee of Anita C. Deselms

Living Trust v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 2021 WL 2948747, at *2 (D. Wyo. June 16, 2021)

(“[W]here a subpoena-related matter is filed with the issuing court and not the court where

compliance is required, the issuing court lacks jurisdiction to decide the matter.”); In re Syngenta

Ag Mir 162 Corn Litig., 2017 WL 386835, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 27, 2017) (“Here, the subpoena

served on Mr. Carrato required compliance in San Francisco, California. Because compliance is

not required in the District of Kansas, this court cannot quash the subpoena or otherwise provide

the relief requested by Monsanto. [] Because this court is without power to quash the subpoena or

transfer the motion to itself, the motion is denied without prejudice to refiling in the Northern

District of California.”).

knew or should have known by January 4, 2024, that the subpoenas were disputed yet

ignored the requested meet and confer and apparently did nothing to advise the subpoenaed

parties of the dispute. Discovery is controlled by the Court and the parties are not free to

engage in discovery at their leisure, on their own timetable or under their own rules. The

Court expects better of both parties’ counsel than what has been displayed in this matter.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash

Subpoenas [Docket No. 162] is hereby GRANTED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that any

documents obtained pursuant to the quashed subpoenas are to be segregated from other

discovery and no such document shall not be admissible as an exhibit in this case without

express leave of Court. To obtain leave from the Court, Defendant must, at a minimum,

request leave which sets forth: (1) justification for why such document was not sought and

obtained during the permitted discovery period; and (2) how such document is relevant to

any claim or defense in this case.

DATED this 24th day of January 2024.

______________________________________

GERALD L. JACKSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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