Leyman v. Amazon Logistics, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

Jurnee Scott Leyman, Individually and as :

Administratrix of the Estate of Noah M. : Case No. 1:23-cv-828

Leyman, Deceased, :

: Judge Susan J. Dlott

Plaintiffs, :

: Order Transferring Case to

v. : Northern District of Texas

:

Amazon Logistics, Inc., et al., :

:

Defendants. :

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Lack of

Personal Jurisdiction and/or Forum Non Conveniens filed by Defendants Amazon Logistics, Inc.,

Amazon Logistics, LLC, Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon.com Sales, Inc., Amazon.com Services,

LLC, and Amazon Web Services, Inc. (collectively “Amazon” or “the Amazon Defendants”).

(Doc. 31.) Plaintiff Jurnee Scott Leyman filed this suit for personal injury and wrongful death on

behalf of herself and as the administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Noah M.

Leyman, against the Amazon Defendants, Defendant Timur Trucking, LLC (“Timur Trucking”),

and Defendants Firdavs Kubaev, Ergash Annakukov, and Kamiloddin Adilov (collectively, “the

Timur Agents”). Ms. Leyman alleges that her husband died when a tracker-trailer operated by

Kubaev and Annakukov and under the direction and control of Timur Trucking and the Amazon

Defendants, struck their vehicle on a divided highway in Texas. The Amazon Defendants now

move to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction and/or forum non conveniens.

Ms. Leyman has filed an Opposition brief, to which the Amazon Defendants filed a Reply.

(Docs. 32, 34.) Ms. Leyman requests that the Court transfer this case to the Northern District of

Texas in lieu of dismissal if the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the

Amazon Defendants. For the reasons that follow, the Court will GRANT the Motion to Dismiss

Complaint insofar as the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the Amazon

Defendants, but the Court will transfer this case to the Northern District of Texas rather than

dismiss the action.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

The Amazon Defendants appear to accept as true the allegations in the Complaint for

purposes of this Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Each of the Amazon Defendants is formed under

the laws of Delaware and has its principal places of business in Washington. (Doc. 1 at PageID

3–9.) Amazon Logistics, Inc. and Amazon Web Services, Inc. are registered to do business in

Ohio and have a registered agent in Ohio. (Id. at PageID 3, 9.) The Amazon Defendants engage

in business in Ohio through the warehousing of goods and products, the delivery and

transportation of goods and products, and “solicitation activities . . . to promote the sale,

consumption, and uses of its services.” (Id. at PageID 3–9.)

Timur Trucking is incorporated in Ohio and has its principal place of business in Warren

County, Ohio. (Id. at PageID 10–11.) Each Timur Agent was “an officer, owner, director, and

supervisor” at Timur Trucking, and each resides in Warren County, Ohio. (Id. at PageID 11.)

Timur Trucking has a history of safety violations documented by the Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Administration in 2022 and 2023. (Id. at PageID 17, 27–31.)

The Amazon Defendants comprise the world’s largest e-commerce and delivery

company. (Id. at PageID 12.) The Amazon Defendants use the “Amazon Delivery Partner”

website to solicit and contract with delivery partners to transport Amazon goods. (Id.) The

Amazon Delivery Website directs motor vehicle carriers to Amazon’s Relay electronic

application or to similar Amazon programs. (Id.) Amazon Relay allows motor carriers meeting

certain minimum qualifications to sign short-term contracts and has a Load Board where motor

carriers can instantly book delivery work across Amazon’s entire freight network. (Id. at PageID

13.) Amazon Relay has features for “(a) finding, booking, and delivering Amazon loads;

(b) assigning drivers; (c) accessing Amazon’s ‘Relay Board’; (d) tracking performance;

(e) viewing and downloading payment details; and (f) reporting issues to Amazon.” (Id. at

PageID 14.) Motor carriers and drivers use the Load Board in the Amazon Relay application to

search for and book assignments in their area. (Id. at PageID 15.) After a motor carrier books a

delivery, the carrier assigns a driver through the Amazon Relay application, and the assignment

appears on the driver’s Amazon Relay phone application. (Id. at PageID 16.) The Load Board

generates a navigation map for the driver specifying the route and delivery times. (Id.) The

drivers use the Amazon Relay application to report delays and update their delivery times. (Id.)

At some point before the collision that took Mr. Leyman’s life, Timur Trucking

contracted with the Amazon Defendants through the Amazon Relay application or similar

Amazon program to deliver Amazon products. (Id. at PageID 17, 27.) The Amazon Defendants

had engaged Timur Trucking to deliver goods interstate and on Ohio roadways. (Id. at PageID

33.) On an unspecified date, Amazon Logistics, Inc. provided a 2021 blue Hyundai translead

trailer, with Amazon labeling on the exterior, to Timur Trucking to deliver Amazon products.

(Id. at PageID 17.) On June 4, 2023, Kubaev and Annakukov, acting in the scope of their agency

and employment with the Amazon Defendants and with Timur Trucking, and driving a

Freightliner Cascadia with the 2021 blue Hyundai translead trailer, drove down the wrong side of

a divided highway on U.S. 287 in Potter County, Texas. (Id.) They struck a motor vehicle in

which Mr. Leyman was the driver and Ms. Leyman was a passenger, killing Mr. Leyman and

causing injury to Ms. Leyman. (Id. at PageID 18.)

The Amazon Defendants assert additional facts via the sworn Declaration of Ryan

Sandefur, an Amazon senior operations manager:

4. Amazon posts available shipments to an online load board (called the

Relay Load Board), which is virtually accessible by any of the thousands of motor

carriers Amazon contracts with nationally that may choose to transport the load.

5. On or before May 24, 2023, Amazon made available a shipment of a

trailer asset unit from an Amazon facility in Albuquerque, New Mexico to an

Amazon facility in Dallas, Texas on its Relay Load Board. Shortly thereafter,

Timur Trucking, LLC (Amazon Relay carrier “AGKOP”) accepted responsibility

for transporting the trailer asset unit from New Mexico Amazon to Texas and

assigned a driver, Firdavs Kubaev. Amazon generated an internal identification

number for the shipment that was made available to Mr. Kubaev for use when

picking up the load at the Amazon facility.

(Doc. 31-1 at PageID 175.) His assertions do not contradict the jurisdictional facts set forth in

the Complaint. Significantly, Ms. Leyman does not contest the validity of his factual assertions.

B. Procedural History

On December 20, 2023, Ms. Leyman filed this suit on behalf of herself and Mr.

Leyman’s estate against the Amazon Defendants, Timur Trucking, and the Timur Agents

asserting the following claims:

Count I: Negligence/Recklessness/Vicarious Liability against all Defendants;

Count II: Negligent Hiring, Training, Retention, and Supervision against the

Amazon Defendants and Timur Trucking;

Count III: Negligent Entrustment against Timur Trucking;

Count IV: Negligent Entrustment and Negligent Hiring against the Amazon

Defendants;

Count V: Vicarious Liability against the Amazon Defendants; and

Count VI: Loss of Consortium against all Defendants.

(Doc. 1 at PageID 19–35.)

The Amazon Defendants have filed the pending Motion to Dismiss Complaint for lack of

personal jurisdiction and/or for forum non conveniens. (Doc. 31.) Ms. Leyman opposes

dismissal. (Doc. 32.) She requests that if the Court is inclined to dismiss the Amazon

Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court first grant her leave to conduct

jurisdictional discovery and submit supplemental briefing. (Id. at PageID 192.) She additionally

requests that if the Court then concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the Amazon

Defendants, that it transfer this case to the Northern District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1631. (Id.)

II. STANDARD OF LAW FOR RULE 12(b)(2) MOTION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes a defendant to move for dismissal

based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the court

can exercise personal jurisdiction over each defendant. Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d

605, 615 (6th Cir. 2005). Where the facts are undisputed such that no evidentiary hearing is

necessary, or where the district court exercises its discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing on the

jurisdiction issue, then the plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the

evidence. Dean v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 134 F.3d 1269, 1272 (6th Cir. 1998). On the other

hand, where facts are disputed and the district court bases its decision solely on the basis of

written submissions without an evidentiary hearing, then “the plaintiff’s burden is solely to make

a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists.” Stolle Mach. Co., LLC v. RAM Precision Indus.,

605 F. App’x 473, 479–480 (6th Cir. 2015). “In that instance, the pleadings and affidavits

submitted must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the district court should

not weigh the controverting assertions of the party seeking dismissal.” Air Prod. & Controls,

Inc. v. Safetech Int’l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation and citation

omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdictional Discovery

As a threshold matter, neither party disputes the jurisdictional facts asserted by Ms.

Leyman in the Complaint nor by Ryan Sandefur in his sworn Declaration on behalf of the

Amazon Defendants. Nonetheless, Ms. Leyman asks the Court to grant her leave to take

jurisdictional discovery if the Court is inclined to grant dismissal on the basis of lack of personal

jurisdiction. The Court has discretion to permit jurisdictional discovery when faced with a Rule

12(b)(2) motion. See Malone v. Stanley Black & Decker, 965 F.3d 499, 505 (2020). The Court

declines to grant discovery here because Ms. Leyman has not identified any contested facts or

topics for discovery which would be material to the Court’s resolution of the jurisdictional issue.

As explained below, the Court finds on the basis of the written submissions alone that Ms.

Leyman has not established the Court’s personal jurisdiction under even the more lenient prima

facie case standard.

B. Ohio’s Long-Arm Statute

The Court next turns to the issue of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the

Amazon Defendant’s comports with Ohio’s long-arm statute and is consistent with constitutional

due process.1 Ohio’s long-arm statute provides in relevant part as follows:

1 In 2020 and 2021, Ohio’s personal jurisdiction statute was amended. Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382. (2020 S.10, eff.

4-7-2021; 2020 H. 272, eff. 12-16-2020). Subsection (C) was modified to state that “[i]n addition to a court’s

exercise of personal jurisdiction under division (A) of this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a

person on any basis consistent with the Ohio Constitution and the United States Constitution.”

Prior to the amendment of Ohio Revised Code § 2307.382(C), the Sixth Circuit held that Ohio’s long-arm statute did

not extend to the constitutional limits of the Due Process Clause. Calphalon Corp., 228 F.3d at 721; Goldstein v.

Christiansen, 70 Ohio St. 3d 232, 638 N.E.2d 541, 545 n.1 (1994). It required a “particularized inquiry” under the

long-arm statute “wholly separate from the analysis of Federal Due Process law.” Conn v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705,

712 (6th Cir. 2012).

(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or

by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s:

(1) Transacting any business in this state;

(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state;

* * * *

(C) In addition to a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction under division (A) of

this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person on any basis

consistent with the Ohio Constitution and the United States Constitution.

Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382. Ms. Leyman argues that the facts alleged support a finding of

jurisdiction under § 2307.382(A)(1) and (2). Ms. Leyman does not address § 2307.382(C),

which became effective in April 2021. At least one court in the Southern District of Ohio has

held that the purpose of revised subsection (C) is merely to provide for the exercise of general

jurisdiction in Ohio, while subsection (A) continues to govern the principle of specific

jurisdiction in Ohio. Premier Prop. Sales Ltd. v. Gospel Ministries Int’l, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 3d

822, 827 n. 2 (S.D. Ohio 2021). Ms. Leyman does not assert that the Court could exercise

general jurisdiction over the Amazon Defendants. The Court, therefore, will focus its attention

on § 2307.382(A)(1) and (2).

Ms. Leyman argues that § 2307.382(A)(1) and (2) are satisfied because she alleges in the

Complaint that the Amazon Defendants contracted with Timur Trucking, an Ohio company, to

It appears that no Ohio court has opined on the meaning of § 2307.382(C). Several federal district courts have held

that Ohio’s long-arm statute now is “coextensive to the limits of the federal Due Process Clause.” Elzayn v. Trad,

No. 2:23-CV-2407, 2024 WL 1367801, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 1, 2024); see also Taner Eren v. Summit Managed

Solutions, LLC, No. 1:22 CV 2340, 2024 WL 2273388, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 2024); Midwest Motor Supply Co.

v. Nietsch, No. 2:22-CV-4049, 2023 WL 8649898, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 14, 2023). However, as stated above, at

least one court in the Southern District of Ohio has held that subsection (C) provides for the exercise of general

jurisdiction in Ohio, but subsection (A) continues to govern the principle of specific jurisdiction in Ohio. Premier

Prop. Sales Ltd., 539 F. Supp. 3d at 827 n. 2. This makes sense, because if subsection (C) applies to the issue of

specific jurisdiction to make the Ohio long-arm statute co-extensive with federal due process, then subsection (A) no

longer has any purpose. Perhaps that is why, in 2022, the Supreme Court of Ohio analyzed specific jurisdiction both

under subsection (A) of the long-arm statute and under the Due Process Clause without addressing subsection (C).

LG Chem, Ltd. v. Goulding, 167 Ohio St. 3d 488, 2022-Ohio-2065, 194 N.E.2d 355.

deliver Amazon products for payment, and therefore the Amazon Defendants were obligated to

pay Timur Trucking in Ohio. She further alleges that the Amazon Defendants provided Timur

Trucking access to the Relay Application and other services in Ohio. (Doc. 32 at PageID 181–

183.) In response, the Amazon Defendants argue that the long-arm statute is not satisfied

because their conduct in Ohio is not the proximate cause of Ms. Leyman’s injuries or damages.

“[T]he Ohio long-arm statute requires a ‘proximate cause’ relationship between the defendant’s

act and the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Lexon Ins. Co. v. Devinshire Land Dev., LLC, 573 F.

App’x 427, 429 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Arnold v. CooperSurgical, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 3d 803,

818 (S.D. Ohio 2023). But-for causation is not sufficient. Lexon Ins. Co., 573 F. App’x at 429.

Proximate cause is defined in Ohio “as a happening or event that as a natural or continuing

sequence, produces an injury without which the injury would not have occurred.” McDougall v.

Smith, 2010-Ohio-6069, ¶ 5, 191 Ohio App. 3d 101, 944 N.E.2d 1218, 1219.

Unfortunately, Ms. Leyman fails to specifically address the proximate causation issue in

her Opposition brief. She does not assert a theory of how the Amazon Defendants’ activities in

or directed to Ohio proximately caused the fatal collision between Timur Trucking and the

Leymans in Texas. Of course, the general business activities of Amazon in Ohio—warehousing,

transporting, and delivering goods in and through the state—are not related to Ms. Leyman’s

claims. Nor are Amazon’s acts of entering into a contract with Timur Trucking, allowing Timur

Trucking access to its Relay application in Ohio, or obligating itself to make payments to Timur

Trucking in Ohio the proximate cause of Ms. Leyman’s injuries and damages. Rather, Timur

Trucking chose to book the assignment to deliver goods from New Mexico to Texas through the

Relay application. Timur Trucking assigned the particular drivers, Kubaev and Annakukov, for

the delivery. Kubaev and Annakukov then drove the commercial truck “negligently, recklessly,

and wantonly [and] crossed from the southbound lane of US 287 [in Texas], heading on into the

northbound lane, traveling on the wrong side of the roadway on a separate highway.” (Doc. 1 at

PageID 18.) In sum, Amazon’s limited acts directed to Ohio through its contractual relationship

with Timur Trucking are not, on the facts alleged, the proximate cause for the fatal accident

resulting from the reckless and wanton driving of Kubaev and Annakukov. To the extent that the

Amazon Defendants had a duty to control and direct the drivers through the Relay application

during the delivery assignment, such conduct by the Amazon Defendants occurred in Texas or at

Amazon’s principal place of business in Washington.

An Ohio court reached a similar decision in the only case on point cited by either party.

In Debeer v. Amazon Logistics, Inc., No. 2022CV00223, 2022 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 3975 (Ct.

Com. Pl. June 22, 2022), the plaintiff sued Amazon in Ohio for a collision occurring in

Minnesota between the plaintiff’s decedent and a truck driver hired by an Ohio corporation to

deliver Amazon goods from New Jersey to Idaho. Id. at PageID *1–2, 6–7.2 The court found

that the plaintiff’s claim did not “arise out of Amazon transacting any business in Ohio,

contracting to supply services or goods in Ohio, or causing tortious injury by an act or omission

committed in Ohio” for purposes of the long-arm statute. Id. at *6–7 (emphases in the original).

This Court agrees. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Amazon Defendants under the

Ohio long-arm statute.

C. Specific Jurisdiction—Due Process

To satisfy the Due Process Clause, a defendant must have had “minimum contacts” with

the forum state “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal

2 There was a dispute whether the driver, in fact, was engaged by the Ohio corporation sued as a defendant or by

another entity. Id. at *6–7. The court stated that personal jurisdiction did not exist over the Ohio corporation even if

the allegation was true. Id.

quotation and citation omitted). A defendant should not be “haled into a jurisdiction solely as a

result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.” Blessing v. Chandrasekhar, 988 F.3d 889,

904 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). A

defendant’s contacts with the forum state can give rise to either general or specific jurisdiction.

Ms. Leyman asserts that jurisdiction is appropriate under a specific jurisdiction analysis.3

The Supreme Court also explained the governing principles of specific jurisdiction as

follows:

Specific jurisdiction is very different [than general jurisdiction]. In order for a

state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, the suit must aris[e] out of or relat[e]

to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. In other words, there must be an

affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an]

activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore

subject to the State’s regulation. For this reason, specific jurisdiction is confined

to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy

that establishes jurisdiction.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017)

(internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in the original).

The Sixth Circuit applies the following three-prong test for specific jurisdiction:

First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in

the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of

action must arise from the defendant’s activities there. Finally, the acts of the

defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial

enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over

the defendant reasonable.

AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington, 836 F.3d 543, 549–550 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

The first prong—purposeful availment—can be shown with a showing of a “regular

course of business” conducted in the state. AMB Media, LLC v. OneMB, LLC, No. 23-5607,

2024 WL 2052151, at *5 (6th Cir. May 8, 2024). The “[u]se of an interactive website to sell

3 By failing to address the Amazon Defendants’ general jurisdiction arguments, Ms. Leyman has waived the right to

assert that they were subject to general jurisdiction in Ohio.

products into a forum creates jurisdiction” where “that course of conduct pairs a willingness to

sell into the forum with regular sales.” Id. at *4. Directly or affirmatively targeting a state is

another way to show purposeful availment. Id. at *5. Ms. Leyman argues that the Amazon

Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of acting in Ohio when they

engaged in the business of warehousing, delivering, and transporting products in and through

Ohio. She further points out that they contracted with Timur Trucking, an Ohio company, to

serve as a delivery partner. The Court finds she has satisfied the purposeful availment prong.

However, the Court notes that jurisdictional facts do not suggest that the Amazon Defendants

affirmatively targeted an Ohio company for this particular assignment to deliver the Amazon

goods from New Mexico to Texas. Rather, the assignment was made widely available on the

Relay application to all motor carriers with whom Amazon contracts.

Ms. Leyman has a more difficult time establishing the second and third prongs—whether

the claims arise out of or relate to the Ohio conduct and whether exercising jurisdiction is

reasonable. The second prong does not require a showing of proximate causation. See Ford

Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 592 U.S. 351, 361 (2021); Sullivan v. LG Chem,

Ltd., 79 F.4th 651, 672 (6th Cir. 2023). The Supreme Court explained:

[O]ur most common formulation of the rule demands that the suit “arise out of or

relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” The first half of that standard

asks about causation; but the back half, after the “or,” contemplates that some

relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing. That does not

mean anything goes. In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the phrase “relate to”

incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign to a

forum. But again, we have never framed the specific jurisdiction inquiry as

always requiring proof of causation—i.e., proof that the plaintiff’s claim came

about because of the defendant’s in-state conduct.

Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 362 (citations omitted). “The foreign defendant’s ‘suit-related

conduct’ must establish ‘a substantial connection with the forum State.’” Power Invs., LLC v. SL

EC, LLC, 927 F.3d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284

(2014)).

To begin, Ms. Leyman’s claims against the Amazon Defendants do not arise out of or

relate to the fact that Amazon warehouses, transports, or delivers goods in and through Ohio.

The fatal collision on June 4, 2023 in Texas did not involve the warehousing, transportation, or

delivery of goods in or through Ohio. Instead, Ms. Leyman asserts that her tort claims based on

the collision arise from or relate to the transportation contract between the Amazon Defendants

and Timur Trucking, an Ohio company.4 That is true in the broadest sense. Nonetheless, the

exercise of jurisdiction over the Amazon Defendants in the Southern District of Ohio would not

be reasonable under the facts presented.

Courts look at a number of factors to determine if the exercise of jurisdiction is

reasonable including “(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interest of the forum state; (3) the

plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; and (4) other states’ interest in securing the most efficient

resolution of the [suit].” AlixPartners, 836 F.3d at 552 (citation omitted). The Amazon

Defendants have their principal places of business in Washington, and Ms. Leyman resides in

Georgia, so neither has a strong connection to Ohio. Both will be required to travel whether the

case proceeds in Ohio or Texas.5 Ms. Leyman has indicated her willingness to pursue these

claims in the Northern District of Texas. The people in the state of Texas have a substantial

interest in resolving the issue of liability for a fatal traffic accident occurring on its roadway.

Finally, as explained more below, the people of the state of Ohio have minimal, if any, interests

in this litigation when the shipment of goods and the alleged negligent or reckless conduct

occurred in Texas.

4 The Court does not find it relevant that Timur Trucking selected drivers who reside in Ohio. The Court only

considers the acts the Amazon Defendants themselves direct towards Ohio.

5 Timur Trucking and the Timur Drivers reside in Ohio, but they were conducting business in Texas at the time of

the accident so both forums should be acceptable to them.

It is useful to ask what activity or occurrence by the defendants in the forum state might

be subject to the state’s regulation. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 582 U.S. at 262 (stating “there

must be an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an]

activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s

regulation”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Ohio could have an interest in enforcing

the contract between the Amazon Defendants and Timur Trucking, an Ohio company, but that

interest does not arise here because there are no claims that the contract is invalid or was

breached. Whatever duty the Amazon Defendants had to oversee or direct the June 4, 2023

delivery by Timur Trucking, that duty arose or took place in Texas where the collision took place

or in Washington where the Amazon Defendants have their principal places of business.

In sum, the acts or conduct directed to Ohio—the Amazon Defendants contracting with

an Ohio trucking company—are attenuated from tort claims arising from the tragic collision in

Texas. The Supreme Court has called “a strong relationship among the defendant, the forum,

and the litigation” the “essential foundation of specific jurisdiction.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S.

at 365 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Here, no strong relationship exists among the

Amazon Defendants, the Ohio forum, and the litigation. This Court agrees with the Ohio court

which determined in similar factual circumstances that exercising personal jurisdiction over

Amazon would be unreasonable:

[That] Amazon’s electronic posting for this cargo shipment from New Jersey to

Idaho was accepted on an online load board by a trucking company that happens

to be incorporated in Ohio . . . illustrates precisely the type of ‘random, fortuitous,

or attenuated’ contact between Amazon and some other entity affiliated with Ohio

that has been found insufficient to justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction

within the bounds of Constitutional due process. Plaintiff essentially contends

that jurisdiction as to Amazon should be found merely because the company that

signed up to haul this shipment from New Jersey to Idaho (using a driver from

Colorado) was incorporated in Ohio. Those facts, even if true, do not establish a

meaningful connection between Amazon and the State of Ohio sufficient to create

jurisdiction within the bounds of due process.

Debeer, 2022 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 3975, at *10–11. Timur Trucking is both incorporated and has

its principal place of business in Ohio, but that distinction is not material when the jurisdictional

facts are considered as a whole. The passive act of allowing an Ohio trucking company to book

an assignment through the Relay application to deliver Amazon goods through two other states is

not sufficient in these circumstances to confer specific jurisdiction over the Amazon Defendants

in the Southern District of Ohio.6

D. Transfer of Jurisdiction

Ms. Leyman requests that the Court transfer this action to the Northern District of Texas

in lieu of dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 upon a finding of lack of personal jurisdiction

over the Amazon Defendants. “Whenever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and that court finds

that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such

action . . . to any other such court . . . in which the action or appeal could have been brought at

the time it was filed or noticed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. In this case, there is not a complete want of

jurisdiction because the Court has personal jurisdiction over Timur Trucking, Kubaev,

Annakukov, and Adilov. Nonetheless, transfer is warranted under 28 U.S.C § 1404(a) even if it

is not warranted under § 1631. “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of

justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it

might have been brought . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

It is in the interest of justice to transfer this case to the Northern District of Texas so that

all claims against all parties can be litigated in one forum. Ms. Leyman has indicated her

preference that the case be transferred rather than dismissed. The Defendants do not appear to

6 The Court need not examine whether dismissal of the Amazon Defendants would be appropriate under the

doctrine of forum non conveniens given its holding that it lacks personal jurisdiction over them.

have reasonable grounds to object to jurisdiction or venue in the Northern District of Texas.

Finally, the people in the State of Texas have a greater interest in adjudicating claims arising

from a fatal traffic collision that occurred in Texas than do the people in the State of Ohio. Non-

party witnesses and evidence concerning the collision will be in Texas. Accordingly, the Court

will transfer this case to the Northern District of Texas.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction and/or Forum Non Conveniens (Doc. 31) is GRANTED insofar as the Court finds

that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants Amazon Logistics, Inc., Amazon Logistics,

LLC, Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon.com Sales, Inc., Amazon.com Services, LLC, and Amazon

Web Services, Inc. However, the Court TRANSFERS this case to the Northern District of

Texas in lieu of dismissal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT:

S/Susan J. Dlott

Susan J. Dlott

United States District Judge