Chapman v. Yost

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

TASHA CHAPMAN,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:24-cv-1865

Judge Michael H. Watson

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

DAVID YOST,

Defendants.

ORDER AND INITIAL SCREEN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Tasha Chapman’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2) is GRANTED. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is required to pay the full

amount of the Court’s $405.00 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). It is ORDERED that

Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute her action without prepayment of fees or costs and that judicial

officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid.

This matter is also before the Court for consideration of the Motion by Pro Se Litigant to

Obtain Electronic Case Filing Rights. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff, appearing pro se, seeks leave to

participate in electronic case filing (e-filing) in this action. (Id.) Plaintiff’s Motion, ECF No. 2,

is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

This matter is also before the Court for an initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of

Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. Having performed the initial screen of the

Complaint required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A, for the reasons that follow, it is

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED in its entirety.

I.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1 as part of the

statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--

* * *

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

1 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on

a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for

the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court

holds pro se ain complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th

Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II.

Plaintiff, proceeding without the assistance of counsel, brings this action pursuant to the

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (the “FDCPA”), alleging that

Defendant – the Attorney General of Ohio – has engaged in unlawful debt collection practices

related to Plaintiff’s unpaid court costs in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. (See

ECF No. 1-1.)1 A claim under the FDCPA has four elements: (1) Plaintiff is a “consumer” as

defined in Section 1692a(3); (2) the “debt” arises out of a transaction which is “primarily for

personal, family, or household purposes”; (3) Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined in

Section 1692a(6); and (4) Defendant has violated one of the prohibitions in the FDCPA. Martin

v. PHH Mortg. Corp., No. 2:23-CV-159, 2023 WL 5241546, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2023)

(citing Wallace v. Washington Mutual Bank, F.A., 683 F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 2012)).

Against that backdrop, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the FDCPA. While

Plaintiff frames her grievance as relating to Defendant’s collection of unpaid court costs, it is

clear that Plaintiff actually challenges the legitimacy of those costs – not the collection of them.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (the “FCCCP”)

offices have been “vacant” since February 3, 2023 and that they “are currently hijacked by civil

servant impersonators” who have no legal authority. (ECF No. 1-1 at PAGEID ## 6-8.) From

these allegations, Plaintiff concludes that the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas “is NOT

a ‘court of competent jurisdiction’” and instead is “currently an organized crime operation

1 Plaintiff also suggests that Defendant and certain non-parties have violated other federal and

state statutes, as well as the United States Constitution, see ECF No. 1-1 at PAGEID ## 5-7, but

it is clear to the Court that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants ultimately only pertain to alleged

collection letters served upon Plaintiff for payment of a state court debt. (See id. at PAGEID #

11, ¶ 15 (“For all these reasons the collection letters are unfair practices . . . and violate[] 15

U.S.C. 1692 ‘e’ and ‘f’, § 806 and § 808 of the FDCPA.”) (emphasis in original); PAGEID ##

11-12 (seeking injunctive relief “compelling compliance of the FDCPA”).)

engaging in unconstitutional[] felony convictions . . . in a conspiracy” to target African

Americans. (Id. at PAGEID # 8, ¶ 10 (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff then alleges that that the

FCCCP Clerk of Courts has unlawfully charged her for unpaid civil court costs. (Id. at PAGEID

# 9, ¶ 11.) Because Plaintiff believes the FCCCP is not a court of competent jurisdiction, she

alleges that Defendant has made a false and misleading representation, in violation of the

FDCPA, by identifying the FCCCP as the creditor. (Id. at PAGEID # 10, ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint is misguided. Even liberally taking the remainder of Plaintiff’s

allegations as true, it was not “false and misleading” for Defendant to identify the FCCCP as the

creditor of the underlying debt for purposes of stating a claim under the FDCPA. By Plaintiff’s

own admission, the FCCCP is the creditor which has charged her fees and seeks her payment,

regardless of whether Plaintiff believes the FCCCP is a court of competent jurisdiction. (ECF

No. 1-1 at PAGEID # 9, ¶ 11.) Accordingly, while Plaintiff “do[es] not acknowledge owing one

penny” to the FCCCP, id. at PAGEID # 10, ¶ 13, Plaintiff’s claim goes towards the validity of

the underlying debt – not Defendant’s statements regarding it.

For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a viable claim under the FDCPA.

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims in their

entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be

granted.

III.

For the reasons explained above, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be

DISMISSED in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is

FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that

for the foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation

would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.

See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge

and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. Even when timely

objections are filed, appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v.

Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report,

which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . .

.” (citation omitted)).

Date: April 22, 2024 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers

ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE