Opinion

1661, Inc. v. Goatlift, LLC

Court
District Court, S.D. Ohio
Filed
Mar 27, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.4%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

1661, Inc., a Delaware corporation

doing business as GOAT,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:24-cv-78

V. Judge Michael H. Watson

Goatlift, LLC, an Ohio limited Magistrate Judge Jolson

liability company,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

On January 9, 2024, 1661, Inc. (“Plaintiff’) sued Goatlift, LLC (“Defendant”)

and ten John and Jane Doe defendants under the Lanham Act, Ohio Deceptive

Trade Practices Act, and Ohio common law. Compl., ECF No. 2. Defendant was

served two days later. ECF No. 5. After Defendant failed to timely answer the

Complaint, Plaintiff received an entry of default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 55(a). Entry of Def., ECF No. 7. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the

John and Jane Doe defendants but moves for default judgment against

Defendant. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 12; Mot. Def. J., ECF No. 11. Defendant

failed to timely respond to the motion for default judgment.

“Once default is entered, the defaulting party is deemed to have admitted

all of the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint regarding liability .. . .”

Zinganything, LLC v. Import Store, 158 F. Supp. 3d 668, 670 (N.D. Ohio 2016)

(citations omitted). But “[e]ven though the well-pleaded factual allegations of the

complaint are accepted as true for the purpose of determining liability, the Court

must still determine whether those facts are sufficient to state a claim for relief

.... Id. at 672 (citation omitted).

Here, even considering the factual allegations in the Complaint as true, the

Court seriously doubts whether Defendant’s marks pose a likelihood of confusion

and, accordingly, whether Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment on its claims.

Instead of deciding that issue, however, the Court elects to STAY this litigation

until conclusion of the opposition proceedings pending before the Trademark

Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”).

“Whether to grant . . .a stay pending an administrative proceeding appears

to be within this Court’s reasonable discretion.” CTP Innovations, LLC v. V.G.

Reed and Sons, Inc., 2014 WL 12726073, at *1 (W.D. Ky. July 18, 2014) (citation

omitted); Goulas v. Goulas, No. 08-cv-12712, 2009 WL 33431, at *1 (E.D. Mich.

Jan. 5, 2009) (“A district court can, at its discretion, stay an action pending the

conclusion of an alternative administrative proceeding.” (citation omitted)). The

Court considers the totality of the circumstances, including “(1) whether the stay

will unduly prejudice a non-moving party; (2) whether the stay will allow for

simplification of the issues in this litigation; . . . and (3) whether the particular

stage in the litigation makes a stay convenient.” CTP Innovations, LLC, 2014 WL

12726073, at *1 (citation omitted).

First, a stay will not prejudice Plaintiff. Plaintiff noticed its opposition to

Defendant’s marks (Applications 88/700640, 88/712447, and 88/712494) in the

Case No. 2:24-cv-78 Page 2 of 5

TTAB proceedings on September 2, 2020.' Unlike here, the TTAB docket

demonstrates that both parties have been actively involved in the opposition

proceedings, with briefing on each application to be completed within

approximately one month. Yet, Plaintiff waited until January of this year—over

three years—to file its civil suit in this Court. Given that Plaintiff proceeded

before the TTAB for three years before filing suit, Plaintiff will not be prejudiced

by waiting for a conclusion of those proceedings.

Second, the stay will simplify issues in this litigation. “Opposition

proceedings before the TTAB are in many ways similar to a civil action in a

federal district court.” B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138,

143 (2015) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Indeed, “the same

likelinood-of-confusion standard applies to both registration and infringement.”

Id. at 154. And, “[s]o long as the other ordinary elements of issue preclusion are

met, when the usages adjudicated by the TTAB are materially the same as those

before the district court, issue preclusion should apply.” /d. at 160.

Thus, if TTAB finds Defendant’s marks will cause a likelihood of confusion,

and that decision is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, Plaintiff is entitled to

default judgment in this case. Alternatively, an upheld TTAB decision of “no

likelihood of confusion” will mean Plaintiff is not entitled to default judgment.

Either way, a final TTAB decision will be binding on this Court. /d.

' The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the filings on TTAB dockets. E.g.,

Davis v. Hollywood and Ivar, LLC, 2021 WL 4816822, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2021).

Case No. 2:24-cv-78 Page 3 of 5

Third, the stage of litigation makes a stay convenient. Ordinarily, it would

be more efficient to resolve a motion for default judgment than to await a final

administrative decision that will affect the same. But, as alluded to above,

Plaintiff's success on its claims is not guaranteed. Instead, the Court would need

to perform a full “likelihood of confusion” analysis based on the alleged facts.

That requires analysis of an eight-factor test—a test Plaintiff did not even cite, let

alone engage fully with, in its motion. Thus, although the civil action is at the

default judgment stage, this is one of the rare instances where it is more

convenient to stay the litigation in favor of the administrative proceeding.

While many courts have refused to stay civil infringement actions pending

conclusion of TTAB opposition proceedings, others have granted a stay. E.g.,

Shaf Int'l, Inc. v. Ultimate Leather Apparel, Inc., 2021 WL 409757 (D.N.J. Feb. 5,

2021) (upholding a magistrate judge’s grant of a stay pending TTAB

proceedings); Branded, LLC v. Vans, Inc., No. SACV 20-2085 JVS (KESx), 2020

WL 8385656, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2020) (“Considering how advanced the

TTAB proceedings are, the Court considers it proper to let them run their course.

Regardless of the outcome, the issues will be simplified for this court, promoting

judicial economy.”); Tigercat Int'l, Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., No. 16-cv-1047-GMS,

2018 WL 2049816, at *4 (D. Del. May 2, 2018) (“Even absent a preclusive effect,

courts look to the TTAB for its analysis on both the issues of likelinood-of-

confusion and dilution as highly instructive and persuasive.” (citation omitted));

Anstalt v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., No. CV 16-06411-GHK (FFMx), 2016 WL 7635955,

Case No. 2:24-cv-78 Page 4 of 5

at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2016) (“At a minimum, TTAB’s ruling on the likelinood-

of-confusion issue will be highly persuasive authority. It might even have

preclusive effect.” (citation omitted)). Given that all three factors favor a stay

here, a stay is appropriate.

Accordingly, the Clerk shall STAY this case. Plaintiff shall FILE a status

update every NINETY DAYS indicating the status of the TTAB opposition

proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED. | . □ ; J Mon

ICHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. 2:24-cv-78 Page 5 of 5

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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