Martinez-Porte v. Multi-Color Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

RICARDO MARTINEZ-PORTE,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:22-cv-768

v. JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE

MULTI-COLOR CORPORATION,

et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Ricardo Martinez-Porte, a Mexican citizen, has sued two American

corporations—Defendants Multi-Color Corporation, a Delaware corporation whose

principal place of business is in Ohio, and W/S Packaging Group, Inc. (WSPG), a

Wisconsin corporation1—over a corporate dispute that arose in Mexico. In particular,

the two American corporations are alleged to be either direct or indirect shareholders

in WS Packaging Mexico, S.A. de C.V. (WSMEX), a Mexican corporation, in which

Martinez-Porte was also a shareholder and the chief executive. (Am. Compl., Doc. 10,

1 As explained further below, Martinez-Porte claims that WSPG is no longer an entity with

corporate personhood due to a purported merger between Multi-Color and WSPG. (Doc. 10

¶ 52, #287). Yet, in his Complaint, Martinez-Porte alleged that WSPG is “a corporation

incorporated under Wisconsin law” that “purport[s] to do business” from a street address

located in Wisconsin. (Id. ¶ 24, #282). Further shifting the goal posts, Martinez-Porte has

since contended that WSPG is domiciled in Ohio based on a 2022 stock certificate attached

to his Amended Complaint. (Doc. 13, #707, 710 n.6 (citing Doc. 10-6, #369)). That WSPG once

purportedly had an address in Ohio and is claimed to be subject to personal jurisdiction here

does not conflict with the allegation in Martinez-Porte’s complaint that WSPG is incorporated

and has its principal place of business in Wisconsin. As a result, at this stage in the litigation,

the Court accepts as true the allegation that WSPG calls Wisconsin its corporate home. Nolan

v. Detroit Edison Co., 991 F.3d 697, 707–08 (6th Cir. 2021) (explaining that at the motion-to-

dismiss stage, an “exhibit trumps the allegations” only to the extent that the contradiction

“render[s] the[ allegations] implausible” (citation omitted)).

#276–82). Using (or misusing) their shareholder powers in Mexico, Defendants

allegedly ousted Martinez-Porte from WSMEX. (Id.). Martinez-Porte argues that

their actions violated WSMEX’s by-laws and applicable Mexican corporate law,

constituted unjust enrichment, and resulted in conversion of WSMEX’s assets. (Id. at

#311–16).

Defendants have now moved to dismiss Martinez-Porte’s Amended Complaint.

(Doc. 12). They contend that the Amended Complaint must be dismissed for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, that the Court should dismiss the action

under the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens because Martinez-Porte’s

suit should be heard in Mexico. (Id. at #379).

As further explained below, the Court agrees with Defendants on the forum

non conveniens front. Martinez-Porte’s suit is better heard in Mexico, where the facts

giving rise to this suit occurred, rather than in an Ohio court foreign to the dispute.

And because the Court dismisses the suit on forum non conveniens grounds, the

Court declines to opine on whether Martinez-Porte has failed to state a claim—

whether under Mexican, Ohio, or any other applicable law. Thus, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) pursuant to the doctrine of forum non

conveniens and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Martinez-Porte’s Amended

Complaint (Doc. 10).

BACKGROUND2

Martinez-Porte started the earliest iteration of WSMEX some thirty-five years

ago as a wholly owned printing label company located and operating in Mexico. (Doc.

10 ¶¶ 29–32, #282–83). As part of his plan to expand WSMEX’s operations, Martinez-

Porte sold 60 percent of the corporation’s shares to an outside investor in 1995. (Id.

¶¶ 33–34, #283). In connection with that sale, he created by-laws and a board of

directors to govern WSMEX’s future operations and to balance the interests of its

majority and minority shareholders. (Id. ¶¶ 35–39, #284).

That 60 percent majority interest has changed hands over the years. (Id. ¶ 40,

#284–85). Part of the dispute before the Court centers on who is the most recent

owner and what corporate identities remain after a disputed merger involving the 60

percent shareowner. (Id.; Doc. 12, #389–90). According to Martinez-Porte, one of the

defendants here, WSPG, obtained the 60 percent interest in WSMEX in 2008. (Doc.

10 ¶ 40, #284–85). And he further alleges that the interest transferred to Multi-Color

in 2019 via a merger between Multi-Color and WSPG orchestrated by a company

named Platinum Equity. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 44–56, #285–93). According to Martinez-Porte,

2 Normally, when a matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept

the allegations in the Complaint as true. Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d

426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). But with respect to motions to dismiss pursuant to forum non

conveniens, the Court is not limited to just the allegations in the Complaint and may

“consider materials outside the complaint,” such as affidavits and declarations submitted by

the parties. Mallory v. Am. Mgmt. Ass’n Int’l, No. 3:13-cv-379, 2014 WL 12676180, at *4 &

n.6 (E.D. Tenn. May 19, 2014) (citing Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 830 (6th Cir.

2009), and Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 259 (1981)). So in reporting the

background here, in light of the Court’s decision to dispose of this motion on forum non

conveniens grounds, the Court relies on both the allegations in the Complaint (with the

caveat that they are just that—allegations) and, where expressly noted, the several affidavits

and declarations submitted by the parties as exhibits to their papers.

this merger between WSPG and Multi-Color destroyed WSPG’s separate corporate

existence, and instead transformed it in a business unit operating within Multi-Color

without a separate corporate identity. (Id. ¶ 52, #287).

Defendants say that is not so. First, they contend that WSPG did not obtain

the 60 percent ownership interest in WSMEX in 2008. Rather, they say that WSPG

obtained it in 2019. Second, they say WSPG did not buy the interest directly from

WSMEX or Martinez-Porte, but rather became the shareholder when WSPG merged

with a separate entity named Wisconsin Label Corporation, which owned the

WSMEX shares at the time of the merger. (Doc. 12, #389 n.3 (citing Doc. 12-1, #420–

21)). Finally, Defendants cite SEC filings related to the merger Martinez-Porte

highlights in his Amended Complaint (allegedly between WSPG and Multi-Color) to

argue that it was WSPG’s parent corporation (similarly named W/S Packaging

Holdings, Inc.)—not WSPG itself—that merged with Multi-Color. (Doc. 12, #390–91

(citing Docs. 12-2, 12-3)). As a result of that merger, WSPG (which owns the WSMEX

shares) became a wholly-owned subsidiary corporation of Multi-Color. (Id. at #386).

But as a subsidiary, Defendants claim WSPG continues to exist and to conduct

business as a separate corporate entity. (Doc. 12, #391; Doc. 12-5, #448). And it is that

separate corporate entity, or so Defendants claim, that owns the majority interest in

WSMEX—not Multi-Color.3 (Doc. 12, #389–91).

3 This dispute over the corporate ownership of the majority interest in WSMEX and Multi-

Color’s corporate structure is one example of the myriad factual challenges to Martinez-

Porte’s allegations that Defendants mount in their motion to dismiss using public records

and other extrinsic evidence attached to their motion. (Docs. 12-1 to 12-14). These factual

Martinez-Porte claims his woes began after Multi-Color’s alleged 2019

acquisition of the majority interest in WSMEX. Specifically, he alleges that Multi-

Color through WSPG (which, as noted above, he contends merged with Multi-Color

and no longer retains a separate corporate identity) attempted to close WSMEX so

Multi-Color could consolidate WSMEX’s operations with its own wholly-owned

Mexican subsidiary, Multi-Color Label Corporation-México, S.A. de C.V. (MCM).

(Doc. 10 ¶¶ 46, 57, #286, 293). To accomplish this, Martinez-Porte alleges that

Defendants sought to dilute his shares in WSMEX by unilaterally (i.e., via resolutions

disputes serve as the primary basis for Defendants’ contention that Martinez-Porte failed to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted in his Amended Complaint.

But there is a central problem with this approach: this case comes before the Court at the

motion-to-dismiss stage. So, with respect to their argument that the Amended Complaint

must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “must construe the complaint in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, [while] accept[ing] all [well-pleaded] factual allegations

as true.” In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993). Admittedly, the Court

may take judicial notice of the existence of public records and reject any “factual allegations

that are [thereby] contradicted by those records.” Clark v. Stone, 998 F.3d 287, 298 (6th Cir.

2021). But the Court may not rely on the contents of those records unless the facts are “not

subject to reasonable dispute” and the records are “from sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Passa v. City of Columbus, 123 F. App’x 694,

697–98 (6th Cir. 2005). At times, “there is no distinction [] between the fact of the document’s

existence and its content,” such as when a party files an amendment to change the name of

a limited liability company. Morse v. Fifty W. Brewing Complany, LLC, No. 1:21-cv-377, 2022

WL 974342, at *3–*4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2022) (typographical error in defendant’s name in

the caption in the original). But just because documents are public records does not put them

beyond reproach—such filings may contain misrepresentations. Namely, that they are

publicly filed does not authenticate or warrant the truth of their contents. Passa, 123 F. App’x

at 698 (noting that accepting the contrary position would “eviscerate all sorts of fraud … and

other laws requiring investigations into [a party’s] motives”); In re Unumprovident Corp. Sec.

Litig., 396 F. Supp. 2d 858, 875–76 (E.D. Tenn. 2005) (“It would be improper for the Court to

rely upon these documents [including several SEC filings] to determine disputed factual

issues and by taking judicial notice of these documents at this time the Court in no way

intends to make any determination as to the truth of any of the facts alleged or otherwise

asserted in the documents themselves.”). At any rate, the resolution of this issue has little

effect on the Court’s disposition because as explained below, the Court finds that dismissal

is proper for forum non conveniens.

adopted at a shareholder meeting that neither Martinez-Porte nor his proxy

attended) authorizing additional shares to issue to Defendants, purportedly to pay

for debts WSMEX incurred for equipment. (Id. ¶¶ 58–61, #293–94). But Martinez-

Porte claims this scheme failed to guarantee Defendants the supermajority of

WSMEX’s shares they needed to authorize actions to injure Martinez-Porte’s

minority interest in the company. (Id. ¶ 61, #294). So, Martinez-Porte alleges,

Defendants tried other tactics to achieve that goal. These purportedly included firing

him as the president and chairman of WSMEX, barring him from all physical access

to the company, accusing him of stealing from WSMEX, and making allegedly false

representations aimed at pressuring him to sell his shares to Defendants at a steep

discount. (Id. ¶ 62, #294). And Martinez-Porte contends that despite failing to obtain

ownership of his shares, Defendants unilaterally shuttered WSMEX’s doors in late

2020, which purportedly resulted in laying off employees and Defendants’ physical

appropriation of WSMEX’s plant, machinery, and other business materials.4 (Id.

¶¶ 84–85, 87–88, #300, 302).

4 Not surprisingly, and as previewed above, see supra note 3, Defendants present a

comprehensive counternarrative to explain away this damning fact pattern. For example,

Defendants claim that Martinez-Porte falsified a loan, which resulted in his termination and

removal from the premises. (Doc. 12, #391). Defendants also claim that rather than pressure

Martinez-Porte to sell his shares, Martinez-Porte himself launched the process to “[c]ash-in”

on the Platinum Equity merger and to sell his shares at what Defendants contend was a

supra-market rate. (Id. at #391–93). And Defendants claim that WSMEX was a failing

business that had to be closed because it was hemorrhaging money and because it lost its

biggest client in 2020. (Id. at #392–93). This is all well and good as a story to tell through

evidence obtained during discovery on a motion for summary judgment. But the Court

struggles to see how Defendants can piece together this storyline by relying solely on the

well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint construed in the light most favorable to

Martinez-Porte, In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d at 1240, coupled with any judicially

noticeable documents containing facts of which there can be no reasonable dispute, Passa,

As a result of these actions, Martinez-Porte evaluated his legal options. He first

sought discovery in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which enables foreign

parties to obtain discovery materials for use in foreign proceedings. In support of that

request, he said he intended to pursue “reasonably contemplated Mexican

proceeding[s] under Mexico’s criminal … [and] civil and labor laws.” Ex parte Appl.

at 1, In re Ricardo Martinez-Porte, No. 1:21-mc-6 (S.D. Ohio June 2, 2021) (Barrett,

J.), ECF No. 1. On July 5, 2021, this Court granted his application permitting him

leave to serve Multi-Color a subpoena for discovery materials to assist his

contemplated foreign suits. Order, In re Ricardo Martinez-Porte, No. 1:21-mc-6 (S.D.

Ohio July 5, 2021), ECF No. 3. Having succeeded in obtaining some materials for a

foreign action, Martinez-Porte changed course. Rather than pursue the contemplated

foreign suits, he filed this domestic lawsuit on December 27, 2022, initially naming

only Multi-Color as a defendant. (Compl., Doc. 1; Doc. 13, #711).

Multi-Color moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim and

under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. (Doc. 9). Rather than respond, Martinez-

Porte amended his complaint, now naming both Multi-Color and WSPG as

defendants liable for the allegedly unlawful corporate ouster. (Doc. 10). Defendants

moved to dismiss on the same grounds that Multi-Color had pressed in its first

123 F. App’x at 697–98, for the purposes of their argument that the Amended Complaint fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Given that Martinez-Porte’s account of

events in his Amended Complaint conflicts with nearly all material details Defendants

proffer, this would be a tall order indeed. (Compare Doc. 12, #389–93 with Doc. 13, #703–07).

Nevertheless, as noted above, this factual contest matters not to the Court’s analysis here,

as the Court finds that this case should be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non

conveniens and should be filed instead in Mexico where the relevant events occurred.

motion. (Doc. 12). Martinez-Porte filed his opposition, (Doc. 13), and Defendants

replied, (Doc. 16). The Court held oral arguments on the motion on October 19, 2023.

(10/19/23 Min. Entry).

The matter is now ripe for the Court’s review.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

a “complaint must present sufficient facts to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Robbins v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, 854 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir.

2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In making that

determination, the Court “construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008)

(cleaned up).

The doctrine of forum non conveniens, on the other hand, is a common law

doctrine which permits “a district court [to] decline to exercise its jurisdiction, even

though the court has jurisdiction and venue.” Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc.,

828 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “In deciding whether to dismiss

a case on this basis, ‘the central focus’ is ‘convenience.’” Prevent USA Corp. v.

Volkswagen AG, 17 F.4th 653, 658 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,

454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981)). A court must evaluate three factors: “(1) whether an

adequate alternative forum is available; (2) whether a balance of private and public

interests suggests that trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome

for the defendant or the court; and (3) the amount of deference to give the plaintiff’s

choice of forum.” Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea, S.A., 920 F.3d 1085, 1090 (6th

Cir. 2019). “The defendant bears the burden of proof on all elements of the forum non

conveniens analysis.” Stalinski v. Bakoczy, 41 F. Supp. 2d 755, 758 (S.D. Ohio 1998).

But in deciding whether the defendant has carried its burden of proof, the Court can

consider not only the pleadings but also affidavits and other evidentiary materials

that the parties supply. Mallory v. Am. Mgmt. Ass’n Int’l, No. 3:13-cv-379, 2014 WL

12676180, at *4 & n.6 (E.D. Tenn. May 19, 2014) (citing Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd.,

589 F.3d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 2009), and Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 259).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Although Defendants moved to dismiss on alternate grounds, the Court begins

with their forum non conveniens argument. As explained further below, the Court

finds that Defendants have shown that all three factors favor a dismissal. This suit

is better prosecuted in Mexico rather than in Ohio. Because this ruling disposes of

the pending motion, the Court declines to evaluate Defendants’ argument that

Martinez-Porte’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Stalinski, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 758 n.2.

A. Adequate Alternative Forum

Because a dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens “say[s] that

the case should be tried elsewhere,” this first factor requires assessing whether there

is an alternate forum for the litigation that is “both available and adequate.” Jones,

920 F.3d at 1090.

“An alternative forum is available if the defendant is amenable to process

there.” Id. at 1091. Although somewhat evasive in their briefing, Defendants

acknowledged “that both entities are subject to service of process” according to the

procedure referenced by Martinez-Porte’s own expert. (Doc. 16, #861–62). And, in

response to the Court’s questioning at oral argument, Defendants clarified that they

were amenable to suit in Mexico, that they were waiving any jurisdictional objection

to litigation in Mexico, and that they would accept process in such a court with respect

to this matter. Beyond that, Defendants also acknowledged in their reply brief and at

oral argument that the Court is free to order Defendants to waive any objections they

have to jurisdiction, venue, and service of process in Mexico as part of granting a

motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. (Doc. 16, #862 n.8). See also

Rustal Trading US, Inc. v. Makki, 17 F. App’x 331, 336 (6th Cir. 2001); accord

Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. (Instituto I),

518 F. Supp. 3d 1258, 1264–65 (N.D. Ind. 2021) (noting that courts can require a

defendant to consent to the jurisdiction of the alternate forum and that “Mexican

courts recognize consents to jurisdiction”). Accordingly, out of an abundance of

caution, the Court will do so here. With that, availability is not an issue.

Turning to adequacy, “[a] forum is adequate if it can remedy the alleged harm.”

Jones, 920 F.3d at 1091. To start, Martinez-Porte brought two Mexican-law claims,

which are clearly cognizable in Mexican courts. Instituto I, 518 F. Supp. 3d at 1265

(noting that the contract claims raised by the plaintiff were both “asserted under

Mexican law, so any remedy would be available in Mexico” and quoting the

professional opinion of a former associate justice of the Mexican Supreme Court

agreeing with that position); see S.R.J. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-1863, 2022

WL 11306888, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2022) (quoting the affidavit of a Mexican

attorney who represented to the court that “there is no question that Mexico has

expressed a sovereign interest in having Mexican laws govern situations … that

occur within its territory”). And while Martinez-Porte raises unjust enrichment and

conversion claims—purportedly under Ohio common law5—he concedes that Mexican

law recognizes similar legal claims. (Doc. 13, #726–27 (citing Doc. 12-12, #603 and

Banco de Mexico v. Orient Fisheries, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2010)

(recognizing similarities between unjust enrichment claims and Mexican

“illegitimate enrichment” claims)); Doc. 13-1, #762). This is more than enough to

demonstrate that a remedy in Mexican court is adequate—that is to say, remedies for

the claims raised are available to Martinez-Porte in the courts there. Piper Aircraft,

454 U.S. at 254 (explaining that a forum is inadequate if there is “no remedy at all”

available to the plaintiff).6

5 The parties vehemently dispute whether, under the Ohio conflict-of-law principles that this

Court must apply, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), Martinez-

Porte has properly raised Ohio law claims. (Compare Doc. 12, #409–11 with Doc. 13, #726–

30). The Court declines to delve into this dispute and the merits of the parties’ competing

positions. The sole reason for highlighting the existence of Mexican law claims akin to unjust

enrichment and conversion is to explain why it is clear Martinez-Porte would have an

adequate remedy available in a Mexican court should he bring suit in that forum.

6 Or as one court aptly put it, “[j]ust because Mexican law or a Mexican court may prove more

circumspect about the claims here is a measure of the merits, a measure of standards or

weight, not a measure of whether the remedies would be so clearly inadequate such as to be

no remedy at all.” Instituto I, 518 F. Supp. 3d at 1265.

In his briefing, Martinez-Porte countered that Mexico was not an adequate

alternate forum for reasons that touched on both its availability and its adequacy. As

to the former, he argued that “Defendants failed to make any [] declaration” that they

were amenable to suit in Mexico. (Doc. 13, #711–12). And as to the latter, he asserted

that Defendants have not proved that Mexico is an adequate alternative. But, when

the Court discussed these factors at oral argument, Martinez-Porte’s counsel

conceded he no longer contested this first prong of the forum non conveniens analysis.

Counsel was correct to abandon any such argument. As to the assertion in his

briefing about Defendants failing to prove that relief would be available, Defendants

cited caselaw in their briefing to support their claim that Martinez-Porte would have

remedies available in Mexico for each of his claims. (Doc. 16, #861). But beyond that,

and as Martinez-Porte’s counsel also conceded at oral argument, the adequacy of

remedies is readily apparent from the fact that Martinez-Porte either raised Mexican

law claims or expressly admitted Mexican law recognized similar causes of action to

the non-Mexican law claims raised in his complaint. Cf. Instituto Mexicano del Seguro

Social v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. (Instituto II), 29 F.4th 351, 358–59 (7th Cir.

2022) (finding that the plaintiff’s failure to “assert [that] a remedy is impossible in

Mexican courts, merely that it is less likely,” supported a finding that a Mexican

forum was an adequate alternative given “two of [the plaintiff]’s causes of action

ar[o]se under Mexican law and … the remedy for the third [wa]s identical in the

United States and Mexico”).

As to his contention about availability, which he based on Defendants’ failure

affirmatively to declare a willingness to accept service in their briefing, Martinez-

Porte is wrong that such a declaration is required by law. Wong, 589 F.3d at 831

(explaining that there is no “case law which requires the district court to make

specific findings on the issue” of amenability to process when conducting a forum non

conveniens suit and holding that the district court’s failure to do so could not

constitute a per se abuse of discretion). But, in any event, during oral argument,

Defendants expressly conceded their amenability to process in Mexico and the Court

is making certain Defendants will be subject to the jurisdiction of the relevant

Mexican court by ordering Defendants’ compliance.

Thus, in accord with the parties’ positions at oral argument, the Court finds

that Mexico is an available and adequate alternate forum for this dispute.

B. Balance of Public and Private Factors

Balancing the public and private factors for or against the current forum

requires the Court to assess “whether the plaintiff’s choice of forum is unnecessarily

burdensome.” Jones, 920 F.3d at 1092. The Court discusses each in turn.

1. Private Factors

The private factors ask the Court to consider “the relative ease of access to

sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and

the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; … and all other practical

problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. (quoting

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)). To make this determination, the

Court reviews “the substance of the dispute between the parties.” Hefferan, 828 F.3d

at 498 (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 528 (1988)).

The substance of the dispute is clear from a plain reading of the Amended

Complaint. Martinez-Porte is the former president and chairman of a Mexican

corporation, WSMEX, who was ousted by WSMEX’s shareholders purportedly in

violation of WSMEX’s by-laws and Mexican corporate law. (Doc. 10 ¶¶ 22, 62–70, 96–

109, #282, 294–96, 304–09). And because of this allegedly illegal ouster, Martinez-

Porte accuses Defendants of wrongfully shuttering WSMEX: in turn, laying off

workers in Mexico, closing plant operations in Mexico, removing machinery and

equipment from the Mexican facility, taking over client accounts that had been

serviced from that Mexican facility, stealing other business materials from Mexico,

and allegedly pilfering cash from WSMEX—again, monies originally held in Mexico.

(Id. ¶¶ 87, 136–60, #302, 314–16). All factual roads clearly and unequivocally lead to

Mexico. Moreover, on the legal front, the scope of the rights that WSMEX’s

shareholders possessed, and whether those rights allowed the shareholders to

undertake the activities at issue, is a matter of Mexican law. And all the alleged harm

occurred in that country. For example, as noted, the vast majority, if not all, of the

allegedly wrongfully taken assets are in that country.7 (Id. ¶¶ 87, 92, 104(b), 106(c),

7 Yes, Martinez-Porte alleges that Multi-Color eventually moved monies in WSMEX’s

accounts to accounts Multi-Color controlled in the United States. (Doc. 10 ¶ 91, #302–03).

But Martinez-Porte does not dispute that the other physical assets and client accounts were

purportedly retained by Defendants through MCM in Mexico. (Id. ¶¶ 87, 92, 104(b), 106(c),

113(d), #302, 303, 307, 308, 310–11; Docs. 12-10, 12-11). And to the extent that Defendants

made such transfers to the United States as Martinez-Porte alleges, any such records of the

transfers would be available in Mexico with WSMEX’s other corporate and financial records.

(Doc. 10-5, #333, 341; Doc, 12-14, #659, 667).

113(d), #302, 303, 307, 308, 310–11; Docs. 12-10, -11). And Martinez-Porte was

harmed, if at all, in his capacity as a president and chairman of a Mexican

corporation, who worked in Mexico. Moreover, any resulting effect on the operations

of WSMEX will undoubtedly manifest, at least as an initial matter, in Mexico.

So it stands to reason that relevant witnesses, evidence, and documentation

necessary for Martinez-Porte to prove his case are likewise in Mexico. Indeed,

Defendants provided a list of such materials and witnesses, including things such as

WSMEX’s power of attorney, Agustin Garza (who, as WSMEX’s power of attorney,

authorized the asset transfers), WSMEX’s corporate records, and its shareholder

registry, all of which appear to be located in Mexico. (Doc. 16, #863–64). See also Lu

v. SAP Am., Inc., No. 22-1253, 2022 WL 13983546, at *9 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 2022)

(holding that a Chinese citizen whose allegations of discrimination occurred at the

hands of Chinese employees at a Chinese company in China supported a finding that

the private factors weighed for litigation in China). Beyond that, many documents

already proffered for the Court’s review are Spanish language documents, which

would require competent translations if this matter were to proceed here.8 Prevent

USA, 17 F.4th at 660 (holding that because “much of the evidence will be in

German[,] … the German courts will be able to access these documents and witnesses

far more conveniently than American courts could”). Considering the sources of proof

8 Indeed, assessing the legal meaning of foreign terms, particularly in determining whether

something constitutes a term of art, is especially difficult for a non-native speaker who is not

steeped in the foreign law. Cf. Martinez v. United States, 828 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2016) (en

banc) (a divided en banc court’s attempting to construe a treaty’s use of the phrase “lapse of

time” to determine whether it constituted a legal term of art or incorporated the Speedy Trial

Clause by reference).

and the practical problems this case presents, the Court concludes that the private

factors favor litigation in Mexico.

Martinez-Porte counters primarily in two ways. First, he contends that the

evidence is mostly located in the United States, not in Mexico. (Doc. 13, #713–14). To

support this assertion, he argued at the hearing that there were three issues of fact

relevant to his claims for relief that require obtaining evidence here in the United

States. The Court addresses each of those below. Second, he objects that there are

procedural difficulties in litigating in a Mexican forum. (Id. at #714–16). Neither

argument has merit.

As to his claim that the evidence is largely in the United States, Martinez-

Porte attempts to focus on aspects of this dispute that have a domestic connection,

while minimizing the relevance of the impact and manifestation of this dispute in

Mexico. (Doc. 10, #310 (alleging in a conclusory fashion that discovery “confirmed”

Defendants “planned, directed, and/or executed” the closure of WSMEX from this

District)). When pressed at oral argument, Martinez-Porte’s counsel expanded on this

argument by highlighting three factual disputes he believed were relevant to

Martinez-Porte’s claims and that exemplified the claimed domestic situs of this suit:

(1) who WSMEX’s majority shareholder is; (2) Defendants’ intent regarding the

shuttering of WSMEX; and (3) what quantum of damages Martinez-Porte suffered.

Take them in order. The alleged dispute about the identity of WSMEX’s

majority shareholder, which Martinez-Porte discusses at some length, strikes the

Court as something of a red herring. (Doc. 13, #705–07, 713). Regardless whether

WPSG or Multi-Color owns the majority interest, Martinez-Porte’s claims are

premised on that shareholder’s attempt to strong-arm him out of his ownership

interest in WSMEX in violation of Mexican law and the applicable by-laws. And if the

ouster was improper, it follows the transfer of WSMEX’s assets to that shareholder—

again, regardless who retains those shares currently—would likely constitute an

illegal conversion of property, given the shareholder lacks proper title, thereby

unjustly enriching the entity as a result. The disputed merger (and any accompanying

transfer of the WSMEX majority shareholder ownership interest) will play a minimal

role in Martinez-Porte’s ultimate showing of proof. And even if necessary, the

evidence needed to prove the shareholder’s true identity is minimal: Martinez-Porte’s

own expert admits the “shareholder register”—a ledger that WSMEX must keep

under Mexican law and is therefore likely located in Mexico with WSMEX’s other

corporate documents, (Doc. 10-5, #333, 341; Doc, 12-14, #659, 667)—is sufficient.9

(Doc. 13-1, #754–55). So the dispute over which defendant owned WSMEX’s shares

does not support prosecution in this Court.

Next turn to Martinez-Porte’s assertion that he must understand what

motivated Defendants to shutter WSMEX. In his briefing and at oral argument, he

contends that “[t]he documents revealing the circumstances that led” to his ouster

from WSMEX and to the “clos[ure of] the WSMEX plant without authorization” are

here in the United States because Defendants have a corporate presence in the

United States. (Doc. 13, #713–14). Yes, Defendants are American corporations. And

9 Importantly, Martinez-Porte has not argued—in his briefing or at oral argument—that

there is evidence suggesting to the contrary that these documents are no longer in Mexico.

yes, they may have made some corporate decisions in the United States about their

exercise of WSMEX shareholder rights, rights that were then executed in Mexico.10

But so what? That does not negate the obvious: the core of Martinez-Porte’s claims

involves a Mexican corporation’s dispute between its former president and its

shareholders, the impact of which led to a shuttering its Mexican operations—a

quintessentially Mexican-oriented dispute. Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 498 (finding that a

products liability suit over a medical device that purportedly malfunctioned during a

surgery in Germany would require evidence and witnesses that were predominantly

in Germany). And Martinez-Porte’s attempt to shoehorn this dispute into American

courts simply by reference to the corporate headquarters of Defendants is a legal

contention that has already been rejected by the Sixth Circuit when the harm

manifests in the foreign country. Id. at 497–98 (explaining that even though the

“design, application, and manufacture” that purportedly introduced a defect in the

product occurred elsewhere, the relevant witnesses and evidence were in Germany

where the alleged harm manifested).

10 As the Court stressed on the record during oral argument, corporations are not physical

people—their personhood is a matter of legal fiction, which means they are entities whose

actions are executed through physical people at specific locations. As a result, Martinez-

Porte’s focus on Defendants’ domicile in the United States carries little weight in the Court’s

analysis of the merits of his claims and where the evidence is present. The actions of

Defendants that impacted Martinez-Porte and WSMEX in Mexico would have been executed

by Defendants’ agents in Mexico. In fact, Defendants highlighted at oral argument the

evidence showing that Augustin Garza was the power of attorney who authorized the transfer

of assets from WSMEX to MCM after the former’s operations were shuttered, all in Mexico

(Doc. 12-10, #560, Doc. 12-11, #569). And Martinez-Porte cannot meaningfully dispute that

Garza’s actions, which carried out the allegedly unlawful shareholder resolutions leading to

his ouster from WSMEX, occurred in Mexico—he alleged as much in his own operative

Amended Complaint. (Doc. 10 ¶ 53(h), #290).

A careful review of Martinez-Porte’s Amended Complaint reveals that he

acknowledges as much—he alleges that many of the relevant events and related

documentation and witnesses are at least as connected to Mexico as the United

States, if not more so. For example, the corporate retreat where he was purportedly

pressured to sell his shares occurred in Cancun, Mexico. (Doc. 10 ¶ 47, #286). Upon

WSMEX’s closure, its assets were allegedly transferred to MCM, a Mexico-based

corporation. (Id. ¶ 104(b), #307). Guards and WSMEX employees were allegedly

instructed to prevent Martinez-Porte’s physical access to its facilities—in Mexico. (Id.

¶ 67, #295). Martinez-Porte was purportedly the “boots on the ground” at WSMEX in

Mexico. (Id. ¶ 79, #299). WSMEX’s “audited financial statements” allegedly prove

that it was profitable such that liquidation would be improper. (Id. ¶ 81, #299). And

allegedly, no board meetings were held or requisite votes taken to authorize

WSMEX’s closure as required by its by-laws, which would be evident from the absence

of these records in WSMEX’s corporate minutes and related governance

documentation, all of which is presumably maintained in Mexico. (Id. ¶¶ 96–99,

#304). All of these events, which Martinez-Porte alleged in detail to bolster his claims

that Defendants used their purported majority interest in WSMEX unlawfully to

consolidate its economic power in, and impermissibly to terminate Martinez-Porte’s

access to, the Mexican printing label market, have a substantial nexus to Mexico. And

as such, evidence of these events would be best accessed and proved in Mexico, not

remotely in this Court.

Further buttressing this assessment that the relevant evidence is in Mexico,

Defendants allegedly adopted the unlawful resolutions at shareholder meetings,

meetings that the by-laws provide must be held at WSMEX’s facilities—Martinez-

Porte makes no allegations to the contrary. (Doc. 10-5, #342; Doc. 12-14, #668). Any

minutes from or resolutions adopted at these meetings were required by the by-laws

to be held by the company in a corporate register—documents that no party has

suggested WSMEX would have retained anywhere but in Mexico. (Doc. 10-5, #338–

39, 341–42; Doc. 12-14, #664–65, 667). Simply, because Martinez-Porte’s corporate

law claims will ultimately turn on what transpired at these allegedly unlawful

meetings, the relevant evidence has a Mexican, rather than American, situs, thereby

undermining his claim to the contrary.

Martinez-Porte countered at oral argument that Defendants’ intent mattered

and that this intent would be proven through people and documents located at

WPSG’s or Multi-Color’s corporate headquarters. But the Court struggles to find the

necessity of proving such intent (other than perhaps to inflame the passions of the

jury) when considering the allegations in his Complaint. Indeed, at oral argument,

the Court specifically asked Martinez-Porte’s counsel to identify any such allegations

about Defendants’ alleged intent. He could not do so. Nor is that particularly

surprising. To prove his breach of the by-laws claims, Martinez-Porte need prove only

whether Defendants took actions the by-laws prohibited—not why they took those

actions. (Doc. 10 ¶¶ 119, 121–24, #312–13 (claiming Defendants needed to obtain a

supermajority vote of the board to close WSMEX and did not do so)). Similarly,

showing that Defendants violated Mexican corporate law will require proof only that

Defendants had a conflict of interest and that they took actions while subject to that

conflict of interest—again, the underlying why is irrelevant. (Id. ¶¶ 130, 132–33,

#313–14 (claiming Defendants had a conflict of interest that rendered the closure of

WSMEX improper)). The same is true of the unjust enrichment and conversion

claims: either Defendants retained WSMEX’s assets unjustly and converted property

to which they did not hold title because they were not properly authorized to do so by

WSMEX’s board and shareholders, or they did not. (Id. ¶¶ 145–46, 150–52, 158–59,

#315–16). Intent plays no role—as evidenced by the fact that the only allegation

referring to “wrongful” behavior defines “wrongful” by reference to a breach of

WSMEX’s by-laws and a violation of Mexican corporate law, rather than Defendants’

motivations. (Id. ¶ 159, #316). The lack of allegations turning on Defendants’ scienter

means Martinez-Porte’s arguments based on the location of evidence necessary to

prove such intent are not well taken. In short, the evidence he identified as residing

in the United States likely is not relevant to his actual claims.

Finally, turn to Martinez-Porte’s last contention that he needs evidence located

in the United States to prove the quantum of damages he suffered because of

Defendants’ actions. The Court struggles to see how this argument makes it out of

the gate. Normally, plaintiffs have competent evidence of their own quantum of

damages. And to the extent that Martinez-Porte’s injuries are tied to his ouster, the

shuttering of WSMEX, or the valuation of its assets—whether equipment, client

accounts, or cash or cash equivalents—that were allegedly taken by Defendants,

documentation valuing all that was appropriated would be retained in Mexico with

WSMEX’s other corporate documents, for the reasons highlighted above.11 (Doc. 10-

5, #333, 341; Doc, 12-14, #659, 667). Simply, Martinez-Porte has failed to explain why

the Court should ignore the obvious and conclude that documentation of damages

Martinez-Porte—a Mexican citizen—suffered is located here rather than in Mexico.

As a result, the Court is not persuaded that the relevant evidence is located

predominantly stateside.

As for Martinez-Porte’s last contention regarding the purported procedural

difficulties of litigating in Mexican courts, the Court is similarly unpersuaded. Other

than provide an exhaustive summary of the “more taxing process for compelling

discovery” in Mexico, Martinez-Porte “do[es] not allege, much less show, that any

witness is unwilling to testify, and that compulsory process is therefore needed.”12

11 Martinez-Porte makes much of one of Defendants’ theories for their defense as to why they

were justified in closing WSMEX—that it was unprofitable and at risk of losing its biggest

client, Driscoll’s. (Doc. 13, #714). But that Defendants intend to defend using this explanation

for its actions cannot explain why Martinez-Porte thinks the evidence about the monetary

value of the loss of this client account would be here rather than in Mexico. After all,

Martinez-Porte is the one who alleged that Defendants transferred WSMEX’s equipment to

MCM so the latter could handle Driscoll’s client account and fulfill its orders. (Doc. 10

¶ 113(d), #310–11). And it is also Martinez-Porte who alleged that Defendants “transferred

WSMEX’s clients [or client accounts] to Multi-Color Mexico” some ten times in his Amended

Complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 87(h), 95, 104(a)–(b), 106(a)–(c), 109, 133, 158, #302, 303–04, 306–07, 308,

309, 314, 316). As MCM is a Mexican company, claiming that the documents related to

WSMEX’s poached clients currently in MCM’s possession are located anywhere but Mexico

is borderline frivolous. “There is a saying that if something looks like a duck, walks like a

duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is probably a duck.” S. Bertram, Inc. v. Citizens Ins. Co.

of Am., 657 F. App’x 477, 478 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Sorah, 163 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir.

1998)). And as a case that “look[s], walk[s], and quack[s]” like a Mexico-centric lawsuit, the

evidence unsurprisingly is largely found in Mexico. Id.

12 Furthermore, Defendants represented to the Court at oral argument that they will work

with Martinez-Porte to obtain any evidence here in the United States that is necessary to

prosecute this suit abroad, thereby ameliorating any of his concerns about the difficulties of

using Mexican procedural mechanisms—to the extent that they exist—to acquire evidence.

Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 499. As another court explained in rejecting the “comparative

ease of obtaining evidence in the United States [relative to] Mexico” as a reason to

conclude that private factors supported domestic litigation, “discrepancies in

discovery procedures are immaterial to the forum non conveniens analysis.” Instituto

II, 29 F.4th at 360. Simply, the alleged procedural difficulties that the parties might—

but not necessarily will—encounter in Mexico do not move the needle in suggesting

that the parties are better served litigating here in Ohio. Put differently, they cannot

outweigh the fact that this is a Mexican corporate dispute with relevant evidence

predominantly in Mexico.

So the Court concludes that the private factors regarding the ease of litigating

here in the United States as compared to abroad in Mexico favors proceedings where

both Martinez-Porte and WSMEX call home—Mexico.

2. Public Factors

Next, turn to the public interest factors, which assess “local interest in the

dispute, the location of the injury, the fullness of the court’s docket, preference for

trying cases in the place of the governing law, hesitance to apply foreign law, and

desire to avoid conflict-of-law problems.” Prevent USA, 17 F.3d at 660.

Again, there is no question that the public factors favor litigation in Mexico.

Although it is exhaustively detailed above, it bears repeating: this case is a corporate

dispute between the shareholders of a Mexican company and its former president,

which resulted in his ouster and physical removal from its location as well as the

allegedly unlawful shuttering of that company’s Mexican facilities. Local interests

significantly outweigh any interest Ohio has in letting the litigation proceed in this

forum. See Kryvicky v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., 807 F.2d 514, 517 (6th Cir. 1986)

(“[T]he country where the injury occurred has a greater interest in the

ensuing … litigation than the country where the [alleged source of the harm] was

[purportedly] manufactured.”). And jurors here in Ohio would have no meaningful

connection to this foreign dispute—either as to the language employed in the

corporate documents or as to the events giving rise to Martinez-Porte’s cause of

action. Prevent USA, 17 F.4th at 660; Stalinski, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (holding that

the application of “the law of a foreign nation … [and the] need to obtain experts on

[that foreign] law to assist with this process” justified dismissal). Like the other

factors analyzed thus far, these factors show that Mexico is the proper home for this

Mexico-centric dispute.13

Again, Martinez-Porte disputes this analysis by contending that there are

backlogs in Mexican courts and by claiming that Ohio law will necessarily be applied

because Multi-Color is headquartered in Ohio and because he raised Ohio law claims

in his complaint. (Doc. 13, #716–17). As to his assertion about backlogs in Mexico,

which he reiterated at oral argument, the potential administrative delay in his ability

to obtain a resolution in this dispute is insufficient to overcome Mexico’s significantly

stronger interest in a dispute local to Mexico, not the United States. Instituto II, 29

13 It is rather telling that at several points during the oral argument when the Court asked

for more information about Mexican law and its process, Martinez-Porte’s counsel confessed

a lack of knowledge because he was not a Mexican attorney. That a party’s own counsel

cannot definitively answer the Court’s questions about the foreign law the Court is asked to

apply under the complaint further bolsters the Court’s conclusion that the public’s interests

are best served by having this suit prosecuted in Mexico, not in the United States.

F.4th at 360–61 (“[D]espite [plaintiff’s Mexican law expert’s] assertion [that]

American courts have one-third the caseload burden of Mexican courts, we cannot

say the district court abused its discretion in concluding the administrative burdens

[in their entirety] are comparatively less significant in Mexico. This is particularly

true given that the volume of evidence and witnesses likely resides in Mexico.”).

And with respect to Martinez-Porte’s argument about Multi-Color’s domicile

and his Ohio law claims, two observations explain why this contention lacks merit.

First, that one of the defendants is domiciled in Ohio cannot metaphysically

convert what is clearly a Mexican corporate dispute into an Ohio-centric cause of

action. Id. (“[W]hile we accept the United States has some interest in malfeasance by

its citizens abroad,” “we are unconvinced an alleged scheme involving … a company

located in Mexico, bribing ‘Mexican agents,’ to enable them to sell medical devices in

Mexico, to be used by Mexican doctors in Mexican hospitals on Mexican patients,

through an agency of the Mexican government, pursuant to contracts executed in

Mexico, presents a ‘local controversy’ to Warsaw, Indiana, regardless where it was

orchestrated.”); cf. Faurecia Exhaust Sys., Inc. v. Walker, 464 F. Supp. 2d 700, 711

(N.D. Ohio 2006) (“Although one of the Plaintiffs here is an Ohio entity, in reality this

is a[n employment] dispute between a French corporation and its former employee,

now a Swiss resident” about whether the latter gave the proper amount of notice for

his resignation, which “do[es] not weigh in favor of litigating the matter in” Ohio.).

Second, it is easy to claim, as Martinez-Porte does, that Ohio law necessarily applies

to Martinez-Porte’s claims. But it is significantly harder legally to justify that position

in light of the intractable conflict-of-law knot presented by the parties. See supra note

5; see generally Jones, 920 F.3d at 1093 (“Conflict of laws is a complicated doctrine.”).

As the Supreme Court has reiterated more than once, “the public interest factors

point towards dismissal where the court would be required to ‘untangle problems in

conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.’” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 251 (quoting

Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509). Thus, it is not enough for Martinez-Porte to rest on Multi-

Color’s domicile and the assertion that he raises two common-law claims. This cannot

overcome the clear public interest Mexico has in overseeing litigation of a Mexican

dispute in Mexican courts, let alone the administrative efficiencies gained by a suit

filed near where the events giving rise to Martinez-Porte’s claims transpired.

So the Court concludes that the public-interest factors also militate in favor of

litigation in a foreign forum rather than here in Ohio.

C. Proper Amount of Deference to Plaintiff’s Forum

Finally, the Court turns to whether Martinez-Porte’s choice in forum should be

given weight in this analysis. Deference accorded to the choice of forum is evaluated

based on a “sliding convenience scale.” Associação Brasileira de Medicina de Grupo

v. Stryker Corp., 891 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). That is to say,

“[a]s the amount of deference owed increases, the strength of the showing necessary

to overcome that deference necessarily increases as well.” Id. The question of what

amount is proper is intertwined with the strength of “a plaintiff’s ties to the United

States.” Id. “When the plaintiff is foreign … th[e] assumption [that the choice of forum

is born out of convenience] is much less reasonable … [and] deserves less deference”

given “citizenship and residence are proxies for convenience.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S.

at 256 & n.24. Certainly, a foreign plaintiff can identify “a legitimate reason” for his

filing in American courts to obtain greater deference, “such as … the ability to obtain

jurisdiction over the defendants rather than tactical advantage.” Hefferan, 828 F.3d

at 494. But even if such a justification is identified, the “presumption of convenience

applies with less force” for foreign plaintiffs. Stryker, 891 F.3d at 619.

As detailed throughout this opinion, beyond Martinez-Porte’s lack of a personal

connection to this forum, the requisite nexus between the facts giving rise to his suit

and the forum is also lacking. This is a Mexican dispute involving a Mexican

corporation and its shareholders with the impact centered in Mexico. So Martinez-

Porte’s choice of a domestic forum carries little to no weight in the Court’s analysis

as it is unreasonable—given the nature of the dispute—to presume the choice was

motivated by convenience. Jones, 920 F.3d at 1095 (“[T]here is strong evidence that

Jones is not at home in the United States. So the assumption that a United States

court is most convenient for him does not hold true.”).

Martinez-Porte contends that minimal deference is improper because he has

identified legitimate reasons for bringing his suit in this district. (Doc. 13, #710). But

his proposed “legitimate reasons” simply rehash his arguments rejected above

regarding his claim that most of the relevant evidence and witnesses are present here

in Ohio, not in Mexico.14 (Id. at #710–11). The Court remains unpersuaded for the

14 And because the Court orders Defendants to submit to the jurisdiction of the Mexican court

where this suit is refiled, Martinez-Porte’s argument that he has a legitimate reason for filing

in Ohio because “this Court has jurisdiction over them” does not require the Court to accord

his choice in forum more than minimal deference. (Doc. 13, #710).

reasons stated above—this case is about a corporate dispute in Mexico. It matters not

that Defendants allegedly might have directed from elsewhere some of the acts

Martinez-Porte claims injured him. Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 498; Instituto I, 29 F.4th

at 360-61.

Accordingly, the Court gives minimal deference to Martinez-Porte’s choice in

forum and finds that it does not meaningfully weigh against dismissal under the

doctrine of forum non conveniens.

CONCLUSION

Altogether, all forum non conveniens factors support dismissal and having this

dispute proceed in Mexico. This is a Mexican corporate dispute involving Mexican law

with all relevant events and alleged injuries occurring in Mexico. Litigation in the

United States would serve no one’s interest. The Court therefore GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Martinez-Porte’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). In addition, the Court ORDERS

Defendants Multi-Color Corporation and W/S Packaging Group, Inc., to consent to

jurisdiction in Mexico, and to accept service of process in Mexico regarding this

matter. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment and to TERMINATE this

case on its docket. /|

SO ORDERED. he

November 1, 2023 — \

DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE \

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

28