Stafford v. Sugarcreek Township

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

JOHN E. STAFFORD,

Plaintiff, Case No. 3:22-cv-136

vs.

SUGARCREEK TOWNSHIP, et al., District Judge Michael J. Newman

Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER: (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE POLICE

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (Doc.

No. 72); (2) DISMISSING FROM THIS CASE (a) DEFENDANT SUGARCREEK

TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT AND (b) PLAINTIFF JOHN STAFFORD’S

§ 1983 CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES FROM DEFENDANT SUGARCREEK

TOWNSHIP; (3) DENYING THE WHIO-TV DEFENDANTS AND DEFENDANTS

RYAN SEXTON, WILLIAM COLEMAN, AND LINDA MILLER’S MOTIONS TO

DISMISS (Doc. Nos. 35, 59, 69, 71, 74); AND (4) DENYING DEFENDANT STEVE

LAMB’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (Doc. No. 73)

______________________________________________________________________________

This civil case, consisting of federal and state-law civil rights and personal injury claims,

filed with the assistance of counsel, is before the Court for review of several Defendants’

dispositive motions. Defendants Sugarcreek Township, Sugarcreek Township Police Department

(“Sugarcreek PD”), Chief Michael Brown, Officer Adam Klark, Officer Mark White, and

Detective Leslie Stayer (collectively, the “Police Defendants”) move for partial judgment on the

pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Doc. No. 72. Defendants WHIO-TV, also known as the

Miami Valley Broadcasting Corporation, and James Brown (collectively, the “WHIO-TV

Defendants”) move, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss Plaintiff John Stafford’s

(“Stafford”) claims against them. Doc. No. 35. Additionally, Defendants Ryan Sexton (“Sexton”),

Linda Miller (“Miller”), and William Coleman1 (“Coleman”) all separately move to dismiss

Stafford’s claims against them for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Doc. Nos. 59, 69, 71, 74. Last, Defendant Steve Lamb (“Lamb”) moves for judgment on the

pleadings.2 Doc. No. 73. Stafford responded to each. Doc. Nos. 36, 64, 70, 79, 80, 81, 82. The

WHIO-TV Defendants, Sexton, Miller, Lamb, and the Police Defendants replied. Doc. Nos. 39,

68, 86, 87, 88. Thus, the motions are ripe for review.

I.

Rule 12(b)(6), like all other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “should be construed,

administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive

determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Motions for judgment on the

pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) are analyzed under the same standard as

motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Roth v. Guzman, 650 F.3d

603, 605 (6th Cir. 2011).

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the

complaint and permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic pleading requirements set

forth in Rule 8(a). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

A complaint will not suffice if it offers only “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

1 Coleman filed an initial motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 69), to which Stafford responded (Doc. No. 70).

Coleman subsequently filed an amended motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 74), and Stafford again responded

(Doc. No. 82).

2 Lamb’s motion is docketed as a motion to dismiss, or alternatively, as a motion for judgment on the

pleadings. Doc. No. 73 at PageID 632. As Lamb has already filed an answer (Doc. No. 60), the Court

construes his motion as one for judgment on the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); see also Roth v.

Guzman, 650 F.3d 603, 605 (6th Cir. 2011).

recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Instead, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A plaintiff must plead “factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a

defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement

to relief.”’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). In considering whether the facial plausibility

standard is met, the court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, accepting

as true all allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor.

See, e.g., Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 344 (6th Cir. 2017).

II.

Two preliminary matters merit mention. First, Stafford’s claims against Sugarcreek PD

fail as a matter of law because Sugarcreek PD is not sui juris. Jones v. Marcum, 197 F. Supp. 2d

991, 997 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (“Police departments are not sui juris; they are merely sub-units of the

municipalities they serve.” (citing Williams v. Dayton Police Dep’t, 680 F. Supp. 1075, 1080 (S.D.

Ohio 1987))). Accordingly, Sugarcreek PD must be dismissed as a party in this case. Second,

Stafford is not entitled to punitive damages on any of his § 1983 claims against Sugarcreek

Township. See Doc. No. 30; see also City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271

(1981) (“[A] municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”).

Defendants’ motions should be denied without prejudice in all other respects. Having

carefully and thoroughly considered the pleadings and briefing in support of, and in opposition to,

those motions, along with the procedural posture of this case, the efficient and appropriate way

forward is to permit discovery to occur and consider the parties’ arguments on summary judgment,

not earlier at the motion-to-dismiss phase of this litigation. See, e.g., Meriwether v. Hartop, 992

F.3d 492, 514 (6th Cir. 2021); cf. Holbrook v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 533 F. App’x 493, 496

(6th Cir. 2013). Proceeding in this manner will ensure that the Court reviews these arguments

only after appropriate discovery has been completed and will guarantee that the Court’s

consideration of the parties’ arguments is not premature. Cf. Humphreys v. Bank of Am., 557 F.

App’x 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2014); Grose v. Caruso, 284 F. App’x 279, 284 (6th Cir. 2008) (Gibbons,

J., concurring); Nuchols v. Berrong, 141 F. App’x 451, 453 (6th Cir. 2005); LRL Prop. v. Portage

Metro Housing Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1113 (6th Cir. 1995) (Jones, J., dissenting).

III.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the Police

Defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. Doc. No. 72. Sugarcreek PD is

DISMISSED from this case and Stafford’s § 1983 claim for punitive damages against Sugarcreek

Township is ALSO DISMISSED. All other claims against the Police Defendants may proceed.

Moreover, the Court DENIES the WHIO-TV Defendants and Sexton and Miller’s motions to

dismiss (Doc. Nos. 35, 59, 71), DENIES Coleman’s amended motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 74),

and DENIES Lamb’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No. 73). The Court anticipates

reviewing all parties’ arguments on summary judgment after the completion of discovery. The

Court also DENIES AS MOOT Coleman’s initial motion to dismiss. Doc. No. 69. Finally,

Defendants Sugar Valley, Keyes, and Clark did not file dispositive motions and remain in this case

subject to all the claims that Stafford has alleged against them in his amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

August 28, 2023 s/Michael J. Newman

Hon. Michael J. Newman

United States District Judge