Opinion

Lott v. Ohio Bar Association

Court
District Court, S.D. Ohio
Filed
Aug 8, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.4%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

HARRY WILLIAM LOTT, EX PARTE, :

: Case No. 2:22-cv-2219

Plaintiff, :

: Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley

v. :

: Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

OHIO BAR ASSOCIATION, :

:

Defendant. :

:

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before this Court on Plaintiffs’ Objections (ECF No. 15) to the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (ECF No. 14) recommending Plaintiff’s action be

dismissed in its entirety and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend a Supplemental Pleading and Motion to

Disqualify (ECF No. 12) be denied as moot. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF

No. 15) is OVERRULED. The R&R (ECF No. 14) is ADOPTED. Accordingly, this matter is

DISMISSED, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend a Supplemental Pleading and to Disqualify (ECF

No. 12) is DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial (ECF No. 16) and Motion for

Case Still Pending (ECF No. 17) are also DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an Ohio resident who is proceeding pro se, initiated this action on May 19, 2022

against the Ohio Bar Association claiming that his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated when the Ohio Bar Association denied his application for an Ohio law license. (ECF

No. 13). The Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis and deferred the initial

screening. (ECF No. 11). The Magistrate Judge issued a R&R recommending that Plaintiff’s action

be dismissed for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and that the Motion to

Amend a Supplemental Pleading and Motion to Disqualify be denied as moot. (ECF No. 14).

Plaintiff filed a timely Objection. (ECF No. 15).

Plaintiff asserts that he is a Scientologist and states that his present claims arise from his

membership in that group. (ECF No. 13 at 5–6). Plaintiff claims that his constitutional rights were

violated by Defendant when it denied his Ohio Bar application for failing to meet the educational

requirements of a bachelor’s degree from an accredited college or university, and a Juris Doctor

from a law school accredited by the American Bar Association (“ABA”). (Id. at 5, 12). Plaintiff

claims that his association as a Scientologist, and his participation in a practice known as

“auditing,” should provide him with a religious exemption to the Ohio Bar Association’s

educational requirements. (See ECF No. 13).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing objections to a R&R, “[t]he district judge must determine de novo any

part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” FED. R. CIV. P.

72(b)(3). The district judge may “accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive

further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instruction.” Id.

When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss” their complaint or

any portion of it that “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Additionally, pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, but “basic

pleading essentials” are still required. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). While

pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards, this lenient treatment is not without limits

and “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty.

Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. 2010), Frengler v. GM, 482 Fed.

App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012).

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court of Ohio, Office of Bar Admissions, explained in Plaintiff’s denial

letter, that since he did not have a bachelor’s degree, nor a Juris Doctor from an ABA accredited

institution—threshold requirements for licensure—his application for bar admission was denied,

and no further review was conducted. (ECF No. 14 at 3–4). Plaintiff asserts that this action violated

his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but he does not support these claims with

sufficient factual detail or a sound basis in law. (See ECF No. 13).

As a threshold matter, even if Plaintiff had satisfied the pleading requirements, this Court

lacks jurisdiction to provide the relief Plaintiff seeks. The Ohio Constitution grants the Supreme

Court of Ohio exclusive jurisdiction to regulate admission to the practice of law in Ohio. Ohio

Const. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g). The Supreme Court of Ohio properly exercises this jurisdiction under

Rule 1 of the Rules of the Government of the Bar. Ohio Gov. Bar R. I. Therefore, this action must

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

That said, Plaintiff timely filed six objections to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, which this

Court will address. (ECF No. 15). First, Plaintiff raises an objection regarding his in forma

pauperis status. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff states he “will pay on payments if money is an issue.” (Id.).

The R&R noted no issues with Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status. (ECF No. 14 at 1–2). Given

that his objection is inapplicable to the R&R, it is therefore OVERRULED.

Second, Plaintiff asserts that default summary judgment must be granted based on an

instance of ex parte communication. (ECF No. 15 at 2). “An ex parte communication occurs when

one party initiates direct or indirect communication on the substance of a pending case without

the knowledge, presence, or consent of all parties involved in the matter.” United States v. Stennis,

457 Fed. App’x 494, 503 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff does not provide any factual detail about ex

parte communication; the only communication this Court discerns is the letter from the Office of

Bar Admissions explaining the denial of Plaintiff’s application, which was issued prior to the

start of this litigation. (ECF No. 13 at 15). Therefore, this objection is inapplicable to the case at

hand and OVERRULED.

Third, Plaintiff objects based on “religious right for a voidable education,” claiming he has

the “right to break the education law when it comes to [religious] rights.” (ECF No. 15 at 3).

Plaintiff relies on Wisconsin v. Yoder to support his position. (Id. (citing 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).

Yoder held that “respondents’ convictions of violating the State’s compulsory school-attendance

law were invalid under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States

Constitution. . .” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207. The Supreme Court reasoned that the “compulsory-

attendance law on respondents’ practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable”

because the Wisconsin law provided for criminal sanctions and required the respondents “to

perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.” Id. at 218

(citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961)). The Supreme Court clarified, however,

that a way of life “may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if

it is based on purely secular considerations.” Id. In Yoder, the Amish’s claim that the traditional

way of life was not merely a personal preference, “but one of deep religious conviction,” and

“intimately related to daily living.” Id.

Yoder is distinguishable because Plaintiff’s religious faith and mode of life are not

inseparable or interdependent regarding obtaining a post-secondary education. There is no

evidence before this Court that avoiding a post-secondary education is a central tenet of

Scientology, whereas in Yoder it was central to the Amish religious practice to object to formal

education past eighth grade. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210. Conclusory statements by the plaintiff are not

enough. See Slater v. Potter, 28 Fed. App’x 512, 513 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The filing of vague, general,

or conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections and is tantamount

to a complete failure to object.”). In fact, Scientologists have a college graduate rate thirty percent

higher than the norm,1 demonstrating that Plaintiff may abide by the education requirements

imposed by the Ohio Bar Association without oppressing his religious rights. This objection is

therefore OVERRULED.

Fourth, Plaintiff objects based on freedom not to associate. (ECF No. 15 at 4). Plaintiff

claims that he “refused to associate with the Ohio Bar’s” education requirements. (Id.) The right

to associate is not absolute and infringements “may be justified by regulations adopted to serve

compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees,

468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). Regulation of the bar is at the “core of a state’s power to protect the

public,” and is “especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function

of administering justice.” Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361–62 (1977). Therefore, this

objection is OVERRULED.

Fifth, Plaintiff objects to the procedure on objections. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff asserts an unclear

argument using the First Amendment and commercial speech, which does not relate to the

procedure for objections under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b).

(Id.). This objection is therefore OVERRULED.

Finally, Plaintiff objects that the Ohio Bar Association did not hold a hearing for the denial

of his application. (Id.). Plaintiff seeks to justify this objection by using a case in which a hearing

1Demographic and Statistical Facts About The Scientology Religion, WHAT IS SCIENTOLOGY?,

https://www.whatisscientology.org/html/Part11/Chp32/pg0572.html (2000-2015).

was required to terminate state welfare benefits. (Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254

(1970)). Admission to a voluntary bar is not afforded the same protections as revocation of welfare

benefits, a statutory entitlement, because “deprivation of a state-defined property right, like a

medical [or law] license, cannot amount to a substantive due process violation.” Ingram v. Tenn.

Dep’t of Health, No. 3:17-cv-01565, 2019 WL 1429644, at *12 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2019) (citing

Sharma v. Johnston, No. 10-21560-Civ-LENARD, 2010 WL 5579885, at *13 n. 15 (S.D. Fla. Dec.

13, 2010)). This objection is therefore OVERRULED.

In summary, Plaintiff’s pleadings contain “random legal standards and Latin words that

have no apparent application” to Plaintiff’s claims. (ECF No. 14 at 5). Based on the lack of factual

and legal support for his claims, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, and therefore dismissal of Plaintiff’s action is warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

Finally, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial (ECF No. 16); however, there has not been

a trial in this action. This Court believes that Plaintiff was referring to his denial of a hearing by

the Ohio Bar Association. (ECF No. 13 at 6). As noted above, this Court lacks jurisdiction to deal

with this matter as exclusive jurisdiction rests with the Supreme Court of Ohio. (ECF No. 14 at 5).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial (ECF No. 16) is DENIED.

Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Case Still Pending (ECF No. 17) based on his belief that

“the District Judge is taking too much time to issue an opinion.” (Id. at 3). The Supreme Court has

held that federal district courts have the “inherent authority to manage their dockets and

courtrooms” as they see fit, “with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.”

Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016). This Court has moved forward as expeditiously as

possible with Plaintiff’s case. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Case Still Pending is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the R&R (ECF No. 14) is ADOPTED, and Plaintiff’s

Objections (ECF No. 15) are OVERRULED. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend a Supplemental Pleading to

Disqualify is DENIED AS MOOT. (ECF No. 12). Plaintiff’s Motions for a New Trial (ECF No.

16) and for Case Still Pending (ECF No. 17) are DENIED. This Court CERTIFIES, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal of this Order will not be taken in good faith and therefore,

if Plaintiff moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, such request will be DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ALGENON L. MARBLEY

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: August 8, 2023

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.