“Unless a deprivation of some federal constitutional or statutory right has occurred, § 1983 provides no redress even if the plaintiff’s common law rights have been violated and even if the remedies available under state law are inadequate”
How later courts described this case
- “Unless a deprivation of some federal constitutional or statutory right has occurred, § 1983 provides no redress even if the plaintiff’s common law rights have been violated and even if the remedies available under state law are inadequate”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS
JOESEPH SHINE-JOHNSON, et al., : Case No. 2:22-cv-3236
:
Plaintiffs, :
: Judge James L. Graham
vs. :
Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman
:
ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
ORDER and
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Joeseph Shine-Johnson and Richard Stanton Whitman have filed an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 concerning the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction’s handling of
“legal mail” at Belmont Correctional Institution, where they are in custody. (Doc. 12). Plaintiffs
are proceeding in the action in forma pauperis (Doc. 3, 10) and without the assistance of counsel.
The matter is currently before the Court for an initial screening of the Complaint as
required by law. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons that follow, the
Undersigned will ALLOW Plaintiffs’ “legal mail” claims under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to PROCEED to further development at this time. However, the Undersigned
RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS any § 1983 claim based on violations of state law or
ODRC policy, any claim under the Eighth Amendment, and all claims for monetary damages
against Defendants in their official capacities.
I. Initial Screening Standard
Because Plaintiffs are prisoners seeking “redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity,” and are proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required
to conduct an initial screening of his complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
The Court must dismiss the Complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2).
To state a claim for relief, a complaint must set forth “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Court must
construe the complaint in Plaintiffs’ favor, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and
evaluate whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). However, a
complaint that consists of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action” is insufficient. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In the interest of justice, this Court is also required to construe a pro se complaint
liberally and to hold it “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)
and citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f) [now (e)]). Even with such a liberal construction, a pro se
complaint must still adhere to the “basic pleading essentials.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594
(6th Cir. 1989). Specifically, a pro se “complaint ‘must contain either direct or inferential
allegations respecting all the material elements’ to recover under some viable legal theory.”
Barhite v. Caruso, 377 F. App’x 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d
712, 716 (6th Cir. 2005)).
II. Parties and Claims
Two plaintiffs filed this case: Joeseph Shine-Johnson and Richard Stanton Whitman.
(Doc. 12, PageID 206-207). Plaintiffs are prisoners in the custody of the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC), currently incarcerated at Belmont Correctional
Institution (BeCI). Plaintiffs sue fourteen defendants, all of whom are affiliated with the ODRC
and/or BeCI:
1. Annette Chambers-Smith, Director of the ODRC
2. Marc Bratton, Assistant Chief Inspector for the ODRC
3. Eddy Bobby, Regional Director of the ODRC
4. Ernie Moore, Deputy Director of the ODRC
5. Jondrea K. Parrish, ODRC Central Policy Review Chairperson
6. Jocelyn K. Lowe, Head of the ODRC Legal Team
7. David Gray, Warden of BeCI
8. Patrick Haley, Institutional Inspector for BeCI
9. Derek Windland (or Winland), Mailroom Staff at BeCI
10. Gerry Harris, Mailroom Staff at BeCI
11. Kriss Dietrich, Mailroom Staff at BeCI
12. Shane Sable, Mailroom Staff at BeCI
13. John Doe, Mailroom Staff at BeCI
14. Jane Doe, Mailroom Staff at BeCI
(Doc. 12, PageID 210-215). Plaintiffs sue Defendants in their individual and official capacities.
(Id., PageID 215). They seek injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as monetary damages.
(Id., PageID 211, 233-234).
Plaintiffs bring their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (see Doc. 12, PageID 211), which
requires them to plead “(1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States (2) caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty.
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). They allege that
changes to the ODRC’s legal mail policies violate, and have led to violations of, their rights
under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 12, PageID 216).
III. Discussion
At this stage of the proceedings, without the benefit of an Answer or other briefing, the
Undersigned concludes that Plaintiffs’ claims concerning their “legal mail” and the ODRC’s
legal mail policies should proceed to further development. The Undersigned expresses no
opinion on the merits of these claims at this time.
Some parts of these claims, however, should be dismissed.
A. Claims Alleging Violations of State Law or ODRC Policy
Among other things, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ actions violated ODRC Policy.
(Doc. 12, PageID 233, ¶ 80). Although this allegation likely forms part of the background for
Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, a § 1983 claim cannot be based on a violation of state law or
policy. See Williams v. Burgess, No. 5:21-cv-99, 2021 WL 5816830, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 7,
2021) (citing Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 580 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007)) (“The purpose of § 1983 is
to remedy violations of federal law, not state law.”); Lewellen v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 34
F.3d 345, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Unless a deprivation of some federal constitutional or statutory
right has occurred, § 1983 provides no redress even if the plaintiff’s common law rights have
been violated and even if the remedies available under state law are inadequate”). Thus, to the
extent that part of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is based on an allegation that Defendants violated state
law or ODRC policy, that part of the claim should be dismissed. See Brown v. Mahlman, No.
1:22-cv-239, 2022 WL 17817615, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2022) (dismissing alleged violations
of ODRC policy because they “fall outside the scope of § 1983”).
B. Claim under the Eighth Amendment
In describing their legal claims, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ actions violated their
rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 12, PageID 233, ¶
81). This appears to be the only mention of the Eighth Amendment in the Complaint. (Compare
Doc. 12, PageID 216, ¶ 21 (alleging violations of First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights)). The inclusion of the Eighth Amendment in a single paragraph near the end of the
Complaint may be a clerical error, as the claim is not otherwise explained.
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have an obligation “to take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” in their custody. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII;
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). The Eighth Amendment also protects prisoners
from the use of excessive force and unwarranted physical assaults by prison staff. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994). It “forbids prison officials from ‘unnecessarily and
wantonly inflicting pain’ on an inmate by acting with ‘deliberate indifference’ toward the
inmate’s serious medical needs.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir.
2004) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). It further protects prisoners from
conditions of confinement causing “extreme deprivations” that deny “the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
None of Plaintiffs’ allegations in the Complaint suggest these types of issues.
Accordingly, any Eighth Amendment claim Plaintiffs may have sought to raise should be
dismissed.
C. Claims for Monetary Damages against Defendants in their Official Capacities
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. (Doc. 12,
PageID 233-234). Any claims for monetary damages against state employees or officials in their
official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 270 (6th Cir. 2018).
“While personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government
official for actions he takes under color of state law, individuals sued in their official capacities
stand in the shoes of the entity they represent.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir.
2003) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)) (cleaned up). Thus, “[a] suit
against an individual in his official capacity is the equivalent of a suit against the governmental
entity.” Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 68 (1989)). Plaintiffs’ claims here against Defendants in their official
capacities are the same as claims against the State of Ohio. (Doc. 1-2, PageID 42-44).
Claims for damages against the State of Ohio are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to
the United States Constitution, which “denies to the federal courts authority to entertain a suit
brought by private parties against a state without its consent.” Maben, 887 F.3d at 270 (quoting
Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)). “The [United States
Supreme] Court has held that, absent waiver by the State or valid congressional override, the
Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court.” Maben, 887 F.3d.
at 270, (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 169). Here, “because Ohio has not consented to suits in
federal court nor has Congress abrogated Ohio’s immunity under § 1983,” the State of Ohio has
immunity for claims against it. Smith v. DeWine, 476 F. Supp. 3d 635, 652 (S.D. Ohio 2020)
(citing Ohio v. Madeline Marie Nursing Homes # 1 & # 2, 694 F.2d 449, 460 (6th Cir. 1984) and
Giles v. Univ. of Toledo, 478 F. Supp. 2d 924, 960-61 (N.D. Ohio 2007)). This immunity
“extends to state officials sued in their official capacity” for monetary damages, such as is
pursued here. Smith v. DeWine, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 650-51.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official
capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and should be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
Having screened the Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a) and 1915(e)(2),
the Undersigned ORDERS that Plaintiffs’ claims concerning their “legal mail” and the ODRC’s
legal mail policies may PROCEED to further development at this time.
The Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS the following:
A. Any § 1983 claim based on violations of state law or ODRC policy;
B. Any claim arising under the Eighth Amendment; and
C. All claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities.
The Undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the Court CERTIFY pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3) that, for the reasons discussed above, an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and
Recommendation would not be taken in good faith, and therefore, deny Plaintiffs leave to appeal
in forma pauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiffs have not yet provided the required service documents for Defendants. Plaintiffs
are ORDERED to provide one completed summons form, one U.S. Marshal form, and one
service copy of the Complaint for each of twelve identified Defendants so that service of process
can be accomplished. The documents must be submitted within thirty days of this order. The
Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send twelve blank copies of the summons form and U.S.
Marshal form to both Plaintiffs for their use.
Finally, Plaintiffs must keep this Court informed of their current addresses, and promptly
file a Notice of New Address if they are released or transferred.
V. Notice Regarding Objections to this Report and Recommendation
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), the party may serve
and file specific, written objections to it within fourteen days after being served with a copy
thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to
and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. The Court may
extend the fourteen-day objections period if a timely motion for an extension of time is filed.
A Judge of this Court will make a de novo determination of those portions of the R&R to
which objection is made. Upon proper objection, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further
evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the R&R will result in a
waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the R&R de novo, and will also operate as a
waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the R&R. See Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
June 8, 2023 s/Stephanie K. Bowman
STEPHANIE K. BOWMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE