The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS
ABDUL AJAMU,
AKA Donald Grady Jones,
Petitioner, : Case No. 2:21-cv-5129
- vs - District Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz
WARDEN,
Belmont Correctional Institution,
:
Respondent.
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This habeas corpus case is before the Court on Petitioner’s Objections (ECF No. 29) to the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations recommending the Petition be dismissed with
prejudice (ECF No. 26). District Judge Sargus has recommitted the case for reconsideration in
light of the Objections (ECF No. 30).
Statute of Limitations
Petitioner’s claim is that Ohio has used an invalid judgment to continue his imprisonment
since 2017. Noting that this habeas corpus action was not filed until 2021, Respondent raised as
a defense the one-year statute of limitations enacted by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(Return of Writ, ECF
No. 20). Petitioner, although represented by counsel, made no response and the Report
recommended upholding the defense and dismissing the Petition as time-barred.
Petitioner now objects “There is no statute of limitations for federal prisoners filing habeas
petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” (Objections, ECF No. 29, PageID 599, citing Morales v. Bezy,
499 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2007) followed by the Sixth Circuit in Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303.
“Petitioner would argue that this should apply to state prisoners as well. There should be no distinction
between the two.” Id.
Morales does not support that result. In the very next sentence after the one quoted above,
Judge Posner refers the reader to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) in which Congress makes the very distinction
in question, expressly imposing the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations on all state prisoners
seeking habeas corpus relief.
Cognizability
The Report also recommended dismissal because the question of whether the state court
judgment in question was valid is a question of state law not cognizable in habeas corpus (Report,
ECF No. 26, PageID 591). Petitioner objects that he invoked the Due Process Clause in Ground
One. But merely claiming a due process violation does not convert a state law procedural question
into a federal constitutional one. “A state cannot be said to have a federal due process obligation
to follow all of its procedures; such a system would result in the constitutionalizing of every state
rule, and would not be administrable.” Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir. 1993).
Ground Two: Due Process Violation by Imposing an Eight-Year Sanction for Parole
Violation
Petitioner objects that the Report does not contain a recommendation on Ground Two. In
that Ground for Relief, Petitioner complains that he was denied Due Process when the Parole Board
did not comply with its obligations under Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1971). Petitioner is
correct that the Report does not contain a separate analysis of Ground Two and for that the
undersigned apologizes.
However, the same statute of limitations defense which applies to Ground One also applies
to Ground Two. Ajamu is a state prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief and is thus subject to the
statute of limitations enacted in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). He would have known of the procedures
used in the revocation proceedings when they occurred in 2009, but did not file his Petition until
2021.
Conclusion
Having reviewed the case in light of Petitioner’s Objections, the Magistrate Judge adheres
to his prior conclusion that the Petition should be dismissed with prejudice. Because reasonable
jurists would not disagree with this conclusion, it is also recommended that Petitioner be denied a
certificate of appealability and that the Court certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be
objectively frivolous and should not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.
April 19, 2023.
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond
to another party’s objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure
to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. #
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge