Sagle v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

WAYNE E. S., :

:

Plaintiff, :

: Case No. 2:22-cv-01405

v. :

: Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley

DR. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, :

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF : Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

SOCIAL SECURITY, :

:

Defendant. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Wayne E. S.’s Objection (ECF No. 17) to the

Magistrate Judge’s October 21, 2022, Report and Recommendation (ECF 16), recommending

that this Court overrule Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (ECF No. 13) and affirm the

Commissioner’s decision. Plaintiff entered a timely Objection on November 4, 2022. (ECF No.

17). Upon independent review and for the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS WITH

MODIFICATIONS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and AFFIRMS the

Commissioner’s non-disability determination. Plaintiff’s Objection is OVERRULED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Wayne E. S.1 is a Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) claimant. He has been

found to have multiple severe impairments, affecting both his physical and mental health. (R. &

R. at 4, ECF No. 16). These ailments include “degenerative joint disease of the left hip and

bilateral hip dysplasia; degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; scoliosis; obesity; asthma;

1 Pursuant to this Court’s General Order 22-01, plaintiffs in Social Security cases are referred to only by

their first names and last initials.

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fibromyalgia; major depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder.” (Id. at 4). Despite these medical

issues, Plaintiff’s SSI claim was denied on the basis that there are significant numbers of jobs

that he is able to perform, in light of his age, education, work experience, and residual functional

capacity (“RFC”), in the national economy. (Id.) (citing R. 1182).

Plaintiff filed his SSI application with the U.S. Social Security Administration (“SSA”)

on April 30, 2012, in which he alleged that he has been disabled since December 31, 2004. (Id.

at 1). That application was denied. (Id.). A hearing was then held on May 14, 2015, before

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Henry Wansker, who issued an unfavorable determination on

June 8, 2015. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff initially sought judicial review of that decision in this Court

once it became final; the Court remanded the matter to SSA on the parties’ joint request. (Id.).

On September 19, 2017, the SSA Appeals Council vacated ALJ Wansker’s unfavorable

determination and remanded the matter with several directives, among them that “further

consideration was to be given to the nature, severity, and limiting effects of Plaintiff’s hip

impairment.” (Id.) (citing R. 1278–83).

On remand, Plaintiff’s case was heard by ALJ Thomas Wang on May 23, 2018; ALJ

Wang issued an unfavorable determination on July 17, 2018. (Id.). In response to Plaintiff’s

request for review, the Appeals Council remanded the matter a second time, suggesting that ALJ

Wang’s determination failed to comply adequately with the Council’s September 19, 2017,

directives regarding Plaintiff’s hip impairment. (Id.). Specifically, the second Appeals Council

decision, dated September 27, 2019, noted that ALJ Wang’s determination that Plaintiff’s “gait is

unimpaired, there is no weakness of the lower extremities, and no limitation of motion” was not

supported by the evidence, including Plaintiff’s treatment records. (See R. 1305–06).

Additionally, the Council noted that ALJ Wang’s determination mentioned certain relevant

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examination findings from Dr. Sayegh but failed to discuss them. (Id.). Accordingly, because

the record lacked up-to-date medical records about the hip impairment,2 the Council directed

ALJ Wang to “consider obtaining a medical consultative examination” “[i]f more recent medical

evidence is not available on remand.” (R. 1306).

ALJ Wang then held a telephone conference on July 23, 2020, before issuing another

unfavorable determination on November 19, 2020, in which he concluded that Plaintiff “has the

residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work” with some limitations.3 (R. 1175). In so

concluding, ALJ Wang acknowledged the Appeals Council directive, writing that he was told to

“obtain a consultative examination (as needed) to evaluate the severity, onset, and limiting

effects, of the claimant’s hip impairment.” (R. 1169). But he did not order a consultative

examination prior to issuing the determination, even though it does not appear that more recent

medical evidence was added to the record. Instead, he explained that he had decided a

consultative examination was not necessary based on the telephone conference with Plaintiff’s

representative and because the evidence in the record was sufficient for him to arrive at a

disability determination; in particular, he highlighted evidence that demonstrated “the claimant is

more active than he has testified to” and that he was “noted to be in no acute distress” even when

claiming that he was suffering from pain that he estimated as an 8 out of 10—thus undermining

Plaintiff’s assertion that his hip issues are debilitating. (R. 1177–78). Additionally, in

formulating the RFC assessment, ALJ Wang gave partial weight to the medical opinions of Dr.

Jeffrey Haggenjos, who treated Plaintiff, though he did not mention one particular opinion about

2 Specifically, the Appeals Council decision stated: “the record contain[ed] minimal treatment records

related to the claimant’s left hip impairment, and the most recent information available related to this impairment is

dated 2015, over 3 years before the date of the decision.” (R. 1306).

3 Residual functional capacity is a determination of the maximum amount of work that an SSI claimant can

do, given their physical and mental limitations.

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Plaintiff’s reaching, handling, fingering, feeling, and pushing limitations (hereinafter, “the

reaching/handling opinion”). (See R. 1180). Plaintiff once again sought review of the

unfavorable determination, but was denied by the Council, thus rendering ALJ Wang’s

determination a final decision of the Commissioner of SSA.

Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on March 9, 2022, seeking judicial review of the

Commissioner’s final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). He filed his Statement of Errors

on August 5, 2022, in which he requested that the Court vacate ALJ Wang’s determination and

remand his claim for a new decision. Plaintiff argued that remand is appropriate for two main

reasons: first, because ALJ Wang failed to obtain a consultative medical examination as

allegedly required by the September 27, 2019, directive of the Appeals Council; and second,

because ALJ Wang failed to explain why he did not afford controlling weight to the

reaching/handling medical opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Haggenjos, in the RFC

assessment. (See Statement of Errors 14–20, ECF No. 13).

On October 21, 2022, Magistrate Judge Vascura issued a Report and Recommendation,

in which she recommended that this Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision and overrule

Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors. The Magistrate Judge recommended finding that neither ALJ

Wang’s failure to obtain a consultative examination nor his failure to incorporate the

reaching/handling opinion in determining Plaintiff’s RFC constituted reversible error. (See R. &

R. at 9, 17, ECF No. 16). Plaintiff filed a timely objection, which is now ripe.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

If a party objects within 14 days to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and

recommendations, the district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28

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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The district court may “accept, reject or

modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the

magistrate with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). On the other hand, if a party fails to object

timely to the magistrate’s recommendation, that party waives the right to de novo review by the

district court of the report and recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).

A party’s objection should be specific, identify the issues of contention, and “be clear enough to

enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Miller v.

Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). When a pleader fails to raise specific issues, the

district court will consider this to be “a general objection to the entirety of the magistrate report,

[which] has the same effects as would a failure to object.” Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).

In reviewing the decisions of the Commissioner of Social Security, federal courts are

“limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decisions ‘is supported by substantial

evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.’” Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594

F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th

Cir. 2007)). Substantial evidence constitutes such relevant evidence, looking to the record as a

whole, as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Ellis v. Schweicker, 739 F.2d 245, 248 (6th Cir.

1984). The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal “merely because there

exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion,” Buxton v. Halter,

246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001), or if the Court itself would have arrived at a different

conclusion, but must be affirmed as long as the Commissioner’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence. See Elkins v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 658 F.2d 437, 439 (6th Cir.

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1981). Additionally, “an ALJ’s failure to follow agency rules and regulations denotes a lack of

substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the

record.” Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

There are two arguments at the heart of Plaintiff’s claim. First, Plaintiff alleges that ALJ

Wang’s failure to obtain a consultative medical examination was in violation of a mandatory

directive from the Appeals Council’s remand order. Second, Plaintiff argues that ALJ Wang

failed to explain sufficiently why he did not afford controlling weight to the medical opinion of

Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Haggenjos, about Plaintiff’s “reaching, handling, fingering,

feeling, and pushing/pulling” capacity.4 The Court addresses each claim in turn.

A. Failure to Obtain Consultative Examination

On November 19, 2020, ALJ Wang issued a revised decision regarding Plaintiff’s SSI

application based on directives from the Appeals Council, which had remanded the case to him

on September 27, 2019. At the heart of the Council’s remand order was a concern that ALJ

Wang’s first decision had failed to consider properly Plaintiff’s hip problems, by ignoring certain

medical findings, arriving at conclusions unsupported by the evidence, and relying on outdated

records. Thus, the Council wrote: “[i]f more recent medical evidence is not available on remand

when the record is updated, then the Administrative Law Judge should consider obtaining a

medical consultative examination to ensure the claimant’s condition is adequately evaluated

through the date of decision.” (R. 1306; see also R. 1307 (ordering the ALJ to “obtain a

4 In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge noted that ALJ Wang gave other medical

opinions of Dr. Haggenjos “partial weight,” see infra Part III.B, but that that decision was explained sufficiently in

the determination. (R. & R. at 15, ECF No. 16). Plaintiff does not dispute that part of the determination, or object

to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion in that respect.

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consultative examination (as needed) to evaluate the severity, onset, and limiting effects of the

claimant’s hip impairment”)). Even though no new evidence was added to the record on remand,

ALJ Wang did not obtain a medical consultative examination before issuing an unfavorable

decision. Plaintiff asserts that this failure was unlawful, because ALJs must follow directives

from the Appeals Council on remand. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.977(b) (noting that an ALJ “shall

take any action that is ordered by the Appeals Council”).

In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge suggested that this Court lacks

jurisdiction to assess whether ALJ Wang’s decision not to obtain a consultative examination

failed to comply with the Appeals Council directive. She noted that federal courts have the

authority to review only a “final decision” of the Commissioner, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), but that

an alleged failure to comply with a directive should be construed as an “internal agency matter

which arises prior to the issuance of the agency’s final decision.” (R. & R. at 7, ECF No. 16)

(quoting Amber R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:21-cv-00204, 2022 WL 3966676, at *2 (S.D.

Ohio Aug. 31, 2022)). The Magistrate Judge further noted that a majority of district courts in

this Circuit have held that the failure to comply with an Appeals Council directive is outside the

jurisdiction of federal courts. (See id. at 6–7) (collecting cases). This position is rooted in the

fact that an ALJ’s unfavorable determination only becomes final after the claimant requests (and

is denied) review by the Appeals Council. According to this theory, that decision to deny review

is an implicit ratification of the ALJ determination as consistent with the previous remand

directive; but the denial itself is only an intermediate agency decision,5 thus precluding judicial

review of the denial itself. See Shope v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:14-cv-02055, 2015 WL

5 When the Appeals Council declines review of an ALJ determination, the underlying determination

“becomes” the “final decision” for purposes of judicial review.

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3823165, at *9 (S.D. Ohio June 19, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL

6155919 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2015).

In his Objection, Plaintiff notes that some district courts in this Circuit have held

otherwise, concluding instead that “the failure by an ALJ to follow a remand order from the

Appeals Council, even if that failure is allowed to stand by a later Appeals Council ruling, can

constitute a reversible error in federal court.” Kaddo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 238 F. Supp. 3d

939, 944 (E.D. Mich. 2017). Although the Sixth Circuit has not addressed this debate explicitly,

it has implicitly ratified the Kaddo position based on the regulatory language mandating Appeals

Council remand orders be followed in subsequent proceedings. See Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 783 F. App’x 489, 497 (6th Cir. 2019). After all, federal courts have a statutory obligation

under § 405(g) to review the final decisions of the Commissioner—in this case, the unfavorable

determination issued by ALJ Wang. And the standard of review requires courts to assess

whether that final decision is in compliance with the applicable legal requirements, statutes, and

regulations. See Cole, 661 F.3d at 937. When the Appeals Council issues a remand order with

specific directives, the directives become requirements that the ALJ legally must follow under 20

C.F.R. § 404.977(b). See Noreja v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 952 F.3d 1172, 1180 (10th Cir. 2020)

(noting that “for jurisdictional purposes, there is little difference between reviewing an ALJ’s

decision for compliance with a remand order under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.977(b) and 416.1477(b)

and reviewing an ALJ’s decision for compliance with other regulations relating to gathering and

evaluating evidence”); see also Mefford v. Gardner, 383 F.2d 748, 758 (6th Cir. 1967) (noting

that, “if the cause is remanded with specific directions . . . any proceedings inconsistent

therewith is error”).

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The fact that ALJs must comply both with remand orders and with regulations

illuminates the flaw in the position that courts lack jurisdiction to review an ALJ’s alleged non-

compliance with remand orders. As mentioned, that position presumes that the denial of review

by the Council is an implicit decision that the ALJ determination complied with the prior remand

order (and that that implicit decision is an unreviewable intermediate decision). See Shope, 2015

WL 3823165, at *8; see also Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:08-cv-00183, 2009 WL

465708, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2009) (“By failing to remand the matter a second time, it

appears that the Appeals Council considered the ALJ’s [] review to be in compliance with the

Council’s previous order of remand.”). If that is the case, then the denial of review should also

be construed as an implicit decision that the ALJ determination complied with all applicable

statutes and regulations.

There is no suggestion, however, that federal courts are precluded from reviewing an

ALJ’s determination for compliance with statutes or regulations; that is the essence of judicial

review under § 405(g). See Noreja, 952 F.2d at 1180 (noting that federal courts “issue reversal

orders all the time based at least in part on an ALJ’s failure to comply with” “regulations relating

to gathering and evaluating evidence” (collecting cases)). But it would be inconsistent to

construe the decision to deny review by the Council as an “intermediate decision” precluding

judicial oversight only with respect to internal directives and not with respect to SSA regulations,

where the internal directive set forth legally-mandatory requirements just as regulations do. See

id. At its core, judicial review in both cases asks whether the ALJ determination is in

“conformity with such regulations” (whatever their source) and does not scrutinize the Appeals

Council denying review. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Ellis v. Colvin, 29 F. Supp. 3d 288, 299

(W.D. N.Y. 2014). The Court concludes, therefore, that judicial authority to review final

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decisions of the Commissioner must include the jurisdiction to evaluate whether an ALJ has

complied with a remand directive from the Appeals Council.

Having established the Court’s jurisdiction to review Plaintiff’s failure-to-comply claim,

the Court next considers the merits of the claim. The Magistrate Judge concluded that ALJ

Wang had a substantial basis for deciding not to obtain a consultative examination, due in part to

the discretion afforded to ALJs by regulation and by the specific Appeals Council directive in the

case sub judice. (See R. & R. at 9, ECF No. 16). Additionally, the Magistrate Judge noted that

ALJ Wang provided extensive explanation for how the evidence available to him in the record

supported his conclusions about Plaintiff’s hip impairment, even without an additional

consultative examination, and that that evidence was sufficient to make a well-reasoned

determination. (Id. at 10) (citing R. 1177–78).

Plaintiff’s objections are unavailing. He does not argue that the Appeals Council

directive left no discretion, but does suggest that ALJ Wang did not retain discretion to skip a

consultative examination under 20 C.F.R. § 416.919a(b), which sets out situations where SSA

“may require” a consultative examination. (See Obj. at 5, ECF No. 17). But Plaintiff has not

shown that the “may” language in the regulation eliminates all discretion, nor that his is a case

where “the evidence as a whole is insufficient to support a determination or decision.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.919a(b). Plaintiff relies on the fact that ALJ Wang initially indicated that he would obtain

a consultative examination, but falls short of explaining how the ultimate decision not to do so

was bereft of sufficient evidence, especially since ALJ Wang provided plenty of evidence in

support of his decision (noting, for example, that Plaintiff had regularly performed daily

activities belying a debilitating hip injury and had been evaluated as not suffering from acute

distress). See AR 1177–78. Plaintiff argues that the reliance on daily living activities was not

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based on substantial evidence and, even if supported by evidence, does not bear on his ability to

carry out the activities associated with a typical 40-hour work week. (Obj. at 5, ECF No. 17). In

fact, ALJ Wang relied upon evidence in the record, which Plaintiff does not dispute, that Plaintiff

was doing more than just watching television, paying bills, or attending college classes, see

Kaddo, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 945, but also climbing ladders, removing aluminum siding, driving a

bulldozer, and leveling a mobile home—activities that do provide some indication of an

individual’s ability to maintain a 40-hour work week.

As Plaintiff has not shown that ALJ Wang lacked discretion or substantial for his

decision to forgo obtaining a consultative examination, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s first

contention of error is without merit.

B. Medical Opinions of Dr. Haggenjos

Plaintiff’s second contention is that ALJ Wang failed to explain in sufficient detail why

he did not give the medical opinions of Dr. Haggenjos controlling weight in formulating the RFC

assessment. Specifically, the contention centers on the ALJ’s omission of Dr. Haggenjos’

reaching/handling opinion in explaining the RFC decision. (See Statement of Errors at 19, ECF

No. 13). The opinion consists of five questions within a larger checkbox form; the questions ask

how often the individual can perform five physical functions—“reaching, handling, fingering,

feeling, pushing/pulling”—with corresponding blanks in which Dr. Haggenjos wrote that

Plaintiff could “rarely” perform the first four functions and could “almost never” push/pull.6 AR

1151. While ALJ Wang mentioned other portions of the checkbox form in formulating the RFC,

he made no mention of the reaching/handling opinion. (See AR 1180–81).

6 The form listed four possible answers that Dr. Haggenjos could choose: constantly, frequently,

occasionally, or never. AR 1151. Dr. Haggenjos’ handwriting is difficult to read for his first four responses. See id.

The Magistrate Judge concluded that he wrote “rarely,” and Plaintiff does not dispute this reading. (See R. & R. at

16, ECF No. 16; see generally Obj., ECF No. 20).

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An ALJ must consider all medical opinions in the record in evaluating a disability claim,

see 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c), with the source of a medical opinion dictating “the process by which

the Commissioner accords it weight.” Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th

Cir. 2013). For a medical source who regularly treats the claimant, otherwise known as a

“treating physician” or “treating source,” an ALJ must analyze the treating physician’s opinion

according to a two-step analysis. See Allums v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 975 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832

(N.D. Ohio 2013). First, the ALJ must consider what weight to give the opinion of a treating

physician, with a presumption that it should be afforded controlling weight so long as the opinion

is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and is

“not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record . . . .” Hensley v.

Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004)). Second, if an ALJ chooses not to give the opinion

of a treating physician controlling weight, the ALJ must analyze a variety of factors in order to

determine how much weight to give the opinion instead. These factors include “length of the

treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment

relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole,

and any specialization of the treating physician.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544; see also 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1527(c)(2)–(6).

If the ALJ chooses not to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, the ALJ

is required to give “good reasons” for that decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). “Good

reasons” are reasons that are “supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be

sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to

the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc.

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Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406–07 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). This applies with extra force to

cases where the ALJ has set aside a treating physician’s opinion that the claimant is disabled.

See id. at 407 (“The requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants understand the

disposition of their cases, particularly in situations where a claimant knows that his physician has

deemed him disabled and therefore might be especially bewildered when told by an

administrative bureaucracy that she is not, unless some reason for the agency’s decision is

supplied.” (quoting Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Although ALJs are required to adhere to the procedural requirements of § 1527(d)(2),

there are three types of violations that can constitute harmless error and thus negate the need for

reversal. See Wilson, 378 F.3d at 547. One category, as relevant to this case, is where the

“treating source’s opinion is so patently deficient that the Commissioner could not possibly

credit it.” Id. The Magistrate Judge concluded that this—the so-called “patently deficient”

exception—applied to the handling/reaching opinion, thus excusing ALJ Wang’s failure to

provide good reasons for excluding the opinion in formulating the RFC. (R. & R. at 16, ECF

No. 16). In reaching this conclusion, the Magistrate Judge noted that the Sixth Circuit has

repeatedly found check-box opinions that lack explanation, like Dr. Haggenjos’

handling/reaching opinion, to be patently deficient. (See id. at 17) (citing Pruitt v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., No. 22-5152, 2022 WL 4517094, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 2022)); Hernandez v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 644 F. App’x 468, 474–75 (6th Cir. 2016).

Plaintiff objects to this conclusion, on the basis that the opinion is not deficient because

Dr. Haggenjos noted on the form that the findings are supported by “x-ray.” (Obj. at 6, ECF No.

17) (citing AR 1151). The cursory mention of “x-ray,” without any further explanation,

apparently refers to an x-ray imaging performed the day before, which showed signs of hip

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dysplasia. (See id.). Plaintiff argues that this removes the opinion from the realm of the

“patently deficient” exception, and thus that ALJ Wang was required to explain his failure to

consider it in the RFC. Plaintiff does not, however, explain how an x-ray of his hip provides any

support for the handling/reaching opinion; after all, hip dysplasia typically limits an individual’s

ability to walk and range of motion in the pelvis (and may cause pain in the groin area), see What

is Hip Dysplasia?, PENN MED., https://www.pennmedicine.org/for-patients-and-visitors/patient-

information/conditions-treated-a-to-z/hip-dysplasia, rather than her upper body capacities, like

her ability to push, pull, or reach.

As the checkbox form lacks support or explanation, the Court concludes that Dr.

Haggenjos’ handling/reaching opinion was patently deficient. Accordingly, ALJ Wang’s failure

to explain why he did not give the opinion controlling weight (or any weight) was harmless

error.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Objection (ECF No. 17) is hereby OVERRULED.

The Court ADOPTS WITH MODIFICATIONS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation (ECF No. 16) and AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s non-disability

determination. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

be > MARBL Ue

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: March 27, 2023

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