Ray v. Bryant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ANGELA EVERSON RAY,

Administrator of the Estate of

Twyla M. Dillard, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs, Case No. 2:21-cv-4378

Judge Sarah D. Morrison

v. Magistrate Judge Chelsey M.

Vascura

:

ELAINE BRYANT, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

For three weeks in the summer of 2019, Twyla Dillard was in limbo—

medically and legally. She had been shot by her ex-boyfriend and then arrested on a

months-old warrant for violating the civil protection order he had against her. The

issuing court was never advised of the warrant’s execution, but the Columbus

Division of Police (“CDP” or the “Division”) nonetheless considered her a

“hospitalized prisoner.” So Ms. Dillard lay in the hospital, under sedation and

armed guard, until her death. Though the facts are indisputably disturbing, this

Court can provide no redress.

The case—brought by Angela Everson Ray (as administrator of Ms. Dillard’s

estate), Dawn Thomas, and Earnest Dillard, II, against Elaine Bryant (as Division

Chief), Officers Kenneth Sauer and Wayne Bryant, and Detectives Laurie Carney

and Jeff Brandt—comes on cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons

set forth below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.,

ECF No. 36) is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ (Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 41) is

DENIED.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts giving rise to this action are largely undisputed.

A. On July 19, 2019, Twyla Dillard was shot by her ex-boyfriend.

When her parents passed away, Twyla Dillard inherited the family home on

the outskirts of Columbus, Ohio. (Dawn Thomas Dep., ECF No. 36-1, 33:16–17.) She

lived there with her sister, Dawn Thomas, and their dog. (Id., 33:16–21.) Their

brother, Earnest Dillard, II, lived nearby. (Earnest Dillard, II Dep., ECF No. 36-2,

8:15.)

Ms. Dillard was engaged in an ‘on-again-off-again’ relationship with Michael

Jackson. (See Dillard Dep., 21:4–7.) The relationship was not a healthy one. (See

Thomas Dep., 33:7–13.) In deposition, Ms. Thomas recalled that Ms. Dillard1 and

Mr. Jackson “were stalking each other.” (Thomas Dep., 75:19–21.) Crucial to the

present action, Mr. Jackson obtained a civil protection order against Ms. Dillard on

June 16, 2016. (See ECF No. 36-6.) Mr. Jackson reported that Ms. Dillard violated

the protection order and, on May 11, 2019, a warrant issued for her arrest. (Id.) See

also State v. Dillard, No. 2019 CR B 008602 (Franklin Cty. Mun. Ct.).

1 On March 8, 2018, a Franklin County jury found Ms. Dillard guilty of

Menacing by Stalking and Attempted Burglary committed against Mr. Jackson. See

State v. Dillard, No. 16 CR 002747 (Franklin Cty. Ct. C.P.). She was sentenced to a

period of incarceration, satisfied by the nearly two years she spent in jail awaiting

trial. Id.

In the early hours of July 19, 2019, Columbus Police Officers Kenneth Sauer

and Wayne Bryant were dispatched to the scene of a reported shooting. (Kenneth

Sauer Aff., ECF No. 36-3, ¶ 4.) When they arrived, the Officers approached a male

matching a description given by the dispatcher:

We exited our cruiser and asked him where the victim was. The male

. . . , identified as MICHAEL JACKSON, . . . said, “She’s over there.”

They asked Mr. Jackson where the shooter was and Mr. Jackson said,

“I’m right here.”

(ECF No. 36-5.) Ms. Dillard had been shot several times. (Id.) She was transported

to Mt. Carmel East Hospital in critical condition. (Id.) Detectives Laurie Carney,

Jeff Brandt, and Glen Bray were later assigned to the case. (ECF No. 36-13,

PAGEID # 521.)

B. Because there had been an outstanding warrant for her arrest,

Ms. Dillard was placed under guard duty at the hospital.

Defendants state (and Plaintiffs do not refute2) that “[a]fter the warrant was

verified, Miss Dillard was placed under arrest and a guard duty was established.”

(ECF No. 36-9, PAGEID # 476.) CDP Directive 4.02 governs the establishment of

guard duty for all “Hospitalized Prisoners.” (Directive 4.02, ECF No. 36-30.)

Directive 4.02 provides that a “misdemeanant requiring hospitalization should be

issued a summons,” if permitted. (Id.) However, under a separate Directive, “a

2 Although Plaintiffs first argue that the arrest was not perfected due to

CDP’s failure to notify the issuing court that the warrant had been executed (see

Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., PAGEID # 732), they later concede that Ms. Dillard “had been

formally arrested.” (See ECF No. 45, PAGEID # 861, 864.)

summons is not permitted when the offense is a violation of protective order.”3 (ECF

No. 36-9, PAGEID # 476.) As to Hospitalized Prisoners, Directive 4.02 provides:

Division personnel shall not allow anyone to visit a hospitalized

prisoner unless the prisoner is near death, or the prisoner has clearly

requested to speak to an attorney. This should be determined by

investigative unit personnel. In the event an attorney has been

authorized, officers shall require identification from the prisoner’s

attorney that shows the individual is a practicing attorney.

Immediate family may be permitted to visit the prisoner once Division

personnel verify with the medical staff that the prisoner is in a near

death condition. . . .

(Directive 4.02.) The Directive further requires the guarding officer to shackle the

hospitalized prisoner to the bed and remain with the prisoner at all times. (Id.)

C. Ms. Thomas and Mr. Dillard were told their sister had been

shot, but her location was withheld.

Around 6:30 on the morning of July 19, Ms. Thomas returned home from her

night-shift job as an analytical chemist. (Thomas Dep., 12:6, 12:18, 18:13–16.) Ms.

Dillard was not home, and did not immediately respond to Ms. Thomas’s texts. (Id.,

18:16–20.) Ms. Thomas noticed that Ms. Dillard’s bike was gone. (Id., 19:5.) By 7:30,

she started to worry. (Id., 19:21–22.) She called several area hospitals to see if Ms.

Dillard had been injured in an accident. (Id., 19:7–13.) With no word by 10:30, Ms.

Thomas reported to CDP that Ms. Dillard was missing. (Id., 23:3–9.)

That afternoon, Ms. Thomas, Mr. Dillard, and two friends took bikes to a

nearby path to search for Ms. Dillard. (E. Dillard Dep., 16:12–19:4.) Mr. Dillard

3 Although Directives 3.09 (Protection Orders) and 3.02 (Summons and

Misdemeanor Citations) are referenced in written discovery responses, neither is

included in the record. (See, e.g., ECF No. 36-8, PAGEID # 470.)

called law enforcement for assistance. (Id., 19:9–17.) While the others were

searching, CDP met Mr. Dillard at the trailhead and revealed that they knew where

his sister was. (Id., 21:10.) Mr. Dillard recounted the conversation in deposition:

The information I received from them was that she had been – that

they knew where she was. And then when we pressed them, they were

hesitant to give me information that she had been at his – at his house,

and then basically they – they finally told us after some coaxing that

she had been shot, but that she was alive, because we were concerned

– the moment you hear someone’s been shot, well, she’s shot, what’s

her condition? Well, her condition at the moment is stable. Okay.

Where is she at? I can’t tell you. And I was asking why I couldn’t be

told where she was at. And they were trying to tell me that there were

other circumstances and that they couldn’t tell me.

(Id., 21:17–22:7.) He was told only that Ms. Dillard and Mr. Jackson “had had some

sort of altercation and that he had shot her,” but “that she was alive and stable.”

(Id., 22:18–23.)

D. Ms. Dillard spent three weeks under guard at Mount Carmel

East.

Though Ms. Dillard spent three weeks under guard at Mount Carmel East,

there is very little evidence of what occurred during that time. What is available is

summarized below.

A type-written note dated July 19, 2019, appears in the CDP file:

Twyla M Dilliard [sic] currently has a warrant for F14 Violation of

Protection Order #15CV10146 case #19-8602. The protected person is

Michael L Jackson.

Additional F1 VPO charges will be filed upon Ms Dillards’ release.

4 The Municipal Court docket indicates that the warrant was for an M1

offense. (See ECF No. 41-1, PAGEID # 750.) It is unclear what, if any, significance

this error might have had.

If there is any change in her condition (good or bad) contact DV Det.

Carney #861 at x7225 or Homicide Det. J. Brandt #1784 x4730 to

advise them.

Should Ms. Dillard be release please contact DV Det. J. Ratliff #2026

x7225 prior to her being slated in order for her to be interviewed on the

current VPO warrant.

**absolutely no contact outside of medical personnel

without approval from Det. Carney or Det. Brandt**

(ECF No. 41-1, PAGEID # 747.) Several hand-written notes are also in the CDP file,

including:

7/20/19 @ 2:00am

Checked on victim at [Mount Carmel East] in Rm # 2N28. Per nurse

still critical and likely to die, also just had surgery. Unknown if any

projectiles found. Would turn in to security if any found. Det. Gribi

#2023 also present.

7/20/19 @ 8:00pm

Check on victim again. Condition still same. Still likely to die.

(id., PAGEID # 748); and

IF PATIENT EXPIRES, CALL DET.(S) ON THE LIST HERE. AND

FAMILY IS ALLOWED SHOULD SHE EXPIRE

(id., PAGEID # 749).

There is conflicting evidence in the record as to when (if ever), for how long,

and to what extent, Ms. Dillard was conscious while in the hospital. Detectives

Carney and Brandt each state they were unable to interview Ms. Dillard “due to

[her] medical condition”—when they visited, Ms. Dillard was “unconscious or

sedated.” (ECF No. 36-13, PAGEID # 521, 524; ECF No. 36-14, PAGEID # 531, 533.)

But medical records (to which no affiant has testified for authentication,

explanation, or otherwise) indicate that Ms. Dillard may have been alert on July 23

and July 27. (ECF No. 41-4, PAGEID # 809–11.) Ms. Thomas testified5 that, for all

but five or six hours of her hospitalization, Ms. Dillard was in a medically-induced

coma. (Thomas Dep., 48:9–15.)

E. CDP permitted family to visit Ms. Dillard on August 7, 2019.

She died two days later.

At 2:00am on August 7, 2019, Detective Carney called Ms. Thomas to advise

her that Ms. Dillard’s medical condition had worsened, and that the family could

visit her at Mount Carmel East.6 (Thomas Dep., 36:8–12.) Ms. Thomas went to the

hospital shortly thereafter. (Id., 40:13–14.) Ms. Dillard died at 12:25pm on August

9, 2019. (ECF No. 36-10, PAGEID # 483.) Mr. Dillard was unable to visit before she

passed. (E. Dillard Dep., 38:1–2.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs first filed this action on August 9, 2021, in the Franklin County

Court of Common Pleas. (See ECF No. 3.) After Defendants removed the action to

this Court, Plaintiffs filed the operative Amended Complaint. (Am. Compl., ECF No.

20.) Therein, Plaintiffs assert § 1983 claims for violation of Ms. Dillard’s civil

rights7; § 1983 claims for violation of Ms. Thomas and Mr. Dillard’s civil rights; and

5 Though there are significant evidentiary issues with this testimony, see Fed.

R. Evid. 602 (Need for Personal Knowledge) and 801 (Rule Against Hearsay),

Defendants raise no objection. (See Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J, PAGEID # 245 (citing Ms.

Thomas’s testimony).)

6 Plaintiffs dispute that there was any change in Ms. Dillard’s medical

condition, arguing that she had been in a near-death state since she was admitted.

(Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., 3.)

7 The Court recognizes that Ms. Ray, as administrator of Ms. Dillard’s estate,

is pursuing the claims alleging violation of Ms. Dillard’s constitutional rights. To

state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of the

duty of care and contributory negligence. (Id., generally.)

With regard to the § 1983 claims, the Amended Complaint does not

enumerate the constitutional provisions alleged to have been violated. Between the

Amended Complaint and their Motion for Summary Judgment, however, Plaintiffs

allude to or reference rights protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments.8 (See Am. Compl.; Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J.) Regardless of the

specific constitutional bases, the Amended Complaint is clear: Plaintiffs’ claims are

based on (i) the decision to restrict the family’s ability to visit Ms. Dillard and

(ii) the failure to timely notify the family about Ms. Dillard’s shooting, medical

condition, and location. (See Am. Compl.) Central to their claims is the argument

that Division Directive 4.02 violated their constitutional rights.

avoid confusion, however, the Court will discuss those claims by reference to Ms.

Dillard alone.

8 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs allege new claims in their Motion for

Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 43, PAGEID # 824.) Plaintiffs dispute that

assertion, arguing that they “were merely expanding on the civil rights violations

that were plead [sic] and inferenced in the amended complaint and better flushed

out in their motion for summary judgment.” (ECF No. 45, PAGEID # 864.) Parties

who seek to raise new claims at the summary-judgment stage must first move to

amend their pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). See Rafferty v.

Trumbull Cnty., 758 F. App’x 425, 429 (6th Cir. 2018). If the plaintiff seeks to raise

new claims for the first time in response to summary judgment, a district court does

not err by refusing to consider them. Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus., &

Textile Emps., 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005). Because the Court grants

summary judgment to Defendants on other grounds, it need not plod through which

allegations in Plaintiffs’ summary judgment briefing were, or were not, included in

the Amended Complaint.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant has the burden of establishing there are no genuine

issues of material fact, which may be achieved by demonstrating the nonmoving

party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its claim. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co.,

12 F.3d 1382, 1388–89 (6th Cir. 1993). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving

party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,

398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).

A genuine issue exists if the nonmoving party can present “significant

probative evidence” to show that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as

to the material facts.” Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 339–40 (6th Cir.

1993). In other words, “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (concluding that

summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence could not lead the trier of fact

to find for the non-moving party).

IV. ANALYSIS

Though the parties seek summary judgment on several grounds, the Court

will address only Defendants’ arguments which are dispositive. The Court finds

that: (1) some of the § 1983 claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) for

those § 1983 claims that are not barred by the statute of limitations, Plaintiffs have

failed to demonstrate that each Defendant, through his or her own actions, violated

the Constitution; and (3) Directive 4.02 does not violate the Constitution. As to

Plaintiffs’ state law claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

A. The § 1983 claims brought by Ms. Thomas and Mr. Dillard are

time-barred. Those brought by Ms. Dillard are not.

Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims accrued on July 19, 2019,

and were time-barred when this action was filed on August 9, 2021. Plaintiffs argue

in response that their claims did not accrue until August 7, 2019, and that, in any

event, the continuing violations doctrine extended their time to file.

The Court looks to state law to determine the applicable statute of

limitations, and federal law to determine when a cause of action accrues. See Ruff v.

Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001). “[T]he appropriate statute of limitations

for actions under § 1983 is the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury

actions.” Jones v. City of Hamtramck, 905 F.2d 908, 909 (6th Cir. 1990). In Ohio,

that statute of limitations is two years. Banks v. City of Whitehall, 344 F.3d 550,

553 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10). The statute of limitations

“begins to run when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms

the basis of their claims.” Ruff, 258 F.3d at 500–501. The United States Supreme

Court has explained:

“Under the traditional rule of accrual . . . the tort cause of action

accrues, and the statute of limitations commences to run, when the

wrongful act or omission results in damages. The cause of action

accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or

predictable.” 1 C. Corman, Limitation of Actions § 7.4.1, pp. 526–527

(1991) (footnote omitted); see also 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions

§ 112, p. 150 (2005). Were it otherwise, the statute would begin to run

only after a plaintiff became satisfied that he had been harmed

enough, placing the supposed statute of repose in the sole hands of the

party seeking relief.

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007). The Sixth Circuit directs courts to “look[ ]

to what event should have alerted the typical lay person to protect his or her

rights.” Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. County of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Dixon v. Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1991)). The test is an

objective one. Thus, courts do not evaluate whether a plaintiff had actual

knowledge—instead, they evaluate whether the plaintiff “knew or should have

known [of the injury] based upon reasonable inquiry, and could have filed suit and

obtained relief.” Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412, 422 (6th Cir. 2007).

1. Ms. Thomas and Mr. Dillard’s § 1983 claims accrued on

July 19, 2019.

In the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action, the Amended Complaint alleges that

Defendants deprived Ms. Thomas and Mr. Dillard of their right to association with

their sister by failing to timely notify them of important information and preventing

them from seeing Ms. Dillard. (Am. Compl., ¶¶ 55, 61, 66, 67.) It further alleges

that Defendants deprived Ms. Thomas and Mr. Dillard of their rights to contact Ms.

Dillard’s minister, or an attorney to advocate on her behalf. (Id., ¶ 59.) The event

that should have alerted Ms. Thomas and Mr. Dillard of their potential claims

against CDP occurred on July 19, 2019. That day, Ms. Thomas and Mr. Dillard

learned that their sister had been shot and was hospitalized, but that CDP would

neither disclose where she was being treated nor allow them to visit. Thus, the

statute of limitations expired on July 19, 2021.

The continuous violation doctrine does not save the siblings’ claims. That

doctrine can apply to § 1983 claims, though in limited circumstances. See Wilder v.

Collins, No. 2:12-cv-0064, 2012 WL 1606035, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May 8, 2012)

(Graham, J.). The Sixth Circuit has explained,

“A ‘continuous violation’ exists if: (1) the defendants engage in

continuing wrongful conduct; (2) injury to the plaintiffs accrues

continuously; and (3) had the defendants at any time ceased their

wrongful conduct, further injury would have been avoided.” Hensley v.

City of Columbus, 557 F.3d 693, 697 (6th Cir. 2009). “A continuing

violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill

effects from an original violation.” Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s

Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007).

Broom v. Strickland, 579 F.3d 553, 555 (6th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). There is no

evidence that Defendants in this case engaged in continued unlawful acts. Rather,

the allegedly-wrongful acts all occurred on July 19—by the end of that day, Ms.

Thomas and Mr. Dillard knew they were not allowed to visit or provide aid to Ms.

Dillard, or even to know her location. Everything occurring after July 19 was a

“continual ill effect” of CDP’s original implementation of Directive 4.02. Because

they did not file this action until August 9, 2021, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED as to Ms. Thomas and Mr. Dillard’s § 1983 claims.

2. Ms. Dillard’s § 1983 claims also accrued on July 19, 2019,

but the statute of limitations was tolled until her death on

August 9.

In the First and Sixth Causes of Action, the Amended Complaint alleges that

Ms. Dillard was deprived of her right to association with family, her right to

freedom of religion, and “possibly” her right to counsel. (Am. Compl., ¶¶ 26, 30, 64.)

Ohio law tolls the statute of limitations if, “at the time the cause of action accrues,

[the plaintiff is] of unsound mind.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.16; see Michelle R. v. Vill.

of Middleport, 2:19-cv-2272, 2019 WL 4452678, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2019)

(Sargus, J.) (“Since Ohio’s statute of limitations applies to section 1983 claims, so

does its tolling statute, unless the result is inconsistent with federal law.”). It is

undisputed that Ms. Dillard was in a coma for all but a few hours of her

hospitalization. As to Ms. Dillard’s claims, then, the statute of limitations was tolled

until her death on August 9, 2019. Cf. Fetterolf v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 661

N.E.2d 811 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (finding that death removed minor’s “disability”

tolling the statute of limitations). Accordingly, Ms. Dillard’s § 1983 claims were

timely filed.

B. Detectives Brandt and Carney were not timely added as party-

defendants.

Plaintiffs’ original complaint named “John or Jane Doe” defendants who,

though unknown at the time of the filing, were believed to become known during

discovery. (See ECF No. 3, ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs replaced the Doe defendants with

Detectives Brandt and Carney in the Amended Complaint, filed on January 19,

2022. (Am. Compl.) An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the

original pleading only in limited circumstances. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1).

“Replacing a ‘John Doe’ defendant with a new, previously unknown party is

considered a change of parties and must comply with the requirements of Rule

15(c)(1)(C) when the change is made after the expiration of the applicable statute of

limitations.” Brown v. Cuyahoga Cty., 517 F. App’x 431, 433 (6th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiffs do not (i) explain why Detectives Brandt and Carney were not named in

the original complaint, (ii) argue that the Detectives has notice, or (iii) contend that

the Detectives knew they would have been named but for some mistake. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C). Accordingly, the Amended Complaint “created a new cause of

action and there is no relation back to the original filing for purposes of limitations.”

Asher v. Unarco Material Handling, Inc., 596 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal

quotation and citation omitted).

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Ms. Dillard’s

§ 1983 claims against Detectives Brandt and Carney.

C. Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Officers Bryant and Sauer are

liable under § 1983 in their individual capacities.

To prevail on the remaining § 1983 claims against the individual officers, Ms.

Dillard must demonstrate that each Defendant, through his own individual actions,

has violated the Constitution—that is, she must prove “that the violation was

committed personally by the defendant.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 615 (6th

Cir. 2014). Here, the Estate has offered neither evidence nor argument that Officer

Bryant or Officer Sauer personally engaged in any conduct that violated Ms.

Dillard’s constitutional rights. Instead, throughout their briefing, Plaintiffs

generically refer to conduct by “Defendants” and never identify any specific actions

taken by either Officer to deprive Ms. Dillard of her rights. Accordingly, she has not

demonstrated that either of these two individuals had direct responsibility for the

challenged actions. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED on

Ms. Dillard’s § 1983 claims against Officers Bryant and Sauer.

D. Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Directive 4.02 is

unconstitutional.

The Amended Complaint names Defendant Elaine Bryant in her official

capacity as Division Chief. It is well-established that “[a] suit against an individual

in [her] official capacity is the equivalent of a suit against the governmental entity.”

Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). The same is true with respect to

administrative departments of governmental entities, such as CDP. See Williams v.

Dayton Police Dep’t, 680 F. Supp. 1075, 1080 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (Rice, J.). As a result,

Plaintiffs’ claims against Chief Bryant will be considered as claims against the City

of Columbus.

To hold the City liable under § 1983, Ms. Dillard must show that the City’s

policy or custom caused her constitutional injury. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 694 (1978). There are four avenues to make out such a claim: (1) official

policy or legislation; (2) action authorized by a designated decisionmaker; (3) failure

to train or supervise employees; or (4) a custom of acquiescence in rights violations.

Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 828 (6th Cir. 2019). Ms. Dillard proceeds

under the first avenue, arguing that the implementation of Directive 4.029 deprived

her of her constitutional rights because CDP used the Directive to justify the no-

visitation policy.

Ms. Dillard had been arrested and was considered to be in pretrial detention

while hospitalized. Pretrial detainees do not possess the full range of freedoms that

unincarcerated individuals hold. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).

Restrictions placed on pretrial detainees are constitutional so long as they do not

amount to punishment or otherwise violate the Constitution. Id. at 535–37. “A court

must decide whether the [restriction] is imposed for the purpose of punishment or

whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. at

538.

[I]f a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is

reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not,

without more, amount to ‘punishment.’ Conversely, if a restriction or

condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is

arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the

purpose of the governmental action is punishment . . . .

Id. at 539; see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584 (1984) (upholding a

detention facility’s ban on contact visits with pretrial detainees in view of the

policy’s “obvious” connection to internal security). In the absence of “substantial

9In addition to Directive 4.02, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment

references “other department policies and procedures.” (ECF No. 41, PAGEID

# 734.) But Plaintiffs never identify any other policy or procedure at issue for the

Monell claims. See Graham v. Cty. of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 383 (6th Cir. 2004)

(“A plaintiff asserting a section 1983 claim on the basis of a municipal custom or

policy must ‘identify the policy, connect the policy to the [City] itself and show that

the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.’”) (quoting

Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510

U.S. 1177 (1994)).

evidence” indicating that law enforcement officials “have exaggerated their

response” to legitimate interests, “courts should ordinarily defer to [those officials’]

expert judgment” regarding restrictions during pretrial detention. Bell, 441 U.S. at

539.

This Court is certainly troubled by the facts in this case—in particular, the

duration and circumstances surrounding CDP’s application of Directive 4.02. See

Bell, 441 U.S. at 543 (finding the duration of the restriction relevant to its

constitutionality). Ms. Dillard was admitted to Mount Carmel East Hospital on July

19, 2019. She was never expected to survive her injuries, and was under near-

constant sedation. But it was not until 19 days had passed that CDP informed the

family of her location and permitted visitation. It is beyond belief that CDP could

not have made some reasonable accommodation to allow controlled visitation by

family—and, if requested by the family, spiritual and legal advisors. (To state the

obvious, Ms. Dillard could not have been expected to request an attorney herself.)

But, with that being said, Plaintiffs do not argue that the restrictions on Ms.

Dillard’s visitation amounted to punishment. Nor do they dispute the Division’s

reasons behind Directive 4.02—including to mitigate security and intelligence risks.

• Security risk. Defendants state that Directive 4.02 “is necessary for the

security of the prisoner as well as the security of the citizens in the area.”

(ECF No. 36-9, PAGEID # 476.) A community hospital is an unsecured

area requiring precautions to ensure the safety of detainees, officers,

hospital personnel, and members of the public. Security is “perhaps the

most legitimate” governmental objective. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S.

126, 133 (2003).

• Intelligence risk. Further, CDP wanted to interview Ms. Dillard before she

spoke to any other potential witnesses. (See ECF No. 36-9, PAGEID

# 476.) Obtaining an uncontaminated statement from a pretrial detainee

may be a legitimate governmental interest. Cordova v. City of

Albuquerque, No. 11-806 GBW/ACT, 2013 WL 12033330, at *6 (D. N.M.

May 21, 2013).

Thus, despite the Court’s concerns, Plaintiffs have not provided any reason why the

Court should not defer to the Division’s expert judgment regarding the restrictions

placed on Ms. Dillard.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Ms. Dillard’s

§ 1983 claims against the City.

E. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Having granting judgment to Defendants on all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims,

the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims.

Federal courts are “courts of limited jurisdiction” that “possess only that power

authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Once a court has original jurisdiction over some claims in

the action, it can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims that are

part of the same case or controversy. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.

715, 725 (1966). But supplemental jurisdiction “need not be exercised in every case

in which it is found to exist”—doing so is a matter of judicial discretion. Id. at 726.

Here, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims would

not serve judicial economy, convenience, fairness, or comity, and the Court declines

to do so. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988).

Plaintiffs’ state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling

in state court.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(ECF No. 36) is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF

No. 41) is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ state law claims are DISMISSED without

prejudice to refiling in state court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Sarah D. Morrison

SARAH D. MORRISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE