Fortson v. Henness

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

TIMOTHY FORTSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 1:22-cv-410

Judge Douglas R. Cole

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

LT. CHARLES HENNESS, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Timothy Fortson, an Ohio inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several corrections officers

employed at Warren Correctional Institution (“WCI”), alleging that Defendants employed

excessive force and were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation

of his constitutional rights. The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed

in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3); accordingly, this matter is before the Court for the initial screen

of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify

cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, or any portion

of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2);

see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the

initial screen, for the reasons that follow, Plaintiff MAY PROCEED on his excessive force

claims against Defendant Henness in his individual capacity arising from the August 2020

incident and against Defendants Anderson, Capella, and Mann in their individual capacities

arising from the April 2022 incident. It is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS

Plaintiff’s remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges two incidents of excessive force. Plaintiff first

alleges that Defendant Charles Henness used excessive force by pinning Plaintiff against the side

of a medical cart such that Plaintiff was hanging over the side of the moving cart and hit his

head. Plaintiff could smell only exhaust fumes through his mask. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7–8, ECF No.

15.)

Plaintiff further alleges that in April 2022, Plaintiff called for medical assistance after

falling from his bed and hitting his head. Several corrections officers responded. Plaintiff alleges

that Defendants Anderson and Capella used unnecessary force by tossing Plaintiff onto a medical

cart, such that Plaintiff landed painfully on his cuffed hands. Plaintiff further alleges that

Defendant Mann pushed Plaintiff’s leg over Plaintiff’s head while Plaintiff screamed. Plaintiff

then alleges that Defendant Henness ordered Defendants Knick, Anderson, and Capella to

shackle Plaintiff, in the course of which Defendant Knick “[did] something to [Plaintiff’s] right

lower shin,” which “may have left a hole in [Plaintiff’s] leg.” Plaintiff further alleges that

Defendants ignored his serious head wound and concussion and left him in cuffs and shackles for

more than fifteen minutes. (Id. ¶¶ 9–14.) Plaintiff also names Corrections Officer Starkey as a

Defendant involved in the April 2022 incident, but Plaintiff does not allege any specific action

by Starkey other than generally alleging he engaged in “the use of force.” (Id. ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which

provides in pertinent part as follows:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the

court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See

also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action

in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion

of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted”).

Further, to properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must

satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under

Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up).

Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

III. ANALYSIS

The undersigned construes Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint to advance claims for

excessive force arising out of the August 2020 and April 2022 incidents and claims for deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs arising out of the April 2022 incident. The undersigned

considers each claim in turn.

A. Excessive Force

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain against

prisoners. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475

U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). To make out a claim under the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner must

satisfy both an objective and a subjective component. Id. (citing Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697,

700 (6th Cir.1993)).

The objective component requires the pain inflicted to be “sufficiently serious.” Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Yet the seriousness of the injuries is not by itself dispositive.

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam). “When prison officials maliciously and

sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . .

[w]hether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).

“Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how

diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” Id.

The subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison officials. Williams,

631 F.3d at 383. The “core judicial inquiry” is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort

to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins, 449

U.S. at 37 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7).

Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has plausibly

alleged excessive force claims against Defendant Henness in his individual capacity arising from

the August 2020 incident and against Defendants Anderson, Capella, and Mann in their

individual capacities arising from the April 2022 incident. Plaintiff therefore MAY PROCEED

on these claims.

Plaintiff has not, however, alleged any specific actions by Defendant Henness in

connection with the April 2022 incident that could satisfy the objective component of an

excessive force claim. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Henness in connection with the April

2022 incident are limited to Henness’s order for Plaintiff to be shackled. In the absence of any

allegations that the shackling caused pain, lasting injury, or was inflicted in a manner “repugnant

to the conscience of mankind,” this type of de minimis use of physical force is “necessarily

exclude[d] from constitutional recognition.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10 (quoting Whitley, 475

U.S. at 327).

Further, Plaintiff alleges only that Knick did “something” to his shin, and alleges no

specific conduct on the part of Starkey. The Sixth Circuit “has consistently held that damage

claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must

allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted

constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terrance v.

Northville Reg’l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis in original).

“[C]ategorical references to ‘Defendants’” do not meet this standard. Marcilis v. Twp. of

Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 596–97 (6th Cir. 2012). Neither do allegations that an individual

defendant “was present and perhaps involved in [the plaintiff’s] restraint,” without allegations as

to the unconstitutionality of the individual defendant’s actions. Lanman, 529 F.3d at 684.

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims for

excessive force against Defendants Knick, Starkey, and Henness in connection with the April

2022 incident.

B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need

The undersigned construes Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint to advance an Eighth

Amendment medical indifference claim arising from the fifteen-minute delay of medical care to

treat Plaintiff’s April 2022 head injury. It is well established that “[t]he Eighth Amendment

forbids prison officials from unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain on an inmate by acting

with deliberate indifference toward [his] serious medical needs.” Jones v. Muskegon Cty., 625

F.3d 935, 941 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). As with Plaintiff’s claims for

excessive force, a claim for deliberate indifference “has both objective and subjective

components.” Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011). The United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained:

The objective component mandates a sufficiently serious medical need. [Blackmore

v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004).] The subjective component

regards prison officials’ state of mind. Id. Deliberate indifference “entails

something more than mere negligence, but can be satisfied by something less than

acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm

will result.” Id. at 895–96 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The

prison official must “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”

Id. at 896 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Barnett, 414 F. App’x at 787–88; see also Jones, 625 F.3d at 941 (“[T]he prison official must

have acted with a state of mind similar to recklessness. Thus, to prove the required level of

culpability, a plaintiff must show that the official: (1) subjectively knew of a risk to the inmate’s

health, (2) drew the inference that a substantial risk of harm to the inmate existed, and

(3) consciously disregarded that risk.” (citations omitted)).

The Sixth Circuit has also noted that in the context of deliberate indifference claims:

“[W]e distinguish between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of

medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate

medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976).

Where a prisoner alleges only that the medical care he received was inadequate,

“federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments.” Id.

However, it is possible for medical treatment to be “so woefully inadequate as to

amount to no treatment at all.” Id.

Alspaugh, 643 F.3d at 169. See also Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (“If

the plaintiff’s claim, however, is based on the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately . . .

the plaintiff must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental

effect of the delay in medical treatment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “In

examining whether a claimed injury is ‘sufficiently serious’” to sustain a claim for deliberate

indifference, “courts look to the effect of any delay in treatment caused by an officer’s inaction.”

Vaughn v. City of Lebanon, 18 F. App’x 252, 274 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original).

Specifically, a plaintiff “who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional

violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect

of the delay in medical treatment to succeed.” Id. (citing Napier v. Madison Cty., Ky., 238 F.3d

739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001)).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any detrimental physical effect from the fifteen-minute

delay in medical care to treat his head injury. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that this claim

be DISMISSED against all Defendants.

IV. DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff MAY PROCEED on his excessive force claims

against Defendant Henness in his individual capacity arising from the August 2020 incident and

against Defendants Anderson, Capella, and Mann in their individual capacities arising from the

April 2022 incident. It is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s remaining

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting

authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit

this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE