Augustus v. Green County Adult Detention Center

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

ANTHONY AUGUSTUS, : Case No. 3:22-cv-328

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge Michael J. Newman

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

:

GREENE COUNTY :

ADULT DETENTION CENTER, :

:

Defendant. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Greene County Adult Detention Center, has filed a pro se civil

rights complaint in this Court against defendant the Greene County Adult Detention Center. By

separate Order plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. This matter is

before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to determine whether the complaint,

or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); §

805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint

A. Legal Standard

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower

judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing

so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

1 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendation.

by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,

malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324

(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)(2)2 as part of the statute, which

provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. See also § 1915A(b). Thus, § 1915(e) requires

sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or

malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill

v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands

on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d

502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

2 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of

considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the

defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds

pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett

v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010)

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits;

“‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,

482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989)).

B. Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiff brings this complaint in connection with the loss of his wedding ring at the Greene

County Adult Detention Center. (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 9). According to plaintiff,

the loss of his ring was the result of negligence, resulting in emotional distress and a financial loss

of $25,437.00. (Id.). As relief, plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Id. at PageID 9-10).

C. Analysis

Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal at the screening stage. See 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

As noted above, the Greene County Adult Detention Center is the sole named defendant to

this action.3 (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 5, 8). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that

“[e]very person who, under the color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured

by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A

correctional facility is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Parker v.

Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 65 F. App’x. 922, 923 (6th Cir. 2003) (Department of Corrections

not a “person” under § 1983). See, e.g., Aladimi v. Hamilton Cnty. Justice Center, No. 1:09-cv-

398, 2012 WL 292587, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 1, 2012) (finding that the Hamilton County Justice

Center was not a person subject to suit), adopted, 2020 WL 529585 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 2012).

Even if the Court were to liberally construe the complaint as against Greene County itself, plaintiff

has failed to allege that his constitutional rights were violated pursuant to a county policy. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Therefore, the Greene County Adult

Detention Center should be dismissed as a defendant to this action.

Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to hold any defendant liable for the

destruction of his property, plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed. In order to assert such a claim,

plaintiff must first “plead . . . that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.” Vicory

3 Plaintiff lists “Greene County Adult Detention Center, et al.” as a defendant in the complaint. (Id. at PageID 8).

However, the only additional named individual in the complaint is Sgt. Richley, who plaintiff indicates he talked to

regarding the investigation of his administrative grievance. (Id. at PageID 7). For the reasons stated below in

discussing plaintiff’s claims regarding the loss of his wedding ring and the grievance procedure/investigation, the

complaint is subject to dismissal even if plaintiff intended to name individuals allegedly involved in the loss of his

property or grievance process.

v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1983). See also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).

“If satisfactory state procedures are provided in a procedural due process case, then no

constitutional deprivation has occurred despite the injury.” Jefferson v. Jefferson County Pub.

Sch. Sys., 360 F.3d 583, 587-88 (6th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, in order to state a procedural due

process claim under section 1983 “the plaintiff must attack the state’s corrective procedure as well

as the substantive wrong.” Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 934 F.2d 726, 731 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting

Vicory, 721 F.2d at 1066). A plaintiff “may not seek relief under Section 1983 without first

pleading and proving the inadequacy of state or administrative processes and remedies to redress

[his] due process violations.” Jefferson, 360 F.3d at 588.

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts even remotely indicating that his remedies under Ohio

law to redress the wrong of which he complains are inadequate. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to

explain why a state tort remedy for conversion would not suffice to address his claim. See Fox v.

Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 349 (6th Cir. 1999). Therefore, he fails to state a due process claim

that is actionable in this § 1983 proceeding.

The complaint is also subject to dismissal to the extent that plaintiff complains about the

administrative grievance procedure. As noted above (see supra n.2), the complaint indicates that

plaintiff filled out an investigation form for lost items, but that “Sgt. Richley talked to me once

and that was it.” (Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 7). To the extent that plaintiff may seek to hold

Richley or any other individual liable in connection with the grievance procedure or investigation,

he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Prison officials whose only roles

“involve their denial of administrative grievances and their failure to remedy the alleged

[unconstitutional] behavior’” cannot be liable under § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300

(6th Cir. 1999). Nor does a prison official’s alleged failure to adequately investigate claims of

misconduct rise to the level of “encouragement” that would make the official liable for such

misconduct. Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1014 (6th Cir. 1992); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d

416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).

Finally, insofar as plaintiff is alleging claims under Ohio law, the Court should decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.4 Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d

195, 210 (6th Cir. 2004) (although the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1367 is a matter of discretion, when a court dismisses all federal claims before trial, it generally

should dismiss the state law claims as well).

Accordingly, in sum, because plaintiff has failed to state an actionable claim against the

named defendant, the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A(b).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); and

2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the

foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and

Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore

deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

November 30, 2022 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

United States Magistrate Judge

4 Plaintiff purports to bring a state law negligence claim, as well as a federal claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress. (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 9). Even if the Court could conclude a federal claim for intentional

infliction of emotion distress is actionable under the PLRA, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see also Lanning v. Doyle, Case

No. 3:14-cv-24, 2015 WL 710427, at *17 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2015), the conclusory allegations in the complaint are

insufficient to plausibly support such a claim.

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections

to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served

with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either

side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to,

and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall

respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy

of those objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit

rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947

(6th Cir. 1981).