The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
SHAWNTELLE HEATH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:22-cv-1186
Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
v. Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
WARDEN TERI BALDAUF, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 11) to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 7), which is hereby OVERRULED. The Report
and Recommendation is ADOPTED in full. (ECF No. 7.) This case remains open.
I.
Plaintiff, a former inmate at the Ohio Reformatory for Women (ORF),1 brings this pro se
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against ORF Warden Teri Baldauf and Lt. Kramer. The Court
liberally construed Plaintiff’s complaint as also bringing claims under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (ADA), and/or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Rehabilitation Act). By separate Order, Plaintiff has been granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
II.
If a party objects within the allotted time to a Report and Recommendation, the Court
“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
1 The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) website indicates that Plaintiff is currently on
judicial release. See https://appgateway.drc.ohio.gov/OffenderSearch/Search/Details/W106391 (last viewed on May
16, 2022).
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed
R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the Complaint, or any
portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). “Dismissal of a complaint for the failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted is appropriate only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867
(6th Cir. 2000). The Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff [and] accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Trzebuckowski v. City of
Cleveland, 319 F.3d 853, 855 (6th Cir. 2003).
Further, the Court holds pleadings by a pro se litigant “to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and may not
uphold the dismissal of such a pleading “simply because the court finds the plaintiff’s allegations
unlikely.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). A pro se litigant’s pleadings must be,
and in this instance are, construed liberally. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520–21.
III.
In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommended:
Plaintiff may proceed at this juncture against Defendant Baldauf with Counts III
through VI, and Counts VIII through X, for alleged failure to provide reasonable
accommodations in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and with
Count XII, for alleged retaliation in violation of the ADA and/or the First
Amendment. Plaintiff’s ADA and/or Rehabilitation Act claims may proceed at this
juncture against Defendant Baldauf in an official capacity and only for
compensatory damages. Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim may proceed
at this juncture against Defendant Baldauf in an individual capacity for monetary
damages. However, for the above-stated reasons, Plaintiff’s remaining claims
should be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
(R&R at 18.)
Plaintiff has objected only to the dismissal of claim titled Count XVII for deliberate
indifference to her medical needs. As to that claim, the Magistrate Judge held:
Plaintiff fails to set forth factual allegations showing that either of the two named
Defendants—Warden Baldauf and Lt. Kramer—were personally involved in the
alleged constitutional violation. “It is well settled that a defendant cannot be held liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations absent a showing that the
defendant was personally involved in some manner in the allegedly unconstitutional
conduct.” Williams v. Hodge, No. 3:08-0387, 2009 WL 47141, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Jan.
7, 2009) (citing Hardin v. Straub, 954 F.2d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1992)). Specifically,
a plaintiff “must show that the defendant personally participated in, or otherwise
authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in, the allegedly unconstitutional
conduct.” Hodge, 2009 WL 47141, at *3 (citations omitted).
(R&R at 16.)
In her objection, Plaintiff argues that the Warden should have been aware of her
treatment, or lack thereof, because of the numerous requests she made as well as the Warden’s
awareness of her medical needs. This, as the Magistrate Judge correctly found, is insufficient to
state a claim for personal involvement, authorization, approval or knowing acquiescence.
IV.
Having conducted a de novo review, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Objection to the Report
and Recommendation unpersuasive and OVERRULES the Objection. (ECF No. 11.) The Court
ADOPTS in full the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 7.) This case remains open.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
11/18/2022 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE