discussing the justifications for the “strong presumption in favor of openness”
How later courts described this case
- discussing the justifications for the “strong presumption in favor of openness”
- requiring a movant to “analyze in detail, document by document, the propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and legal citations”
- “The proponent of sealing therefore must ‘analyze in detail, document by document, the propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and legal citations.’”
- “‘[T]he greater the public interest in the litigation’s subject matter, the greater the showing necessary to overcome the presumption of access.’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
THOMAS MERCK,
:
Plaintiff, Case No. 2:20-cv-2908
Judge Sarah D. Morrison
v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A.
Preston Deavers
WALMART INC.,
:
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Thomas Merck, individually and as representative of a proposed
class, alleges that Defendant Walmart Inc. violated the pre-adverse action notice
requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b)(3), by failing to
provide Mr. Merck with a copy of the credit report on which it relied in rejecting his
employment application. The matter is now before the Court on Mr. Merck’s
Unopposed Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 95) and Walmart’s Unopposed
Motion to File Document Under Seal (ECF No. 96). Mr. Merck’s Motion for Class
Certification (ECF No. 67) and Walmart’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
75) are also pending.
For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Merck’s Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED; Walmart’s Motion to File Document Under Seal is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part; and the Motions for Class Certification and Summary
Judgment are DENIED without prejudice to refiling in compliance with this
Opinion and Order within seven days of the date hereof.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Court adopted the parties’ proposed Protective Order in
October 2020.
Mr. Merck first filed this action more than two years ago. (See ECF No. 1.) In
October of 2020, the parties proposed, and this Court adopted, a Stipulated
Protective Order. (Protective Order, ECF No. 29.) The Protective Order permits the
parties to designate “any documents, testimony, written responses, or other
materials produced in this case” as Confidential or Attorneys’ Eyes Only. (Id.,
PAGEID # 190–91.) Material may be designated as Confidential if:
the Producing Entity asserts in good faith [that it] is protected from
disclosure by statute or common law, including, but not limited to,
confidential personal information, medical or psychiatric information,
trade secrets, personnel records, or such other sensitive commercial
information that is not publicly available.
(Id.) Material may be designated as Attorneys’ Eyes Only if it satisfies the above
test and:
the Producing Entity also asserts in good faith that the information is
so competitively sensitive that the receipt of the information by parties
to the litigation could result in competitive or personal harm to the
Producing Entity.
(Id.)
Although a Confidential- or Attorneys’ Eyes Only-designation subjects the
material to the terms of the Protective Order, it does not constitute “a judicial
determination” that the material is “subject to protection under Rule 26(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedures or otherwise[.]” (Id., PAGEID # 201.) Accordingly,
the parties must seek leave of court to file under seal any materials they believe are
not appropriate for the public docket. (See id., PAGEID # 196.) See also S.D. Ohio
Civ. R. 5.2.1(a) “Unless permitted by statute, parties may not file documents under
seal without obtaining leave of Court upon motion and for good cause shown.”).
B. The parties filed heavily redacted briefing in support of their
motions, without first moving for leave to file documents under
seal.
In Spring of 2022, Mr. Merck filed a Motion for Class Certification (ECF No.
67) and Walmart filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 75). But seven of
the thirteen total exhibits supporting those motions were withheld from the docket.
“Placeholders” were filed instead:
EXHIBIT 1 PLACEHOLDER
DOCUMENT DESIGNATED CONFIDENTIAL BY DEFENDANT
PURSUANT TO ECF NO. 29
Transcript and Exhibits from September 24, 2021 Deposition of Natalie Bartlett
(to be filed under seal, pending Court order on forthcoming Motion to Seal to be filed by
Walmart Inc.)
(ECF No. 67-2.) The briefs are similarly opaque, redacted to a degree more suited
for national security secrets than the hiring practices of the country’s largest
private employer. Take the following example:
Because Walmart was taking “adverse action based in whole or in part™
on a consumer report, it had an obligation under the FCRA to provide Plaintiff “a copy of the
report” on which it was going to base its decision. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
This was not an action that merely ran “a nsk of violating the law;” rather, it is an action that
objectively violated the law and there is clear evidence to support it:
, i
ee
Se
(ECF No. 83, PAGEID # 1081.) Clear evidence, indeed.
The parties filed their motions to seal the information redacted and withheld
only after the Motion for Class Certification and Motion for Summary Judgment
were fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 88, 90.)
C. The Magistrate Judge denied Walmart’s Motion to File Under
Seal and granted in part and denied in part Mr. Merck’s.
On October 3, 2022, Magistrate Judge Deavers issued an Opinion and Order
on the motions to seal. (Oct. 3 Opinion & Order, ECF No. 93.) Her Honor concluded
that Mr. Merck could file certain personal details under seal—including his health
information and unrelated criminal history—but could not seal the settlement
agreement he entered into with Sterling Infosystems, Inc. (Id., 4–6.) As to Walmart,
the Magistrate Judge found that, “in many significant ways, [its] motion falls short
of meeting the standards in this Circuit for sealing court documents.” (Id., 9.) In
particular, she noted that “Walmart appears to blur the distinction between
information deemed confidential under the terms of the [P]rotective [O]rder and
truly proprietary information.” (Id., 7 (citing Wiggins v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 2:19-
cv-3223, 2020 WL 5891565, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2020) (Jolson, M.J.)).) And, in
doing so, Walmart failed to carry its heavy burden, as articulated by the Sixth
Circuit. (Id. (citing Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d
299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016) (requiring a movant to “analyze in detail, document by
document, the propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and legal citations”)).)
Magistrate Judge Deavers denied the motion without prejudice to refiling a
properly supported successor.
The matter is now before the Court on motions made in response to the
October 3 Opinion and Order.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Magistrate Judge Deavers summarized the standard for analyzing a motion
for leave to file documents under seal:
It is well established that “[e]very court has supervisory power over its
own records and files.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 598
(1978). A court’s discretion to seal records from public inspection,
however, is limited by “the presumptive right of the public to inspect
and copy judicial documents and files[,]” which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has described as a “long-
established legal tradition.” In re Knoxville News Sentinel Co., Inc., 723
F.2d 470, 473–74 (6th Cir. 1983); see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178–80 (6th Cir. 1983) (discussing the
justifications for the “strong presumption in favor of openness”).
Therefore, “[o]nly the most compelling reasons can justify non-
disclosure of judicial records.” [Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 305]
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Sixth Circuit has
indicated that exceptions fall into two categories: (1) exceptions “based
on the need to keep order and dignity in the courtroom”; and
(2) “content-based exemptions,” which “include certain privacy rights of
participants or third parties, trade secrets, and national security.”
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1179 (citations
omitted).
In addition, the Sixth Circuit has recently emphasized the public’s
“strong interest in obtaining the information contained in the Court
record.” Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 305 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see also In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927
F.3d 919, 939 (6th Cir. 2019) (“‘[T]he greater the public interest in the
litigation’s subject matter, the greater the showing necessary to
overcome the presumption of access.’”) (quoting Shane Grp., Inc., 825
F.3d at 305). Accordingly, district courts must consider “each pleading
[to be] filed under seal or with redactions and to make a specific
determination as to the necessity of nondisclosure in each instance”
and must “bear in mind that the party seeking to file under seal must
provide a ‘compelling reason’ to do so and demonstrate that the seal is
‘narrowly tailored to serve that reason.’” In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., 927 F.3d at 940 (quoting Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 305). If a
district court “permits a pleading to be filed under seal or with
redactions, it shall be incumbent upon the court to adequately explain
‘why the interests in support of nondisclosure are compelling, why the
interests supporting access are less so, and why the seal itself is no
broader than necessary.’” Id. (quoting Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at
306).
(Oct. 3 Opinion & Order, 2–4.)
III. ANALYSIS
A. Mr. Merck’s Motion for Reconsideration
Mr. Merck now seeks leave to file the full Sterling Settlement Agreement
under seal, and a redacted version on the public docket “with the only redaction
being of the settlement amount.” (ECF No. 95, 1.) Mr. Merck contends that this
“alternative proposal” appropriately balances the public interest in disclosure with
his and Sterling’s private interest in confidentiality by “protect[ing] that piece of
information . . . that is most private[.]” (Id., 2.) The Court agrees. “[S]ettlement
amounts can be—and often are—sealed.” In re Black Diamond Mining Co., LLC,
No. 15-96-ART, 2016 WL 4433356, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 18, 2016) (Thapar, J.). That
is particularly true where, as here, the settlement agreement involves a non-party
to the litigation. Id.
Mr. Merck’s Motion (ECF No. 95) is GRANTED.
B. Walmart’s Motion to Seal
Walmart also moves in response to the October 3 Opinion and Order. (ECF
No. 96.) Through its motion, Walmart seeks leave to file only the cited portions of
depositions as exhibits, and renews its request to seal certain deposition testimony
and documents related to the parties’ briefing.
1. Walmart may file excerpted deposition transcripts.
This Court generally requires a litigant to file the entirety of any deposition
that is cited to or relied upon in a motion or briefing. Hon. Sarah D. Morrison
Standing Order re: Filings and Decorum, ¶ 8 (available online at
https://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/standingordersJMorrison). Walmart seeks relief
from this requirement. (ECF No. 96, 3.) Instead, it proposes to file only the cited
deposition testimony, because the “uncited testimony contains confidential
information[.]” (Id., 4.) Mr. Merck does not object to Walmart’s request.
The standing order on filing deposition transcripts is intended to mitigate the
risk of parties misrepresenting testimony. It is a protective measure that ensures
the Court has the context necessary to make an informed ruling. But if the parties
do not want the benefit of that protection, the Court will not force it. Walmart’s
Motion is GRANTED to the extent it seeks to file only those portions of the
deposition testimony cited in the briefing.
2. Walmart fails to properly support its renewed request to
file “confidential” materials under seal.
Walmart next renews its motion to file under seal certain deposition
testimony and documents that contain “personally identifiable information” and
“confidential and proprietary business information.” (Id., 5.)
a) Personally identifiable information
Given the nature of Mr. Merck’s claims, the information in his background
report appears throughout relevant evidence. Walmart’s motion is GRANTED to
the extent it seeks to redact information described in Rule 5.2(a) as to Mr. Merck
and any putative class members. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a). For the avoidance of doubt,
Walmart is granted leave to redact only the first five digits of Mr. Merck’s Social
Security Number and the date and month of his birth from Exhibits 3, 4, and 24.
b) Confidential and proprietary business information
After Walmart’s first motion to seal confidential and proprietary business
information, the Magistrate Judge observed:
Certainly, as Walmart contends, courts grant motions to seal in order
to protect a company’s proprietary information. See, e.g., Whitestone
Grp., Inc. v. Excalibur Assocs., Inc., No. 2:22-CV-551, 2022 WL 985665,
at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 1, 2022). Indeed, “[t]his Court has repeatedly
‘recognized that protecting confidential information that would
otherwise allow competitors an inside look at a company’s business
strategies is a compelling reason to restrict public access to filings.’”
Total Quality Logistics, LLC v. Riffe, No. 1:19-CV-23, 2020 WL
5849408, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2020) (quoting Ethicon Endo-
Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-871, 2017 WL 4168290, at
*2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2017)).
. . . Walmart appears to blur the distinction between information
deemed confidential under the terms of the [P]rotective [O]rder and
truly proprietary information. This distinction is important because
the Sixth Circuit recognizes “a ‘stark difference’ between court orders
which preserve the secrecy of proprietary information while parties
trade discovery and orders which seal the court’s record.” Wiggins v.
Bank of Am., N.A., No. 2:19-CV-3223, 2020 WL 5891565, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 5, 2020) (quoting Borum v. Smith, No. 4:17-CV-17, 2017 WL
2588433, at *1 (W.D. Ky. June 14, 2017)).
Thus, Walmart’s request to seal is insufficient to the extent it relies on
the parties’ confidentiality agreement. See Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d
at 305 (“The proponent of sealing therefore must ‘analyze in detail,
document by document, the propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and
legal citations.’”). . . . [R]egardless of the parties’ agreement during
discovery or otherwise, the Court has an independent obligation to
explain the basis for sealing court records. United States ex rel. Scott v.
Humana Inc., No. 318CV00061GNSCHL, 2021 WL 4449277, at *9
(W.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2021) (citing Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 306).
Further, to the extent that Walmart truly considers particular
information proprietary, it fails to explain how disclosure would give a
significant advantage to its competitors or result in any other “clearly
defined and serious injury.” Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d 15 307.
Walmart instead offers declarative and conclusory assertions,
apparently expecting the Court to take its word, rather than provide
the Court with meaningful explanation or other information necessary
to make an independent determination. The Court, despite having
completed an in camera review, is not inclined to guess based on
Walmart’s deficient effort. “A party cannot expect to reap the benefits
of an overbroad request by placing the onus on the Court to determine
on a ‘line-by-line basis—that specific information in the court record
meets the demanding requirements for a seal.’” Humana Inc., 2021 WL
4449277, at *9 (quoting Rudd Equip. Co., Inc. v. Volvo Constr. Equip.
N. Am., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-778-DJH-CHL, 2020 WL 6946577, at *4
(W.D. Ky. Nov. 25, 2020) (quoting Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 305)).
Moreover, much of the information Walmart seeks to seal appears to
have been revealed already either by the very nature of Plaintiff’s
claim and its supporting factual allegations or by discussions in the
parties’ briefing. . . . These observations should not be construed as an
exhaustive list but are intended to highlight that, in many significant
ways, Walmart’s current motion falls short of meeting the standards in
this Circuit for sealing court documents. This is especially so because,
given Walmart’s status as one of the country’s largest employers, the
public may well have a strong interest in access to the information
contained in the court record of this putative class action.
(Oct. 3 Opinion & Order, 7–9.) The Magistrate Judge denied the motion without
prejudice, giving Walmart fourteen days to refile a properly supported motion. (Id.,
9.)
But Walmart’s second take is as deficient as the first. It could have used the
Magistrate Judge’s observations to improve the motion, thereby improving its
chances at success. Instead, Walmart “apologize[d to the Court] for any confusion”
its first motion may have caused (ECF No. 96, 1, 5); “narrowed its confidentiality
designations” (id., 8); and offered two brief sentences purporting to justify why vast
swaths of information should be shielded from public view (id., 6–7). The additions
are declarative and conclusory in a familiar way, and altogether fail to remedy the
deficiencies identified by the Magistrate Judge. (Compare ECF No. 90 with ECF No.
96.) There is no explanation of why the material is properly considered confidential
or proprietary, and there is no explanation of why its disclosure would be harmful.
Cf. Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 307–08 (“[I]n delineating the injury to be
prevented, specificity is essential.”). The Court is in no better position to fulfill its
independent obligation to explain why the subject materials deserve secrecy than it
was at the outset.1 As the Magistrate Judge explained—without mistake or
confusion—Walmart’s ipse dixit does not make it so.
Accordingly, the balance of Walmart’s Motion is DENIED.
C. Other Pending Motions
In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Class Certification and Motion for
Summary Judgment are DENIED without prejudice to refiling, in a form that
comports with this Opinion and Order, within seven days of the date hereof.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mr. Merck’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 95) is GRANTED. He may
file the full settlement agreement under seal, and a redacted version on the public
docket.
Walmart’s Motion to File Under Seal (ECF No. 96) is GRANTED to the
extent it seeks an exception to the Court’s standing order requiring full deposition
transcripts be filed, and to the extent it seeks to redact Rule 5.2(a) information. The
balance of the Motion is DENIED.
1 On this record, the Court has reason to doubt whether it could ever permit
Walmart to file these materials under seal under the Shane Grp., Inc. standard. In
the most flagrant example of why, Walmart seeks to seal a chart showing the
reporting structure of its “Associate Vetting Team” as it existed in 2017. Walmart
first argued that the chart contained “[c]onfidential and proprietary information
regarding Walmart’s metrics, internal processes and resource allocation as it relates
to conducting background checks for employment purposes.” (ECF No. 90, 5.) In its
renewed motion, Walmart seems to concede that the chart is not really “confidential
and proprietary,” and instead seeks to redact the names of individuals listed
therein, purportedly to protect the privacy of “non-parties and non-fact witnesses.”
(ECF No. 96, 11.)
Finally, the pending Motion for Class Certification (ECF No. 67) and Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 75) are DENIED without prejudice to refiling
in compliance with this Opinion and Order within seven days of the date hereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Sarah D. Morrison
SARAH D. MORRISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE