Williams v. Wright Patterson Air Force Base

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES W.D. WILLIAMS, IV,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:22-cv-3440

v. Judge Sarah D. Morrison

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M.

Vascura

WRIGHT PATTERSON AIR FORCE

BASE, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, James W.D. Williams, IV, an Ohio inmate who is proceeding

without the assistance of counsel, brings this action against Wright Patterson Air

Force Base and John & Jane Does #1–100, alleging that Defendants have stalked,

harassed, and attempted to kill him. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) This matter is before the

Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)

and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s

Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore

v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial

screen, for the reasons that follow, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be

granted.

This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), which is

GRANTED. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff is required to pay the full amount of the Court’s

$350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statement

reveals that he has $40.82 in his prison account, which is insufficient to pay the

filing fee.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust

accounts at Greene County Adult Detention Center is DIRECTED to submit to the

Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an

initial partial payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to

the inmate trust account or the average monthly balance in the inmate trust

account, for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint.

After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit

20% of the inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only

when the amount in the account exceeds $10.00, until the full fee of $350.00 has

been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The

checks should be sent to:

Prisoner Accounts Receivable

260 U.S. Courthouse

85 Marconi Boulevard

Columbus, Ohio 43215

The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.

It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without

prepayment of fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this

action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and the prison cashier’s office.

The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Order to the Court’s

financial office in Columbus.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute,

seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504

U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose

filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks

an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive

lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To

address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which provides in pertinent

part as follows:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires

sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is

frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to

conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity

. . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the

complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted”).

Further, to properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a

plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.

2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must

contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar

Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual

allegations, a pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid

of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up). Instead, in order to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of

considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations

for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted).

Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x

612, 614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This

lenient treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the

nature of the claim asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77

(6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s ten-page handwritten Complaint names Wright Patterson Air

Force Base and John and Jane Does as Defendants, but also contains wide-ranging

allegations against the Beaver Creek Police Department, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, the United States Postal Service, his wireless carrier, and his bank.

As a sample of Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff alleges that, for more than two years,

Defendant Wright Patterson Air Force Base’s personnel has stalked, harassed, and

attempted to kill him. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PAGEID #1–2.) Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant’s personnel have created tunnels into his home, used drones to follow

him, and placed surveillance equipment inside his home. (Id. at PAGEID #2–3.)

Plaintiff alleges that “a foot [fell] through [the] ceiling/attic into his bedroom” and

that at a later date, someone “dropped a cigarette butt through said foot hole” which

caused a piece of cardboard (which Plaintiff was using to block drone laser lights

from shining through his windows) to ignite, causing the window curtains and

blinds to catch fire. (Id. at PAGEID #3–4.)

The allegations Plaintiff sets forth in his Complaint are so implausible as to

render his Complaint frivolous. A claim is frivolous if it lacks “an arguable basis

either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The former

occurs when “indisputably meritless” legal theories underlie the complaint, and the

latter when it relies on “fantastic or delusional” allegations. Id. at 327–28. This

Court is not required to accept the factual allegations set forth in a complaint as

true when such factual allegations are “clearly irrational or wholly incredible.” Ruiz

v. Hofbauer, 325 F. App’x 427, 429–30 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Denton v. Hernandez,

504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)). Because Plaintiff’s claims are predicated on allegations that

rise to the level of being “irrational or wholly incredible” and “fantastic or

delusional,” his Complaint fails to meet the facial plausibility standard such that it

is legally frivolous. Plaintiff’s Complaint is therefore DISMISSED pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim on which relief may

be granted.

III. DISPOSITION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2) (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1) for

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. As a result, Plaintiff’s

remaining pending motions (ECF Nos. 8–12) are DENIED AS MOOT.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case. The Clerk is further

DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and the prison cashier’s office

and to forward a copy of this Order to the Court’s financial office in Columbus.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SARAH D. MORRISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE