Brooks v. Ohio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

CHARLES BROOKS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:22-cv-305

v. JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE

Magistrate Judge Deavers

OHIO, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

This cause is before the Court on the Magistrate Judge’s August 29, 2022,

Report and Recommendation (“R&R,” Doc. 9) recommending (1) sua sponte dismissal

of Plaintiff Charles Brooks’s Complaint (Doc. 8) for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted and (2) denial of Brooks’s “86FR24031 Case Standards Request”

motion (Doc. 4). For the reasons briefly discussed below, and especially given the lack

of any objections to the R&R, the Court ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. 9) in full.

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Brooks’s Complaint (Doc. 8) WITH

PREJUDICE and DENIES Brooks’s “86FR24031 Case Standards Request” Motion

(Doc. 6).

On May 27, 2022, Brooks, an inmate incarcerated at the Toledo Correctional

Institution, filed a pro se motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis on his

proposed Complaint against the State of Ohio and the “County Court” located in

Cincinnati (presumably, the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas). (Doc. 1). On

August 29, 2022, the Magistrate Judge granted Brooks’s request to proceed in forma

pauperis, and ordered his Complaint filed. The Complaint was docketed that same

day. (Doc. 8).

In the Complaint, Brooks seeks to hold the defendants liable, apparently under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/or Title II of the ADA, for an August 31, 2020, parole board

hearing in which that board denied him parole. (Id. at #48–53). Brooks claims he has

been unable to acquire information about the decision, his appeal process, and other

related records. (See, e.g., id. at #50). As an exhibit, though, Brooks attaches the

decision itself. (Id. at #58–59). He seeks a new hearing and monetary damages of

$100,000. (Id. at #53).

On June 13, while the Magistrate Judge was reviewing the request to proceed

in forma pauperis, Brooks also filed a “Motion for 86FR24031 Case Standards

Request.” (Doc. 4). That motion is largely incomprehensible but requests “a review

standard controlled by [Brooks’s] real circumstances.” (Id. at #30). The content

appears to boil down to Brooks’s belief that, given his circumstances, including his

incarceration and drug addiction issues, the standard of review that the Court applies

to his arguments, and to his compliance with procedural requirements such as

signature, should be less stringent. (Id. at #32–34).

The same day that the Magistrate Judge ordered the Complaint filed as a

separate document on the docket, she also issued the R&R (Doc. 9). In that R&R, the

Magistrate Judge addressed the requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act

of 1995 to sua sponte screen the Complaint to determine whether any portion of it

should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. (Id. at #60 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). And

based on her sua sponte review of the Complaint, the Magistrate Judge recommends

dismissal because Brooks failed to sue a suable entity and, alternatively, has

proffered no evidence to support his claims on the merits. (Id. at #63–67). The R&R

also recommends denial of Brooks’s self-styled motion. (Id. at #68).

The R&R also advised both parties that failure to object to its conclusions

within fourteen days may result in forfeiture of certain rights on appeal, including

the right to review by this Court. (Id. at #69). See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 152

(1985) (“There is no indication that Congress, in enacting § 636(b)(1)(C), intended to

require a district judge to review a magistrate's report to which no objections are

filed.”); Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting that “fail[ure]

to file an objection to the magistrate judge’s R & R ... is forfeiture”).

Neither party objected to the R&R. Even still, the advisory committee notes to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) suggest that nonetheless the Court must

“satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept

the recommendation.” See also Redmon v. Noel, No. 1:21-cv-445, 2021 WL 4771259,

at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2021) (citing cases).

Consistent with that charge, the Court has reviewed the R&R and determined

that it does not contain “clear error on [its] face.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) (advisory

committee notes). The R&R did not clearly err in finding that the State of Ohio is

immune from suit under § 1983 in this Court. This is because the Eleventh

Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits suit against a State, such as

Ohio, in federal courts like this one. U.S. Const. amend. XI; see also Seminole Tribe

of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996). And as the R&R notes, the limited exceptions

to the Eleventh Amendment do not apply here. (Doc. 9, #64). So Brooks’s claims

against the State of Ohio must be dismissed.

The R&R also did not clearly err in finding that the “County Court” is not a

suable entity. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) instructs, in part, that “[c]apacity

to sue or be sued is determined … by the law of the state where the court is located.”1

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). And it is well-settled that, under Ohio law, an Ohio court “can

neither sue nor be sued in its own right.” Malone v. Ct. of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga

Cnty., 344 N.E.2d 126, 128 (1976); see also Harsh v. City of Franklin, No. 1:07-cv-874,

2009 WL 806653, at *4–5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009) (holding that other Ohio state

courts could not be sued). So Brooks’s claims against the “County Court” must be

dismissed as well.

The R&R also capably reviews the merits of his asserted § 1983 and ADA Title

II claims. As to the first, the Court agrees with the R&R that Brooks does not have a

liberty interest in parole eligibility under Ohio law. (Doc. 9, #66). Thus, his allegation

that he was wrongfully denied parole cannot support a due process claim. And his

loss of property claim fails because he has not pled or proven that the State’s

1 The R&R quotes Rule 17(b) as “capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state

in which the district court is held.” (Doc. 9, #65). While the sentiment is certainly still accurate, it

appears that in 2007 the Federal Rules amended the exact language through which that sentiment is

expressed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 (2007 Amendment).

processes and remedies are inadequate. (Id. at #67). Finally, as to his ADA Title II

claim, the Court finds no error in the R&R’s assertion that Brooks’s conclusory

allegation that he was denied parole based solely on his drug addiction does not meet

the plausibility standard that Iqbal and Twombly impose. (Id. at #68). See Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

That leave Brooks’s “86FR24031 Case Standards Request” Motion, which the

R&R recommends denying, but without explanation. (Doc. 9, #68). In fairness to

Brooks, a pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to less

stringent standards than those filed with assistance of counsel. Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). So, if that more liberal standard of review is all that he is

requesting, his motion perhaps has some merit. That said, pro se litigants still must

comply with the procedural rules governing civil cases, see McNeil v. United States,

508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993), so if Brooks is requesting relief from those rules, the Court

denies that request. Either way, the Court has reviewed the pleadings with an eye to

the fact that Brooks is proceeding pro se and nonetheless concludes that Brooks has

failed to state a claim here, a threshold requirement he cannot overcome.

In sum, the Court ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. 9) in full. Accordingly, the Court

DISMISSES Brooks’s Complaint (Doc. 8) WITH PREJUDICE and DENIES

Brooks’s Motion for “86FR24031 Case Standards Request” (Doc. 4), at least to the

extent that it seeks a standard of review more deferential than the one that typically

applies to pro se filings. Accordingly, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter

judgment and TERMINATE this matter on the Court’s docket.

SO ORDERED.

October 12, 2022

DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE \

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE