Chatman v. Postmaster General, United States Postal Service

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

SHERRI C. CHATMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:22-cv-3277

Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

LOUIS DEJOY, Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Defendant.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 4) to the undersigned’s

September 2, 2022 Report and Recommendation, which recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis be denied. (ECF No. 3.) Based on additional information

regarding her financial resources provided in her Objection, the undersigned VACATES the

September 2, 2022 Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 3) and GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion

for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1). It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed

to prosecute her action without prepayment of fees or costs and that judicial officers who render

services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid.

This matter is further before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF

No. 2.) When parties proceed in forma pauperis, appointment of counsel is discretionary under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); appointment of counsel in a civil case is not a constitutional right. See

Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605–06 (6th Cir. 1993). Rather, “[i]t is a privilege that is

justified only by exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 606. The Court has evaluated whether such

exceptional circumstances exist and determines that the appointment of counsel is not warranted

at this juncture. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 2) is

DENIED.

This matter is further before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s

Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow,

the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS this action pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)

for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) as part of the

statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that–

* * *

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up).

Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

The entirety of Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint are as follows: “1. unfair

treatment; 2. slander; 3. misconduct by defendant; 4. termination without cause. The above items

plus additional claims would be some but not all of my claims.” (Compl. 3, ECF No. 1-1.) This

brief listing of the claims Plaintiff intends to advance is no more than the “naked assertions

devoid of further factual enhancement” that the Supreme Court has held insufficient to satisfy the

pleading standards of Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff has failed to

allege any facts whatsoever supporting her claims such that the court cannot draw a reasonable

inference that Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. It is therefore

RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2).

In sum, the September 2, 2022 Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 3) is VACATED;

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED;

Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 2) is DENIED; and it is RECOMMENDED

that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be

granted pursuant to § 1915(e)(2).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting

authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit

this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE