Dawson v. United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters (Local 189)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MARYSE LAROSE DAWSON, :

: Case No. 2:21-cv-3478

Plaintiff, :

: Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley

v. :

: Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

:

LOCAL 189 UNITED ASSOCIATION :

OF PLUMBERS AND PIPEFITTERS :

:

Defendant. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before this Court on Defendant Local 198 United Association of Plumbers

and Pipefitters’ (“Local 189”) Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 6). Given the following analysis,

Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s Complaint is hereby

DISMISSED without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

The Local 189 Plumbers and Pipefitters Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee

(“JATC”) is a training program jointly funded and administered by Local 189 and the Mechanical

Contractors Association of Central Ohio (the “Association”). (ECF No. 6 at 3). Local 189, JATC,

and the Association are all separate legal entities with separate locations, separate leadership, and

separate tax identification numbers. (Id.).

In approximately March 2018, Plaintiff Maryse Dawson applied to JATC’s Apprenticeship

Program. (ECF No. 7 at 10). As part of that application, Ms. Dawson was required to complete the

Differential Aptitude Test (“DAT”) at the Plumbers & Pipefitters Training School in Columbus,

Ohio. (Id.). “[The] test is intended to determine [an applicant’s] manual dexterity regarding the

usage of tools, following instructions, familiarity of hardware nomenclature, and an ability to

remove and reinstall fasteners without losing any parts; while using a limited number and type of

tools.” (Id.). While Plaintiff’s DAT score earned her an oral interview, she did not receive a top

fifty interview score and, as a result, was denied admission. (Id. at 14).

On December 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights

Commission (“OCRC”) alleging that JATC denied her admission based on age, and that she was

subjected to other adverse employment action based on sex. (ECF No. 7-1 at 16). Plaintiff did not

accuse Local 189 or the Association of discrimination. The charge was also filed with the U.S.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); the EEOC and the OCRC cooperated to

investigate Plaintiff’s allegations. (ECF No. 6-1 at 27). After completing the investigation, the

OCRC found it was probable that JATC engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice and

scheduled the matter for conciliation. (ECF No. 7 at 20). The Ohio Attorney General’s Office then

advised Plaintiff that OCRC and JATC had reached a Conciliation Agreement, that “the

Commission [would] not be moving forward with its case,” and that Plaintiff was “free to engage

in whatever other legal actions that may be available to [her].” (ECF No. 1 at 5). On March 10,

2021, the EEOC sent Plaintiff a Dismissal and Notice of Rights, adopting the findings of the

OCRC, and notifying Plaintiff of her right to sue. (Id. at 6).

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this case on June 14, 2021, against Local 189. (ECF No.

1). After service was effectuated (ECF No. 3), Local 189 moved to dismiss on October 8, 2021.

(ECF No. 6). Plaintiff responded on October 29, 2021 (ECF No. 7), and Local 189 timely replied

(ECF No. 10), making the Motion ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383

(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Nevertheless, “basic

pleading essentials” still are required. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Among

such essentials are the obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) to provide “a short

and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” and “a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss

based on a court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Jurisdiction in the federal

courts is limited: it may be based on a federal question, which is one “arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” or on diversity of citizenship where the sum

in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. The plaintiff has the burden of proving

subject matter jurisdiction when it is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1). Rogers v. Stratton Indus.,

798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986). Where a motion to dismiss presents alternative arguments, such

as improper venue or failure to state a claim, the court must address subject matter jurisdiction

first. City of Heath v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 971, 975 (S.D. Ohio 1993).

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted “is a test of the plaintiff’s cause of action as stated in the

complaint, not a challenge to the plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Golden v. City of Columbus, 404

F.3d 950, 958–59 (6th Cir. 2005). When evaluating such a motion, “[a]ll factual allegations in the

complaint must be presumed to be true, and reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the

non-moving party.” Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield,

552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). But the court need not accept unwarranted factual inferences.

Id. Complaints must state “more than a bare assertion of legal conclusions to survive a motion to

dismiss.” Horn v. Husqvarna Consumer Outdoor Products N.A., Inc., 2013 WL 693119, at *1

(S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2013) (internal citations omitted). A plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007). The claim to relief must be “‘plausible on its face,’” with “factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Defendant’s position is straight forward: Plaintiff has sued the wrong entity; she was

granted the right to sue JATC, not Local 189. (ECF No. 6 at 5). Relying on Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s failure to name the proper party,

constitutes either a failure to exhaust or a failure to state a claim. (Id. at 4, 6). Defendant maintains

that the administrative record and the Conciliation Agreement illustrate that JATC, not Local 189,

was the subject of the OCRC’s investigation. (Id. at 3). The Conciliation Agreement, argues

Defendant, explicitly states that it is between the OCRC and “Joint Apprentice Committee of

Plumbers & Pipefitters.” (Id.). Local 189 is not mentioned in the Conciliation Agreement. (Id.).

Accordingly, because it is a separate legal entity from JATC, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has

sued the wrong party and her case should be dismissed. (Id. at 8).

Plaintiff argues that her case is properly before this Court because “a substantial part of the

events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in this District and the case “raises a federal

question.” (ECF No. 7 at 3). She represents that she filed her OCRC complaint in good faith and

in compliance with applicable statutory and administrative requirements. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff argues

that because her case was dually filed with the EEOC and she received a right-to-sue letter, she

has fully exhausted her administrative remedies. (Id.). While Plaintiff does not directly respond to

Defendant’s “improper party” argument, she does note that the Ohio Secretary of State allegedly

shows a business name filing only for Local 189, not JATC. (Id.).

Before this Court delves into Defendant’s Motion, it first addresses a preliminary matter

regarding the consideration of evidence. Generally, a Court may only consider the Complaint, and

documents attached thereto, when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v.

Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c)). Furthermore,

where “a document is referred to in the pleadings and is integral to the claims, it may be considered

without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.” Id. at 335–36; Young v.

Int’l Union, 148 F. Supp. 3d 602, 611 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (“This is especially relevant . . . where

[p]laintiffs provide no documents with their [c]omplaint, yet reference a plethora of agreements

and correspondence that are central to their claims.”). “A court may [also] consider matters of

public record . . . without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.” Commercial

Money, 508 F.3d at 335. Upon review of the materials relied on by the parties in the briefing on

Defendant’s Motion, this Court finds that they are matters of public record and/or central to

Plaintiff’s claims. As such, this Court will consider these limited documents outside the Complaint

without converting Defendant’s motion to one for summary judgment.

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

“The exhaustion of administrative remedies is a condition precedent to a Title VII . . .

action.” Williams v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 53 Fed. Appx. 350, 351, 2002 WL 31856089, at *1

(6th Cir. 2002). Because exhaustion is non-jurisdictional, however, a motion to dismiss based upon

the failure to exhaust should be brought under Rule 12(b)(6), rather than under 12(b)(1). Waller v.

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 391 F.Supp.2d 594, 597 (E.D. Mich. 2005); Hill v. Nicholson, 2010 WL

2640261, *3 (6th Cir. June 24, 2010) (“[E]xhaustion is not a jurisdictional prerequisite[.]”).

Defendant’s reliance on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is misplaced. Because Defendant is

arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies (see ECF No. 6 at 4–6), its

Motion is more appropriately brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is DENIED. See

Waller v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 594, 597 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (because exhaustion

is non-jurisdictional, dismissal for failure to exhaust should not be bought under Rule 12(b)(1)).

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

Alternatively, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Defendant argues Plaintiff’s failure to

name the proper party, necessarily means she has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. (ECF No. 6 at 8). This Court agrees.

As established above, an individual may not file a discrimination suit under Title VII

without first filing an administrative charge with the EEOC or the appropriate state or local agency.

Williams v. NW. Airlines, Inc., 53 F. App’x 350, 351–52 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). And,

should the EEOC dismiss the charge and issue a right-to-sue letter, a plaintiff has 90 days to file a

civil action. Id. at 352 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). If a plaintiff initiates a civil action

without first receiving a right-to-sue letter, the court must dismiss “the premature action for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies.” Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 820, n. 10 (6th Cir. 2003)

(citing Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir.

2000)). Similarly, an action initiated beyond the 90-day period may also be dismissed for failure

to exhaust. Botter v. Tuesday Morning, No. 1:18-CV-00847, 2019 WL 2452987 *3 (S.D. Ohio

June 12, 2019) (citing Williams, 53 F. App’x at 351).

While this case does not squarely fit within the traditional exhaustion framework, the

analysis (and result, in this instance) is fundamentally the same. Throughout the administrative

process, Plaintiff repeatedly alleged she was discriminated by the Plumbers and Pipefitters Joint

Apprenticeship Training Program––the JATC. The documents in the administrative record

illustrate as much. (ECF No. 6-1 at 15 (Plaintiff’s OCRC Charge of Discrimination alleging

JATC’s “interviewing process could easily mask discrimination”); id. at 19 (the OCRC

discrimination charge notice, issued to “Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union 189 Joint

Apprenticeship and Journeyman Training Committee School”); ECF No. 7 at 20 (OCRC’s Letter

of Determination, naming respondent as “Joint Apprentice Committee of Plumbers and

Pipefitters”); ECF No. 6-1 at 30 (the Conciliation Agreement and Consent Order between OCRC

and JATC); ECF No. 1 at 5–6 (OCRC and EEOC noticing that neither would be moving forward

with Plaintiff’ case, and granting her right-to-sue JATC)).

As evidenced by this lengthy administrative record, all of which is public record, Plaintiff

fully exhausted her administrative remedies and timely filed suit in this Court after receiving a

right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Had Plaintiff sued JATC, dismissal would be improper. But

JATC and Local 189 are distinct legal entities. See Ohio Secretary of State, Business Details,

https://businesssearch.ohiosos.gov?=businessDetails/2281954 (last visited August 4, 2022); Ohio

Secretary of State, Business Details,

https://businesssearch.ohiosos.gov?=businessDetails/2275727 (last visited August 4, 2022). And

because exhaustion involved JATC and not Local 189, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Said differently, because Plaintiff did not administratively

exhaust against this entity (Local 189), she cannot be awarded relief against it.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6) is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Complaint shall be DISMISSED without prejudice,

subject to refiling.

IV. CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the foregoing analysis, Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 6) is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED. ef) — fo ff

ALGENON(. MARBLEY

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: August 15, 2022