Lott v. Ohio Bar Association

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

HARRY WILLIAM LOTT,

EX PARTE,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:22-CV-2219

vs. Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

OHIO BAR ASSOCIATION,

Defendant.

ORDER AND INITIAL SCREEN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Ohio resident who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, initiated

this action on May 19, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in

forma pauperis and deferred the initial screen. (ECF No. 11.)

This matter is now before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s

Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow,

it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s action in its entirety.

I.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1 as part of the

statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--

* * *

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

1Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on

a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for

the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court

holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”

Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April

1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however,

has limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v.

Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591,

594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II.

Plaintiff’s Complaint and “Motion to Amended Supplemental Pleading, Motion to

Disqualify” consist largely of quotes and citations to various United States Supreme Court cases,

constitutional amendments and Latin legal terms. As best the undersigned can discern, Plaintiff

apparently applied for an Ohio law license which the Supreme Court of Ohio denied. (ECF No.

1-1 at PageID 16.) The Supreme Court explained as follows:

The Office of Bar Admissions is returning your Applicant's Supplemental

Character Questionnaire and other related documents because you do not meet the

requirements of Rule I of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar

of Ohio ("Gov. Bar R. I"). Please note that Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(g) of the

Ohio Constitution grants the Supreme Court of Ohio exclusive jurisdiction to

regulate admission to the practice of law in Ohio. The Ohio Supreme Court

exercises this jurisdiction pursuant to Rule I of the Rules of the Government of the

Bar.

Gov. Bar R. I, Sec. 1, clearly states that whether you are applying to sit for the Ohio

Bar Examination, applying for Admission Without Examination, applying to

transfer a UBE score or applying for any other form of admission, an applicant for

admission to the Ohio Bar must have earned a bachelor's degree from an accredited

college or university and must have earned a J.D. from a law school approved by

the American Bar Association.

In your application, you indicated that you are seeking an Ohio law license without

obtaining either a bachelor's degree or a law degree and you are requesting the

Court to waive both the. exam and the cost to take the exam due to a religious

exemption and First Amendment exemption. Because a person entering the legal

profession must understand and have formal instruction on laws and rules, this

requirement is not waivable. Please be advised that because it was determined that

you do not meet education requirements, we did not further review your application

for compliance with the rule.

(Id.)

In his Complaint, Plaintiff states that he “does not agree with the fact that the Ohio bar

NCB and MPRE are engaging in lobbying for a JD ABA degree for admission to the Ohio Bar

which violates the First Amendment.” (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 8.) He alleges that he “has a

right to exercise his religion in the court based on the L. Ron H[ubbar]d and his teaching,” citing

The Scientologist, a Manual on the Dissemination of Material. (Id.) He insists “he had a

religious right to break the law in accord to the no having a ABA Juris Doctor based on the

religious right of scientology auditing, which is a religious act.” (Id., citation omitted.) In

conclusion, he explains he is “requesting a Yale law degree and an Ohio law license . . . . Also,

he is seeking a Bachelor’s Degree from Harvard Business school under equal protection. . . .”

(Id., at Page ID 13.) To the extent the Court considers it, Plaintiff’s “Motion to Amend[]

Supplemental Pleading Motion to Disqualify” adds random legal standards and Latin words that

have no apparent application. He seems to add to his grievances that the Ohio Supreme Court

refused to give him a hearing and a case number to appeal which is why he “must use file this

lawsuit in the Southern District of Ohio.” (ECF No. 12, at Page ID 90.) He suggests that the

Ohio Supreme Court’s actions, together with the Ohio Bar Association, violate his First, Eighth

and Fourteen Amendment rights.

The undersigned cannot collect any discernable claims in Plaintiff’s filings. This Court

has no jurisdiction to provide the relief Plaintiff seeks. As the Ohio Supreme Court explained,

Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(g) of the Ohio Constitution grants the Supreme Court of Ohio exclusive

jurisdiction to regulate admission to the practice of law in Ohio. It exercises this jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule I of the Rules of the Government of the Bar.

To the extent Plaintiff’s complaint could be read as challenging the outcome of any state

court rulings, the Court is precluded from reviewing any state law decision. See Davis v.

Johnson, 664 F. App’x 446, 448 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (“The

claims in Plaintiff's instant complaint could be read as challenges to state court orders which are

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”)

For these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss all claims against the

Belmont County Courthouse.

III.

For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Complaint in its

entirety be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It is also RECOMMENDED

that the Court DENY AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion to Amended an Supplemental Pleading

Motion to Disqualify.” (ECF No. 12.) It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court

certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order

adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore, if

Plaintiff moves for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, that such request be denied. See Callihan

v. Schneider, 178 F.3d 800, 803 (6th Cir.1999), overruling in part Floyd v. United States Postal

Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 277 (6th Cir. 1997).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge

and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l

Latex Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the

magistrate judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal

the district court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding

that defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely

object to magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed,

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .” (citation

omitted)).

/s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers______

DATED: July 18, 2022 ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE