Marshall v. Hinkle

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

STEPHANIE MARSHALL,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action 2:22-cv-2667

v. Judge Michael H. Watson

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

JAMES HINKLE, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Stephanie Marshall, an Ohio resident who is proceeding without the assistance

of counsel, brings this action against Stephanie Mingo, an Ohio state-court judge, Stephen

Dunbar, a city prosecutor, and James Hinkle, a real property owner, seeking reversal of a state

court order and dismissing her from the underlying state-court litigation related to Mr. Hinkle’s

property. This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s

Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow,

the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS this action pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)

for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED. It is

ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute her action without prepayment of fees or costs

and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been

prepaid.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) as part of the

statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that–

* * *

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up).

Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s Complaint generally alleges deficiencies in prior state-court proceedings

related to real property located in Columbus, Ohio. Plaintiff alleges an “obvious procedural

error” by “[Defendant Assistant Prosecuting Attorney] Stephan Dunbar and [Defendant] Judge

Stephanie Mingo” in “reopening a closed case” and “reopen[ing] the case against [Plaintiff] for a

status conference even though [Plaintiff] was removed from the case and [is] not the lawful

owner of the house.” (Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at PAGEID #12.) Plaintiff also alleges that

Defendant Dunbar improperly failed to dismiss her and other defendants from the underlying

litigation. (Id. at PAGEID #13.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that “the Assistant Prosecuting Attorney

and Judge Stephanie Mingo are abusing both their sense of judicial authority and abuse of

process of the courts to harass and maliciously injure me by placing me under undue duress” and

that she is “seeking to have the order overturned and for me to dismissed from the case with

prejudice.” (Id. at PAGEID #17–18.)

All of Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. First, no matter how liberally the Court

construes Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Defendants Stephan Dunbar and Stephanie Mingo, as

prosecuting attorney and municipal court judge, respectively, are entitled to absolute immunity

from civil liability. Judges and prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from suit when

acting within the scope of their duties. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (judges

immune); Imber v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (prosecutors immune for actions taken

within the scope of duty); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citations omitted) (immunity

overcome only if actions taken are not within the judge’s judicial capacity or if the actions,

“though judicial in nature, [are] taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction”). Plaintiff’s

Complaint contains no plausible allegations upon which this Court could rely to conclude that

the exceptions to judicial and prosecutorial immunity apply to exempt the state-court judge and

prosecutor she names.

Further, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to overturn orders entered by a state court, a

doctrine known as Rooker-Feldman limits this Court’s ability to adjudicate such claims. See

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine embodies the

notion that appellate review of state-court decisions and the validity of state judicial proceedings

is limited to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and thus that federal district courts lack

jurisdiction to review such matters.” In re Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). The Rooker-

Feldman doctrine applies to cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused

by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Ind.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “The pertinent question in determining whether a federal

district court is precluded under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from exercising subject-matter

jurisdiction over a claim is whether the ‘source of the injury’ upon which plaintiff bases his

federal claim is the state court judgment.” In re Cook, 551 F.3d at 548. Thus, to the extent

Plaintiff is attempting to appeal from any of the state court’s decisions, this Court lacks

jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Finally, as to Defendant James Hinkle, Plaintiff lists him as a Defendant, but her

Complaint contains no allegations of wrongdoing by him. Plaintiff merely notes that Mr. Hinkle

is the current owner of the real estate at issue in the state-court litigation. (Pl.’s Compl., ECF No.

1-1 at PAGEID #10.) Plaintiff therefore lacks standing to assert any claims against Mr. Hinkle.

See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (plaintiff must establish the “irreducible

constitutional minimum” of standing by showing that she has “(1) suffered an injury in fact,

(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be

redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555

(1992)).

For these reasons, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this action pursuant to

§ 1915(e)(2).

III. DISPOSITION

For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting

authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit

this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE