Opinion

Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region v. Yost

Court
District Court, S.D. Ohio
Filed
Jun 24, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.3%

recognizing the necessity to modify or dissolve injunctions if “the statutory or decisional law has changed to make legal what the decree was designed to prevent”

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing the necessity to modify or dissolve injunctions if “the statutory or decisional law has changed to make legal what the decree was designed to prevent”
  • “Under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may dissolve an injunction if it ‘is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated’ or if applying the injunction prospectively ‘is no longer equitable.’”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio )

Region, et al., )

) Case No.: 1:19-cv-00118

Plaintiffs, )

) Judge Michael R. Barrett

vs. )

)

David Yost, et al., each in their official )

capacity as well as their employees, )

agents, and successors, )

)

Defendants.

ORDER DISSOLVING APRIL 18, 2019 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (DOC. 49)

This matter is before the Court on the emergency motion, filed by Ohio Attorney

General Dave Yost pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4), to dissolve the Preliminary

Injunction (Doc. 49) entered on April 18, 2019. (Doc. 83). Defendant Yost also asks that

this case be dismissed. (Id. PAGEID 1821).

Yost argues that the cases on which the Court relied to enter injunctive relief were

overruled today in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., No. 19-1392, --- S.Ct. ---,

2022 WL 2276808 (June 24, 2022) and, applying the standard of review decided by

Dobbs, a rational basis supports the statute criminalizing “dismemberment abortions”

(codified at Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.15(B)).

Plaintiffs oppose the motion (Doc. 84), explaining that Rule 65(b)(4) applies only

when temporary restraining orders are issued without notice. Further, Plaintiffs maintain

that the Court should delay ruling until the expiration of the 25-day period for a petition for

rehearing to be filed under Sup. Ct. R. 45.1.3. Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the equities

do not favor an expedited ruling given that “[p]ractitioners, legal scholars, and

reproductive care practitioners are still reading the [Dobbs] opinion and debating its

implications.” (Id. PAGEID 1825).

Defendant Yost replies (Doc. 85) that none of these arguments are meritorious and

the Court agrees. Injunctions may be dissolved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). See

Associated Builders & Contractors v. Michigan Dep't of Lab. & Econ. Growth, 543 F.3d

275, 278 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a

court may dissolve an injunction if it ‘is based on an earlier judgment that has been

reversed or vacated’ or if applying the injunction prospectively ‘is no longer equitable.’”).

And while the mandate in Dobbs will not issue for 25 days, in the Court’s view the

opinion’s precedential value for other litigants has attached. Moreover, the equities

clearly favor immediate action. Dobbs expressly overruled Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113

(1973) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the

two seminal cases upon which the Court relied to find a likelihood of success on the

merits, which, in turn, supported injunctive relief. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, “[t]he

principle that an equitable remedy should be enforced only so long as the equities require

is one that is deeply rooted in the traditions of common law.” In re Detroit Auto Dealers

Ass'n, Inc., 84 F.3d 787, 789 (6th Cir. 1996). “A court has continuing jurisdiction to

terminate or modify an injunction.” Id.

Injunctions are one of the law's most powerful weapons. Ongoing

injunctions should be dissolved when they no longer meet the

requirements of equity. The law changes and clarifies itself over

time. Neither the doctrines of res judicata or waiver nor a proper

respect for previously entered judgments requires that old injunctions

remain in effect when the old law on which they were based has

changed.

Id. (quoting Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166–67 (6th Cir.1994)). See generally

Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 388 (1992) (recognizing the

necessity to modify or dissolve injunctions if “the statutory or decisional law has changed

to make legal what the decree was designed to prevent”).

Defendant Yost’s emergency motion (Doc. 83) is GRANTED in PART, such that

the Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 49) entered on April 18, 2019 is hereby DISSOLVED.

However, the Court declines to dismiss this case at this juncture. Rather, a status

conference will be set by separate notice to discuss further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Michael R. Barrett

Michael R. Barrett, Judge

United States District Court

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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