Terry v. Garnett

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

CAMILIA T. TERRY,

Plaintiff, Case No. 3:21-cv-174

vs.

CHRISTOPHER GARNETT, et al., District Judge Michael J. Newman

Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr

Defendant.

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER: (1) DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT (Doc. No. 3) WITH PREJUDICE

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b); AND (2) TERMINATING THE CASE

ON THE DOCKET

______________________________________________________________________________

This civil case is before the Court for a sua sponte review—pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)—of the complaint filed by pro se Plaintiff Camilia T. Terry, an inmate at

the Dayton Correctional Institution. This sua sponte review is warranted because the Court

previously granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. No. 3. Sua

sponte review occurs before issuance of process “so as to spare prospective defendants the

inconvenience and expense of answering such [frivolous, malicious, or repetitive] lawsuits.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989) (“a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing

frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits”).

Plaintiff was convicted in state court of aggravated murder (and other crimes) and

sentenced to 31 years to life imprisonment. Terry v. Jackson, No. 16-4330, 2017 WL 5664915, at

*1 (6th Cir. July 17, 2017).1 In the instant case, Plaintiff’s lengthy pro se complaint—

1 The Court takes judicial notice of these historical facts because Plaintiff’s state criminal convictions are

matters of public court records. Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d 327, 333 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999) (“it is well-settled

approximately 80 single-spaced pages containing about 923 paragraphs2—names approximately

30 Defendants who allegedly violated her constitutional rights in connection with her state criminal

convictions.3 Doc. No. 1 at PageID 17-25. Her claims arise under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986,

and state law. Id. at 17-18, 136-66. She seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages,

“and the reversal of her conviction and injunctive relief ….” Id. at 17, 166.

I.

In conducting a sua sponte review under § 1915(e)(2), a complaint should be dismissed as

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992);

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. A complaint sets forth no arguable factual basis where the allegations

are “fantastic or delusional.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28. A complaint presents no arguable legal

basis by advancing “indisputably meritless” legal theories, i.e., when the defendant is immune

from suit or when the plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest that clearly does not exist. Id.;

see Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 (6th Cir. 2000).

Courts may also dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint “must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). A claim is plausible where “plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. A plausible complaint raises “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

that ‘[f]ederal courts may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts of record’….” (citation

omitted)).

2 Plaintiff acknowledges a slight paragraph numbering error. Doc. No. 1, PageID 77.

3 Plaintiff initially lists approximately 30 Defendants in her complaint. Doc. No. 1, PageID 17-24. At the

complaint’s conclusion, she seeks relief against these 30 Defendants and others, totaling “42 & more

[Defendants].” Id. at 165.

In conducting an initial review under § 1915, the Court accepts a pro se plaintiff’s

allegations as true and construes them liberally in his or her favor. Donald v. Marshall, No. 84-

3231, 1985 WL 13183, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 5, 1985). However, while pro se pleadings are

“liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), pro se plaintiffs must still

satisfy basic pleading requirements. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

II.

Plaintiff’s introduction to the claims in her complaint explains (without correct):

Plaintiff … alle[]ges that trial counsel; and appellate counsel who acted

under the color of state law conspired with one another and various state & federal

officials to maliciously prosecute, unlawfully detain/convict; wrongfully imprison;

secure conviction; deny constitutional legal redress; opportunity for presentation of

constitutional claims; equal access to the courts; due process; and under abuse of

process in violation of the 1st; 4th; 5th; 6th; 14th; 8th; & 13th Amendment rights

under the United States Constitution. State officials; state police & federal police

agents who acted under color of state law conspired with one another; with trial

counsel; and various state officials to falsely arrest; maliciously prosecute, deny

Miranda rights & rights to counsel; coverup violations; wrongfully imprison &

convict; deny equal access to the courts; judicial process relief; legal redress, secure

conviction & imprisonment, and under abuse of process in violation of the 1st; 4th;

5th; 6th; 14th; 8th; & 13th Amendment right under the United States Constitution.

Doc. No. 1 at PageID 17-18.

To understand Plaintiff’s allegations and claims, her state criminal convictions need further

description.

Following a jury trial, [Plaintiff] Terry was convicted of aggravated murder,

murder, felonious assault, endangering children, tampering with evidence, making

false alarms, and gross abuse of a corpse. Her case concerned the death of her son

Emiliano. After merging most of the counts, the trial court sentenced Terry to a

term of imprisonment of thirty years to life for the aggravated murder charge, to

run concurrently with a three-year term of imprisonment for the tampering with

evidence charge. She also received a one-year term of imprisonment for the abuse

of a corpse charge, to run consecutively to her term for aggravated murder, resulting

in a total sentence of thirty-one years to life. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed

on direct appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court denied Terrys delayed application for

leave to appeal.

Terry, 2017 WL 5664915, at *1. After exhausting her state court remedies, Plaintiff sought relief

in federal court by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Her petition

was denied, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial, and the U.S.

Supreme Court denied her petition for a writ of certiorari. Terry v. Warden, No. 1:15 CV 2008,

2016 WL 5477552, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2016), report & recommendation adopted sub nom.

Terry v. Jackson, No. 1:15-cv-2008, 2016 WL 5462968, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2016),

affirmed, 2017 WL 5664915, cert. denied, __U.S.__, 138 S.Ct. 561 (2017).

Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true and liberally construing her pro se complaint in

her favor, her constitutional claims encounter an insurmountable problem under Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994):

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would

render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,

or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]

Id. at 486-87. Where “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity

of his [or her] conviction or sentence ... the complaint must be dismissed.” Id. at 487. Thus, a

claim for damages challenging the validity of an existing conviction “is not cognizable under §

1983.” Id.

Returning to Plaintiff’s complaint, a favorable decision on any of her § 1983 claims would

call into question the validity of her state criminal convictions. Because her convictions have not

been overturned or otherwise invalidated, Heck bars her § 1983 claims. See id.; see, e.g., Hayward

v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 759 F.3d 601, 614 (6th Cir. 2014) (“If Plaintiff were to succeed on an

illegal home entry claim, it would render his arrest unlawful and imply the invalidity of his

underlying guilty plea for resisting arrest. Therefore, the district court properly denied this claim

as barred under Heck”); Parker v. Phillips, 27 F. App’x 491, 493 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that,

where a “prosecution ends in a conviction, [a plaintiff asserting false imprisonment and malicious

prosecution claims] must have the conviction overturned on direct appeal or via collateral attack

before any claims can accrue”) (citations omitted); Holland v. Cty. of Macomb, No. 16-2103, 2017

WL 3391653, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 2017).

III.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e),

1915A(b). For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby CERTIFIES, under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(3), that an appeal of this Order would not be taken in good faith. Consequently, Plaintiff

should be denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

April 26, 2022 s/Michael J. Newman

Hon. Michael J. Newman

United States District Judge