Opinion

Justice v. State of Ohio

Court
District Court, S.D. Ohio
Filed
Apr 13, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.3%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

LOTUS JUSTICE,

:

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:21-cv-5903

v. Judge Sarah D. Morrison

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M.

Vascura

STATE OF OHIO, et al.,

:

Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 11) to the

Magistrate Judge’s February 8, 2022 Order (ECF No. 8), and Plaintiff’s Objection

(ECF No. 23) to the Magistrate Judge’s March 17, 2022 Report and

Recommendation (R&R, ECF No. 17).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. She filed her Complaint alleging, inter alia,

that her constitutional rights were violated in the course of her arrest, prosecution,

and incarceration. (ECF No. 1.) She also filed motions to proceed in forma pauperis.

(ECF Nos. 1, 6.) Plaintiff was granted in forma pauperis status and was ordered to

pay the filing fee in full at a later period. (ECF No. 8, PageID 47–48.)

The Magistrate Judge screened Plaintiff’s Complaint and found that Plaintiff

misjoined several unrelated claims in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

20. As the Magistrate Judge explained:

This case presents a classic example of misjoinder given that Plaintiff

advances unrelated claims against a variety of Defendants based upon

unrelated events that occurred at different times. That is, Plaintiff’s

claims do not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of

transactions or occurrences. For example, Plaintiff’s appeal of the

probate order is unrelated to her appeal of the eviction notice, her

claims of excessive force related to her arrest, the appeal of her

criminal conviction, her claims arising out of her assault by other

inmates, her claims arising out of her placement in solitary

confinement, and her claims alleging a denial of access to the courts.

(ECF No. 8, PageID 50–51.) Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge ordered Plaintiff to

file an amended complaint that complied with Rule 20 so that Plaintiff could

determine which claims she wanted to pursue in this action and which claims she

would pursue in separate actions. Plaintiff was warned that her failure to comply

with the order would result in the severance of all claims not related to her

purported appeal of a state-court probate order. (Id., PageID 51.) Plaintiff objected

to this order on various grounds (ECF No. 11), but she also filed an amended

complaint, effectively mooting at least part of her objection. (ECF No. 10.)

The Magistrate Judge then screened Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and

found that it suffered from the same defects as the original Complaint. (ECF

No. 17.) Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge severed and dismissed without prejudice

the claims unrelated to Plaintiff’s appeal of a state-court probate order and issued a

R&R recommending dismissal of that appeal. (Id., PageID 109.) Plaintiff objected to

the R&R. (ECF No. 23.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and recommendation,

the Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made

by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the

Complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). “The dismissal standard

articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and in

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs dismissals for failure

state a claim under [28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)] because the relevant statutory

language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Jones v. Domberski, 2020 WL

5902516, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 2020) (citing Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71

(6th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotations omitted).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim

with sufficient specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). A complaint that falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if it

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent

with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must

include more than labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a

cause of action. Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555). And although pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “basic pleading essentials” are still required. Wells

v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s February 8, 2022

Order.

The February 8, 2022 Order granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status and

required her to pay the filing fee at a later time. It also required Plaintiff to file an

amended complaint that complied with Rule 20. Plaintiff’s Objection to this Order

raises two issues.

First, Plaintiff asserts that she should not have to pay the filing fee. (ECF

No. 11, PageID 65). The controlling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, provides otherwise.

Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status allows her to proceed without prepaying the

filing fee, but she is nonetheless required to pay the fee in full over a period of time

after filing. See § 1915(a)–(b).

Second, Plaintiff disputes the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the claims

brought in her original Complaint were unrelated; therefore, she argues, the claims

should not be severed. (ECF No. 11, PageID 66–68.) However, by filing an amended

complaint in response to the Magistrate Judge’s Order, Plaintiff rendered moot this

argument.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s February 8, 2022

Order are OVERRULED.

B. Plaintiff’s Objection to the R&R.

The Magistrate Judge found that the Amended Complaint suffered from the

same defects as the original Complaint, so she severed and dismissed without

prejudice all claims not related to Plaintiff’s purported appeal of a state-court

probate order. (R&R, PageID 105–06.) The Magistrate Judge then screened

Plaintiff’s remaining claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and recommended dismissal of

Plaintiff’s appeal of a state-court probate order.

Plaintiff raises two issues in her Objection. First, Plaintiff argues that she

should be permitted to either re-amend her Complaint or refile the action to “perfect

the claim.” (ECF No. 23, PageID 141.) Because all but one of her claims were

severed, and because Plaintiff failed to state a claim as to her only remaining claim,

the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend her Complaint a second time.

Plaintiff is not prohibited from filing a new action bringing appropriate claims – her

remaining, unrelated claims were severed without prejudice “to re-filing in separate

actions.” (R&R, PageID 109.) Plaintiff is ORDERED to list 2:21-cv-5903 as a

related case if she elects to file additional actions.

Second, Plaintiff argues that the state probate court had no jurisdiction to

issue a probate order in her case. (ECF No. 23, PageID 142–43.) However, the

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine prohibits a federal district court’s review of a state court

decision. In re Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation to dismiss this claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) was correctly

addressed. Relief cannot be granted on Plaintiff’s purported appeal of a state-court

probate order.

Plaintiff’s Objections to the R&R are OVERRULED.

IV. CONCLUSION

Both of Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF Nos. 11, 23) are OVERRULED, and her

claim appealing a state-court probate order is dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e). The

Court ADOPTS the R&R (ECF No. 17) in full.

Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED. The Clerk shall enter judgment

accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Sarah D. Morrison

SARAH D. MORRISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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